| British Columbia Utilities Commission
An Inquiry into the Regulation of Safety
Stage 1 |
| Decision and Order G-381-22 |
| December 22, 2022 |
|
|
| Before: D. M. Morton, Panel Chair C. M. Brewer, Commissioner R. I. Mason, Commissioner |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page no.
3.1 Public Utility Safety Regulation in BC
3.3 Guiding Principles for the BCUC’s Regulation of the Safety of Public Utilities
3.3.3 Safety Considerations when Adjudicating
4.0 Participant Assistance / Cost Award (PACA) Provisions
BCUC ORDER G-381-22
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A Final Stage 1 Report
APPENDIX B Final Stage 1 Report - Blackline
APPENDIX C List of Acronyms
APPENDIX D Exhibit List
In September 2020, the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC) established an inquiry to examine the role of the BCUC in the regulation of safety (Inquiry). Stage 1 of the Inquiry focuses on:
1. The nature and extent of the BCUC’s jurisdiction to regulate the safety of public utilities under the Utilities Commission Act (UCA);
2. The conditions, if any, under which the BCUC can forbear from regulating the safety of public utilities within its jurisdiction, as allowable under the UCA; and
3. Setting out a framework of key principles to guide the BCUC in carrying out its safety-related duties.
In Stage 2, the BCUC will explore the application of these principles to its regulation of public utilities.
On August 12, 2022, the BCUC issued a draft report with its preliminary findings in Stage 1 of the Inquiry (Draft Report). Parties were provided an opportunity to comment on the Draft Report.[1] In this decision, the Panel considers the comments received and issues the final Stage 1 report.
In the final Stage 1 report, the Panel considers that sections 23, 25, and 38 of the UCA together set out the basis of the regulatory scheme for the BCUC’s oversight of the safety of public utilities. These sections of the UCA provide that:
• The BCUC is responsible for general supervision of all public utilities;
• Public utilities are required to provide and maintain their property and equipment in a manner that the BCUC considers “is in all respects… safe”; and
• If, after a hearing, the BCUC determines that the service of a public utility is unsafe, it must make a determination of what constitutes safe service and order the utility to provide it.
There is nothing in the UCA that prescribes or expressly constrains the scope of the BCUC’s safety jurisdiction with respect to public utilities. Therefore, in light of the provisions in sections 23, 25, and 38 of the UCA, the Panel finds that the BCUC has jurisdiction over all aspects of public utility safety.
Further, the Panel recognizes that the safe operation of British Columbia’s public utilities is a shared responsibility amongst multiple provincial and federal regulatory bodies. As the UCA is not prescriptive about whether the BCUC must explicitly set out what it considers is necessary for a service to be safe, nor how safety compliance is achieved, the Panel finds that what the BCUC considers to be safe service should be informed by the statutory regime of and standards set by other regulators.
Respecting forbearance, the Panel finds that the BCUC does not have the power to forbear its jurisdiction over public utility safety. The UCA contains no express provision for the BCUC to forbear from exercising its powers and the BCUC may only exempt utilities from aspects of regulation with the advance approval of the minister responsible for the administration of the Hydro and Power Authority Act, pursuant to section 88 of the UCA.
Finally, the Panel sets out the following key principles to guide the BCUC in carrying out its safety oversight role:
• Regulatory Overlaps – the BCUC should (i) refrain from actively regulating public utility safety in areas where it is satisfied that another regulatory body is providing adequate safety oversight; and (ii) avoid duplication by collaborating with other regulators to leverage information, knowledge, and expertise when carrying out its safety-related mandate.
• Operational Gaps – the BCUC should ensure that any operational gaps that emerge in the regulation of public utility safety are filled.
• Exemptions from the UCA – the BCUC should not recommend an exemption for a public utility from its safety oversight without explicitly considering whether an exemption from safety regulation is in the public interest.
• Keeping Informed – the BCUC should take active steps to keep itself informed regarding the safety of public utilities.
• Safety Considerations when Adjudicating – the BCUC should continue to consider relevant aspects of public utility safety in all its adjudications, including when determining whether an application is in the public interest and whether rates are just and reasonable. The Panel recommends that the BCUC review its filing guidelines to ensure they contain specific guidance regarding information relevant to safety that may need to be filed.
1.0 Introduction
The British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC) is an independent regulatory agency of the British Columbia (BC) government, operating under and administering the Utilities Commission Act (UCA). The BCUC is responsible for ensuring safe and reliable energy supply at fair rates for energy users across the province. The BCUC balances this responsibility with the need to ensure public utilities[2] under its jurisdiction are afforded a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on their investments.
The BCUC determined that greater clarity around the nature and extent of the BCUC’s jurisdiction over public utility safety was required and established an inquiry to examine the role of the BCUC in the regulation of safety (Inquiry).
Stage 1 of the Inquiry focuses on:
1. The nature and extent of the BCUC’s jurisdiction to regulate the safety of public utilities under the UCA;
2. The conditions, if any, under which the BCUC can forbear from regulating the safety of public utilities within its jurisdiction, as allowable under the UCA; and
3. Setting out a framework of key principles to guide the BCUC in carrying out its safety-related duties.
2.0 Regulatory Process
By Order G-241-20, dated September 23, 2020, the BCUC established an initial regulatory timetable for the Inquiry. The regulatory timetable was subsequently furthered and amended by Orders G-342-20, G-34-21, G‑209-21, G-296-21, and G-356-21, respectively.
The following parties registered as interveners in the Inquiry:
| • Don Flintoff (Flintoff) • Borealis Geopower Inc. (Borealis) • Chargepoint BC • FortisBC Energy Inc. and FortisBC Inc. (Collectively, FortisBC) • Movement of United Professionals (MoveUP) • TE Burns Engineering Ltd. • Commercial Energy Consumers Association of British Columbia (CEC) • Corix Multi-Utility Services Inc. • Pacific Northern Gas Ltd. (PNG) |
• Kyuquot Power Ltd. • British Columbia Old Age Pensioners’ Organization et al. (BCOAPO) • Technical Safety BC (TSBC) • British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro) • Surplus Energy Match • IRSRGC[3] • River District Energy • Residential Consumer Intervener Group (RCIA) |
By November 12, 2020, the BCUC received written submissions from interveners and interested parties regarding the BCUC’s jurisdiction with respect to the regulation of safety, legislative gaps or overlaps, and whether a workshop in support of the Inquiry would be beneficial.
By Order G-342-20, dated December 18, 2020, the BCUC proposed a two-staged approach to the Inquiry, with Stage 1 focusing on:
1. The nature and extent of the BCUC’s jurisdiction to regulate the safety of public utilities under the UCA;
2. The conditions, if any, under which the BCUC can forbear from regulating the safety of public utilities within its jurisdiction, as allowable under the UCA; and
3. Setting out a framework of key principles to guide the BCUC in carrying out its safety-related duties.
Following Stage 1, the BCUC would initiate the second stage of the Inquiry (Stage 2) to explore the application of the key principles to its regulation of public utilities and to establish how the BCUC will implement its mandate with regards to safety.
On January 27, 2021, the BCUC held a procedural conference in which interveners were invited to comment on the BCUC’s proposed approach to the Inquiry. Interveners were generally supportive and suggested that there would be value in the BCUC issuing a set of “sub issues” to help guide intervener submissions in Stage 1.
By Order G-34-21, dated January 29, 2021, the BCUC confirmed that the Inquiry would be undertaken in two stages and established a further regulatory timetable. The regulatory timetable included, among other things, the issuance of proposed Stage 1 sub issues, an opportunity for intervener submissions and reply submissions, and the issuance of final Stage 1 sub issues by July 8, 2021.
Following issuance of the final Stage 1 sub issues, interveners were provided an opportunity to file evidence addressing Stage 1 of the Inquiry. Information requests on intervener evidence followed.
Interveners filed final and reply arguments addressing Stage 1 of the Inquiry by January 12, 2022 and January 26, 2022, respectively.
On August 12, 2022, the BCUC issued a draft report with its preliminary findings in Stage 1 of the Inquiry (Draft Report). By Order G-221-22, the BCUC sought written submissions on the Draft Report.
Flintoff, Borealis, FortisBC, the CEC, BCOAPO, BC Hydro and RCIA filed submissions by October 3, 2022. FortisBC and the CEC filed reply submissions on October 18, 2022.
3.0 Final Stage 1 Report
Having considered intervener submissions on the Draft Report, the Panel will now finalize the Safety Inquiry Stage 1 Report. With the exception of the areas noted below, parties were supportive of, or provided no comments on, the language proposed in the Draft Report and we adopt the proposed language as final.
A copy of the final Stage 1 report is attached as Appendix A to this decision. A blacklined copy showing the changes from the Draft Report is attached as Appendix B.[4]
3.1 Public Utility Safety Regulation in BC
Section 3.0 of the Draft Report provided an overview of public utility safety regulation in the province. Flintoff indicates support for the discussion in Section 3.0, with the exception of references made to the governance of professional engineers by Engineers and Geoscientists B.C. (EGBC), pursuant to the Professional Governance Act (PGA). Flintoff submits that while section 57 (standards of conduct and competence) and section 58 (duty to report) of the PGA address safety “most events that may pose a risk of significant harm to the environment or the health or safety of the public or a group of people occur after the events have occurred.” As such, Flintoff argues that EGBC’s safety regulation is more likely to be reactive rather than proactive.[5]
FortisBC and the CEC disagree with Flintoff’s characterization of EGBC’s regulation of professional engineers.[6] FortisBC submits that a fundamental principle of the PGA is to ensure that only qualified individuals perform engineering work, and that this is a measure that proactively ensures public safety. FortisBC states that:
the Draft Report should not be revised to remove the statement in section 3 that reads: “Another way in which the safety of public utilities in BC is managed is through employment or retention of professional engineers, which are governed by Engineers and Geoscientists B.C., pursuant to the Professional Governance Act (PGA)” as that statement is accurate.[7]
BC Hydro notes that Section 3.0 of the Draft Report recognizes that WorkSafeBC and the Comptroller of Water Rights both have exclusive jurisdiction over certain public utility safety matters. BC Hydro submits that the draft would be improved if specific language to this effect, such as “The Comptroller of Water Rights also has exclusive jurisdiction over aspects of public utility safety”, was added to the description of the role of the comptroller.[8] The CEC supports this clarification.[9]
Panel Determination
The Panel is not persuaded by Flintoff’s submission that changes to the description of EGBC’s role in public utility safety are necessary. As noted by FortisBC, the description of EGBC’s governance of professional engineers in the Draft Report is accurate and nothing on the record suggests that EGBC’s safety regulation is “reactive” rather than proactive in nature. Accordingly, the Panel finds that revisions to the Draft Report in this respect are not warranted.
The Panel is, however, persuaded by BC Hydro’s submission that the clarity of the Draft Report language would be improved through the inclusion of specific wording respecting the exclusive jurisdiction of the Comptroller of Water Rights.
Therefore, the Panel adopts Section 3.0 of the Draft Report as final, subject to the following modification:
The Comptroller of Water Rights also has exclusive jurisdiction over aspects of public utility safety. Dam safety in BC is regulated under the Water Sustainability Act, through the Dam Safety Regulation, which is overseen by the Comptroller of Water Rights. The comptroller oversees the Provincial Dam Safety Program, which, under the Dam Safety Regulation, sets requirements for design, construction, operation, maintenance, surveillance, and removal and decommissioning of dams in BC.[10] Section 120 of the Water Sustainability Act sets out restrictions respecting decisions made under the Act and provides, among other things, that a hearing, investigation or proceeding of the comptroller, a water manager, an engineer, an officer or a water bailiff may not be questioned, reviewed or restrained by any process or proceeding in any court.
(addition underlined)
3.2 Forbearance
Section 5.0 of the Draft Report addresses the BCUC’s ability to forbear on its safety jurisdiction. Flintoff, BCOAPO, and the CEC support the Panel’s findings in the Draft Report that the BCUC does not have the power to forbear its jurisdiction over public utility safety.[11]
FortisBC does not suggest any revisions to this section of the Draft Report, however, provides clarification with respect to its position on forbearance. FortisBC identifies that the Draft Report states that the BCUC should “refrain from actively regulating public utility safety in areas where it is satisfied that another regulatory body is providing adequate safety oversight.” In FortisBC’s view, to “refrain from actively regulating” is akin to its statement regarding forbearance, which was that the UCA permits the BCUC to forbear from exercising its regulatory jurisdiction where it is satisfied that a sufficient alternative exists.[12]
No other interveners provided comments on this section of the Draft Report.
Panel Determination
The Panel notes intervener support for the proposed findings respecting the BCUC’s ability to forbear its safety jurisdiction. The Panel considers that no changes to the language in the Draft Report are necessary in response to Fortis’ clarification of its position and adopts the language in Section 5.0 of the Draft Report as final.
3.3 Guiding Principles for the BCUC’s Regulation of the Safety of Public Utilities
In the Draft Report, the Panel proposed the following key principles to guide the BCUC’s regulation of public utility safety:
• Regulatory Overlaps – the BCUC should (i) refrain from actively regulating public utility safety in areas where it is satisfied that another regulatory body is providing adequate safety oversight; and (ii) avoid duplication by collaborating with other regulators to leverage information, knowledge, and expertise when carrying out its safety-related mandate.
• Operational Gaps – the BCUC should ensure that any operational gaps that emerge in the regulation of public utility safety are filled.
• Exemptions from the UCA – the BCUC should not recommend exemptions from its safety oversight to government without explicitly considering whether an exemption from safety regulation is in the public interest.
• Keeping Informed – the BCUC should take active steps to keep itself informed regarding the safety of public utilities.
• Safety Considerations when Adjudicating Applications – the BCUC should continue to consider relevant aspects of public utility safety in all its adjudications, including when determining whether an application is in the public interest and whether rates are just and reasonable. The Panel recommends that the BCUC review its filing guidelines to ensure they contain specific guidance regarding information, relevant to safety, that may need to be filed.
No party suggested changes be made to the proposed principles respecting exemptions from the UCA or keeping informed. Upon review, the Panel considers that modification of the language used in the proposed exemptions principle is warranted to clarify that it applies generally to all public utility exemptions made on the recommendation of the BCUC. The revised principle is as follows:
the BCUC should not recommend an exemption for a public utility from its safety oversight without explicitly considering whether an exemption from safety regulation is in the public interest.
With this change, the Panel adopts these proposed principles as final. The Panel addresses party submissions on each of the remaining principles, in turn, below.
3.3.1 Regulatory Overlaps
Positions of the Parties
Flintoff recommends replacing the phrase “refrain from actively regulating” in the proposed regulatory overlaps principle with “passively regulate”. In Flintoff’s view, the wording “refrain from actively regulating” is too strong and may be interpreted as not being involved or maintaining awareness. Flintoff also suggests replacing “should” with “could” since this is an action to be determined by the BCUC.[13]
In response to Flintoff, the CEC states that it is satisfied with Flintoff’s suggestion to replace “refrain from actively regulating” with “passively regulate”, since it implies ongoing regulation at a passive level, rather than the absence of regulation altogether. However, the CEC does not support the change from the word “should” to “could”.[14]
Further, the CEC agrees that it is appropriate for the BCUC to rely on the expertise of other regulatory bodies, and to reasonably defer to other regulators with greater specific expertise and jurisdiction. The CEC considers the phrase “where it is satisfied that another regulatory body is providing adequate safety oversight” to be a vitally important caveat that supports the BCUC in fulfilling its safety-related mandate. The CEC also supports BCUC collaborating with other regulators to leverage information, knowledge and expertise to ensure a qualified and consistent approach to safety management.[15]
BCOAPO also agrees with BCUC’s position with respect to refraining from actively regulating public utility safety in areas where it is satisfied that another regulatory body is providing adequate safety oversight. However, BCOAPO submits that there should be more clarity on what is “adequate safety oversight”, and whether the BCUC will consider it in the next phase of the Inquiry or if it will be decided on an ad hoc basis. BCOAPO recommends that the BCUC establish formal protocols with other regulators.[16]
Borealis considers that, since safety comes at a cost, the BCUC should focus most of its attention on determining what level of safety is in the public interest, rather than setting the technical standards as they relate to various safety protocols or on specific safety concerns that are under the jurisdiction of another regulatory body.[17]
FortisBC states that its position regarding existing oversight and reporting of public utilities was not accurately summarized in this portion of the Draft Report. FortisBC submits that it is not in a position to comment whether additional reporting requirements may be necessary for other public utilities in order to keep the BCUC informed of safety-related matters, and rather its submissions on this matter were with respect to FortisBC only.[18]
Finally, BC Hydro highlights the following statements from the Draft Report:[19]
• There is nothing in the UCA that prescribes or expressly constrains the scope of the BCUC’s safety jurisdiction with respect to public utilities;
• The BCUC acknowledges the jurisdiction and experience of other safety regulators in BC and finds that what the BCUC considers to be safe service should be informed by the statutory regime of and standards set by other regulators;
• How the BCUC ensures ongoing compliance with safety standards and requirements, particularly those imposed by other agencies, may vary with specific circumstances;
• The UCA contains no express provision for the BCUC to forbear from exercising its powers and is also silent on how or whether the BCUC should ensure and monitor compliance with any specific safety standard that might apply to a public utility;
• The BCUC should refrain from actively regulating public utility safety in areas where it is satisfied that another regulatory body is providing adequate safety oversight and avoid duplication by collaborating with other regulators to leverage information, knowledge, and expertise when carrying out its safety-related mandate;
• While the BCUC has general oversight responsibility for the safety of public utilities, where the BCUC considers that the oversight of other regulators is sufficient to ensure that public utility service is safe with respect to that oversight, it should avoid taking on the operational role of another regulator to avoid unnecessary duplication; and
• Where the BCUC refrains from actively regulating public utility safety in areas where it is satisfied that another regulatory body is providing adequate safety oversight, formal protocols with other regulators should be put in place (e.g., how complaints should be handled and sharing of information). [citations omitted]
BC Hydro submits that, taken together, these statements imply that in areas where another regulator has exclusive jurisdiction over certain public utility safety matters the BCUC would not perform a safety compliance function. In BC Hydro’s view, the final Stage 1 report would benefit from a clear statement to this effect.[20]
The CEC submits that the language in the Draft Report is “sufficiently indicative of the Commission’s desire to avoid actively regulating where other bodies are sufficiently serving the function” and, as such, does not support BC Hydro’s proposed addition that, in areas where another regulator has exclusive jurisdiction over certain public utility safety matters, the BCUC would not perform a safety compliance function.[21]
Panel Determination
For the reason set out below, the Panel is not persuaded that the language in the proposed regulatory overlaps principle should be revised in the manner Flintoff suggests. Replacing the word “should” with the term “could”, does not clearly express the BCUC’s intent in instances of regulatory overlap. Further, the term “passively regulate” may be construed as ambiguous by readers, as this is not a defined term. However, as a similar concern exists for the proposed language in the Draft Report that the BCUC should “refrain from actively regulating…”, the Panel considers that revisions are necessary in the final report to clarify that it is the BCUC’s intention to calibrate the degree and nature of its safety regulation when there is overlapping safety jurisdiction.
With respect to the phrase “adequate safety oversight” the Panel agrees that further definition may also be beneficial. However, examination of how the BCUC will determine what constitutes adequate safety oversight is best suited to Stage 2 of the Inquiry, where application of the guiding principles will be explored.
The Panel notes FortisBC’s statement on the accuracy of how its position was summarized in the Draft Report and will include a footnote in the final Stage 1 report clarifying the applicability of FortisBC’s submissions; however, no changes to the Panel discussion in Section 6.1 of the Draft Report are required as a consequence of this clarification.
Finally, the Panel does not share BC Hydro’s view that, taken together, statements in the Draft Report imply that the BCUC is precluded from performing a “safety compliance function” in “areas where another regulator has exclusive jurisdiction over certain public utility safety matters”. As discussed in the Draft Report, the BCUC has general supervision of public utilities and jurisdiction over all aspects of public utility safety. There may be circumstances where this accountability requires the BCUC to undertake a safety compliance or other role in areas of a public utility’s operations where another regulator has exclusive jurisdiction over specific aspects of safety.
As noted in Section 6.1 of the Draft Report, Phase 2 of the Inquiry will further examine how the BCUC will regulate public utility safety in instances of regulatory overlap with WorkSafeBC and the Comptroller of Water Rights. Nevertheless, the Panel considers that the clarity of the language in the Draft Report would be improved by expressly noting the potential for the BCUC to assume a role in instances of regulatory overlap.
Accordingly, we adopt the Panel discussion in Section 6.1 of the Draft Report as final subject to the following modifications:
Two distinct cases of regulatory overlap to consider are:
1. There have been two examples cited where other regulators have exclusive statutory jurisdiction over certain public utility safety matters: WorkSafeBC and the Comptroller of Water Rights. In the next phase we will further consider these areas of overlap.
2. When other regulators have non-exclusive but over-lapping jurisdiction over aspects of public utility safety, the BCUC should ensure that its safety oversight is harmonious with the jurisdiction of other regulators. We will further consider this in the next phase of the Inquiry.
In both of the above cases of overlap, the BCUC’s general supervisory responsibility over the safety of public utilities is not negated. At times, it may be necessary for the BCUC to assume a role in areas where another regulator has overlapping exclusive, or non-exclusive, jurisdiction over specific aspects of public utility safety. How the BCUC will address such instances will be explored in Stage 2 of the Inquiry.
…
In finding the right balance of regulatory efficiency in its regulation of safety, the BCUC should:
(i) refrain from actively regulating public utility safety in areas where it is satisfied that another regulatory body is providing adequate safety oversight; and
(ii) avoid duplication by collaborating with other regulators to leverage information, knowledge, and expertise when carrying out its safety-related mandate.
For clarity, in establishing the above principle, the Panel intends that the BCUC would calibrate the degree and nature of its safety regulation based on the level of risk and the actions of other regulators with overlapping jurisdiction. What constitutes adequate safety oversight and how the BCUC will calibrate its safety regulation will be examined in Stage 2 of the Inquiry.
(addition underlined)
3.3.2 Operational Gaps
Positions of the Parties
The CEC, BCOAPO, and RCIA generally agree that the BCUC should ensure that any operational gaps that emerge in the regulation of public utility safety are filled.[22]
RCIA submits that the BCUC should allow sufficient latitude so that utilities can establish standard practices and operational regimes before triggering a materiality threshold, notably as new technologies are deployed at a large scale. RCIA suggests that “any operational gaps” be modified to include a materiality threshold.[23]
In response to RCIA, the CEC states that it does not find the use of the word “material” to be necessary in confining BCUC regulation and submits it could be difficult to determine what may or may not be material where there are changing circumstances.[24]
BC Hydro submits that the final Stage 1 report would benefit from a clear statement that the BCUC may perform a safety compliance function to fill an operational gap and a description of the circumstances under which the BCUC may perform such a function.[25]
The CEC is amenable to including a statement that the BCUC may perform a safety compliance function to fill an operational gap. However, the CEC submits that a discussion regarding the relevant circumstances would be appropriately reviewed in Stage 2 of the Inquiry.[26]
Panel Determination
The Panel recognizes RCIA’s submission. However, we do not consider the addition of the word “material” to the proposed operational gaps principle to be warranted. As noted by the CEC, with the proposed language the BCUC retains the ability to determine the appropriate means of filling any operational gaps that may emerge in the regulation of public utility safety. Including an explicit materiality threshold within the guiding principle could result in a loss of needed flexibility and inappropriately bind the decision-making abilities of future BCUC panels.
Further, the Panel agrees with BC Hydro that the language in the Draft Report would be improved through the addition of a statement that the BCUC may perform a safety compliance function to fill an operational gap. Accordingly, we adopt the Panel discussion in Section 6.2 of the Draft Report as final, subject to the following modification:
The BCUC should ensure that any operational gaps that emerge in the regulation of public utility safety are filled. The BCUC has a responsibility to ensure the safety of public utilities where it deems operational gaps in public utility safety regulation have emerged. This may necessitate performance of a safety compliance function or other role by the BCUC.
(addition underlined)
3.3.3 Safety Considerations when Adjudicating
Positions of the Parties
Flintoff submits that the reasonableness and appropriateness of a public utility’s safety-related expenditures are appropriate criteria in the BCUC’s determination of whether a public utility’s rates are just and reasonable. Further, Flintoff supports the Panel’s recommendation that the BCUC review its filing guidelines to ensure they contain specific guidance regarding information, relevant to safety, that may need to be filed.[27]
As a preface to comments on this principle, Flintoff refers to, among other things, WorkSafeBC premiums; a report respecting Site C; and BC Hydro’s serious injury rate. FortisBC submits that in this, and other parts of his submission,[28] Flintoff appears to rely on evidence that is not part of the evidentiary record of this proceeding. FortisBC submits that “the BCUC should not revise the Draft Stage 1 report to incorporate evidence that was not on the record and for which no opportunity has been accorded to provide information requests.”[29]
Regarding the principle itself, FortisBC states that it “does not disagree with the Draft Report’s recommendation that ‘the BCUC review its filing guidelines to ensure they contain specific guidance regarding information,
relevant to safety, that may need to be filed’”.[30]
The CEC agrees with the Panel’s position that BCUC should continue to consider relevant aspects of public utility safety in all its adjudications, including when determining whether an application is in the public interest and
whether rates are just and reasonable.[31]
The CEC and BCOAPO also indicate their support for the Panel’s recommendation to review the filing guidelines to ensure comprehensive safety management. The CEC indicates its willingness to participate in such a review, while BCOAPO recommends that the Draft Report be revised to provide more details on a timeline and process for this work.[32]
Panel Determination
The Panel recognizes FortisBC’s submission that the Draft Report should not be revised to incorporate evidence that was not part of the evidentiary record of the Inquiry. The Panel’s determinations on Stage 1 of the Inquiry do not consider any new evidence introduced through intervener comments on the Draft Report.
The Panel also recognizes BCOAPO’s recommendation that the Draft Report include further details on the timeline and process for a BCUC review of the filing guidelines. However, as such a review is the responsibility of the BCUC, rather than this Panel, we do not consider the proposed revision to the Panel discussion in Section 6.5 of the Draft Report to be appropriate.
As the BCUC’s adjudications are not limited solely to applications, the Panel considers that the language in the Draft Report would be improved by revising the title of this principle from “Safety Considerations when Adjudicating Applications” to simply “Safety Considerations when Adjudicating”.
Given the broad intervener support for the proposed principle respecting safety considerations in BCUC adjudications and finding no contrary positions, we adopt Section 6.5 of the Draft Report as final, subject to the above revision.
3.4 Stage 2 of the Inquiry
Several parties indicate their support for, and willingness to participate in, Stage 2 of the Inquiry.[33]
With regards to the scope of Stage 2, BCOAPO seeks “a more comprehensive list of issues and questions once Stage 2 is initiated.” BC Hydro requests that the BCUC clarify any outstanding issues it seeks to address with respect to the BCUC’s role in “safety compliance” in areas where another regulator has exclusive jurisdiction if the BCUC intends to explore this issue in Stage 2.[34] The CEC supports such a clarification, so long as it does not limit the scope of discussion in Stage 2.[35] The CEC also supports a discussion of the circumstances under which the BCUC would perform a safety compliance function to fill an operational gap in Stage 2 of the Inquiry.[36]
Panel Determination
The Panel notes the support of interveners for participation in Stage 2 of the Inquiry. Further information on the specific regulatory process and timetable for Stage 2 will be provided in due course. We adopt Section 7.0 of the Draft Report as final and look forward to participant submissions in Stage 2.
4.0 Participant Assistance / Cost Award (PACA) Provisions
The Panel appreciates the active participation of all parties in Stage 1 of the Inquiry and encourages further participation in Stage 2. The Panel invites parties to file final PACA or to file any revised PACA applications if further costs have been incurred and are sought to be awarded for Stage 1 of the Inquiry, prior to commencement of Stage 2. Alternatively, parties may wish to file any PACA applications upon completion of Stage 2 for the total PACA amounts sought in both stages of the Inquiry.
Given this Inquiry was initiated prior to June 30, 2022, the Panel reminds participants that PACA for Stages 1 and 2 of the Inquiry will be awarded pursuant to the PACA guidelines as found in Appendix A attached to BCUC Order G-97-17.
Dated at the City of Vancouver, in the Province of British Columbia, this 22nd day of December 2022.
Original signed by:
____________________________________
D. M. Morton
Panel Chair / Commissioner
Original signed by:
____________________________________
C. M. Brewer
Commissioner
Original signed by:
____________________________________
R. I. Mason
Commissioner
List of Acronyms
| Acronym |
Description |
| BC |
British Columbia |
| BC Hydro |
British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority |
| BCOAPO |
British Columbia Old Age Pensioners’ Organization et al. |
| BCUC |
British Columbia Utilities Commission |
| Borealis |
Borealis Geopower Inc. |
| CEC |
Commercial Energy Consumers Association of British Columbia |
| Draft Report |
Draft report with preliminary findings in Stage 1 of the Inquiry |
| EGBC |
Engineers and Geoscientists B.C. |
| Flintoff |
Don Flintoff |
| FortisBC |
FortisBC Energy Inc. and FortisBC Inc., collectively |
| Inquiry |
Inquiry to examine the role of the BCUC in the regulation of safety |
| MoveUP |
Movement of United Professionals |
| PACA |
Participant Assistance/Cost Award |
| PGA |
Professional Governance Act |
| PNG |
Pacific Northern Gas Ltd. |
| RCIA |
Residential Consumer Intervener Group |
| Stage 1 |
First stage of the Inquiry |
| Stage 2 |
Second stage of the Inquiry |
| TSBC |
Technical Safety BC |
| UCA |
Utilities Commission Act |
[1] Order G-221-22.
[2] In the UCA, a “public utility” is defined as a person, or the person's lessee, trustee, receiver or liquidator, who owns or operates in BC, equipment or facilities for the production, generation, storage, transmission, sale, delivery or provision of electricity, natural gas, steam or any other agent for the production of light, heat, cold or power to or for the public or a corporation for compensation. There are a number of exclusions from the definition of a public utility, including municipalities or regional districts that provide services within their own boundaries, and a person that provides services to employees or tenants.
[3] IRSRGC includes the following interveners: (i) British Columbia Solar Coalition; (ii) Irrigation Ratepayers Group; (iii) Net Metering Ratepayers Group; (iv) Vancouver Electric Vehicle Association; and (v) Zone 1B Ratepayer Group.
[4] The Panel notes that in addition to the revisions discussed in Sections 3.1 to 3.3.3, below, the language in the final report has also been updated to reflect issuance of the Draft Report and the receipt of submissions thereon, and to correct errata. All changes are marked in the blacklined copy of the final report provided in Appendix B.
[5] Exhibit C1-9, p. 2.
[6] Exhibit C4-10, p. 3; Exhibit C7-10, p. 2.
[7] Exhibit C4-10, p. 3.
[8] Exhibit C13-8, pp. 1–2.
[9] Exhibit C7-10, p. 3.
[10] Exhibit C13-2, p. 10; Exhibit C-13-6, p. 6.
[11] Exhibit C1-9, p. 1; Exhibit C11-6, p. 2; Exhibit C7-9, p. 2.
[12] Exhibit C4-9, pp. 3–4.
[13] Exhibit C1-9, p. 2.
[14] Exhibit C7-10, p. 2.
[15] Exhibit C7-9, p. 2
[16] Exhibit C11-6, pp. 2–3.
[17] Exhibit C2-10, p. 1.
[18] Exhibit C4-9, p. 5.
[19] Exhibit C13-8, pp. 1–2.
[20] Exhibit C13-8, pp. 3–4.
[21] Exhibit C7-10, p. 3.
[22] Exhibit C7-9, p. 2; Exhibit C11-6, p. 3; Exhibit C21-3, p. 1.
[23] Exhibit C21-3, p. 1.
[24] Exhibit C7-10, p. 4.
[25] Exhibit C13-8, p. 4.
[26] Exhibit C7-10, p. 4.
[27] Exhibit C1-9, pp. 5–6.
[28] FortisBC cites sections 4.1, 6.1, and 6.2 of Exhibit C1-9 as examples.
[29] Exhibit C4-10, p. 4.
[30] Exhibit C4-10, p. 4.
[31] Exhibit C7-9, p. 4.
[32] Exhibit C7-9, pp. 3–4; Exhibit C11-6, p. 1.
[33] Exhibit C1-9, p. 6; Exhibit C4-9 p. 6; Exhibit C7-9, p. 4; Exhibit C13-8, p. 4; Exhibit C11-6, pp. 4–5.
[34] Exhibit C13-8, p. 3.
[35] Exhibit C7-10, p. 3.
[36] Exhibit C7-10, p. 4.