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ORDER NUMBER R-6-25

IN THE MATTER OF the Utilities Commission Act, RSBC 1996, Chapter 473

and

British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority Mandatory Reliability Standards Planning Coordinator Assessment Report

BEFORE:

A. K. Fung, KC, Panel Chair C. M. Brewer, Commissioner W. M. Everett, KC, Commissioner

on June 16, 2025

ORDER

WHEREAS:

- A. On February 28, 2025, the British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro) submitted to the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC) Mandatory Reliability Standards (MRS) 2025 Planning Coordinator Assessment Report (2025 PC Report) as a comprehensive assessment that supersedes the Planning Coordinator (PC) assessment report filed on May 31, 2021. The 2025 PC Report assesses 14 reliability standards of which 11 reliability standards were previously held in abeyance (EOP-003-2, FAC-001-4, FAC-002-4, FAC-013-2, MOD-032-1, MOD-033-2, PRC-006-5, PRC-010-2, PRC-026-2, TPL-001-5.1 and TPL-007-4), two reliability standards where select requirements and attachments were previously held in abeyance (PRC-012-2 and PRC-023-2) and one reliability standard pertaining to the Planning Coordinator (PRC-023-6) that would have been included in the 2024 annual assessment report (Revised Standards) and four terms (Glossary Terms) from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Glossary of Terms dated March 8, 2023 (NERC Glossary) that were previously held in abeyance;
- B. In the 2025 PC Report, BC Hydro recommends that 12 of the Revised Standards and the four Glossary Terms, be adopted in BC;
- C. BC Hydro recommends that two of the Revised Standards, EOP-003-2 and FAC-013-2, not be adopted as they have been retired in the US by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC);
- D. Further, BC Hydro recommends that six BC-specific implementation plans related to the Revised Standards be adopted (BC-specific Implementation Plans);
- E. By Order R-3-25 dated March 12, 2025, the BCUC established a regulatory timetable and a written comment process for the review of the 2025 PC Report and directed BC Hydro to make the 2025 PC Report available on its external website and to notify all entities registered in the British Columbia MRS Program (Registered Entities) of the review process;
- F. On March 26, 2025, FortisBC Inc. (FBC), as a new PC for its own assets in BC, and the Residential Consumer Intervener Association (RCIA) submitted letters of comment. FBC states that its feedback is reflected in the 2025

PC Report and has no additional comments. RCIA expresses concerns that BC Hydro's cost estimates are significantly higher than FBC's even after accounting for differences in infrastructure size and raises questions about cost allocations among Registered Entities and cost distribution among ratepayers;

- G. On April 4, 2025, BC Hydro filed its response to letters of comment from FBC and RCIA, stating that its cost estimates relative to FBC's cost estimates are higher because of greater system complexity, need for custom approaches and a higher number of interconnections. BC Hydro states further that each Registered Entity is responsible for the costs associated with compliance for their systems and that BC Hydro's actual costs will be recovered from ratepayers through general rates;
- H. On April 14, 2025, the BCUC issued Information Request No. 1 (BCUC IR No. 1) to BC Hydro. BCUC IR No. 1 included questions regarding whether BC Hydro recommends that the BCUC approve the use of the Canadian variance of reliability standard TPL-007-4 (TPL-007-4 Canadian Variance);
- On April 30, 2025, BC Hydro filed its response to BCUC IR No. 1. In BC Hydro's response to BCUC IR No. 1, it recommends that the TPL-007-4 Canadian Variance be approved for use in BC. BC Hydro also submitted an errata to the 2025 PC Report (Errata No. 1) with a revised effective date and a revised BC-specific implementation plan for reliability standard TPL-007-4;
- J. On May 26, 2025, after an invitation to file a letter of comment by the BCUC regarding the TPL-007-4 Canadian Variance, FBC filed a letter of comment stating that it agrees with BC Hydro's recommendation that the BCUC should approve it for use in BC;
- K. In the 2025 PC Report, BC Hydro states that it did not assess compliance-related provisions (Compliance Provisions) in the standards because they are not mandatory reliability standard requirements;
- L. The BCUC has not reviewed the recoverability of the estimated costs to adopt the Revised Standards and Glossary Terms;
- M. Pursuant to section 125.2(6) of the Utilities Commission Act, the BCUC must adopt the reliability standards and associated glossary terms addressed in the 2025 PC Report if the BCUC considers that the reliability standards are required to maintain or achieve consistency in BC with other jurisdictions that have adopted the reliability standards, unless the BCUC determines under section 125.2(7), after a hearing, that the reliability standards are not in the public interest;
- N. The BCUC has reviewed and considered the 2025 PC Report, the evidence and submissions in this proceeding and determines that adoption of the recommendations in the 2025 PC Report and Errata No. 1 is warranted, with the BC-specific Implementation Plans; and
- O. Although not assessed by BC Hydro, the BCUC finds that the Compliance Provisions of the Revised Standards should be adopted to maintain compliance monitoring consistency with other jurisdictions that have adopted the reliability standards with the Compliance Provisions. The BCUC also considers it appropriate to provide effective dates for Registered Entities to come into compliance with the Revised Standards adopted in this order.

NOW THEREFORE pursuant to sections 125.2(3) and 125.2(6) of the *Utilities Commission Act*, the BCUC orders as follows:

- 1. Revised Standards FAC-001-4, FAC-002-4, MOD-032-1, MOD-033-2, PRC-006-5, PRC-010-2, PRC-012-2, PRC-023-2, PRC-023-6, PRC-026-2, TPL-001-5.1 and TPL-007-4 assessed in the 2025 PC Report are adopted with effective dates as identified in Attachment A to this order.
- 2. The TPL-007-4 Canadian Variance is approved for use in BC.

- 3. Each standard to be superseded by a Revised Standard adopted in this order shall remain in effect until the effective date of the Revised Standard superseding it.
- 4. The Glossary Terms assessed in the 2025 PC Report are adopted with effective dates as identified in Attachment B to this order.
- 5. Revised Standards EOP-003-2 and FAC-013-2 are not adopted and are of no force or effect in BC.
- 6. All reliability standards listed in Attachment A to this order are effective in BC as of the dates shown. The effective dates for the reliability standards listed in Attachment A supersede the effective dates that were included in any similar list appended to any previous order of the BCUC.
- 7. Individual requirements and requirement parts in reliability standards that incorporate by reference reliability standards that have not been adopted by the BCUC are of no force or effect in BC, and individual requirements or requirement parts in reliability standards that the BCUC has adopted but for which the BCUC has not determined an effective date, are of no force or effect in BC.
- 8. Defined terms in the reliability standards bear the same meanings as those in the NERC Glossary dated March 8, 2023. Terms in the NERC Glossary, which do not include a FERC approval effective date on or before March 8, 2023, are of no force or effect in BC.
- 9. All NERC Glossary terms listed in Attachment B to this order are in effect in BC as of the effective dates indicated.
- 10. The BC-specific Implementation Plans for reliability standards FAC-001-4 and FAC-002-4, MOD-033-2, PRC-012-2, PRC-023-6 and PRC-023-2 Requirement R1 Criterion 6, TPL-001-5.1 and TPL-007-4 are adopted in BC as of the effective dates in Attachment C to this order.
- 11. The Revised Standards FAC-001-4, FAC-002-4, MOD-032-1, MOD-033-2, PRC-006-5, PRC-010-2, PRC-012-2, PRC-023-2, PRC-023-6, PRC-026-2, TPL-001-5.1 and TPL-007-4 in their written form are adopted as set out in Attachment D to this order.
- 12. The Compliance Provisions that accompany each of the adopted reliability standards are adopted by the BCUC.
- 13. The Revised Standards and BC-specific Implementation Plans adopted in BC by the BCUC are to be posted by the Western Electricity Coordinating Council on its website with a link from the BCUC website.
- 14. Entities subject to MRS adopted in BC must report to the BCUC and may, on a voluntary basis, report to NERC and/or to FERC.

DATED at the City of Vancouver, in the Province of British Columbia, this 16th day of June 2025.

BY ORDER

Electronically signed by Anna Fung

A. K. Fung, KC Commissioner

Attachments

British Columbia Utilities Commission Reliability Standards with Effective Dates adopted in British Columbia

Standard	Name	BCUC Order	Effective Date / Notes
BAL-001-2	Real Power BalancingR-14-16Control Performance		July 1, 2016
BAL-002-3	Disturbance Control Standard – Contingency Reserve for Recovery from a Balancing Contingency Event	R-21-19	April 1, 2020
BAL-002-WECC-3	Contingency Reserve	R-34-22A1	October 29, 2022
BAL-003-2	Frequency Response and Frequency Bias Setting	R-21-21	October 1, 2021
BAL-004-WECC-3	Automatic Time Error Correction	R-21-19	January 1, 2020
BAL-005-1	Balancing Authority Control	R-33-18	October 1, 2019
CIP-002-5.1a	Cyber Security — BES Cyber System Categorization	R-33-18	October 1, 2018 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan
CIP-003-81	Cyber Security — Security Management Controls	R-19-20	October 1, 2020 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan
CIP-003-9	Cyber Security — Security Management Controls	R-19-24	October 1, 2027 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan
CIP-004-6 ¹	Cyber Security — Personnel & Training	R-39-17	October 1, 2018 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan
CIP-004-7	Cyber Security — Personnel & Training	R-44-23	October 1, 2025 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan
CIP-005-7	Cyber Security – Electronic Security Perimeter(s)	R-34-22A1	July 1, 2024 and as per BC- specific Implementation Plan
CIP-006-6	Cyber Security — Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems	R-39-17	October 1, 2018 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan

¹ Reliability standard is superseded by the revised/replacement reliability standard listed immediately below it as of the effective date(s) of the revised/replacement reliability standard.

Standard	Name	BCUC Order	Effective Date / Notes	
CIP-007-6	Cyber Security — System Security Management	R-39-17	October 1, 2018 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan	
CIP-008-6	Cyber Security – Incident Reporting and Response Planning	R-19-20	April 1, 2023	
CIP-009-6	Cyber Security — Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems	R-39-17	October 1, 2018 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan	
CIP-010-4	Cyber Security – Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments	R-34-22A1	July 1, 2024 and as per BC- specific Implementation Plan	
CIP-011-2 ¹	Cyber Security – Information Protection	R-39-17	October 1, 2018 and as BC- specific Implementation Plan	
CIP-011-3	Cyber Security – Information Protection	R-44-23	October 1, 2025 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan	
CIP-012-1	Cyber Security – Communications between Control Centers	R-21-21	October 1, 2023	
CIP-013-2	Cyber Security - Supply Chain Risk Management	R-34-22A1	July 1, 2024 and as per BC- specific Implementation Plan	
CIP-014-3	Physical Security	R-44-23	September 8, 2023	
COM-001-3	Communications	R-39-17	R1, R2: October 1, 2017	
			R3-R13: October 1, 2018	
COM-002-4	Operating Personnel Communications Protocols	R-32-16A	April 1, 2017	
EOP-003-1 ²	Load Shedding Plans	G-67-09	November 1, 2010	
EOP-004-4	Event Reporting	R-21-19	October 1, 2020	
EOP-005-3	System Restoration from Blackstart Resources	R-21-19	October 1, 2020	
EOP-006-3	System Restoration Coordination	R-21-19	October 1, 2020	
EOP-008-2	Loss of Control Center Functionality	R-21-19	October 1, 2020	

² Reliability standard is superseded by EOP-011-1 as of the effective date of EOP-011-1 and PRC-010-2 Requirement 1.

Standard	Name	BCUC Order	Effective Date / Notes		
EOP-010-1	Geomagnetic Disturbance	R-38-15	R1, R3: October 1, 2016		
	Operations		R2: October 1, 2017		
EOP-011-2 ¹	Emergency Preparedness and Operations	R-34-22A1	July 1, 2024 and as per BC- specific Implementation Plan		
EOP-011-3	Emergency Operations	R-19-24	Adoption held in abeyance at this time		
EOP-012-1	Extreme Cold Weather Preparedness and Operations	R-19-24	Adoption held in abeyance at this time		
FAC-001-3 (errata revision) ¹	Facility Interconnection Requirements	R-44-23	September 8, 2023		
FAC-001-4	Facility Interconnection Requirements	R-6-25	October 1, 2026		
FAC-002-3 ¹	Facility Interconnection Studies	R-21-21	January 1, 2022		
FAC-002-4	Facility Interconnection Studies	R-6-25	October 1, 2026		
FAC-003-4 ¹	Transmission Vegetation Management	R-39-17	October 1, 2017		
FAC-003-5	Transmission Vegetation Management	R-44-23	October 1, 2025 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan		
FAC-008-5	Facility Ratings	R-34-22A1	April 1, 2023		
FAC-010-3	System Operating Limits Methodology for the Planning Horizon	R-39-17	R1–R4: October 1, 2017 R1-R4: Retired October 1, 2025		
FAC-011-3 ¹	System Operating Limits Methodology for the Operations Horizon	R-39-17	October 1, 2017		
FAC-011-4	System Operating Limits Methodology for the Operations Horizon	R-44-23	October 1, 2025 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan		
FAC-014-2 ¹	Establish and Communicate System Operating Limits	G-167-10	January 1, 2011		
FAC-014-3	Establish and Communicate System Operating Limits	R-44-23	October 1, 2025 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan		
FAC-501-WECC-2	Transmission Maintenance	R-21-19	October 1, 2019		

Standard	Name	BCUC Order	Effective Date / Notes
INT-006-5	Evaluation of Interchange Transactions	R-34-22A1	October 29, 2022
INT-009-3	Implementation of Interchange	R-34-22A1	October 29, 2022
IRO-001-4	Reliability Coordination – Responsibilities	R-39-17	October 1, 2017
IRO-002-7	Reliability Coordination – Monitoring and Analysis	R-34-22A1	October 29, 2022
IRO-006-5	Reliability Coordination – Transmission Loading Relief	R-1-13	April 15, 2013
IRO-006-WECC-3	Qualified Path Unscheduled Flow (USF) Relief	R-19-20	January 1, 2021
IRO-008-2 ¹	Reliability Coordinator Operational Analyses and Real-time Assessments	R-39-17	October 1, 2017
IRO-008-3	Reliability Coordinator Operational Analyses and Real-time Assessments	R-44-23	October 1, 2025 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan
IRO-009-2	Reliability Coordinator Actions to Operate Within IROLs	R-39-17	October 1, 2017
IRO-010-4 ¹	Reliability Coordinator Data Specification and Collection	R-34-22A1	July 1, 2024 and as per BC- specific Implementation Plan
IRO-010-5	Reliability Coordinator Data Specification and Collection	R-19-24	April 1, 2026
IRO-014-3	Coordination Among Reliability Coordinators	R-39-17	October 1, 2017
IRO-017-1	Outage Coordination	R-39-17	October 1, 2020
IRO-018-1(i)	Reliability Coordinator Real-time Reliability Monitoring and Analysis Capabilities	R-33-18	April 1, 2020
MOD-010-0 ³	Steady-State Data for Modeling and Simulation for the Interconnected Transmission System	G-67-09	November 1, 2010

³ Reliability standard will be superseded by Requirement 2 of MOD-032-1 by the effective date of MOD-032-1 Requirement 2.

Standard	Name	BCUC Order	Effective Date / Notes
MOD-012-0 ³	Dynamics Data for Modeling and Simulation of the Interconnected Transmission System	G-67-09	November 1, 2010
MOD-025-2	Verification and Data Reporting of Generator Real and Reactive Power Capability and Synchronous Condenser Reactive Power Capability	R-38-15 With revised effective dates by Order R-14-20	40% by October 1, 2017 60% by October 1, 2018 80% by October 1, 2019 100% by April 1, 2021
MOD-026-1	Verification of Models and Data for Generator Excitation Control System or Plant Volt/Var Control Functions	R-38-15	R1: October 1, 2016 R2: 30% by October 1, 2019 50% by October 1, 2021 100% by October 1, 2025 R3-R6: October 1, 2015
MOD-027-1	Verification of Models and Data for Turbine/Governor and Load Control or Active Power/Frequency Control Functions	R-38-15	R1: October 1, 2016 R2: 30% by October 1, 2019 50% by October 1, 2021 100% by October 1, 2025 R3-R5: October 1, 2015
MOD-031-3	Demand and Energy Data	R-21-21	January 1, 2022
MOD-032-1	Data for Power System Modeling and Analysis	R-6-25	R1: October 1, 2026 R2-R4: July 1, 2027
MOD-033-2	Steady-State and Dynamic System Model Validation	R-6-25	July 1, 2028
NUC-001-4	Nuclear Plant Interface Coordination	R-21-21	October 1, 2021
PER-003-2	Operating Personnel Credentials	R-21-19	April 1, 2020
PER-005-2	Operations Personnel Training	R-38-15	R1-R4, R6: October 1, 2016 R5: October 1, 2017
PER-006-1	Specific Training for Personnel	R-21-19	October 1, 2021

Standard **BCUC Order Effective Date / Notes** Name PRC-002-21 Disturbance Monitoring and R-32-16A R1, R5: April 1, 2017 **Reporting Requirements** R2-R4, R6-R11: staged as per **BC-specific Implementation** Plan R12: July 1, 2017 PRC-002-4 Disturbance Monitoring and R-19-24 October 1, 2025 **Reporting Requirements** PRC-004-6 Protection System R-34-22A1 April 1, 2023 **Misoperation Identification** and Correction PRC-005-1.1b^{1, 4} Transmission and R-32-14 January 1, 2015 Generation Protection System Maintenance and Testing PRC-005-6 Protection System, R-39-17 R1, R2, R5: October 1, 2019 Automatic Reclosing, and R3, R4: See BC-specific Sudden Pressure Relaying **Implementation Plan** Maintenance R-6-25 July 1, 2027 PRC-006-5 Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding PRC-007-0⁵ Assuring Consistency of G-67-09 November 1, 2010 Entity Underfrequency Load Shedding Program Requirements PRC-008-04 Implementation and G-67-09 November 1, 2010 Documentation of Underfrequency Load Shedding Equipment Maintenance Program PRC-009-05 G-67-09 Analysis and Documentation November 1, 2010 of Underfrequency Load **Shedding Performance** Following an **Underfrequency Event**

⁴ Reliability standard is superseded by PRC-005-6 as per the PRC-005-6 B.C. specific Implementation Plan.

⁵ Reliability standard superseded by PRC-006-5.

Standard	Name	BCUC Order	Effective Date / Notes
PRC-010-0 ¹	Technical Assessment of the Design and Effectiveness of Undervoltage Load Shedding Program	G-67-09	November 1, 2010 R2: Retired January 21, 2014 ⁶
PRC-010-2	Under Voltage Load Shedding	R-6-25	December 1, 2025
PRC-011-0 ⁴	Undervoltage Load Shedding System Maintenance and Testing	G-67-09	November 1, 2010
PRC-012-2	Remedial Action Schemes	R-33-18	October 1, 2021, except for
			R1 Attachment 1, Section II Parts 6(d) and 6(e);
			R2 Attachment 2, Section I Parts 7(d) and 7(e); and
			R4: Adoption held in abeyance
		R-6-25	R1 Attachment 1, Section II Parts 6(d) and 6(e);
			R2 Attachment 2, Section I Parts 7(d) and 7(e); and
			R4: July 1, 2028
PRC-017-14	Remedial Action Scheme Maintenance and Testing	R-39-17	October 1, 2017
PRC-019-2	Coordination of Generating	R-32-16A	40% by October 1, 2017
	Unit or Plant Capabilities, Voltage Regulating Controls,	With revised effective dates by Order	60% by October 1, 2018
	and Protection	R-14-20	80% by October 1, 2019
			100% by April 1, 2021
PRC-021-17	Under Voltage Load Shedding Program Data	G-67-09	November 1, 2010
PRC-022-1 ⁷	Under Voltage Load Shedding Program Performance	G-67-09	November 1, 2010 R2: Retired January 21, 2014 ⁶

⁶ On November 21, 2013, FERC Order 788 (referred to as Paragraph 81) approved the retiring of the reliability standard requirements.

⁷ Reliability standard is superseded by PRC-010-2.

Standard	Name	BCUC Order	Effective Date / Notes
PRC-023-2 ^{1, 8}	Transmission Relay Loadability	R-41-13	R1-R5: For circuits identified by sections 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.4 that meet Criterion 6 of Requirement 1: January 1, 2016
			For circuits identified by sections 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.1.6 that meet Criterion 6 of Requirement 1; and R6: Adoption held in abeyance
		R-6-25	For circuits identified by sections 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.1.6 that meet Criterion 6 of Requirement 1: October 1, 2025
PRC-023-4 ¹	Transmission Relay Loadability	R-39-17	R1-R5 Circuits 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.4: October 1, 2017 with the exception of Criterion 6 of R1 which will not become effective until PRC-025-2 R1 is completely effective in BC. Until then, PRC-023-2 R1, Criterion 6 will remain in effect
			R1-R5 Circuits 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.1.5, 4.2.1.6 and R6: Adoption held in abeyance at this time

⁸ PRC-023-2 Requirement 1, Criterion 6 only is superseded by PRC-025-2 as of PRC-025-2's 100 per cent Effective Date.

Standard	Name	BCUC Order	Effective Date / Notes
PRC-023-5 ¹	Transmission Relay Loadability	R-44-23	R1-R5 Circuits 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.1.4: October 1, 2025 except R1 criterion 6 which will not become effective until PRC-025-2 is completely effective in BC.
			Until then, PRC-023-2 R1 Criterion 6 remains in effect.
			R1-R5 Circuits 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.1.5, 4.2.1.6 and R6: Adoption held in abeyance at this time
PRC-023-6	Transmission Relay Loadability	R-6-25	October 1, 2025
PRC-024-3	Frequency and Voltage Protection Settings for Generating Resources	R-21-21	October 1, 2023
PRC-025-2	Generator Relay Loadability	R-21-19	October 1, 2019 and staged per BC-specific Implementation Plan
PRC-026-2	Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings	R-6-25	R1: January 1, 2029 R2-R4: January 1, 2031
PRC-027-1	Coordination of Protection Systems for Performance During Faults	R-21-19	October 1, 2021
TOP-001-5 ¹	Transmission Operations	R-34-22A1	October 29, 2022
TOP-001-6	Transmission Operations	R-44-23	October 1, 2025 and as per BC-specific Implementation Plan
TOP-002-4	Operations Planning	R-39-17 With revised effective dates by Order R-14-20	April 1, 2021
TOP-003-5 ¹	Operational Reliability Data	R-34-22A1	July 1, 2024 and as per BC- specific Implementation Plan
TOP-003-6.1	Transmission Operator and Balancing Authority Data and Information Specification and Collection	R-19-24	April 1, 2026

Standard	Name	BCUC Order	Effective Date / Notes
TOP-010-1(i)	Real-time Reliability Monitoring and Analysis Capabilities	R-33-18 With revised effective dates by Order R-14-20	April 1, 2021
TPL-001-4 ¹	Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements	R-27-18A	R1: July 1, 2019 R2-R6, R8: July 1, 2020 R7: Adoption held in abeyance
TPL-001-5.1	Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements	R-6-25	July 1, 2030
TPL-007-4	Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events	R-6-25	April 1, 2026
VAR-001-5	Voltage and Reactive Control	R-21-19	October 1, 2019
VAR-002-4.1	Generator Operation for Maintaining Network Voltage Schedules	R-33-18	October 1, 2018
VAR-501-WECC-3.1	Power System Stabilizer (PSS)	R-33-18	October 1, 2020 R3: For units placed into service after the effective date: January 1, 2021 For units placed into service prior to the effective date: January 1, 2024

British Columbia (B.C.) Exceptions to the Glossary of Terms Used in

North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Reliability Standards (NERC Glossary)

Updated by Order R-6-25.

Introduction:

This document is to be used in conjunction with the NERC Glossary dated March 8, 2023.

- The NERC Glossary terms listed in <u>Table 1</u> below are effective in B.C. on the date specified in the "Effective Date" column.
- <u>Table 2</u> below outlines the adoption history by the BCUC of the NERC Glossaries in B.C.
- Any NERC Glossary terms and definitions in the NERC Glossary that are not approved by FERC on or before November 30, 2023 are of no force or effect in B.C.
- Any NERC Glossary terms that have been remanded or retired by NERC are of no force or effect in B.C., with the exception of those remanded or retired NERC Glossary terms which have not yet been retired in B.C.
- The Texas Regional Entity, Northeast Power Coordinating Council and Reliability First regional definitions listed at the end of the NERC Glossary have been adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees for use in regional standards and are of no force or effect in B.C.

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
Actual Frequency (FA)	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Adoption	October 1, 2019
Actual Net Interchange (NIA)	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Adoption	October 1, 2019
Automatic Time Error Correction (IATEC)	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Adoption	October 1, 2019
Adjacent Balancing Authority	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Alternative Interpersonal Communication	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Area Control Error (from NERC section of the Glossary)	ACE	Report No. 7	R-32-14	Adoption	October 1, 2014
Area Control Error (from the WECC Regional Definitions section of the Glossary)	ACE	Report No. 7	R-32-14	Retirement	October 1, 2014
Arranged Interchange	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Attaining Balancing Authority	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Automatic Generation Control	AGC	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Adoption	October 1, 2019
Automatic Time Error Correction	-	Report No. 7	R-32-14	Adoption	October 1, 2014
Balancing Authority	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Adoption	January 1, 2019
Balancing Contingency Event ¹	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	January 1, 2018
BES Cyber Asset ²	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5,

Table 1: B.C. Effective Date Exceptions to Definitions in the March 8, 2023 Version of the NERC Glossary

¹ FERC approved terms in the NERC Glossary of Terms as of February 7, 2017; intended for BAL-002-2.

² NERC Glossary term definition is superseded by the revised NERC Glossary term definition listed immediately below it as of the effective date(s) of the revised NERC Glossary term definition.

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
					CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
BES Cyber Asset	BCA	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2018
BES Cyber System	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
BES Cyber System Information	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Blackstart Capability Plan	-	Report No. 7	R-32-14	Retirement	August 1, 2015
Blackstart Resource ²	-	Report No. 6	R-41-13	Adoption	December 12, 2013
Blackstart Resource	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Bulk Electric System	BES	Report No. 8	R-38-15	-	October 1, 2015
Bulk-Power System ²	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	-	October 1, 2015
Bulk-Power System	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Bus-tie Breaker	-	TPL-001-4	R-27-18A	Adoption	July 1, 2019
Cascading	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
CIP Exceptional Circumstance	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
CIP Senior Manager	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Composite Confirmed Interchange	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Confirmed Interchange	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Composite Protection System	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Consequential Load Loss	-	TPL-001-4	R-27-18A	Adoption	July 1, 2019
Contingency Event Recovery Period ¹	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	January 1, 2018
Contingency Reserve ¹	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	January 1, 2018
Contingency Reserve Restoration Period ¹	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	January 1, 2018
Contributing Schedule (WECC Regional Term)	-	Report No. 13	R-19-20	Retirement	December 31, 2020
Control Center	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Critical Assets	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Retirement	September 30, 2018
Critical Cyber Assets	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Retirement	September 30, 2018
Cyber Assets	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5,

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
					CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Cyber Security Incident ²	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Cyber Security Incident	-	Report No. 13	R-19-20	Adoption	April 1, 2023
Demand-Side Management	DSM	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Adoption	October 1, 2016
Dial-up Connectivity	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Distribution Provider	DP	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Disturbance	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Retirement	October 1, 2018
Dynamic Interchange Schedule or Dynamic Schedule	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems	EACMS	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Electronic Access Point	EAP	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
Electronic Security Perimeter	ESP	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Element	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Energy Emergency ²	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Adoption	October 1, 2016
Energy Emergency	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Retirement	October 1, 2018
External Routable Connectivity	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Extreme Cold Weather Temperature	-	Report No. 17	R-19-24	N/A	To be determined.
Frequency Bias Setting	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with earliest effective date of BAL-003-1 standard where this term is referenced
Frequency Response Measure	FRM	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with earliest effective date of BAL-003-1 standard where this term is referenced
Frequency Response Obligation	FRO	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with earliest effective date of BAL-003-1 standard where this term is referenced
Frequency Response Sharing Group	FRSG	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with earliest effective date of BAL-003-1 standard where this term is referenced
Generator Cold Weather Critical Component	-	Report No. 17	R-19-24	N/A	To be determined.
Generator Cold Weather Reliability Event	-	Report No. 17	R-19-24	N/A	To be determined.

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
Generator Operator	GOP	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Generator Owner	GO	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Geomagnetic Disturbance Vulnerability Assessment or GMD Vulnerability Assessment	GMD	PC Report 2025	R-6-25	Adoption	April 1, 2026
Interactive Remote Access	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Interchange Authority	IA	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Interchange Meter Error (IME)	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Adoption	October 1, 2019
Interconnected Operations Service	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Interconnection	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Interconnection Reliability Operating Limit	IROL	Report No. 6	R-41-13	Adoption	December 12, 2013
Intermediate Balancing Authority	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Intermediate System	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Interpersonal Communication	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Load-Serving Entity	LSE	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon	-	TPL-001-4	R-27-18A	Adoption	July 1, 2019

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
Minimum Vegetation Clearance Distance	MVCD	Report No. 7	R-32-14	Adoption	August 1, 2015
Misoperation	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Most Severe Single Contingency ¹	MSSC	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	January 1, 2018
Native Balancing Authority	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Non-Consequential Load Loss	-	TPL-001-4	R-27-18A	Adoption	July 1, 2019
Non-Spinning Reserve	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Retirement	October 1, 2018
Operating Instruction	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Adoption	April 1, 2017
Operational Planning Analysis ²	-	Report No. 6	R-41-13	Adoption	December 12, 2013
Operational Planning Analysis ²	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Operational Planning Analysis ²	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Adoption	October 1, 2016
Operational Planning Analysis	OPA	Report No. 12	R-21-19	Adoption	October 1, 2021
Operations Support Personnel	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of Requirement 5 of the PER-005-2 standard where this term is referenced
Physical Access Control Systems	PACS	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Physical Security Perimeter	PSP	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Planning Assessment	-	TPL-001-4	R-27-18A	Adoption	July 1, 2019

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
Planning Authority	PA	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Point of Receipt	POR	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Pre-Reporting Contingency Event ACE Value ¹	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	January 1, 2018
Protected Cyber Assets ²	PCA	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Protected Cyber Assets	РСА	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2018
Protection System	-	Report No. 6	R-41-13	Adoption	January 1, 2015 for each entity to modify its protection system maintenance and testing program to reflect the new definition (to coincide with recommended effective date of PRC-005-1b) and until the end of the first complete maintenance and testing cycle to implement any additional maintenance and testing for battery chargers as required by that entity's program.
Protection System Coordination Study	-	Report No. 12	R-21-19	Adoption	October 1, 2021
Protection System Maintenance Program	PSMP	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of Requirement 1 of the PRC-005-2 standard where this term is referenced
Protection System Maintenance Program (PRC-005-6)	PSMP	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2019
Pseudo-Tie ²	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Pseudo-Tie	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Adoption	January 1, 2019

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
Qualified Controllable Device (WECC Regional Term)	-	Report No. 13	R-19-20	Retirement	December 31, 2020
Qualified Path (WECC Regional Term)	-	Report No. 13	R-19-20	Adoption	January 1, 2021
Qualified Transfer Path (WECC Regional Term)	-	Report No. 13	R-19-20	Retirement	December 31, 2020
Qualified Transfer Path Curtailment Event (WECC Regional Term)	-	Report No. 13	R-19-20	Retirement	December 31, 2020
Reactive Power	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Real Power	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Real-time Assessment ²	-	Report No. 6	R-41-13	Adoption	January 1, 2014
Real-time Assessment ²	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Adoption	October 1, 2016
Real-time Assessment	RTA	Report No. 12	R-21-19	Adoption	October 1, 2021
Reliability Adjustment Arranged Interchange	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Reliability Coordinator	RC	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Reliability Directive	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Retirement	July 18, 2016
Reliability Standard ²	-	Report No. 8	R-32-14	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Reliability Standard	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Reliable Operation ²	-	Report No. 8	R-32-14	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Reliable Operation	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Relief Requirement (WECC Regional Term)	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of IRO-006-WECC-2 standard where this term is referenced

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
Relief Requirement (WECC Regional Term)	-	Report No. 13	R-19-20	Retirement	December 31, 2020
Remedial Action Scheme ²	RAS	Report No. 1	G-67-09	Adoption	June 4, 2009
Remedial Action Scheme	RAS	PC Report 2025	R-6-25	Adoption	December 1, 2025
Removable Media ²	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2018
Removable Media	-	Report No. 12	R-21-19	Adoption	October 1, 2019
Reporting ACE	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Adoption	October 1, 2019
Reportable Balancing Contingency Event ¹	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	January 1, 2018
Reportable Cyber Security Incident ²	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) where this term is referenced.
Reportable Cyber Security Incident	-	Report No. 13	R-19-20	Adoption	April 1, 2023
Request for Interchange	RFI	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Reserve Sharing Group	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Reserve Sharing Group Reporting ACE ¹	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	January 1, 2018
Resource Planner	RP	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Scheduled Net Interchange (NIS)	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Adoption	October 1, 2019
Sink Balancing Authority	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015
Source Balancing Authority	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	October 1, 2015

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
Special Protection System (Remedial Action Scheme) ²	SPS	Report No. 1	G-67-09	Adoption	June 4, 2009
Special Protection System (Remedial Action Scheme)	SPS	PC Report 2025	R-6-25	Adoption	December 1, 2025
Spinning Reserve	-	Report No. 11	R-33-18	Retirement	October 1, 2018
System Operating Limit ²	SOL	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
System Operating Limit	-	Report No. 16	R-44-23	Adoption	October 1, 2025
System Operator	-	Report No. 8	R-38-15	Adoption	Align with effective date of CIP Version 5 standards (CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-5, CIP-004-5, CIP-005-5, CIP-006-5, CIP-007-5, CIP-008-5, CIP-009-5, CIP-010-1, and CIP-011-1) as reference is made to the term Control Center as part of the definition of System Operator. The term Control Center is in turn referenced from the CIP Version 5 standards.
System Voltage Limit	-	Report No. 16	R-44-23	Adoption	October 1, 2025
Total Internal Demand	-	Report No. 9	R-32-16A	Adoption	October 1, 2016
Transient Cyber Asset ²	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2018
Transient Cyber Asset	ТСА	Report No. 12	R-21-19	Adoption	October 1, 2019
Transmission Customer	-	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Transfer Distribution Factor (WECC Regional Term)	TDF	Report No. 13	R-19-20	Retirement	December 31, 2020
Transmission Operator	ТОР	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Transmission Owner	то	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Transmission Planner	ТР	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017
Transmission Service Provider	TSP	Report No. 10	R-39-17	Adoption	October 1, 2017

NERC Glossary Term	Acronym	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Number	BCUC Adoption or Retirement	Effective Date
Under Voltage Load Shedding Program	UVLS Program	PC Report 2025	R-6-25	Adoption	December 1, 2025
Right-of-Way	ROW	Report No. 7	R-32-14	Adoption	August 1, 2015
TLR (Transmission Loading Relief) Log	-	Report No. 7	R-32-14	Adoption	August 1, 2014
Vegetation Inspection	-	Report No. 7	R-32-14	Adoption	August 1, 2015

NERC Glossary of Terms Version Date	Assessment Report Number	BCUC Order Adoption Date	BCUC Order Adopting	Effective Date		
February 12, 2008	Report No. 1	June 4, 2009	G-67-09			
April 20, 2010	Report No. 2	November 10, 2010	G-167-10			
August 4, 2011	Report No. 3	September 1, 2011	G-162-11 replacing G-151-11	 The NERC Glossaries listed became effective as of the date of the respective BCUC Orders adopting them. See the exception of the BAL-001-2 Glossary Terms within the NERC 		
December 13, 2011	Report No. 5	January 15, 2013	R-1-13	Glossary dated December 7, 2015. ¹		
December 5, 2012	Report No. 6	December 12, 2013	R-41-13	2. Specific effective dates of new and revised NERC Glossary		
January 2, 2014	Report No. 7	July 17, 2014	R-32-14	terms adopted in a BCUC Order appear in attachments to the Order.		
October 1, 2014	Report No. 8	July 24, 2015	R-38-15	Each Glossary term to be superseded by a revised Glossary		
December 7, 2015	BAL-001-2	April 21, 2016	R-14-16	term adopted in the Order shall remain in effect until the effective date of the Glossary term superseding it.		
December 7, 2015	Report No. 9 ²	July 18, 2016	R-32-16A	3. NERC Glossary terms which have not been approved by		
November 28, 2016	Report No. 10	July 26, 2017	R-39-17	FERC are of no force or effect in B.C.		
November 28, 2016	TPL-001-4	June 28, 2018	R-27-18A	4. Any NERC Glossary terms that have been remanded or retired by NERC are of no force or effect in B.C., with the		
October 6, 2017	Report No. 11	October 1, 2018	R-33-18	exception of those remanded or retired NERC Glossary		
July 3, 2018	Report No.12	September 26, 2019	R-21-19	terms which have not yet been retired in B.C.		
August 12, 2019	Report No. 13	September 8, 2020	R-19-20	5. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Northeast Power Coordinating Council and Reliability First regional		
October 8, 2020	Report No. 14	September 21, 2021	R-21-21	definitions listed at the end of the NERC Glossary of Terms		
June 28, 2021	Report No. 15	October 28, 2022	R-34-22A1	are of no force or effect in B.C.		
March 29, 2022	Report No. 16	September 8, 2023	R-44-23			
March 8, 2023	Report No. 17	July 16, 2024	R-19-24			

Table 2: NERC Glossary Adoption History in BC

British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC)

Implementation Plan for Reliability Standards FAC-001-4 and FAC-002-4

Applicable Standards

- FAC-001-4 Facility Interconnection Requirements
- FAC-002-4 Facility Interconnection Studies

Requested Retirements

- FAC-001-3 Facility Interconnection Requirements
- FAC-002-3 Facility Interconnection Studies

Applicable Entities for FAC-001-4

- Transmission Owner;
- Applicable Generator Owner;
- Generator Owner with a fully executed Agreement to conduct a study on the reliability impact of
 interconnecting a third party Facility to the Generator Owner's existing Facility that is used to interconnect
 to the Transmission system.

Applicable Entities for FAC-002-4

- Planning Coordinator;
- Transmission Planner;
- Transmission Owner
- Distribution Provider;
- Generator Owner;
- Applicable Generator Owner;
- Generator Owner with a fully executed Agreement to conduct a study on the reliability impact of interconnecting a third-party Facility to the Generator Owner's existing Facility that is used to interconnect to the Transmission system.

Terms in the NERC Glossary of Terms

• There are no new, modified, or retired terms.

Background

Reliability Standards FAC-001-4 and FAC-002-4 revise Reliability Standards FAC-001-3 and FAC-002-3 to provide clarity and specificity regarding which changes to existing Facility interconnections require study under the standards.

Currently effective Reliability Standards FAC-001-3 and FAC-002-3 require coordination and cooperation between a Facility owner and the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator when a new or materially modified interconnection Facility is connected to their system. These standards imply that the term "materially modified" should be used to distinguish between facility changes that are required to be studied and those that need not be studied; however, neither standard specifies what entity is responsible for determining what is considered to be a material modification. Further, the existing language is unclear about whether these requirements only apply when a different entity is proposing to interconnect to a Facility owner's Facility or if they also apply to the Facility owner's new or modified Facility.

Reliability Standards FAC-001-4 and FAC-002-4 address these issues by clarifying that the changes to existing Facilities that will need to be studied under the standards are those meeting the definition of "qualified change" developed by the Planning Coordinator under new Requirement R6 of proposed FAC-002-4.

Effective Date and Phased-In Compliance Dates

Standards FAC-001-4 and FAC-002-4

The standards shall become effective on the later of October 1, 2026 or the first day of the first calendar quarter that is twelve (12) months after the effective date of the BCUC's order approving the standards.

Compliance Date for FAC-001-4 Requirements R3 and R4 and FAC-002-4 Requirement R1, R2, R3 and R4

To the extent a change is considered a "qualified change" under the definition developed by the Planning Coordinator under Reliability Standard FAC-002-4 Requirement R6 but was not considered a "material modification" under FAC-001-3 or FAC-002-3, the entity shall not be required to comply with Reliability Standard FAC-001-4 Requirement R3 and R4 or Reliability Standard FAC-002-4 Requirements R1, R2, R3 and R4 until 12 months after the effective date of the standards.

Retirement Date

Reliability Standards FAC-001-3 and FAC-002-3 shall be retired immediately prior to the effective date of FAC-001-4 and FAC-002-4.

British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC)

Implementation Plan for Reliability Standard MOD-033-2

Approvals Requested

• MOD-033-2 – Steady-State and Dynamic System Model Validation

Effective Date

MOD-033-2 shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 36 months after the date that the standard is approved by the BCUC.

Initial Performance of Periodic Requirements

MOD-033-2, Requirement R1, parts 1.1 and 1.2 include periodic components for validation that contain time parameters for subsequent and recurring iterations of implementing the requirement, specified as, "... at least once every 24 calendar months ...", and responsible entities shall comply initially with those periodic components within 24 calendar months after the Effective Date of MOD-033-2.

British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC)

Implementation Plan for PRC-012-2

Requested Approval

- PRC-012-2 Remedial Action Schemes
- Requirement R1, Attachment 1, Section II Parts 6(d) and 6(e)
- Requirement R2, Attachment 2, Section I Parts 7(d) and 7(e)
- Requirement R4

Applicable Entities

- Reliability Coordinator
- Planning Coordinator
- RAS-entity the Transmission Owner, Generator Owner or Distribution Provider that owns all or part of a RAS

General Considerations

Reliability Standard PRC-012-2 consolidates previously unapproved standards and revises other RAS-related standards. Reliability Standard PRC-012-2 also provides clear and unambiguous responsibilities to the specific users, owners and operators of the Bulk Electric System. Reliability Standard PRC-012-2 establishes a new working framework between RAS-entities, Planning Coordinators (PCs), and Reliability Coordinators (RCs), and this new framework will involve considerable start-up effort. As such, implementation of Reliability Standard PRC-012-2 will occur over a 36-month period after approval of the standard by the BCUC.

Limited Impact RAS

A RAS implemented prior to the effective date of PRC-012-2 that has been through the regional review process of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) and is classified as a Local Area Protection Scheme (LAPS) in WECC is recognized as a limited impact RAS upon the effective date of PRC-012-2 and is subject to all applicable requirements.

Effective Date

Reliability Standard PRC-012-2 became effective on October 1, 2021 after the BCUC's Order No. R-33-18 approved the standard. Provisions concerning the initial performance of obligations under Requirements R1, R2, R4, R8 and R9 are outlined below.

Requirements R1, R2 and R4

Attachment 1, Section II Parts 6d) and 6e) as referenced from Requirement R1, Attachment 2 Section I Parts 7d) and 7e) as referenced from Requirement R2, and all of Requirement R4 shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter, 36 calendar months after BCUC approval.

Requirement R4

For existing RAS, initial performance of obligations under Requirement R4 must be completed within five (5) full calendar years after the effective date of Requirement R4, as described above. For new or functionally modified RAS, the initial performance of Requirement R4 must be completed within five (5) full calendar years after the date that the RAS is approved by the reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) under Requirement R3.

Requirement R8

For each RAS not designated as limited impact, initial performance of obligations under Requirement R8 must be completed at least once within six full calendar years after the October 1, 2021 effective date for PRC-012-2.

For each RAS designated as limited impact, initial performance of obligations under Requirement R8 must be completed at least once within twelve full calendar years after the October 1, 2021 effective date for PRC-012-2.

Requirement R9

For each Reliability Coordinator that does not have a RAS database, the initial obligation under Requirement R9 is to establish a database by the October 1, 2021 effective date of PRC-012-2.

Each Reliability Coordinator will perform the obligation of Requirement R9 within twelve full calendar months after the October 1, 2021 effective date of PRC-012-2.

British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC)

Implementation Plan for Reliability Standard PRC-023-6 and PRC-023-2 Requirement 1 Criterion 6

Applicable Standard(s)

- PRC-023-6 Transmission Relay Loadability
- PRC-023-2 Requirement 1 for circuits under Applicability sections 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.1.6 that meet Criterion 6

Requested Retirement(s)

• PRC-023-5 – Transmission Relay Loadability

Applicable Entities

- Transmission Owner
- Generator Owner
- Distribution Provider
- Planning Coordinator

General Considerations

None.

Effective Date

Reliability Standard PRC-023-6 and PRC-023-2 Requirement 1 Criterion 6 for circuits under Applicability sections 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.1.5, and 4.2.1.6 shall become effective on the later of: (i) the first day of the first calendar quarter after the effective date of the BCUC's order approving the PRC-023-6 standard; or (ii) the October 1, 2025 effective date of Reliability Standard PRC-023-5 in British Columbia.

Retirement Date

Reliability Standard PRC-023-5 shall be retired immediately prior to the effective date of the proposed Reliability Standard PRC-023-6 in British Columbia.

Initial Performance Date

Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct its first assessment under Reliability Standard PRC-023-6 by the later of October 1, 2027 or 24-calendar months after the effective date of PRC-023-6 in British Columbia.

Time Period to Address New Designations

Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that owns circuits that become applicable to this standard or applicable per circuits under Applicability sections 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.1.5, or 4.2.1.6 meeting Criterion 6 of PRC-023-2 Requirement 1, pursuant to Requirement R6 shall become compliant with R1 through R5 of PRC-023-6 on the later of the first day of the first calendar quarter 39 months following notification by the Planning Coordinator of a circuit's inclusion on a list of circuits per application of Attachment B, or the first day of the first calendar year in which any criterion in Attachment B applies, unless the Planning Coordinator removes the circuit from the list before the applicable effective date of PRC-023-6 in British Columbia.

British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC)

Implementation Plan for Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.1

Applicable Standard(s)

• TPL-001-5.1 – Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements

Requested Retirement(s)

• TPL-001-4 – Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements

Pre-requisite Standard(s)

• MOD-032-1 (as referenced from TPL-001-5.1 Requirement 1)

Applicable Entities

- Planning Coordinator
- Transmission Planner

General Considerations

The standard will become effective 36 months following the date that the MOD-032-1 reliability standard becomes fully effective in British Columbia. The 36-month period provides time for Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners to develop, among other things:

- A procedure or technical rationale for selecting known outages of generation and Transmission Facilities;
- Coordination with protection engineers to obtain the necessary data to perform the single points of failure analysis required by the standard; and
- Additional analysis required due to changes in the standard.

Following this 36-month period, an additional 24-month period allows time for the development of Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) under TPL-001-5.1 for Category P5 planning events involving single points of failure in Protection Systems.

Transmission Planners and Planning Coordinators shall have an additional 48 months beyond the time by which CAPs must be developed to comply with the bolded part of Requirement R2, Part 2.7 that states: "Revisions to the Corrective Action Plan(s) are allowed in subsequent Planning Assessments <u>but the planned System shall continue to meet</u> <u>the performance requirements in Table 1</u>" for P5 planning events for non-redundant components of a Protection System identified in footnote 13 items a, b, c, and d.

This implementation plan reflects consideration that Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners will need time to conduct the new studies and analyses in order to coordinate with asset owners and protection engineers to identify appropriate CAP actions and establish the associated timetables for completion. This includes any necessary CAP(s) to address System performance issues for studies involving Table 1 Category P5 (Fault plus non-redundant component of a Protection System failure to operate) required by TPL-001-5.1 Requirement R2, Part 2.7 for the non-redundant components of a Protection System identified in TPL-001-5.1 Table 1 Footnote 13.

Please see Figure 1 Implementation Timeline below for an illustration of the 108-month implementation timeline in British Columbia.




Figure 1 Implementation Plan Timeline

Effective Date

TPL-001-5.1 – Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements

The standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is 36 months after the MOD-032-1 reliability standard becomes fully effective in British Columbia.

Compliance Date for TPL-001-5.1 Requirement 2, Part 2.7 associated with Table 1 Category P5 Footnote 13 items a, b, c, and d

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R2, Part 2.7 for the Table 1 Category P5 planning event for the non-redundant components of a Protection System identified in footnote 13 items a, b, c, and d until 24 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.1.

For CAPs developed to address failures to meet Table 1 performance requirements for the P5 planning event for the non-redundant components of a Protection System identified in footnote 13 items a, b, c, and d, entities shall not be required to comply until 72 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-001-5.1 with the bolded part of Requirement R2, Part 2.7 that states: "Revisions to the Corrective Action Plan(s) are allowed in subsequent Planning Assessments <u>but the planned System shall continue to meet the performance</u> requirements in Table 1."

Initial Performance of Periodic Requirements

Each responsible entity shall complete the first annual Planning Assessment in accordance with TPL- 001-5.1 (without CAP(s) for the revised P5 planning event) by the effective date of the standard.

Each responsible entity shall develop any required CAP(s) under Requirement R2, Part 2.7 associated with the non-redundant components of a Protection System identified in Table 1 Category P5 Footnote 13 items a, b, c, and d by 24 months after the effective date of the standard.

Retirement Date

TPL-001-4 – Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements

Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 shall be retired immediately prior to the effective date of TPL-001-5.1 in British Columbia.

British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC)

Implementation Plan for Reliability Standard TPL-007-4

Applicable Standard

• TPL-007-4 – Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events

Prerequisite Standard

None

Revisions to Glossary Terms

There is one new definition in the proposed standard, which shall become effective when TPL-007-4 is approved by the BCUC:

Geomagnetic Disturbance Vulnerability Assessment or GMD Vulnerability Assessment: *Documented evaluation of potential susceptibility to voltage collapse, Cascading, or localized damage of equipment due to geomagnetic disturbances.*

Applicable Entities

- Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard;
- Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard; and
- Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in Section 4.2 of the standard.

Section 4.2 states that the standard applies to facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high-side, wyegrounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.

Background

On September 22, 2016, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 830 approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and its associated five-year Implementation Plan. In the Order, FERC also directed NERC to develop certain modifications to the standard. FERC established a deadline of 18 months from the effective date of Order No. 830 for completing the revisions, which was May 2018.

In May 2018, a Standard Authorization Request was submitted identifying a need for a Canadian- specific Variance to the TPL-007-2 standard. Specifically, the Standard Authorization Request sought to provide an option for Canadian Registered Entities to define alternative Benchmark GMD Events and/or Supplemental GMD Events specific to their unique topology.

On November 15, 2018, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 851 approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 and its associated implementation plan. In the order, FERC also directed NERC to develop certain modifications to the standard. FERC established a deadline of 12 months from the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to submit a revised standard (July 1, 2020).

On February 7, 2019, the NERC Board of Trustees adopted Reliability Standard TPL-007-3, which added a

Variance option for applicable entities in Canadian jurisdictions. The Canadian Variance replaced, in its entirety, Requirement R7, Part 7.3 of the continent-wide standard for Canadian entities and added an alternate methodology for GMD Vulnerability Assessments, as described in Attachment 1-CAN. None of the continentwide Requirements were changed. Under the terms of its implementation plan, Reliability Standard TPL-007-3 became effective in the United States on July 1, 2019. All phased-in compliance dates from the TPL-007-2 implementation plan were carried forward unchanged in the TPL-007-3 implementation plan.

Effective Date

Compliance with TPL-007-4 shall be implemented over a 7-year period as follows. Phased implementation provides:

- Necessary time for entities to develop the required models.
- Proper sequencing of assessments. The assessment of thermal impact on transformers is dependent upon geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flow calculations that are determined by the responsible planning entity.
- Necessary time for development of viable Corrective Action Plans, which may require entities to develop, perform, and/or validate new or modified studies, assessments, procedures, etc., to meet the TPL-007-4 requirements. Some mitigation measures may have significant budget, siting, or construction planning requirements.

Reliability Standard TPL-007-4

The standard shall become effective on the first day of the first calendar quarter that is nine (9) months after the effective date of the BCUC's order approving the standard.

• Phased-In Compliance Dates

Compliance Date for TPL-007-4 Requirements R1, R2 and R9

Entities shall be required to comply with Requirements R1, R2 and R9 upon the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-4.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-4 Requirements R12 and R13

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R12 and R13 until 18 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-4.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-4 Requirement R5

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R5 until 24 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-4.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-4 Requirements R6 and R10

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R6 and R10 until 48 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-4.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-4 Requirements R3, R4 and R8

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirements R3, R4 and R8 until 60 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-4.

Compliance Date for TPL-007-4 Requirement R7, Requirement R11, and Regional Variances for Canadian Jurisdictions D.A.7.3, D.A.7.4, D.A.7.5, D.A.11.3, D.A.11.4, and D.A.11.5

Entities shall not be required to comply with Requirement R7, Requirement R11 or Regional Variances for Canadian Jurisdictions D.A.7.3, D.A.7.4, D.A.7.5, D.A.11.3, D.A.11.4, and D.A.11.5, until 72 months after the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-4.

Initial Performance of Periodic Requirements

Transmission Owners and Generator Owners are not required to comply with Requirement R6 prior to the compliance date for Requirement R6, regardless of when geomagnetically-induced current (GIC) flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1 is received.

Transmission Owners and Generator Owners are not required to comply with Requirement R10 prior to the compliance date for Requirement R10, regardless of when GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 is received.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Facility Interconnection Requirements
- 2. Number: FAC-001-4
- **3. Purpose:** To avoid adverse impacts on the reliability of the Bulk Electric System, Transmission Owners and applicable Generator Owners must document and make Facility interconnection requirements available so that entities seeking to interconnect will have the necessary information.

4. Applicability:

- 4.1. Functional Entities:
 - 4.1.1. Transmission Owner
 - **4.1.2.** Applicable Generator Owner
 - **4.1.2.1.** Generator Owner with a fully executed Agreement to conduct a study on the reliability impact of interconnecting a third party Facility to the Generator Owner's existing Facility that is used to interconnect to the Transmission system.
- 5. Effective Date*: See BC Implementation Plan for FAC-001-4.

B. Requirements and Measures

- **R1.** Each Transmission Owner shall document Facility interconnection requirements, update them as needed, and make them available upon request. Each Transmission Owner's Facility interconnection requirements shall address interconnection requirements for: [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 1.1. generation Facilities;
 - **1.2.** transmission Facilities; and
 - **1.3.** end-user Facilities.
- **M1.** Each Transmission Owner shall have evidence (such as dated, documented Facility interconnection requirements) that it met all requirements in Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each applicable Generator Owner shall document Facility interconnection requirements and make them available upon request within 45 calendar days of full execution of an Agreement to conduct a study on the reliability impact of interconnecting a third party Facility to the Generator Owner's existing Facility that is used to interconnect to the Transmission system. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M2.** Each applicable Generator Owner shall have evidence (such as dated, documented Facility interconnection requirements) that it met all requirements in Requirement R2.
- **R3.** Each Transmission Owner shall address the following items in its Facility interconnection requirements: [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-Term Planning]
 - **3.1.** Procedures for coordinated studies for new interconnections or existing interconnections seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator and their impacts on affected systems.
 - **3.2.** Procedures for notifying those responsible for the reliability of affected system(s) of new interconnections or existing interconnections seeking to make a qualified change.
 - **3.3.** Procedures for confirming with those responsible for the reliability of affected systems that new Facilities or existing Facilities seeking to make a qualified change are within a Balancing Authority Area.
- M3. Each Transmission Owner shall have evidence (such as dated, documented Facility interconnection requirements addressing the procedures) that it met all requirements in Requirement R3.
- **R4.** Each applicable Generator Owner shall address the following items in its Facility interconnection requirements: [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-Term Planning]
 - **4.1.** Procedures for coordinated studies of new interconnections and their impacts on affected system(s).

- **4.2.** Procedures for notifying those responsible for the reliability of affected system(s) of new interconnections.
- **4.3.** Procedures for confirming with those responsible for the reliability of affected systems that new Facilities or existing Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator are within a Balancing Authority Area.
- M4. Each applicable Generator Owner shall have evidence (such as dated, documented Facility interconnection requirements addressing the procedures) that it met all requirements in Requirement R4.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

- **1.1.** Compliance Enforcement Authority: The British Columbia Utilities Commission.
- **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- The responsible entities shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.
- If a responsible entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.
- The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

Violation Severity Levels

D .#	R#			Violation Se	Violation Severity Levels		
R #	Horizon	VRF	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
R1.	Long- term Planning	Lower	N/A	The Transmission Owner documented Facility interconnection requirements and updated them as needed, but failed to make them available upon request. OR The Transmission Owner documented Facility interconnection requirements and made them available upon request, but failed to update them as needed. OR The Transmission Owner documented Facility interconnection requirements,	The Transmission Owner documented Facility interconnection requirements, but failed to update them as needed and failed to make them available upon request. OR The Transmission Owner documented Facility interconnection requirements, updated them as needed, and made them available upon request, but failed to address interconnection requirements for two of the Facilities as	The Transmission Owner did not document Facility interconnection requirements.	

D #	Time	VDE		Violation Se	verity Levels	
R #	Horizon	VRF	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				updated them as needed, and made them available upon request, but failed to address interconnection requirements for one of the Facilities as specified in R1, Parts 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3.	specified in R1, Parts 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3.	
R2.	Long- term Planning	Lower	The applicable Generator Owner failed to document Facility interconnection requirements and make them available upon request until more than 45 calendar days but less than or equal to 60 calendar days after full execution of an Agreement to conduct a study on the reliability impact of interconnecting a third	The applicable Generator Owner failed to document Facility interconnection requirements and make them available upon request until more than 60 calendar days but less than or equal to 70 calendar days after full execution of an Agreement to conduct a study on the reliability impact of interconnecting a third	The applicable Generator Owner failed to document Facility interconnection requirements and make them available upon request until more than 70 calendar days but less than or equal to 80 calendar days after full execution of an Agreement to conduct a study on the reliability impact of interconnecting a third	The applicable Generator Owner failed to document Facility interconnection requirements and make them available upon request until more than 80 calendar days after full execution of an Agreement to conduct a study on the reliability impact of interconnecting a third party Facility to the Generator Owner's

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D #	Time			Violation Se	verity Levels	
R #	Horizon	VRF	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			party Facility to the Generator Owner's existing Facility that is used to interconnect to the Transmission system.	party Facility to the Generator Owner's existing Facility that is used to interconnect to the Transmission system.	party Facility to the Generator Owner's existing Facility that is used to interconnect to the Transmission system.	existing Facility that is used to interconnect to the Transmission system.
R3.	Long- term Planning	Lower	N/A	The Transmission Owner failed to address one part of Requirement R3 (Part 3.1 through Part 3.3).	The Transmission Owner failed to address two parts of Requirement R3 (Part 3.1 through Part 3.3).	The Transmission Owner failed to address three parts of Requirement R3 (Part 3.1 through Part 3.3).
R4.	Long- term Planning	Lower	N/A	The Generator Owner failed to address one part of Requirement R4 (Part 4.1 through Part 4.3).	The Generator Owner failed to address two parts of Requirement R4 (Part 4.1 through Part 4.3).	The Generator Owner failed to address three parts of Requirement R4 (Part 4.1 through Part 4.3).

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

None.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	April 1, 2005	Effective Date	New
1		Added requirements for Generator Owner and brought overall standard format up to date.	
1	February 9, 2012	Adopted by the Board of Trustees	
1	September 19, 2013	A FERC order was issued on September 19, 2013, approving FAC-001-1. This standard became enforceable on November 25, 2013 for Transmission Owners. For Generator Owners, the standard becomes enforceable on January 1, 2015.	
2		Revisions to implement the recommendations of the FAC Five-Year Review Team.	Revision under Project 2010-02
2	August 14, 2014	Adopted by the Board of Trustees	
2	November 6, 2014	FERC letter order issued approving FAC-001-2.	
3	February 11, 2016	Adopted by the Board of Trustees	Moved BAL-005- 0.2b Requirement R1 into FAC-001-3 Requirements R3 and R4
3	September 20, 2017	FERC Order No. 836 issued approving FAC-001-3	
3	February 19, 2021	FERC letter Order issued approving FAC- 001-3 Errata	
4	May 12, 2022	Adopted by the Board of Trustees	Revisions under Project 2020-05
4	November 17,2022	FERC Order RD22-5-000 issued approving FAC-001-4	
4	December 2, 2022	Effective Date	1/1/2024

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Facility Interconnection Studies
- **2. Number:** FAC-002-4
- **3. Purpose:** To study the impact of interconnecting new or changed Facilities on the Bulk Electric System.
- 4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. Functional Entities:
 - **4.1.1.** Planning Coordinator
 - **4.1.2.** Transmission Planner
 - 4.1.3. Transmission Owner
 - 4.1.4. Distribution Provider
 - 4.1.5. Generator Owner
 - **4.1.6.** Applicable Generator Owner
 - **4.1.6.1.** Generator Owner with a fully executed Agreement to conduct a study on the reliability impact of interconnecting a third party Facility to the Generator Owner's existing Facility that is used to interconnect to the Transmission system.
- 5. Effective Date*: See BC Implementation Plan for FAC-002-4

B. Requirements and Measures

- **R1.** Each Transmission Planner and each Planning Coordinator shall study the reliability impact of: (i) interconnecting new generation, transmission, or electricity end-user Facilities and (ii) existing interconnections of generation, transmission, or electricity end-user Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6. The following shall be studied: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **1.1.** The reliability impact of the new interconnection, or existing interconnection seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, on affected system(s);
 - **1.2.** Adherence to applicable NERC Reliability Standards; regional and Transmission Owner planning criteria; and Facility interconnection requirements;
 - **1.3.** Steady-state, short-circuit, and dynamics studies, as necessary, to evaluate system performance under both normal and contingency conditions; and
 - **1.4.** Study assumptions, system performance, alternatives considered, and coordinated recommendations. While these studies may be performed independently, the results shall be evaluated and coordinated by the entities involved.
- **M1.** Each Transmission Planner or each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence (such as study reports, including documentation of reliability issues) that it met all requirements in Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each Generator Owner seeking to interconnect new generation Facilities, or existing interconnections of generation Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, shall coordinate and cooperate on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator, including but not limited to the provision of data as described in R1, Parts 1.1-1.4. [Violation Risk Factor: *Medium*] [*Time Horizon: Long-term Planning*]
- M2. Each Generator Owner shall have evidence (such as documents containing the data provided in response to the requests of the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator) that it met all requirements in Requirement R2.
- **R3.** Each Transmission Owner and each Distribution Provider seeking to interconnect new transmission Facilities or electricity end-user Facilities, or existing interconnections of transmission Facilities or electricity end-user Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, shall coordinate and cooperate on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator, including but not limited to the provision of data as described in R1, Parts 1.1-1.4. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M3.** Each Transmission Owner and each Distribution Provider shall have evidence (such as documents containing the data provided in response to the requests of the

Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator) that it met all requirements in Requirement R3.

- R4. Each Transmission Owner shall coordinate and cooperate with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator on studies regarding requested new or existing interconnections seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, to its Facilities, including but not limited to the provision of data as described in R1, Parts 1.1-1.4. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M4. Each Transmission Owner shall have evidence (such as documents containing the data provided in response to the requests of the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator) that it met all requirements in Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each applicable Generator Owner shall coordinate and cooperate with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator on studies regarding requested interconnections to its Facilities, including but not limited to the provision of data as described in R1, Parts 1.1-1.4. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Longterm Planning]
- **M5.** Each applicable Generator Owner shall have evidence (such as documents containing the data provided in response to the requests of the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator) that it met all requirements in Requirement R5.
- **R6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall maintain a publicly available definition of qualified change for the purposes of facility interconnection. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence that it has maintained a publicly available definition of qualified change.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

- **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** The British Columbia Utilities Commission.
- **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, Transmission Owner, Distribution Provider, Generator Owner and applicable Generator Owner shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

The responsible entities shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.

If a responsible entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

Violation Severity Levels

D #	Time	VRF	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Horizon	VKF	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
R1.	Long- term Planning	Medium	The Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator studied the reliability impact of: (i) interconnecting new generation, transmission, or electricity end-user Facilities, and (ii) existing interconnections of generation, transmission, or electricity end-user Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, but failed to study one of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	The Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator studied the reliability impact of: (i) interconnecting new generation, transmission, or electricity end-user Facilities, and (ii) existing interconnections of generation, transmission, or electricity end-user Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, but failed to study two of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	The Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator studied the reliability impact of: (i) interconnecting new generation, transmission, or electricity end-user Facilities, and (ii) existing interconnections of generation, transmission, or electricity end-user Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, but failed to study three of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	The Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator failed to study the reliability impact of: interconnecting new generation, transmission, or electricity end-user Facilities, and (ii) existing interconnections of, generation, transmission, or electricity end-user Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6.	
R2.	Long- term Planning	Medium	The Generator Owner seeking to interconnect new generation Facilities,	The Generator Owner seeking to interconnect new generation Facilities,	The Generator Owner seeking to interconnect new generation Facilities,	The Generator Owner seeking to interconnect new generation Facilities,	

R #	Time		Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Horizon		Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
			or existing interconnections of generation Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in one of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	or existing interconnections of generation Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in two of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	or existing interconnections of generation Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in three of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	or existing interconnections of generation Facilities seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, failed to coordinate and cooperate on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator.	
R3.	Long- term Planning	Medium	The Transmission Owner or Distribution Provider seeking to interconnect new transmission Facilities or electricity end-user Facilities, or existing interconnections of transmission Facilities	The Transmission Owner, or Distribution Provider seeking to interconnect new transmission Facilities or electricity end-user Facilities, or existing interconnections of transmission Facilities	The Transmission Owner or Distribution Provider seeking to interconnect new transmission Facilities or electricity end-user Facilities, or existing interconnections of transmission Facilities	The Transmission Owner, or Distribution Provider seeking to interconnect new transmission Facilities or electricity end-user Facilities, or existing interconnections of transmission Facilities	

R #	D # Time	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
K #	Horizon		Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, or electricity end- user Facilities, coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in one of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, or electricity end- user Facilities, coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in two of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, or electricity end- user Facilities, coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in three of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6, or electricity end- user Facilities, failed to coordinate and cooperate on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator.
R4.	Long- term Planning	Medium	The Transmission Owner coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator regarding requested new or existing interconnections	The Transmission Owner coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator regarding requested new or existing interconnections	The Transmission Owner coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator regarding requested new or existing interconnections	The Transmission Owner failed to coordinate and cooperate on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator regarding requested new or existing interconnections

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R #	Time	VRF	Violation Severity Levels				
K #	Horizon		Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
			seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6to its Facilities, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in one of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6to its Facilities, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in two of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6to its Facilities, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in three of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	seeking to make a qualified change as defined by the Planning Coordinator under Requirement R6to its Facilities.	
R5.	Long- term Planning	Medium	The applicable Generator Owner coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator regarding requested interconnections to its Facilities, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in one of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	The applicable Generator Owner coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator regarding requested interconnections to its Facilities, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in two of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	The applicable Generator Owner coordinated and cooperated on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator regarding requested interconnections to its Facilities, but failed to provide data necessary to perform studies as described in three of the Parts (R1, 1.1-1.4).	The applicable Generator Owner failed to coordinate and cooperate on studies with its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator regarding requested interconnections to its Facilities.	

D #	Time Horizon		Violation Severity Levels			
R #		VRF	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R6.	Long- term Planning	Lower	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator did not maintain a publicly available definition of qualified change for the purposes of facility interconnection.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

None.

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Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	April 1, 2005	Effective Date	New
0	January 13, 2006	Removed duplication of "Regional Reliability Organizations(s).	Errata
1	August 5, 2010	Modified to address Order No. 693 Directives contained in paragraph 693. Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Revised
1	February 7, 2013	R2 and associated elements approved by NERC Board of Trustees for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) pending applicable regulatory approval.	
1	November 21, 2013	R2 and associated elements approved by FERC for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02)	
2		Revisions to implement the recommendations of the FAC Five-Year Review Team.	Revision under Project 2010-02
2	August 14, 2014	Adopted by the Board of Trustees.	
2	November 6, 2014	FERC letter order issued approving FAC-002-2.	
3	February 6, 2020	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees.	Revisions under Project 2017-07
4	May 12, 2022	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees.	Revisions under Project 2020-05
4	November 17,2022	FERC Order RD22-5-000 issued approving FAC-002-4	
4	December 2, 2022	Effective Date	1/1/2024

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Data for Power System Modeling and Analysis
- 2. Number: MOD-032-1
- **3. Purpose:** To establish consistent modeling data requirements and reporting procedures for development of planning horizon cases necessary to support analysis of the reliability of the interconnected transmission system.
- 4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. Functional Entities:
 - **4.1.1** Balancing Authority
 - 4.1.2 Generator Owner
 - 4.1.3 Load Serving Entity
 - **4.1.4** Planning Authority and Planning Coordinator (hereafter collectively referred to as "Planning Coordinator")

This proposed standard combines "Planning Authority" with "Planning Coordinator" in the list of applicable functional entities. The NERC Functional Model lists "Planning Coordinator" while the registration criteria list "Planning Authority," and they are not yet synchronized. Until that occurs, the proposed standard applies to both Planning Authority and Planning Coordinator.

- 4.1.5 Resource Planner
- 4.1.6 Transmission Owner
- 4.1.7 Transmission Planner
- 4.1.8 Transmission Service Provider
- 5. Effective Date*:

6. Background:

MOD-032-1 exists in conjunction with MOD-033-1, both of which are related to system-level modeling and validation. Reliability Standard MOD-032-1 is a consolidation and replacement of existing MOD-010-0, MOD-011-0, MOD-012-0, MOD-013-1, MOD-014-0, and MOD-015-0.1, and it requires data submission by applicable data owners to their respective Transmission Planners and Planning Coordinators to support the Interconnection-wide case building process in their Interconnection. Reliability Standard MOD-033-1 is a new standard, and it requires each Planning Coordinator to implement a documented process to perform model validation within its planning area.

The transition and focus of responsibility upon the Planning Coordinator function in both standards are driven by several recommendations and FERC directives from FERC Order No. 693, which are discussed in greater detail in the rationale sections of the standards. One of the most recent and significant set of recommendations came from the NERC Planning Committee's System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee (SAMS). SAMS proposed several improvements to the modeling data standards, to include consolidation of the standards (the SAMS whitepaper is available from the December 2012 NERC Planning Committee's agenda package, item 3.4, beginning on page 99, here:

http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Agendas%20Highlights%20and%20Minutes%20DL/2 012/2012 Dec PC%20Agenda.pdf).

B. Requirements and Measures

- **R1.** Each Planning Coordinator and each of its Transmission Planners shall jointly develop steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data requirements and reporting procedures for the Planning Coordinator's planning area that include: [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **1.1.** The data listed in Attachment 1.
 - **1.2.** Specifications of the following items consistent with procedures for building the Interconnection-wide case(s):
 - 1.2.1. Data format;
 - 1.2.2. Level of detail to which equipment shall be modeled;
 - 1.2.3. Case types or scenarios to be modeled; and
 - **1.2.4.** A schedule for submission of data at least once every 13 calendar months.

- **1.3.** Specifications for distribution or posting of the data requirements and reporting procedures so that they are available to those entities responsible for providing the data.
- **M1.** Each Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall provide evidence that it has jointly developed the required modeling data requirements and reporting procedures specified in Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, and Transmission Service Provider shall provide steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data to its Transmission Planner(s) and Planning Coordinator(s) according to the data requirements and reporting procedures developed by its Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner in Requirement R1. For data that has not changed since the last submission, a written confirmation that the data has not changed is sufficient. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each registered entity identified in Requirement R2 shall provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has submitted the required modeling data to its Transmission Planner(s) and Planning Coordinator(s); or written confirmation that the data has not changed.
- **R3.** Upon receipt of written notification from its Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner regarding technical concerns with the data submitted under Requirement R2, including the technical basis or reason for the technical concerns, each notified Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service Provider shall respond to the notifying Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner as follows: [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **3.1.** Provide either updated data or an explanation with a technical basis for maintaining the current data;
 - **3.2.** Provide the response within 90 calendar days of receipt, unless a longer time period is agreed upon by the notifying Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner.
- M3. Each registered entity identified in Requirement R3 that has received written notification from its Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner regarding technical concerns with the data submitted under Requirement R2 shall provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided either updated data or an explanation with a technical basis for maintaining the current data to its Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner within 90 calendar days of receipt (or within the longer time period agreed upon by the notifying Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner), or a statement that it has not received written notification regarding technical concerns with the data submitted.

- **R4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall make available models for its planning area reflecting data provided to it under Requirement R2 to the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) or its designee to support creation of the Interconnection-wide case(s) that includes the Planning Coordinator's planning area. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M4. Each Planning Coordinator shall provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has submitted models for its planning area reflecting data provided to it under Requirement R2 when requested by the ERO or its designee.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

The British Columbia Utilities Commission.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance with Requirements R1 through R4, and Measures M1 through M4, since the last audit, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

If an applicable entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF		Violation Se	verity Levels	
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	Lower	The Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) developed steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data requirements and reporting procedures, but failed to include less than or equal to 25% of the required components specified in Requirement R1.	The Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) developed steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data requirements and reporting procedures, but failed to include greater than 25% but less than or equal to 50% of the required components specified in Requirement R1.	The Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) developed steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data requirements and reporting procedures, but failed to include greater than 50% but less than or equal to 75% of the required components specified in Requirement R1.	The Planning and Transmission Planner(s) Coordinator did not develop any steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data requirements and reporting procedures required by Requirement R1; OR The Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) developed steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data requirements and reporting procedures, but failed to include greater than 75% of the required components specified

					in Requirement R1.
ong-term lanning	Medium	The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service Provider provided steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data to its Transmission Planner(s) and Planning Coordinator(s), but failed to provide less than or equal to 25% of the required data specified in Attachment 1; OR The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service Provider provided	The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service Provider provided steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data to its Transmission Planner(s) and Planning Coordinator(s), but failed to provide greater than 25% but less than or equal to 50% of the required data specified in Attachment 1; OR The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service	The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service Provider provided steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data to its Transmission Planner(s) and Planning Coordinator(s), but failed to provide greater than 50% but less than or equal to 75% of the required data specified in Attachment 1; OR The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or	The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service Provider did not provide any steady- state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data to its Transmission Planner(s) and Planner(s) and Planning Coordinator(s); OR The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service Provider provided steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data to its Transmission

				,
	steady-state,	Provider provided	Provider provided	Planner(s) and
	dynamics, and short	steady-state,	steady-state,	Planning
	circuit modeling data	dynamics, and short	dynamics, and short	Coordinator(s), but
	to its Transmission	circuit modeling data	circuit modeling data	failed to provide
	Planner(s) and	to its Transmission	to its Transmission	greater than 75% of
	Planning	Planner(s) and	Planner(s) and	the required data
	Coordinator(s), but	Planning	Planning	specified in
	less than or equal to	Coordinator(s), but	Coordinator(s), but	Attachment 1;
	25% of the required	greater than 25% but	greater than 50% but	OR
	data failed to meet	less than or equal to	less than or equal to	OK
	data format,	50% of the required	75% of the required	The Balancing
	shareability, level of	data failed to meet	data failed to meet	Authority, Generator
	detail, or case type	data format,	data format,	Owner, Load Serving
	specifications;	shareability, level of	shareability, level of	Entity, Resource
	OR	detail, or case type	detail, or case type	Planner, Transmission
	UK	specifications;	specifications;	Owner, or
	The Balancing	OR	OR	Transmission Service
	Authority, Generator	OR	OR	Provider provided
	Owner, Load Serving	The Balancing	The Balancing	steady-state,
	Entity, Resource	Authority, Generator	Authority, Generator	dynamics, and short
	Planner, Transmission	Owner, Load Serving	Owner, Load Serving	circuit modeling data
	Owner, or	Entity, Resource	Entity, Resource	to its Transmission
	Transmission Service	Planner, Transmission	Planner, Transmission	Planner(s) and
	Provider failed to	Owner, or	Owner, or	Planning
	provide steady-state,	Transmission Service	Transmission Service	Coordinator(s), but
	dynamics, and short	Provider failed to	Provider failed to	greater than 75% of
	circuit modeling data	provide steady-state,	provide steady-state,	the required data
	to its Transmission	dynamics, and short	dynamics, and short	failed to meet data
	Planner(s) and	circuit modeling data	circuit modeling data	format, shareability,
	Planning	to its Transmission	to its Transmission	level of detail, or case
	Coordinator(s) within	Planner(s) and	Planner(s) and	type specifications;
	the schedule specified	Planning	Planning	
	· ·			·

			by the data requirements and reporting procedures but did provide the data in less than or equal to 15 calendar days after the specified date.	Coordinator(s) within the schedule specified by the data requirements and reporting procedures but did provide the data in greater than 15 but less than or equal to 30 calendar days after the specified date.	Coordinator(s) within the schedule specified by the data requirements and reporting procedures but did provide the data in greater than 30 but less than or equal to 45 calendar days after the specified date.	OR The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, or Transmission Service Provider failed to provide steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data to its Transmission Planner(s) and Planning Coordinator(s) within the schedule specified by the data requirements and reporting procedures but did provide the data in greater than 45 calendar days after the specified date.
R3	Long-term Planning	Lower	The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service	The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service	The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service	The Balancing Authority, Generator Owner, Load Serving Entity, Resource Planner, Transmission Owner, or Transmission Service

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Provider failed to	Provider failed to	Provider failed to	Provider failed to
provide a written	provide a written	provide a written	provide a written
response to its	response to its	response to its	response to its
Transmission	Transmission	Transmission	Transmission
Planner(s) or Planning	Planner(s) or Planning	Planner(s) or Planning	Planner(s) or Planning
Coordinator(s)	Coordinator(s)	Coordinator(s)	Coordinator(s)
according to the	according to the	according to the	according to the
specifications of	specifications of	specifications of	specifications of
Requirement R4 within	Requirement R4 within	Requirement R4 within	Requirement R4 within
90 calendar days (or	90 calendar days (or	90 calendar days (or	135 calendar days (or
within a longer period	within a longer period	within a longer period	within a longer period
agreed upon by the	agreed upon by the	agreed upon by the	agreed upon by the
notifying Planning	notifying Planning	notifying Planning	notifying Planning
Coordinator or	Coordinator or	Coordinator or	Coordinator or
Transmission Planner),	Transmission Planner),	Transmission Planner),	Transmission Planner).
but did provide the	but did provide the	but did provide the	
response within 105	response within	response within	
calendar days (or	greater than 105	greater than 120	
within 15 calendar	calendar days but less	calendar days but less	
days after the longer	than or equal to 120	than or equal to 135	
period agreed upon by	calendar days (or	calendar days (or	
the notifying Planning	within greater than 15	within greater than 30	
Coordinator or	calendar days but less	calendar days but less	
Transmission Planner).	than or equal to 30	than or equal to 45	
	calendar days after the	calendar days after the	
	longer period agreed	longer period agreed	
	upon by the notifying	upon by the notifying	
	Planning Coordinator	Planning Coordinator	
	or Transmission	or Transmission	
	Planner).	Planner).	
	,	,	

R4	Long-term Mediun Planning	n The Planning Coordinator made available the required data to the ERO or its designee but failed to provide less than or equal to 25% of the required data in the format specified by the ERO or its designee.	The Planning Coordinator made available the required data to the ERO or its designee but failed to provide greater than 25% but less than or equal to 50% of the required data in the format specified by the ERO or its designee.	The Planning Coordinator made available the required data to the ERO or its designee but failed to provide greater than 50% but less than or equal to 75% of the required data in the format specified by the ERO or its designee.	The Planning Coordinator made available the required data to the ERO or its designee but failed to provide greater than 75% of the required data in the format specified by the ERO or its designee.
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D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

MOD-032-01 - ATTACHMENT 1:

Data Reporting Requirements

The table, below, indicates the information that is required to effectively model the interconnected transmission system for the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon and Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon. Data must be shareable on an interconnectionwide basis to support use in the Interconnection-wide cases. A Planning Coordinator may specify additional information that includes specific information required for each item in the table below. Each functional entity¹ responsible for reporting the respective data in the table is identified by brackets "[functional entity]" adjacent to and following each data item. The data reported shall be as identified by the bus number, name, and/or identifier that is assigned in conjunction with the PC, TO, or TP.

steady-state	dynamics	short circuit
(Items marked with an asterisk indicate data that vary	(If a user-written model(s) is submitted	
with system operating state or conditions. Those items	in place of a generic or library model, it	
may have different data provided for different modeling	must include the characteristics of the	
scenarios)	model, including block diagrams, values	
	and names for all model parameters,	
	and a list of all state variables)	
1. Each bus [TO]	1. Generator [GO, RP (for future planned	1. Provide for all applicable elements in
a. nominal voltage	resources only)]	column "steady-state" [GO, RP, TO]
b. area, zone and owner	2. Excitation System [GO, RP(for future planned	a. Positive Sequence Data
2. Aggregate Demand ² [LSE]	resources only)]	b. Negative Sequence Data
a. real and reactive power*	3. Governor [GO, RP(for future planned resources	c. Zero Sequence Data
b. in-service status*	only)]	2. Mutual Line Impedance Data [TO]
3. Generating Units ³ [GO, RP (for future planned resources only)]	4. Power System Stabilizer [GO, RP(for future	3. Other information requested by the
a. real power capabilities - gross maximum and minimum values	planned resources only)]	Planning Coordinator or Transmission
b. reactive power capabilities - maximum and minimum values at	5. Demand [LSE]	Planner necessary for modeling

¹ For purposes of this attachment, the functional entity references are represented by abbreviations as follows: Balancing Authority (BA), Generator Owner (GO), Load Serving Entity (LSE), Planning Coordinator (PC), Resource Planner (RP), Transmission Owner (TO), Transmission Planner (TP), and Transmission Service Provider (TSP).

 $^{^2}$ For purposes of this item, aggregate Demand is the Demand aggregated at each bus under item 1 that is identified by a Transmission Owner as a load serving bus. A Load Serving Entity is responsible for providing this information, generally through coordination with the Transmission Owner.

³ Including synchronous condensers and pumped storage.

steady-state	dynamics	short circuit
(Items marked with an asterisk indicate data that vary	(If a user-written model(s) is submitted	
with system operating state or conditions. Those items	in place of a generic or library model, it	
may have different data provided for different modeling	must include the characteristics of the	
scenarios)	model, including block diagrams, values	
	and names for all model parameters,	
	and a list of all state variables)	
real power capabilities in 3a above	6. Wind Turbine Data [GO]	purposes. [BA, GO, LSE, TO, TSP]
c. station service auxiliary load for normal plant configuration	7. Photovoltaic systems [GO]	
(provide data in the same manner as that required for aggregate	8. Static Var Systems and FACTS [GO, TO, LSE]	
Demand under item 2, above).	9. DC system models [TO]	
d. regulated bus* and voltage set point* (as typically provided by	10. Other information requested by the Planning	
the TOP)	Coordinator or Transmission Planner necessary	
e. machine MVA base	for modeling purposes. [BA, GO, LSE, TO, TSP]	
f. generator step up transformer data (provide same data as that		
required for transformer under item 6, below)		
 generator type (hydro, wind, fossil, solar, nuclear, etc) h. in-service status* 		
4. AC Transmission Line or Circuit [TO]		
a. impedance parameters (positive sequence)		
b. susceptance (line charging)		
c. ratings (normal and emergency)*		
d. in-service status*		
5. DC Transmission systems [TO]		
6. Transformer (voltage and phase-shifting) [TO]		
a. nominal voltages of windings		
b. impedance(s)		
 c. tap ratios (voltage or phase angle)* 		
d. minimum and maximum tap position limits		
e. number of tap positions (for both the ULTC and NLTC)		
f. regulated bus (for voltage regulating transformers)*		
g. ratings (normal and emergency)*		
 h. in-service status* 7. Reactive compensation (shunt capacitors and reactors) [TO] 		
 Reactive compensation (shunt capacitors and reactors) [TO] a. admittances (MVars) of each capacitor and reactor 		
b. regulated voltage band limits* (if mode of operation not fixed)		
c. mode of operation (fixed, discrete, continuous, etc.)		
d. regulated bus* (if mode of operation not fixed)		
e. in-service status*		
8. Static Var Systems [TO]		

steady-state (Items marked with an asterisk indicate data that vary with system operating state or conditions. Those items may have different data provided for different modeling scenarios)	dynamics (If a user-written model(s) is submitted in place of a generic or library model, it must include the characteristics of the model, including block diagrams, values and names for all model parameters, and a list of all state variables)	short circuit
 a. reactive limits b. voltage set point* c. fixed/switched shunt, if applicable d. in-service status* 9. Other information requested by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner necessary for modeling purposes. [BA, GO, LSE, TO, TSP] 		

Guidelines and Technical Basis

For purposes of jointly developing steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit modeling data requirements and reporting procedures under Requirement R1, if a Transmission Planner (TP) and Planning Coordinator (PC) mutually agree, a TP may collect and aggregate some or all data from providing entities, and the TP may then provide that data directly to the PC(s) on behalf of the providing entities. The submitting entities are responsible for getting the data to both the TP and the PC, but nothing precludes them from arriving at mutual agreements for them to provide it to the TP, who then provides it to the PC. Such agreement does not relieve the submitting entities from agreeing to consolidate or act as a conduit to pass the data, and it is in fact encouraged in certain circumstances, but the requirement is aimed at the act of submitting the data). Notably, there is no requirement for the TP to provide data to the PC. The intent, in part, is to address potential concerns from entities that they would otherwise be responsible for the quality, nature, and sufficiency of the data provided by other entities.

The requirement in Part 1.3 to include specifications for distribution or posting of the data requirements and reporting procedures could be accomplished in many ways, to include posting on a Web site, distributing directly, or through other methods that the Planning Coordinator and each of its Transmission Planners develop.

An entity submitting data per the requirements of this standard who needs to determine the PC for the area, as a starting point, should contact the local Transmission Owner (TO) for information on the TO's PC. Typically, the PC will be the same for both the local TO and those entities connected to the TO's system. If this is not the case, the local TO's PC can typically provide contact information on other PCs in the area. If the entity (e.g., a Generator Owner [GO]) is requesting connection of a new generator, the entity can determine who the PC is for that area at the time a generator connection request is submitted. Often the TO and PC are the same entity, or the TO can provide information on contacting the PC. The entity should specify as the reason for the request to the TO that the entity needs to provide data to the PC according to this standard. Nothing in the proposed requirement language of this standard is intended to preclude coordination between entities such that one entity, serving only as a conduit, provides the other entity's data to the PC. This can be accomplished if it is mutually agreeable by, for example, the GO (or other entity), TP, and the PC. This does not, however, relieve the original entity from its obligations under the standard to provide data, nor does it pass on the compliance obligation of the entity. The original entity is still accountable for making sure that the data has been provided to the PC according to the requirements of this standard.

The standard language recognizes that differences exist among the Interconnections. Presently, the Eastern/Quebec and Texas Interconnections build seasonal cases on an annual basis, while the Western Interconnection builds cases on a continuous basis throughout the year. The intent of the standard is not to change established processes and procedures in each of the Interconnections, but to create a framework to support both what is already in place or what it may transition into in the future, and to provide further guidance in a common platform for the collection of data that is necessary for the building of the Interconnection-wide case(s).

The construct that these standards replace did not specifically list which Functional Entities were required to provide specific data. Attachment 1 specifically identifies the entities responsible for the data required for the building of the Interconnection-wide case(s).

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

This requirement consolidates the concepts from the original data requirements from MOD-011-0, Requirement R1, and MOD-013-0, Requirement R1. The original requirements specified types of steady-state and dynamics data necessary to model and analyze the steady-state conditions and dynamic behavior or response within each Interconnection. The original requirements, however, did not account for the collection of short circuit data also required to perform short circuit studies. The addition of short circuit data also addresses the outstanding directive from FERC Order No. 890, paragraph 290.

In developing a performance-based standard that would address the data requirements and reporting procedures for model data, it was prohibitively difficult to account for all of the detailed technical concerns associated with the preparation and submittal of model data given that many of these concerns are dependent upon evolving industry modeling needs and software vendor terminology and product capabilities.

This requirement establishes the Planning Coordinator jointly with its Transmission Planners as the developers of technical model data requirements and reporting procedures to be followed by the data owners in the Planning Coordinator's planning area. FERC Order No. 693, paragraphs 1155 and 1162, also direct that the standard apply to Planning Coordinators. The inclusion of Transmission Planners in the applicability section is intended to ensure that the Transmission Planners are able to participate jointly in the development of the data requirements and reporting procedures.

This requirement is also consistent with the recommendations from the NERC System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee (SAMS) White Paper titled "Proposed Improvements for NERC MOD Standards", available from the December 2012 NERC Planning Committee's agenda package, item 3.4, beginning on page 99, <u>here</u>:

Aside from recommendations in support of strengthening and improving MOD-010 through MOD-015, the SAMS paper included the following suggested improvements:

- 1) reduce the quantity of MOD standards;
- 2) add short circuit data as a requirement to the MOD standards; and
- 3) supply data and models:

- a. add requirement identifying who provides and who receives data;
- b. identify acceptability;
- c. standard format;
- d. how to deal with new technologies (user written models if no standard model exists); and
- e. shareability.
- 4) These suggested improvements are addressed by combining the existing standards into two new standards, one standard for the submission and collection of data, and one for the validation of the planning models. Adding the requirement for the submittal of short circuit data is also an improvement from the existing standards, consistent with FERC Order No. 890, paragraph 290. In supplying data, the approach clearly identifies what data is required and which Functional Entity is required to provide the data.
- 5) The requirement uses an attachment approach to support data collection. The attachment specifically lists the entities that are required to provide each type of data and the steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit data that is required.
- 6) Finally, the decision to combine steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit data requirements into one requirement rather than three reflects that they all support the requirement of submission of data in general.

Rationale for R2:

This requirement satisfies the directive from FERC Order No. 693, paragraph 1155, which directs that "the planning authority should be included in this Reliability Standard because the planning authority is the entity responsible for the coordination and integration of transmission facilities and resource plans, as well as one of the entities responsible for the integrity and consistency of the data."

Rationale for R3:

In order to maintain a certain level of accuracy in the representation of a power system, the data that is submitted must be correct, periodically checked, and updated. Data used to perform steady-state, dynamics, and short circuit studies can change, for example, as a result of new planned transmission construction (in comparison to as-built information) or changes performed during the restoration of the transmission network due to weather-related events. One set of data that changes on a more frequent basis is load data, and updates to load data are needed when new improved forecasts are created.

This requirement provides a mechanism for the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner (that does not exist in the current standards) to collect corrected data from the entities that have the data. It provides a feedback loop to address technical concerns related to the data when the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner identifies technical concerns, such as concerns about the usability of data or simply that the data is not in the correct format and cannot be used. The requirement also establishes a time-frame for response to address timeliness.

Rationale for R4:

This requirement will replace MOD-014 and MOD-015.

This requirement recognizes the differences among Interconnections in model building processes, and it creates an obligation for Planning Coordinators to make available data for its planning area.

The requirement creates a clear expectation that Planning Coordinators will make available data that they collect under Requirement R2 in support of their respective Interconnection-wide case(s). While different entities in each Interconnection create the Interconnection-wide case(s), the requirement to submit the data to the "ERO or its designee" supports a framework whereby NERC, in collaboration and agreement with those other organizations, can designate the appropriate organizations in each Interconnection to build the specific Interconnection-wide case(s). It does not prescribe a specific group or process to build the larger Interconnection-wide case(s), but only requires the Planning Coordinators to make available data in support of their creation, consistent with the SAMS Proposed Improvements to NERC MOD Standards (at page 3) that, "industry best practices and existing processes should be considered in the development of requirements, *as many entities are successfully coordinating their efforts.*" (Emphasis added).

This requirement is about the Planning Coordinator's obligation to make information available for use in the Interconnection-wide case(s); it is not a requirement to build the Interconnection-wide case(s).

For example, under current practice, the Eastern Interconnection Reliability Assessment Group (ERAG) builds the Eastern Interconnection and Quebec Interconnection-wide cases, the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) builds the Western Interconnection-wide cases, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) builds the Texas Interconnection-wide cases. This requirement does not require a change to that construct, and, assuming continued agreement by those organizations, ERAG, WECC, and ERCOT could be the "designee" for each Interconnection contemplated by this requirement. Similarly, the requirement does not prohibit transition, and the requirement remains for the Planning Coordinators to make available the information to the ERO or to whomever the ERO has coordinated with and designated as the recipient of such information for purposes of creation of each of the Interconnection–wide cases.

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	February 6, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Developed to consolidate and replace MOD-010-0, MOD -011-0, MOD-012-0, MOD-013-1, MOD-014-0, and MOD-015-0.1
1	May 1, 2014	FERC Order issued approving	See Implementation Plan

Version History

Ν	MOD-032-1.	posted on the Reliability Standards web page for details on enforcement
		dates for Requirements.

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A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Steady-State and Dynamic System Model Validation
- 2. Number: MOD-033-2
- **3. Purpose:** To establish consistent validation requirements to facilitate the collection of accurate data and building of planning models to analyze the reliability of the interconnected transmission system.
- 4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. Functional Entities:
 - 4.1.1 Planning Coordinator
 - 4.1.2 Reliability Coordinator
 - 4.1.3 Transmission Operator
- 5. Effective Date*: See BC Implementation Plan for MOD-033-2.

B. Requirements and Measures

- **R1.** Each Planning Coordinator shall implement a documented data validation process that includes the following attributes: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **1.1.** Comparison of the performance of the Planning Coordinator's portion of the existing system in a planning power flow model to actual system behavior, represented by a state estimator case or other Real-time data sources, at least once every 24 calendar months through simulation;
 - **1.2.** Comparison of the performance of the Planning Coordinator's portion of the existing system in a planning dynamic model to actual system response, through simulation of a dynamic local event, at least once every 24 calendar months (use a dynamic local event that occurs within 24 calendar months of the last dynamic local event used in comparison, and complete each comparison within 24 calendar months of the dynamic local event). If no dynamic local event occurs within the 24 calendar months, use the next dynamic local event that occurs;
 - **1.3.** Guidelines the Planning Coordinator will use to determine unacceptable differences in performance under Part 1.1 or 1.2; and
 - **1.4.** Guidelines to resolve the unacceptable differences in performance identified under Part 1.3.
- M1. Each Planning Coordinator shall provide evidence that it has a documented validation process according to Requirement R1 as well as evidence that demonstrates the implementation of the required components of the process.
- **R2.** Each Reliability Coordinator and Transmission Operator shall provide actual system behavior data (or a written response that it does not have the requested data) to any Planning Coordinator performing validation under Requirement R1 within 30 calendar days of a written request, such as, but not limited to, state estimator case or other Real-time data (including disturbance data recordings) necessary for actual system response validation. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each Reliability Coordinator and Transmission Operator shall provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date that it has distributed the requested data or written response that it does not have the data, to any Planning Coordinator performing validation under Requirement R1 within 30 days of a written request in accordance with Requirement R2; or a statement by the Reliability Coordinator or Transmission Operator that it has not received notification regarding data necessary for validation by any Planning Coordinator.

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority**

The British Columbia Utilities Commission.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance with Requirements R1 through R2, and Measures M1 through M2, since the last audit, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

If an applicable entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Planning Coordinator documented and implemented a process to validate data but did not address one of the four required topics under Requirement R1;	The Planning Coordinator documented and implemented a process to validate data but did not address two of the four required topics under Requirement R1;	The Planning Coordinator documented and implemented a process to validate data but did not address three of the four required topics under Requirement R1;	The Planning Coordinator did not have a validation process at all or did not document or implement any of the four required topics under Requirement R1; OR
			OR The Planning Coordinator did not perform simulation as required by part 1.1 within 24 calendar months but did perform the simulation within 28 calendar months; OR The Planning Coordinator did not perform simulation as	OR The Planning Coordinator did not perform simulation as required by part 1.1 within 24 calendar months but did perform the simulation in greater than 28 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months; OR	OR The Planning Coordinator did not perform simulation as required by part 1.1 within 24 calendar months but did perform the simulation in greater than 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months; OR	The Planning Coordinator did not validate its portion of the system in the power flow model as required by part 1.1 within 36 calendar months; OR The Planning Coordinator did not perform simulation as required by part 1.2 within 36 calendar

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R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels				
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
			required by part 1.2 within 24 calendar months (or the next dynamic local event in cases where there is more than 24 months between events) but did perform the simulation within 28 calendar months.	The Planning Coordinator did not perform simulation as required by part 1.2 within 24 calendar months (or the next dynamic local event in cases where there is more than 24 months between events) but did perform the simulation in greater than 28 calendar months but less than or equal to 32 calendar months.	The Planning Coordinator did not perform simulation as required by part 1.2 within 24 calendar months (or the next dynamic local event in cases where there is more than 24 months between events) but did perform the simulation in greater than 32 calendar months but less than or equal to 36 calendar months.	months (or the next dynamic local event in cases where there is more than 24 months between events).	
R2	Long-term Planning	Lower	The Reliability Coordinator or Transmission Operator did not provide requested actual system behavior data (or a written response that it does not have the requested data) to a requesting Planning	The Reliability Coordinator or Transmission Operator did not provide requested actual system behavior data (or a written response that it does not have the requested data) to a requesting Planning	The Reliability Coordinator or Transmission Operator did not provide requested actual system behavior data (or a written response that it does not have the requested data) to a requesting Planning	The Reliability Coordinator or Transmission Operator did not provide requested actual system behavior data (or a written response that it does not have the requested data) to a requesting Planning	

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			Coordinator within 30 calendar days of the written request, but did provide the data (or written response that it does not have the requested data) in less than or equal to 45 calendar days.	Coordinator within 30 calendar days of the written request, but did provide the data (or written response that it does not have the requested data) in greater than 45 calendar days but less than or equal to 60 calendar days.	Coordinator within 30 calendar days of the written request, but did provide the data (or written response that it does not have the requested data) in greater than 60 calendar days but less than or equal to 75 calendar days.	Coordinator within 75 calendar days; OR The Reliability Coordinator or Transmission Operator provided a written response that it does not have the requested data, but actually had the data.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

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Guidelines and Technical Basis

Requirement R1:

The requirement focuses on the results-based outcome of developing a process for and performing a validation, but does not prescribe a specific method or procedure for the validation outside of the attributes specified in the requirement. For further information on suggested validation procedures, see "Procedures for Validation of Powerflow and Dynamics Cases" produced by the NERC Model Working Group.

The specific process is left to the judgment of the Planning Coordinator, but the Planning Coordinator is required to develop and include in its process guidelines for evaluating discrepancies between actual system behavior or response and expected system performance for determining whether the discrepancies are unacceptable.

For the validation in part 1.1, the state estimator case or other Real-time data should be taken as close to system peak as possible. However, other snapshots of the system could be used if deemed to be more appropriate by the Planning Coordinator. While the requirement specifies "once every 24 calendar months," entities are encouraged to perform the comparison on a more frequent basis.

In performing the comparison required in part 1.1, the Planning Coordinator may consider, among other criteria:

- 1. System load;
- 2. Transmission topology and parameters;
- 3. Voltage at major buses; and
- 4. Flows on major transmission elements.

The validation in part 1.1 would include consideration of the load distribution and load power factors (as applicable) used in the power flow models. The validation may be made using metered load data if state estimator cases are not available. The comparison of system load distribution and load power factors shall be made on an aggregate company or power flow zone level at a minimum but may also be made on a bus by bus, load pocket (e.g., within a Balancing Authority), or smaller area basis as deemed appropriate by the Planning Coordinator.

The scope of dynamics model validation is intended to be limited, for purposes of part 1.2, to the Planning Coordinator's planning area, and the intended emphasis under the requirement is on local events or local phenomena, not the whole Interconnection.

The validation required in part 1.2 may include simulations that are to be compared with actual system data and may include comparisons of:

- Voltage oscillations at major buses
- System frequency (for events with frequency excursions)
- Real and reactive power oscillations on generating units and major inter-area ties

Determining when a dynamic local event might occur may be unpredictable, and because of the analytic complexities involved in simulation, the time parameters in part 1.2 specify that the comparison period of "at least once every 24 calendar months" is intended to both provide for at least 24 months between dynamic local events used in the comparisons and that comparisons must be completed within 24 months of the date of the dynamic local event used. This clarification ensures that PCs will not face a timing scenario that makes it impossible to comply. If the time referred to the completion time of the comparison, it would be possible for an event to occur in month 23 since the last comparison, leaving only one month to complete the comparison. With the 30 day timeframe in Requirement R2 for TOPs or RCs to provide actual system behavior data (if necessary in the comparison), it would potentially be impossible to complete the comparison within the 24 month timeframe.

In contrast, the requirement language clarifies that the time frame between dynamic local events used in the comparisons should be within 24 months of each other (or, as specified at the end of part 1.2, in the event more than 24 months passes before the next dynamic local event, the comparison should use the next dynamic local event that occurs). Each comparison must be completed within 24 months of the dynamic local event used. In this manner, the potential problem with a "month 23" dynamic local event described above is resolved. For example, if a PC uses for comparison a dynamic local event occurring on day 1 of month 1, the PC has 24 calendar months from that dynamic local event's occurrence to complete the comparison. If the next dynamic event the PC chooses for comparison occurs in month 23, the PC has 24 months from that dynamic local event's occurrence to complete the comparison.

Part 1.3 requires the PC to include guidelines in its documented validation process for determining when discrepancies in the comparison of simulation results with actual system results are unacceptable. The PC may develop the guidelines required by parts 1.3 and 1.4 itself, reference other established guidelines, or both. For the power flow comparison, as an example, this could include a guideline the Planning Coordinator will use that flows on 500 kV lines should be within 10% or 100 MW, whichever is larger. It could be different percentages or MW amounts for different voltage levels. Or, as another example, the guideline for voltage comparisons could be that it must be within 1%. But the guidelines the PC includes within its documented validation process should be meaningful for the Planning Coordinator's system. Guidelines for the dynamic event comparison may be less precise. Regardless, the comparison should indicate that the conclusions drawn from the two results should be consistent. For example, the guideline could state that the simulation result will be plotted on the same graph as the actual system response. Then the two plots could be given a visual inspection to see if they look similar or not. Or a guideline could be defined such that the rise time of the transient response in the simulation should be within 20% of the rise time of the actual system response. As for the power flow guidelines, the dynamic comparison criteria should be meaningful for the Planning Coordinator's system.

The guidelines the PC includes in its documented validation process to resolve differences in Part 1.4 could include direct coordination with the data owner, and, if necessary, through the provisions of MOD-032-1, Requirement R3 (i.e., the validation performed under this requirement could identify technical concerns with the data). In other words, while this standard is focused on validation, results of the validation may identify data provided under the

modeling data standard that needs to be corrected. If a model with estimated data or a generic model is used for a generator, and the model response does not match the actual response, then the estimated data should be corrected or a more detailed model should be requested from the data provider.

While the validation is focused on the Planning Coordinator's planning area, the model for the validation should be one that contains a wider area of the Interconnection than the Planning Coordinator's area. If the simulations can be made to match the actual system responses by reasonable changes to the data in the Planning Coordinator's area, then the Planning Coordinator should make those changes in coordination with the data provider. However, for some disturbances, the data in the Planning Coordinator's area may not be what is causing the simulations to not match actual responses. These situations should be reported to the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO). The guidelines the Planning Coordinator includes under Part 1.4 could cover these situations.

Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for R1:

In FERC Order No. 693, paragraph 1210, the Commission directed inclusion of "a requirement that the models be validated against actual system responses." Furthermore, the Commission directs in paragraph 1211, "that actual system events be simulated and if the model output is not within the accuracy required, the model shall be modified to achieve the necessary accuracy." Paragraph 1220 similarly directs validation against actual system responses relative to dynamics system models. In FERC Order 890, paragraph 290, the Commission states that "the models should be updated and benchmarked to actual events." Requirement R1 addresses these directives.

Requirement R1 requires the Planning Coordinator to implement a documented data validation process to validate data in the Planning Coordinator's portion of the existing system in the steady-state and dynamic models to compare performance against expected behavior or response, which is consistent with the Commission directives. The validation of the full Interconnection-wide cases is left up to the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) or its designees, and is not addressed by this standard. The following items were chosen for the validation requirement:

A. Comparison of performance of the existing system in a planning power flow model to actual system behavior; and

B. Comparison of the performance of the existing system in a planning dynamics model to actual system response.

Implementation of these validations will result in more accurate power flow and dynamic models. This, in turn, should result in better correlation between system flows and voltages

seen in power flow studies and the actual values seen by system operators during outage conditions. Similar improvements should be expected for dynamics studies, such that the results will more closely match the actual responses of the power system to disturbances.

Validation of model data is a good utility practice, but it does not easily lend itself to Reliability Standards requirement language. Furthermore, it is challenging to determine specifications for thresholds of disturbances that should be validated and how they are determined. Therefore, this requirement focuses on the Planning Coordinator performing validation pursuant to its process, which must include the attributes listed in parts 1.1 through 1.4, without specifying the details of "how" it must validate, which is necessarily dependent upon facts and circumstances. Other validations are best left to guidance rather than standard requirements.

Rationale for R2:

The Planning Coordinator will need actual system behavior data in order to perform the validations required in R1. The Reliability Coordinator or Transmission Operator may have this data. Requirement R2 requires the Reliability Coordinator and Transmission Operator to supply actual system data, if it has the data, to any requesting Planning Coordinator for purposes of model validation under Requirement R1.

This could also include information the Reliability Coordinator or Transmission Operator has at a field site. For example, if a PMU or DFR is at a generator site and it is recording the disturbance, the Reliability Coordinator or Transmission Operator would typically have that data.

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	February 6, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Developed as a new standard for system validation to address outstanding directives from FERC Order No. 693 and recommendations from several other sources.
1	May 1, 2014	FERC Order issued approving MOD-033-1.	
2	February 6, 2020	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Revisions under Project 2017-07
2	October 30, 2020	FERC Order approving MOD- 033-2. Docket No. RD20-4-000	

Version History

2	April 1, 2021	Effective Date	
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A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding
- 2. Number: PRC-006-5
- **3. Purpose:** To establish design and documentation requirements for automatic underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) programs to arrest declining frequency, assist recovery of frequency following underfrequency events and provide last resort system preservation measures.

4. Applicability:

- **4.1.** Planning Coordinators
- **4.2.** UFLS entities shall mean all entities that are responsible for the ownership, operation, or control of UFLS equipment as required by the UFLS program established by the Planning Coordinators. Such entities may include one or more of the following:
 - **4.2.1** Transmission Owners
 - **4.2.2** Distribution Providers
 - **4.2.3** UFLS-Only Distribution Providers
- **4.3.** Transmission Owners that own Elements identified in the UFLS program established by the Planning Coordinators.
- 5. Effective Date*:

B. Requirements and Measures

- R1. Each Planning Coordinator shall develop and document criteria, including consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the Bulk Electric System (BES), including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas that may form islands. [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M1. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, or other documentation of its criteria to select portions of the Bulk Electric System that may form islands including how system studies and historical events were considered to develop the criteria per Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each Planning Coordinator shall identify one or more islands to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program including: [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - 2.1. Those islands selected by applying the criteria in Requirement R1, and

- **2.2.** Any portions of the BES designed to detach from the Interconnection (planned islands) as a result of the operation of a relay scheme or Special Protection System, and
- **2.3.** A single island that includes all portions of the BES in either the Regional Entity area or the Interconnection in which the Planning Coordinator's area resides. If a Planning Coordinator's area resides in multiple Regional Entity areas, each of those Regional Entity areas shall be identified as an island. Planning Coordinators may adjust island boundaries to differ from Regional Entity area boundaries by mutual consent where necessary for the sole purpose of producing contiguous regional islands more suitable for simulation.
- M2. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, or other documentation supporting its identification of an island(s) as a basis for designing a UFLS program that meet the criteria in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1 through 2.3.
- **R3.** Each Planning Coordinator shall develop a UFLS program, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, that meets the following performance characteristics in simulations of underfrequency conditions resulting from an imbalance scenario, where an imbalance = [(load actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s). [VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **3.1.** Frequency shall remain above the Underfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
 - **3.2.** Frequency shall remain below the Overfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
 - **3.3.** Volts per Hz (V/Hz) shall not exceed 1.18 per unit for longer than two seconds cumulatively per simulated event, and shall not exceed 1.10 per unit for longer than 45 seconds cumulatively per simulated event at each generator bus and generator step-up transformer high-side bus associated with each of the following:
 - Individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
 - Generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
 - Facilities consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA gross nameplate rating.
- **M3.** Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, program plans, or other documentation of its UFLS program, including the

notification of the UFLS entities of implementation schedule, that meet the criteria in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1 through 3.3.

- **R4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct and document a UFLS design assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2. The simulation shall model each of the following: [VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **4.1.** Underfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
 - **4.2.** Underfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
 - **4.3.** Underfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
 - **4.4.** Overfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
 - **4.5.** Overfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
 - 4.6. Overfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
 - **4.7.** Any automatic Load restoration that impacts frequency stabilization and operates within the duration of the simulations run for the assessment.
- M4. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, dynamic simulation models and results, or other dated documentation of its UFLS design assessment that demonstrates it meets Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.
- **R5.** Each Planning Coordinator, whose area or portions of whose area is part of an island identified by it or another Planning Coordinator which includes multiple Planning Coordinator areas or portions of those areas, shall coordinate its UFLS program design with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are also part of the same identified island through one of the following: [VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- Develop a common UFLS program design and schedule for implementation per Requirement R3 among the Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are part of the same identified island, or
- Conduct a joint UFLS design assessment per Requirement R4 among the Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are part of the same identified island, or
- Conduct an independent UFLS design assessment per Requirement R4 for the identified island, and in the event the UFLS design assessment fails to meet Requirement R3, identify modifications to the UFLS program(s) to meet Requirement R3 and report these modifications as recommendations to the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are also part of the same identified island and the ERO.
- **M5.** Each Planning Coordinator, whose area or portions of whose area is part of an island identified by it or another Planning Coordinator which includes multiple Planning Coordinator areas or portions of those areas, shall have dated evidence such as joint UFLS program design documents, reports describing a joint UFLS design assessment, letters that include recommendations, or other dated documentation demonstrating that it coordinated its UFLS program design with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas are also part of the same identified island per Requirement R5.
- **R6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall maintain a UFLS database containing data necessary to model its UFLS program for use in event analyses and assessments of the UFLS program at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between maintenance activities. [VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M6. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as a UFLS database, data requests, data input forms, or other dated documentation to show that it maintained a UFLS database for use in event analyses and assessments of the UFLS program per Requirement R6 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between maintenance activities.
- **R7.** Each Planning Coordinator shall provide its UFLS database containing data necessary to model its UFLS program to other Planning Coordinators within its Interconnection within 30 calendar days of a request. [VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M7. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as letters, memorandums, e-mails or other dated documentation that it provided their UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators within their Interconnection within 30 calendar days of a request per Requirement R7.
- **R8.** Each UFLS entity shall provide data to its Planning Coordinator(s) according to the format and schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. [VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M8. Each UFLS Entity shall have dated evidence such as responses to data requests, spreadsheets, letters or other dated documentation that it provided data to its Planning Coordinator according to the format and schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator to support maintenance of the UFLS database per Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each UFLS entity shall provide automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, as determined by its Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which it owns assets. [VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M9.** Each UFLS Entity shall have dated evidence such as spreadsheets summarizing feeder load armed with UFLS relays, spreadsheets with UFLS relay settings, or other dated documentation that it provided automatic tripping of load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, per Requirement R9.
- **R10.** Each Transmission Owner shall provide automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage as a result of underfrequency load shedding if required by the UFLS program and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, as determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission. [*VRF: High*][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M10. Each Transmission Owner shall have dated evidence such as relay settings, tripping logic or other dated documentation that it provided automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors in order to control over-voltage as a result of underfrequency load shedding if required by the UFLS program and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, per Requirement R10.
- **R11.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event results in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall conduct and document an assessment of the event within one year of event actuation to evaluate: [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]
 - 11.1. The performance of the UFLS equipment,
 - **11.2.** The effectiveness of the UFLS program.
- M11. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it conducted an event assessment of the performance of the UFLS equipment and the effectiveness of the UFLS program per Requirement R11.
- R12. Each Planning Coordinator, in whose islanding event assessment (per R11) UFLS program deficiencies are identified, shall conduct and document a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies within two years of event actuation. [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]

- M12. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it conducted a UFLS design assessment per Requirements R12 and R4 if UFLS program deficiencies are identified in R11.
- **R13.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event occurred that also included the area(s) or portions of area(s) of other Planning Coordinator(s) in the same islanding event and that resulted in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall coordinate its event assessment (in accordance with Requirement R11) with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event through one of the following: [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]
 - Conduct a joint event assessment per Requirement R11 among the Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event, or
 - Conduct an independent event assessment per Requirement R11 that reaches conclusions and recommendations consistent with those of the event assessments of the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event, or
 - Conduct an independent event assessment per Requirement R11 and where the assessment fails to reach conclusions and recommendations consistent with those of the event assessments of the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event, identify differences in the assessments that likely resulted in the differences in the conclusions and recommendations and report these differences to the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas or portions of whose areas and report these differences to the other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were included in the same islanding event and the ERO.
- M13. Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event occurred that also included the area(s) or portions of area(s) of other Planning Coordinator(s) in the same islanding event and that resulted in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall have dated evidence such as a joint assessment report, independent assessment reports and letters describing likely reasons for differences in conclusions and recommendations, or other dated documentation demonstrating it coordinated its event assessment (per Requirement R11) with all other Planning Coordinator(s) whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event per Requirement R13.
- **R14.** Each Planning Coordinator shall respond to written comments submitted by UFLS entities and Transmission Owners within its Planning Coordinator area following a comment period and before finalizing its UFLS program, indicating in the written response to comments whether changes will be made or reasons why changes will not be made to the following [VRF: Lower][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]:

- 14.1. UFLS program, including a schedule for implementation
- 14.2. UFLS design assessment
- 14.3. Format and schedule of UFLS data submittal
- M14. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence of responses, such as e-mails and letters, to written comments submitted by UFLS entities and Transmission Owners within its Planning Coordinator area following a comment period and before finalizing its UFLS program per Requirement R14.
- **R15.** Each Planning Coordinator that conducts a UFLS design assessment under Requirement R4, R5, or R12 and determines that the UFLS program does not meet the performance characteristics in Requirement R3, shall develop a Corrective Action Plan and a schedule for implementation by the UFLS entities within its area. [VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **15.1.** For UFLS design assessments performed under Requirement R4 or R5, the Corrective Action Plan shall be developed within the five-year time frame identified in Requirement R4.
 - **15.2.** For UFLS design assessments performed under Requirement R12, the Corrective Action Plan shall be developed within the two-year time frame identified in Requirement R12.
- M15. Each Planning Coordinator that conducts a UFLS design assessment under Requirement R4, R5, or R12 and determines that the UFLS program does not meet the performance characteristics in Requirement R3, shall have a dated Corrective Action Plan and a schedule for implementation by the UFLS entities within its area, that was developed within the time frame identified in Part 15.1 or 15.2.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

The British Columbia Utilities Commission.

1.2. Evidence Retention

Each Planning Coordinator and UFLS entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain the current evidence of Requirements R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R12, R14, and R15, Measures M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M12, M14, and M15 as well as any evidence necessary to show compliance since the last compliance audit.
- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain the current evidence of UFLS database update in accordance with Requirement R6, Measure M6, and evidence of the prior year's UFLS database update.
- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain evidence of any UFLS database transmittal to another Planning Coordinator since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R7, Measure M7.
- Each UFLS entity shall retain evidence of UFLS data transmittal to the Planning Coordinator(s) since the last compliance audit in accordance with Requirement R8, Measure M8.
- Each UFLS entity shall retain the current evidence of adherence with the UFLS program in accordance with Requirement R9, Measure M9, and evidence of adherence since the last compliance audit.
- Transmission Owner shall retain the current evidence of adherence with the UFLS program in accordance with Requirement R10, Measure M10, and evidence of adherence since the last compliance audit.
- Each Planning Coordinator shall retain evidence of Requirements R11, and R13, and Measures M11, and M13 for 6 calendar years.

If a Planning Coordinator or UFLS entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant or for the retention period specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

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Violation Severity Levels

R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	N/A	The Planning Coordinator developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas that may form islands. OR	The Planning Coordinator developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas, that may form islands.	The Planning Coordinator failed to develop and document criteria to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas, that may form islands.
		The Planning Coordinator developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas and Regional Entity areas, that may form islands.		
R2	N/A	The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) to	The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) to serve	The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) to serve

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R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
		serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include one (1) of the Parts as specified in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, 2.2, or 2.3.	as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include two (2) of the Parts as specified in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, 2.2, or 2.3.	as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include all of the Parts as specified in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, 2.2, or 2.3.
				OR
				The Planning Coordinator failed to identify any island(s) to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program.
R3	N/A	The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area where imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s)., but failed to meet one (1) of the performance characteristic in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1, 3.2, or 3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions.	The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area where imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s)., but failed to meet two (2) of the performance characteristic in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1, 3.2, or 3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions.	The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area where imbalance = [(load — actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s).,but failed to meet all the performance characteristic in Requirement R3, Parts 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions. OR
				The Planning Coordinator failed to develop a UFLS program

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R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area
R4	The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 but the simulation failed to include one (1) of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.	The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 but the simulation failed to include two (2) of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.	The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2 but the simulation failed to include three (3) of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7.	The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 but simulation failed to include four (4) or more of the items as specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.7. OR The Planning Coordinator failed to conduct and document a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement R3 for each island identified in Requirement R2

R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R5	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, whose area or portions of whose area is part of an island identified by it or another Planning Coordinator which includes multiple Planning Coordinator areas or portions of those areas, failed to coordinate its UFLS program design through one of the manners described in Requirement R5.
R6	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator failed to maintain a UFLS database for use in event analyses and assessments of the UFLS program at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between maintenance activities.
R7	The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 30 calendar days and up to and including 40 calendar days following the request.	The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 40 calendar days but less than and including 50 calendar days following the request.	The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 50 calendar days but less than and including 60 calendar days following the request.	The Planning Coordinator provided its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators more than 60 calendar days following the request. OR

R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				The Planning Coordinator failed to provide its UFLS database to other Planning Coordinators.
R8	The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) less than or equal to 10 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database.	The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) more than 10 calendar days but less than or equal to 15 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. OR The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) but the data was not according to the format specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database.	The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) more than 15 calendar days but less than or equal to 20 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database.	The UFLS entity provided data to its Planning Coordinator(s) more than 20 calendar days following the schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database. OR The UFLS entity failed to provide data to its Planning Coordinator(s) to support maintenance of each Planning Coordinator's UFLS database.
R9	The UFLS entity provided less than 100% but more than (and including) 95% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS	The UFLS entity provided less than 95% but more than (and including) 90% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design	The UFLS entity provided less than 90% but more than (and including) 85% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design	The UFLS entity provided less than 85% of automatic tripping of Load in accordance with the UFLS program design and schedule for implementation,

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R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	program design and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, as determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets.	and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, as determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets.	and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, as determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets.	including any Corrective Action Plan, as determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) area in which it owns assets.
R10	The Transmission Owner provided less than 100% but more than (and including) 95% automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over- voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, as determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission.	The Transmission Owner provided less than 95% but more than (and including) 90% automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over- voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, as determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission.	The Transmission Owner provided less than 90% but more than (and including) 85% automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over- voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, as determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission.	The Transmission Owner provided less than 85% automatic switching of its existing capacitor banks, Transmission Lines, and reactors to control over-voltage if required by the UFLS program and schedule for implementation, including any Corrective Action Plan, as determined by the Planning Coordinator(s) in each Planning Coordinator area in which the Transmission Owner owns transmission.
R11	The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of	The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of	The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the	The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program,

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R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than one year but less than or equal to 13 months of actuation.	the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than 13 months but less than or equal to 14 months of actuation.	UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than 14 months but less than or equal to 15 months of actuation. OR The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate one (1) of the Parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts11.1 or 11.2.	conducted and documented an assessment of the event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2 within a time greater than 15 months of actuation. OR The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, failed to conduct and document an assessment of the event and evaluate the Parts as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2. OR The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, conducted and documented an assessment of the event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate all of the Parts

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R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				as specified in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 and 11.2.
R12	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, conducted and documented a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies greater than two years but less than or equal to 25 months of event actuation.	The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, conducted and documented a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies greater than 25 months but less than or equal to 26 months of event actuation.	The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, conducted and documented a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies greater than 26 months of event actuation. OR The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement R11, failed to conduct and document a UFLS design assessment to consider the identified deficiencies.
R13	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event occurred that also included the area(s) or portions of area(s) of other Planning Coordinator(s) in the same islanding event and that resulted in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS

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R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				program, failed to coordinate its UFLS event assessment with all other Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event in one of the manners described in Requirement R13
R14	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator failed to respond to written comments submitted by UFLS entities and Transmission Owners within its Planning Coordinator area following a comment period and before finalizing its UFLS program, indicating in the written response to comments whether changes were made or reasons why changes were not made to the items in Parts 14.1 through 14.3.
R15	N/A	The Planning Coordinator determined, through a UFLS design assessment performed under Requirement R4, R5, or R12, that the UFLS program did not meet the performance characteristics in Requirement	The Planning Coordinator determined, through a UFLS design assessment performed under Requirement R4, R5, or R12, that the UFLS program did not meet the performance characteristics in Requirement	The Planning Coordinator determined, through a UFLS design assessment performed under Requirement R4, R5, or R12, that the UFLS program did not meet the performance characteristics in Requirement

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R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
		R3, and developed a Corrective Action Plan and a schedule for implementation by the UFLS entities within its area, but exceeded the permissible time frame for development by a period of up to 1 month.	R3, and developed a Corrective Action Plan and a schedule for implementation by the UFLS entities within its area, but exceeded the permissible time frame for development by a period greater than 1 month but not more than 2 months.	R3, but failed to develop a Corrective Action Plan and a schedule for implementation by the UFLS entities within its area. OR The Planning Coordinator determined, through a UFLS design assessment performed under Requirement R4, R5, or R12, that the UFLS program did not meet the performance characteristics in Requirement R3, and developed a Corrective Action Plan and a schedule for implementation by the UFLS entities within its area, but exceeded the permissible time frame for development by a period greater than 2 months.

D. Regional Variances

D.A. Regional Variance for the Quebec Interconnection

The following Interconnection-wide variance shall be applicable in the Quebec Interconnection and replaces, in their entirety, Requirements R3 and R4 and the violation severity levels associated with Requirements R3 and R4.

Rationale for Requirement D.A.3:

There are two modifications for requirement D.A.3 :

1. <u>25% Generation Deficiency</u>: Since the Quebec Interconnection has no potential viable BES Island in underfrequency conditions, the largest generation deficiency scenarios are limited to extreme contingencies not already covered by RAS.

Based on Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie Transmission Planning requirements, the stability of the network shall be maintained for extreme contingencies using a case representing internal transfers not expected to be exceeded 25% of the time.

The Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie defense plan to cover these extreme contingencies includes two RAS (RPTC- generation rejection and remote load shedding and TDST - a centralized UVLS) and the UFLS.

2. <u>Frequency performance curve (attachment 1A) :</u> Specific cases where a small generation deficiency using a peak case scenario with the minimum requirement of spinning reserve can lead to an acceptable frequency deviation in the Quebec Interconnection while stabilizing between the PRC-006-2 requirement (59.3 Hz) and the UFLS anti-stall threshold (59.0 Hz).

An increase of the anti-stall threshold to 59.3 Hz would correct this situation but would cause frequent load shedding of customers without any gain of system reliability. Therefore, it is preferable to lower the steady state frequency minimum value to 59.0 Hz.

The delay in the performance characteristics curve is harmonized between D.A.3 and R.3 to 60 seconds.

Rationale for Requirements D.A.3.3. and D.A.4:

The Quebec Interconnection has its own definition of BES. In Quebec, the vast majority of BES generating plants/facilities are not directly connected to the BES. For simulations to take into account sufficient generating resources D.A.3.3 and D.A.4 need simply refer to BES generators, plants or facilities since these are listed in a Registry approved by Québec's Regulatory Body (Régie de l'Énergie).

D.A.3. Each Planning Coordinator shall develop a UFLS program, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, that meets the following performance characteristics in simulations of underfrequency conditions resulting from each of these extreme events:

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- Loss of the entire capability of a generating station.
- Loss of all transmission circuits emanating from a generating station, switching station, substation or dc terminal.
- Loss of all transmission circuits on a common right-of-way.
- Three-phase fault with failure of a circuit breaker to operate and correct operation of a breaker failure protection system and its associated breakers.
- Three-phase fault on a circuit breaker, with normal fault clearing.
- The operation or partial operation of a RAS for an event or condition for which it was not intended to operate.

[VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **D.A.3.1.** Frequency shall remain above the Underfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006 - Attachment 1A, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.0 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
- **D.A.3.2.** Frequency shall remain below the Overfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006 - Attachment 1A, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.0 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
- **D.A.3.3.** Volts per Hz (V/Hz) shall not exceed 1.18 per unit for longer than two seconds cumulatively per simulated event, and shall not exceed 1.10 per unit for longer than 45 seconds cumulatively per simulated event at each Quebec BES generator bus and associated generator step-up transformer high-side bus
- M.D.A.3. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, program plans, or other documentation of its UFLS program, including the notification of the UFLS entities of implementation schedule, that meet the criteria in Requirement D.A.3 Parts D.A.3.1 through D.A.3.3.
- D.A.4. Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct and document a UFLS design assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement D.A.3 for each island identified in Requirement R2. The simulation shall model each of the following; [VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **D.A.4.1** Underfrequency trip settings of individual generating units that are part of Quebec BES plants/facilities that trip above the Generator

Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006 - Attachment 1A, and

- D.A.4.2 Overfrequency trip settings of individual generating units that are part of Quebec BES plants/facilities that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006 Attachment 1A, and
- **D.A.4.3** Any automatic Load restoration that impacts frequency stabilization and operates within the duration of the simulations run for the assessment.
- M.D.A.4. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence such as reports, dynamic simulation models and results, or other dated documentation of its UFLS design assessment that demonstrates it meets Requirement D.A.4 Parts D.A.4.1 through D.A.4.3.

D#	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
DA3	N/A	The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet one (1) of the performance characteristic in Parts D.A.3.1, D.A.3.2, or D.A.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions	The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet two (2) of the performance characteristic in Parts D.A.3.1, D.A.3.2, or D.A.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions	The Planning Coordinator developed a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet all the performance characteristic in Parts D.A.3.1, D.A.3.2, and D.A.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions OR The Planning Coordinator failed to develop a UFLS program including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area.
DA4	N/A	The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement D.A.3 but the simulation failed to include one (1) of the items as	The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement D.A.3 but the simulation failed to include two (2) of the items as	The Planning Coordinator conducted and documented a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determined through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design met the performance characteristics in Requirement D.A.3 but the simulation failed to include all of the items as

D#	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
		specified in Parts D.A.4.1, D.A.4.2 or D.A.4.3.	specified in Parts D.A.4.1, D.A.4.2 or D.A.4.3.	specified in Parts D.A.4.1, D.A.4.2 and D.A.4.3. OR
				The Planning Coordinator failed to conduct and document a UFLS assessment at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement D.A.3

D.B. Regional Variance for the Western Electricity Coordinating Council

The following Interconnection-wide variance shall be applicable in the Western Interconnection and replaces, in their entirety, Requirements R1 through R5, and R11 through R15.

As used in the RV, Planning Coordinator is specific to those Planning Coordinators providing Planning Coordinator service(s) to entities within the Western Interconnection, regardless of where the Planning Coordinator is located.

- **D.B.1.** Each Planning Coordinator shall participate in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators that develops and documents criteria, including consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the Bulk Electric System (BES) that may form islands. [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M.D.B.1.** Each Planning Coordinator will have evidence such as reports, or other documentation of its criteria, developed as part of the joint regional review with other Planning Coordinators to select portions of the Bulk Electric System that may form islands including how system studies and historical events were considered to develop the criteria per Requirement D.B.1.
 - **D.B.2.** Each Planning Coordinator shall identify one or more islands from the regional review (per D.B.1) to serve as a basis for designing a Western Interconnection-wide coordinated UFLS program including: [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **D.B.2.1.** Those islands selected by applying the criteria in Requirement D.B.1, and
 - **D.B.2.2.** Any portions of the BES designed to detach from the Western Interconnection (planned islands) as a result of the operation of a relay scheme or Remedial Action Scheme.
- M.D.B.2. Each Planning Coordinator will have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, or other documentation supporting its identification of an island(s), from the regional review (per D.B.1), as a basis for designing a Western Interconnection-wide coordinated UFLS program meeting the criteria in Requirement D.B.2 Parts D.B.2.1 and D.B.2.2.
 - D.B.3. Each Planning Coordinator shall adopt a UFLS program, coordinated across the Western Interconnection, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, that meets the following performance characteristics in simulations of underfrequency conditions resulting from an imbalance scenario, where an imbalance = [(load actual generation output) / (load)], of up to 25 percent within the identified island(s). [VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **D.B.3.1.** Frequency shall remain above the Underfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-5 - Attachment 1, either for 60

seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and

- **D.B.3.2.** Frequency shall remain below the Overfrequency Performance Characteristic curve in PRC-006-5 - Attachment 1, either for 60 seconds or until a steady-state condition between 59.3 Hz and 60.7 Hz is reached, and
- **D.B.3.3.** Volts per Hz (V/Hz) shall not exceed 1.18 per unit for longer than two seconds cumulatively per simulated event, and shall not exceed 1.10 per unit for longer than 45 seconds cumulatively per simulated event at each generator bus and generator step-up transformer high-side bus associated with each of the following:
 - **D.B.3.3.1.** Individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
 - **D.B.3.3.2.** Generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES
 - **D.B.3.3.3.** Facilities consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA gross nameplate rating.
- M.D.B.3. Each Planning Coordinator will have evidence such as reports, memorandums, e-mails, program plans, or other documentation of its adoption of a UFLS program, coordinated across the Western Interconnection, including the notification of the UFLS entities of implementation schedule meeting the criteria in Requirement D.B.3 Parts D.B.3.1 through D.B.3.3.
 - **D.B.4.** Each Planning Coordinator shall participate in and document a coordinated UFLS design assessment with the other Planning Coordinators in the Western Interconnection at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement D.B.3 for each island identified in Requirement D.B.2. The simulation shall model each of the following: [VRF: High][Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **D.B.4.1.** Underfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
 - **D.B.4.2.** Underfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.

- **D.B.4.3.** Underfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip above the Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
- **D.B.4.4.** Overfrequency trip settings of individual generating units greater than 20 MVA (gross nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
- **D.B.4.5.** Overfrequency trip settings of generating plants/facilities greater than 75 MVA (gross aggregate nameplate rating) directly connected to the BES that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
- **D.B.4.6.** Overfrequency trip settings of any facility consisting of one or more units connected to the BES at a common bus with total generation above 75 MVA (gross nameplate rating) that trip below the Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling curve in PRC-006-5 Attachment 1.
- **D.B.4.7.** Any automatic Load restoration that impacts frequency stabilization and operates within the duration of the simulations run for the assessment.
- **M.D.B.4.** Each Planning Coordinator will have dated evidence such as reports, dynamic simulation models and results, or other dated documentation of its participation in a coordinated UFLS design assessment with the other Planning Coordinators demonstrating that it meets Requirement D.B.4 Parts D.B.4.1 through D.B.4.7.

D.B.5. through D.B.10. Reserved

- **D.B.11.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event results in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, shall participate in and document a coordinated event assessment with all affected Planning Coordinators to conduct and document an assessment of the event within one year of event actuation to evaluate: [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]
 - D.B.11.1. The performance of the UFLS equipment,
 - D.B.11.2 The effectiveness of the UFLS program
- M.D.B.11. Each Planning Coordinator will have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it participated in a coordinated event assessment of the performance of the UFLS equipment and the effectiveness of the UFLS program per Requirement D.B.11.

- **D.B.12.** Each Planning Coordinator, in whose islanding event assessment (per D.B.11) UFLS program deficiencies are identified, shall participate in and document a coordinated UFLS design assessment of the UFLS program with all other Planning Coordinators in the Western Interconnection to consider the identified deficiencies within two years of event actuation. [VRF: Medium][Time Horizon: Operations Assessment]
- M.D.B.12. Each Planning Coordinator will have dated evidence such as reports, data gathered from an historical event, or other dated documentation to show that it participated in a UFLS design assessment per Requirements D.B.12 and D.B.4 if UFLS program deficiencies are identified in D.B.11.

D #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
D.B.1	N/A	The Planning Coordinator participated in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators that developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas, that may form islands OR The Planning Coordinator participated in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators that developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas, that may	The Planning Coordinator participated in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators that developed and documented criteria but failed to include the consideration of historical events and system studies, to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas, that may form islands	The Planning Coordinator failed to participate in a joint regional review with the other Planning Coordinators that developed and documented criteria to select portions of the BES, including interconnected portions of the BES in adjacent Planning Coordinator areas that may form islands
		form islands		The Discussion Countington
D.B.2	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) from the	The Planning Coordinator identified an island(s) from the

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D #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			regional review to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include one (1) of the parts as specified in Requirement D.B.2, Parts D.B.2.1 or D.B.2.2	regional review to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS program but failed to include all of the parts as specified in Requirement D.B.2, Parts D.B.2.1 or D.B.2.2 OR The Planning Coordinator failed to identify any island(s) from the regional review to serve as a basis for designing its UFLS
				program.
D.B.3	N/A	The Planning Coordinator adopted a UFLS program, coordinated across the Western Interconnection that included notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet one (1) of the performance characteristic in Requirement D.B.3, Parts D.B.3.1, D.B.3.2, or D.B.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions	The Planning Coordinator adopted a UFLS program, coordinated across the Western Interconnection that included notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet two (2) of the performance characteristic in Requirement D.B.3, Parts D.B.3.1, D.B.3.2, or D.B.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions	The Planning Coordinator adopted a UFLS program, coordinated across the Western Interconnection that included notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area, but failed to meet all the performance characteristic in Requirement D.B.3, Parts D.B.3.1, D.B.3.2, and D.B.3.3 in simulations of underfrequency conditions OR
				The Planning Coordinator failed to adopt a UFLS program,

D #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				coordinated across the Western Interconnection, including notification of and a schedule for implementation by UFLS entities within its area.
D.B.4	The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators across the Western Interconnection at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement D.B.3 for each island identified in Requirement D.B.2 but the simulation failed to include one (1) of the items as specified in Requirement D.B.4, Parts D.B.4.1 through D.B.4.7.	The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators across the Western Interconnection at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement D.B.3 for each island identified in Requirement D.B.2 but the simulation failed to include two (2) of the items as specified in Requirement D.B.4, Parts D.B.4.1 through D.B.4.7.	The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators across the Western Interconnection at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement D.B.3 for each island identified in Requirement D.B.2 but the simulation failed to include three (3) of the items as specified in Requirement D.B.4, Parts D.B.4.1 through D.B.4.7.	The Planning Coordinator participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators across the Western Interconnection at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement D.B.3 for each island identified in Requirement D.B.2 but the simulation failed to include four (4) or more of the items as specified in Requirement D.B.4, Parts D.B.4.1 through D.B.4.7. OR The Planning Coordinator failed to participate in and document a coordinated UFLS assessment with the other Planning Coordinators across the Western

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D #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				Interconnection at least once every five years that determines through dynamic simulation whether the UFLS program design meets the performance characteristics in Requirement D.B.3 for each island identified in Requirement D.B.2
D.B.11	The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement D.B.11, Parts D.B.11.1 and D.B.11.2 within a time greater than one year but less than or equal to 13 months of actuation.	The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement D.B.11, Parts D.B.11.1 and D.B.11.2 within a time greater than 13 months but less than or equal to 14 months of actuation.	The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement D.B.11, Parts D.B.11.1 and D.B.11.2 within a time greater than 14 months but less than or equal to 15 months of actuation. OR The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event	The Planning Coordinator, in whose area a BES islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event and evaluated the parts as specified in Requirement D.B.11, Parts D.B.11.1 and D.B.11.2 within a time greater than 15 months of actuation. OR The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency

D #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
			resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate one (1) of the parts as specified in Requirement D.B.11, Parts D.B.11.1 or D.B.11.2.	excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, failed to participate in and document a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portion of whose areas were also included in the same island event and evaluate the parts as specified in Requirement D.B.11, Parts D.B.11.1 and D.B.11.2. OR The Planning Coordinator, in whose area an islanding event resulting in system frequency excursions below the initializing set points of the UFLS program, participated in and documented a coordinated event assessment with all Planning Coordinators whose areas or portions of whose areas were also included in the same islanding event within one year of event actuation but failed to evaluate all of the parts as specified in Requirement D.B.11, Parts D.B.11.1 and D.B.11.2.

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D #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
D.B.12	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement D.B.11, participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS design assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators across the Western Interconnection to consider the identified deficiencies in greater than two years but less than or equal to 25 months of event actuation.	The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement D.B.11, participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS design assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators across the Western Interconnection to consider the identified deficiencies in greater than 25 months but less than or equal to 26 months of event actuation.	The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement D.B.11, participated in and documented a coordinated UFLS design assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators across the Western Interconnection to consider the identified deficiencies in greater than 26 months of event actuation. OR The Planning Coordinator, in which UFLS program deficiencies were identified per Requirement D.B.11, failed to participate in and document a coordinated UFLS design assessment of the coordinated UFLS program with the other Planning Coordinators across the Western Interconnection to consider the identified deficiencies


E. Associated Documents


Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	April 1, 2005	Effective Date	New
1	May 25, 2010	Completed revision, merging and updating PRC-006-0, PRC-007-0 and PRC-009-0.	
1	November 4, 2010	Adopted by the Board of Trustees	
1	May 7, 2012	FERC Order issued approving PRC- 006-1 (approval becomes effective July 10, 2012)	
1	November 9, 2012	FERC Letter Order issued accepting the modification of the VRF in R5 from (Medium to High) and the modification of the VSL language in R8.	
2	November 13, 2014	Adopted by the Board of Trustees	Revisions made under Project 2008-02: Undervoltage Load Shedding (UVLS) & Underfrequency Load Shedding (UFLS) to address directive issued in FERC Order No. 763. Revisions to existing Requirement R9 and R10 and addition of new Requirement R15.
2	March 4, 2015	FERC Order issued approving PRC- 006-2. Docket No. RD15-2-000	
3	August 10, 2017	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revisions to the Regional Variance for the Quebec Interconnection.
3	September 5, 2017	FERC Order issued approving PRC- 006-3.	

4	February 6, 2020	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	Revisions under Project 2017-07
5	August 20, 2020	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	In Version 5: 1) Requirements R14 and R15 were added to the list of Requirements not applicable to the Western Interconnection (WI), 2) use of "Planning Coordinator" (PC) was made specific to PCs providing services within the WI, regardless of where the PC is located, 3) non-substantive changes were made conforming the document and styles to the newest NERC conventions and templates, and 4) references to Version 3 were updated to Version 5.
5	December 23,2020	FERC Oder approving PRC-006-5 Docket No. RD21-1-000	
5	April 1, 2021	Effective Date	

PRC-006-5 – Attachment 1





金金金金 Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling (Requirement R4 Parts 4.4-4.6)
 金金金金 Overfrequency Performance Characteristic (Requirement R3 Part 3.2)
 金金金金 Underfrequency Performance Characteristic (Requirement R3 Part 3.1)
 金金金金 Generator Underfrequency Trip Modeling (Requirement R4 Parts 4.1-4.3)

Curve Definitions


Generato	Generator Overfrequency Trip Modeling		uency Performance Characteristi	с
t ≤ 2 s	t > 2 s	t ≤ 4 s	4 s < t ≤ 30 s	t > 30 s
f = 62.2	f = -0.686log(t) + 62.41	f = 61.8	f = -0.686log(t) + 62.21	f = 60.7
Hz	Hz	Hz	Hz	Hz

Generator Underfrequency Trip	Underfrequency Performance Characteristic	
Modeling		

PRC-006-5 — Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding

t ≤ 2 s	t > 2 s	t ≤ 2 s	2 s < t ≤ 60 s	t > 60 s
f = 57.8	f = 0.575log(t) + 57.63	f = 58.0	f = 0.575log(t) + 57.83	f = 59.3
Hz	Hz	Hz	Hz	Hz

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Rationale:

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for R9:

The "Corrective Action Plan" language was added in response to the FERC directive from Order No. 763, which raised concern that the standard failed to specify how soon an entity would need to implement corrections after a deficiency is identified by a Planning Coordinator (PC) assessment. The revised language adds clarity by requiring that each UFLS entity follow the UFLS program, including any Corrective Action Plan, developed by the PC.

Also, to achieve consistency of terminology throughout this standard, the word "application" was replaced with "implementation." (See Requirements R3, R14 and R15)

Rationale for R10:

The "Corrective Action Plan" language was added in response to the FERC directive from Order No. 763, which raised concern that the standard failed to specify how soon an entity would need to implement corrections after a deficiency is identified by a PC assessment. The revised language adds clarity by requiring that each UFLS entity follow the UFLS program, including any Corrective Action Plan, developed by the PC.

Also, to achieve consistency of terminology throughout this standard, the word "application" was replaced with "implementation." (See Requirements R3, R14 and R15)

Rationale for R15:

Requirement R15 was added in response to the directive from FERC Order No. 763, which raised concern that the standard failed to specify how soon an entity would need to implement corrections after a deficiency is identified by a PC assessment. Requirement R15 addresses the FERC directive by making explicit that if deficiencies are identified as a result of an assessment, the PC shall develop a Corrective Action Plan and schedule for implementation by the UFLS entities.

A "Corrective Action Plan" is defined in the NERC Glossary of Terms as, "a list of actions and an associated timetable for implementation to remedy a specific problem." Thus, the Corrective Action Plan developed by the PC will identify the specific timeframe for an entity to implement corrections to remedy any deficiencies identified by the PC as a result of an assessment.

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A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Undervoltage Load Shedding
- **2. Number:** PRC-010-2
- **3. Purpose:** To establish an integrated and coordinated approach to the design, evaluation, and reliable operation of Undervoltage Load Shedding Programs (UVLS Programs).
- 4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. Functional Entities:
 - **4.1.1** Planning Coordinator.
 - **4.1.2** Transmission Planner.
 - **4.1.3** Undervoltage load shedding (UVLS) entities Distribution Providers and Transmission Owners responsible for the ownership, operation, or control of UVLS equipment as required by the UVLS Program established by the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator.
- 5. Effective Date*:

B. Requirements and Measures

- **R1.** Each Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner that is developing a UVLS Program shall evaluate its effectiveness and subsequently provide the UVLS Program's specifications and implementation schedule to the UVLS entities responsible for implementing the UVLS Program. The evaluation shall include, but is not limited to, studies and analyses that show: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **1.1.** The implementation of the UVLS Program resolves the identified undervoltage issues that led to its development and design.
 - **1.2.** The UVLS Program is integrated through coordination with generator voltage ride-through capabilities and other protection and control systems, including, but not limited to, transmission line protection, autoreclosing, Remedial Action Schemes, and other undervoltage-based load shedding programs.
- M1. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, date-stamped studies and analyses, reports, or other documentation detailing the effectiveness of the UVLS Program, and date-stamped communications showing that the UVLS Program specifications and implementation schedule were provided to UVLS entities.
- **R2.** Each UVLS entity shall adhere to the UVLS Program specifications and implementation schedule determined by its Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner associated with UVLS Program development per Requirement R1 or with any Corrective Action Plans per Requirement R5. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M2. Acceptable evidence must include date-stamped documentation on the completion of actions and may include, but is not limited to, identifying the equipment armed with UVLS relays, the UVLS relay settings, associated Load summaries, work management program records, work orders, and maintenance records.
- **R3.** Each Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner shall perform a comprehensive assessment to evaluate the effectiveness of each of its UVLS Programs at least once every 60 calendar months. Each assessment shall include, but is not limited to, studies and analyses that evaluate whether: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **3.1.** The UVLS Program resolves the identified undervoltage issues for which the UVLS Program is designed.
 - **3.2.** The UVLS Program is integrated through coordination with generator voltage ride-through capabilities and other protection and control systems, including, but not limited to, transmission line protection, autoreclosing, Remedial Action Schemes, and other undervoltage-based load shedding programs.
- **M3.** Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, date-stamped reports or other documentation detailing the assessment of the UVLS Program.
- **R4.** Each Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner shall, within 12 calendar months of an event that resulted in a voltage excursion for which its UVLS Program was designed to operate, perform an assessment to evaluate: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
 - **4.1.** Whether its UVLS Program resolved the undervoltage issues associated with the event, and
 - **4.2.** The performance (i.e., operation and non-operation) of the UVLS Program equipment.
- M4. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, date-stamped event data, event analysis reports, or other documentation detailing the assessment of the UVLS Program and associated equipment.
- **R5.** Each Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner that identifies deficiencies during an assessment performed in either Requirement R3 or R4 shall develop a Corrective Action Plan to address the deficiencies and subsequently provide the Corrective Action Plan, including an implementation schedule, to UVLS entities within three calendar months of completing the assessment. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- M5. Acceptable evidence must include a date-stamped Corrective Action Plan that addresses identified deficiencies and may also include date-stamped reports or other documentation supporting the Corrective Action Plan. Evidence should also include date-stamped communications showing that the Corrective Action Plan and an associated implementation schedule were provided to UVLS entities.

- **R6.** Each Planning Coordinator that has a UVLS Program in its area shall update a database containing data necessary to model the UVLS Program(s) in its area for use in event analyses and assessments of the UVLS Program at least once each calendar year. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- M6. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, date-stamped spreadsheets, database reports, or other documentation demonstrating a UVLS Program database was updated.
- **R7.** Each UVLS entity shall provide data to its Planning Coordinator according to the format and schedule specified by the Planning Coordinator to support maintenance of a UVLS Program database. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- M7. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, date-stamped emails, letters, or other documentation demonstrating data was provided to the Planning Coordinator as specified.
- **R8.** Each Planning Coordinator that has a UVLS Program in its area shall provide its UVLS Program database to other Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners within its Interconnection, and other functional entities with a reliability need, within 30 calendar days of a written request. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- M8. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, date-stamped emails, letters, or other documentation demonstrating that the UVLS Program database was provided within 30 calendar days of receipt of a written request.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

The British Columbia Utilities Commission.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, Distribution Provider, and Transmission Owner shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified

below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The applicable entity shall retain documentation as evidence for six calendar years.

If an applicable entity is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

Table of Compliance Elements

R #	Time	VRF	Violation Severity Levels				
Ν #	Horizon	VKF	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
R1	Long-term Planning	High	N/A	N/A	N/A	The applicable entity that developed the UVLS Program failed to evaluate the program's effectiveness and subsequently provide the UVLS Program's specifications and implementation schedule to UVLS entities in accordance with Requirement R1, including the items specified in Parts 1.1 and 1.2.	

D #	R#		Violation Severity Levels				
Ν#	Horizon	VRF	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
R2	Long-term Planning	High	N/A	N/A	The applicable entity failed to adhere to the UVLS Program specifications in accordance with Requirement R2. OR The applicable entity failed to adhere to the implementation schedule in accordance with Requirement R2.	The applicable entity failed to adhere to the UVLS Program specifications and implementation schedule in accordance with Requirement R2.	
R3	Long-term Planning	Medium	N/A	N/A	N/A	The applicable entity failed to perform an assessment at least once during the 60 calendar months in accordance with Requirement R3, including the items specified in Parts 3.1 and 3.2.	

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R #	Time	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
κ#	Horizon		Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R4	Operations Planning	Medium	The applicable entity performed an assessment in accordance with Requirement R4 within a time period greater than 12 calendar months but less than or equal to 13 calendar months after an applicable event.	The applicable entity performed an assessment in accordance with Requirement R4 within a time period greater than 13 calendar months but less than or equal to 14 calendar months after an applicable event.	The applicable entity performed an assessment in accordance with Requirement R4 within a time period greater than 14 calendar months but less than or equal to 15 calendar months after an applicable event.	The applicable entity performed an assessment in accordance with Requirement R4 within a time period greater than 15 calendar months after an applicable event. OR The applicable entity failed to perform an assessment in accordance with Requirement R4.

R #	Time	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
Ν #	Horizon		Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R5	Operations Planning	Medium	The applicable entity developed a Corrective Action Plan and provided it to UVLS entities in accordance with Requirement R5 but was late by less than or equal to 15 calendar days.	The applicable entity developed a Corrective Action Plan and provided it to UVLS entities in accordance with Requirement R5 but was late by more than 15 calendar days but less than or equal to 30 calendar days.	The applicable entity developed a Corrective Action Plan and provided it to UVLS entities in accordance with Requirement R5 but was late by more than 30 calendar days but less than or equal to 45 calendar days.	The applicable entity developed a Corrective Action Plan and provided it to UVLS entities in accordance with Requirement R5 but was late by more than 45 calendar days. OR The responsible entity failed to develop a Corrective Action Plan or provide it to UVLS entities in accordance with Requirement R5.

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels				
			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
R6	Operations Planning	Lower	The applicable entity updated the database in accordance with Requirement R6 but was late by less than or equal to 30 calendar days.	The applicable entity updated the database in accordance with Requirement R6 but was late by more than 30 calendar days but less than or equal to 60 calendar days.	The applicable entity updated the database in accordance with Requirement R6 but was late by more than 60 calendar days but less than or equal to 90 calendar days.	The applicable entity updated the database in accordance with Requirement R6 but was late by more than 90 calendar days. OR The applicable entity failed to update the database in accordance with Requirement R6.	

R #	Time	Time VRF	Violation Severity Levels				
κ#	Horizon		Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
R7	Operations Planning	Lower	The applicable entity provided data in accordance with Requirement R7 but was late by less than or equal to 30 calendar days per the specified schedule. OR The applicable entity provided data in accordance with Requirement R7 but the data was not provided according to the specified format.	The applicable entity provided data in accordance with Requirement R7 but was late by more than 30 calendar days but less than or equal to 60 calendar days per the specified schedule.	The applicable entity provided data in accordance with Requirement R7 but was late by more than 60 calendar days but less than or equal to 90 calendar days per the specified schedule.	The applicable entity provided data in accordance with Requirement R7 but was late by more than 90 calendar days per the specified schedule. OR The applicable entity failed to provide data in accordance with Requirement R7.	

R #	Time Horizon	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
Ν#			Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R8	Operations Planning	Lower	The applicable entity provided its UVLS Program database in accordance with Requirement R8 but was late by less than or equal to 15 calendar days.	The applicable entity provided its UVLS Program database in accordance with Requirement R8 but was late by more than 15 calendar days but less than or equal to 30 calendar days.	The applicable entity provided its UVLS Program database in accordance with Requirement R8 but was late by more than 30 calendar days but less than or equal to 45 calendar days.	The applicable entity provided its UVLS Program database in accordance with Requirement R8 but was late by more than 45 calendar days. OR The applicable entity failed to provide its UVLS Program database in accordance with Requirement R8.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

None.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	February 8, 2005	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	
0	April 1, 2005	Effective Date	
0	February 7, 2013	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	R2 and associated elements for retirement as part of the Paragraph 81 project (Project 2013-02) pending applicable regulatory approval.
1	November 13, 2014	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	Revisions made under Project 2008-02: Undervoltage Load Shedding (UVLS) & Underfrequency Load Shedding (UFLS) to address directive issued in FERC Order No. 763.
2	May 7, 2015	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	Revisions made under Project 2008- 02.2: Undervoltage Load Shedding (UVLS): Misoperation to include UVLS equipment.
2	November 19, 2015	FERC Letter Order issued approving PRC-010-2. Docket RD15-5-000	

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Introduction

The standard drafting team provides the following discussion to support the approach to the standard. The information is meant to enhance the understanding of the reliability needs and deliverable expectations of each requirement, supported as necessary by technical principles and industry experience.


Guidelines for UVLS Program Definition

The definition for the term, "Undervoltage Load Shedding Program" or "UVLS Program" includes automatic load shedding programs that utilize only voltage inputs at locations where action is taken to shed load. As such, the failure of a single component is unlikely to affect the reliable operation of the program.

The UVLS Program definition excludes centrally controlled undervoltage-based load shedding, which utilizes inputs from multiple locations and may also utilize inputs other than voltages (such as generator reactive reserves, facility loadings, equipment statuses, etc.). The design and characteristics of a centrally controlled undervoltage-based load shedding system are the same as that of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), wherein load shedding is the remedial action. Therefore, just like for a RAS, the failure of a single component can compromise the reliable operation of centrally controlled undervoltage-based load shedding.

To ensure that the applicability of the standard includes only those undervoltage-based load shedding systems whose performance has an impact on system reliability, a UVLS Program must mitigate risk of one or more of the following: voltage instability, voltage collapse, or Cascading impacting the Bulk Electric System (BES). An example of a program that would not fall under this category is undervoltage-based load shedding installed to mitigate damage to equipment or local loads that are directly affected by the low voltage event.

Figure 1 below is an example of a BES subsystem for which a UVLS system could be used as a solution to mitigate various issues following the loss of the 345 kV double circuit line between buses A and B. If the consequence of this Contingency does not impact the BES by leading to voltage instability, voltage collapse, or Cascading, a UVLS system (installed at either, or both, bus B and D) used to mitigate this Contingency would not fall under the definition of a UVLS Program. However, if this same UVLS system is used to mitigate an Adverse Reliability Impact outside this contained area, it would be classified as a wide-area undervoltage problem and would fall under the definition of UVLS Program.



*UVLS systems may be installed at either, or both, bus B and D

Figure 1: UVLS Subsystem

Guidelines for Requirements

Table 1 provides a high-level overview of the requirements contained in the standard.

Table 1: High-Level Requirement Overview							
Requirement	Entity	Evaluate Program Effectiveness	Adhere to Program Specifications and Schedule	Perform Program Assessment (Periodic or Performance)	Develop a CAP to Address Program Deficiencies	Update and/or Share Program Data	
R1	PC or TP	Х					
R2	UVLS entity		х				
R3	PC or TP	Х		Х			
R4	PC or TP	Х		Х			
R5	PC or TP				Х		
R6	PC					Х	
R7	UVLS entity					Х	
R8	PC					Х	

Guidelines for Requirement R1

A UVLS Program may be developed and implemented to either serve as a safety net system protection measure against unforeseen extreme Contingencies or to achieve specific system

performance for known transmission Contingencies for which dropping of load is allowed under Transmission Planning (TPL) Reliability Standards. Regardless of the purpose, it is important that the UVLS Program being implemented is effective in terms that it mitigates undervoltage conditions impacting the Bulk Electric System (BES), leading to voltage instability, voltage collapse, or Cascading. Consideration should be given to voltage set points and time delays, rate of voltage decay or recovery, power flow levels, etc. when designing a UVLS Program.

For the UVLS Program to be effective in achieving its goal, it is also necessary that the UVLS Program is coordinated with generator voltage ride-through capabilities and other protection and control systems that may have an impact on the performance of the UVLS Program. Some of these protection and control systems may include, but are not limited to, transmission line protection, RAS, other undervoltage-based load shedding programs, autoreclosing, and controls of shunt capacitors, reactors, and static voltampere-reactive systems (SVSs).

For example, if the purpose of a UVLS Program is to mitigate fault-induced delayed voltage recovery (FIDVR) events in a large load center that also includes local generation, it is important that such a UVLS Program is coordinated with local generators' voltage ride-through capabilities. Generators in the vicinity of a load center are critical to providing dynamic voltage support to the system during FIDVR events. To maximize the benefit of on-line generation, the best practice may be to shed load prior to generation trip. However, occasionally, it may be best to let generation trip prior to load shed. Therefore, the impact of generation tripping should be considered while designing a UVLS Program.

Another example that can be highlighted is the coordination of a UVLS Program with automatic shunt reactor tripping devices if there are any on the system. Most likely, any shunt reactors on the system will trip off automatically after some time delay during low voltage conditions. In such cases, shunt reactors should be tripped before the load is shed to preserve the system. This may require coordination of time delays associated with the UVLS Program with shunt reactor tripping devices.

The examples given above demonstrate that, for a UVLS Program to be effective, proper consideration should be given to coordination of a UVLS Program with generator ride-through capabilities and other protection and control systems.

Guidelines for Requirement R2

Once a Planning Coordinator (PC) or Transmission Planner (TP) has identified a need for a UVLS Program, the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner will develop a program that includes specifications and an implementation schedule, which are then provided to UVLS entities per Requirement R1. Specifications may include voltage set points, time delays, amount of load to be shed, and the location at which load needs to be shed. If UVLS entities do not implement the UVLS Program according to the specifications and schedule provided, the UVLS Program may not be effective and may not achieve its intended goal. The UVLS entity must document that all necessary actions were completed to implement the UVLS Program.

Similarly, when a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to address UVLS Program deficiencies is developed by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner and provided to UVLS entities per Requirement R5, UVLS entities must comply with the CAP and its associated implementation schedule to ensure that the UVLS Program is effective. The UVLS entity is required to complete the actions specified in the CAP, document the plan implementation, and retain the appropriate evidence to demonstrate implementation and completion.

Deferrals or other relevant changes to the UVLS Program specifications or CAP need to be documented so that the record includes not only what was planned, but what was implemented. Depending on the planning and documentation format used by the responsible entity, evidence of a successful execution could consist of signed-off work orders, printouts from work management systems, spreadsheets of planned versus completed work, timesheets, work inspection reports, paid invoices, photographs, walk-through reports, or other evidence.

For example, documentation of a CAP provides an auditable progress and completion confirmation for the identified UVLS Program deficiency:

CAP Example 1 - Corrective actions for a quick triggering problem; preemptive actions for similar installations:

The PC or TP obtains fault records from a UVLS entity that participates in its UVLS Program that indicate a group of UVLS relays triggered at the appropriate undervoltage level but with shorter delays than expected. The PC or TP directed the UVLS entity to schedule on-site inspections within three weeks. The results of the inspection confirmed that the delay-time programmed on the relays was 60 cycles instead of 90 cycles. The PC or TP then directed the UVLS entity to correct to a 90-cycle time delay setting of the UVLS relays identified to have shorter time delay settings within eight weeks.

Applicability to other UVLS relays: The PC or TP then developed a schedule with the UVLS entity to verify and adjust all remaining UVLS relays time delay settings within a one-year period.

The PC or TP verified completion of verification and adjustment of the time delay settings for all of the UVLS entity's equipment that participates in the PC or TP UVLS Program

CAP Example 2 - Corrective actions for a firmware problem; preemptive actions for similar installations:

The PC or TP obtains fault records on 6/4/2014 from a UVLS entity that participates in its UVLS Program. The UVLS entity also provided the fault records to the manufacturer, who responded on 6/11/2014 that the Misoperation¹ of the UVLS relay was caused by a bug in version 2 firmware, and recommended installing version 3 firmware. The PC or TP approved the UVLS entity's plan to schedule Version 3 firmware installation on 6/12/2014.

¹ Misoperation of Protection Systems reporting was initiated by the NERC Board of Trustees adopted NERC Rules of Procedure, Section 1600, Request for Data or Information. Refer to: *Request for Data of Information, Protection System Misoperation Data Collection*, August 14, 2014. <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ProtectionSystem</u> Misoperations/PRC-004-3%20Section%201600%20Data%20Request 20140729.pdf.

Applicability to other UVLS relays: The PC or TP then developed a schedule with the UVLS entity to install firmware version 3 at all of the UVLS entity's UVLS relays that are determined to be programmed with version 2 firmware. The completion date was scheduled no-later-than 12/31/2014.

The firmware replacements were completed on 12/4/2014.

Guidelines for Requirement R3

In addition to the initial studies required to develop a UVLS Program, periodic comprehensive assessments (detailed analyses) are required to ensure its continued effectiveness. This assessment is required to be completed at least once every 60 calendar months to capture the accumulated effects of minor changes to the system that have occurred since the last assessment was completed. However, at any point in time, a Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner may also determine that a material change² to system topology or operating conditions affects the performance of the UVLS Program and therefore necessitates the same comprehensive assessment. Regardless of the trigger, each assessment should include an evaluation of each UVLS Program to ensure the continued integration through coordination.

This comprehensive assessment complements the TPL-001-4 annual assessment requirement to evaluate the impact of protection systems. The 60-month period is the same time frame used in TPL-001-4 and in PRC-006-1.

As specified in Requirement R3, a comprehensive assessment must be performed at least once every 60 calendar months. If a Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner conducts a comprehensive assessment sooner for the reasons discussed above, the 60-month time period would restart upon completion of this assessment.

Guidelines for Requirement R4

After a voltage excursion event, the goal of the assessment required in Requirement R4 is to evaluate: (1) whether the UVLS Program resolved the undervoltage issues, and (2) the performance of the UVLS Program equipment. The assessment should include event data analysis, such as the relevant sequence of events leading to the undervoltage conditions (e.g., Contingencies, operation of protection systems, and RAS) and field measurements useful to analyzing the behavior of the system. A comprehensive description of the UVLS Program operation should be presented, including conditions of the trigger (e.g., voltage levels, time delays) and amount of load shed for each affected substation. Assessment of the event is performed to evaluate the level of performance of the program for the event of interest and to identify deficiencies to be included in a CAP per Requirement R5. Misoperation of UVLS equipment is addressed as a deficiency. Reporting of UVLS equipment Misoperations are

² It is understood that the term material change is not transportable on a continent-wide basis. This determination must be made by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner and should be accompanied by documentation to support the technical rationale for determining material changes.

addressed by the NERC Request for Data and Information, Protection System Misoperation Data Collection.³

The studies and analyses showing the effectiveness of the UVLS Program can be similar to what is required in Requirements R1 and R3, but should include a clear link between the evaluation of effectiveness (in studies using simulations) and the analysis of the event (with measurements and event data) that actually occurred. For example, differences between the expected and actual system behavior for the event of interest should be discussed and modeling assumptions should be evaluated. Important discrepancies between the simulations and the actual event should be investigated.

Considering the importance of an event that involves the operation of a UVLS Program, the 12calendar-month period provides adequate time to analyze the event and perform an assessment while identifying deficiencies within a reasonable time. This time period is also required in PRC-006-1.

Guidelines for Requirement R5

Requirement R5 promotes the prudent correction of an identified problem during the assessment of a UVLS Program. Per Requirements R3 and R4, an assessment of an active UVLS Program is triggered:

- Within 12 calendar months of an event that resulted in a voltage excursion for which the program was designed to operate
- At least once every 60 calendar months. The default time frame of 60 calendar months or less between assessments has the intention to assure that the cumulative changes to the network and operating condition affecting the UVLS Program are evaluated

Since every UVLS is unique, if material changes are made to system topology or operating conditions, the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner will decide the degree to which the change in topology or operating condition becomes a material change sufficient to trigger an assessment of the existing UVLS Program.

A CAP is a list of actions and an associated timetable for implementation to remedy a specific problem. It is a proven tool for resolving operational problems. Per Requirement R5, the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner is required to develop a CAP and provide it to UVLS entities to accomplish the purpose of this requirement, which is to prevent future deficiencies in the UVLS Program, thereby minimizing risk to the system. Determining the cause of the deficiency is essential in developing an effective CAP to avoid future re-occurrence of the same problem. A CAP can be revised if additional causes are found.

Based on industry experience and operational coordination timeframes, three calendar months from the date an assessment is completed is a reasonable time frame for development of a CAP, including time to consider alternative solutions and coordination of resources. The "within three

³ Id.

calendar months" time frame is solely to develop a CAP, including its implementation schedule, and provide it to UVLS entities. It does not include the time needed for its implementation by UVLS entities. This implementation time frame is dictated within the CAP's associated timetable for implementation, and the execution of the CAP according to its schedule is required in Requirement R2.

Guidelines for Requirements R6–R8

An accurate UVLS Program database is necessary for the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner to perform system reliability assessment studies and event analysis studies. Without accurate data, there is a possibility that annual reliability assessment studies that are performed by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner can lead to erroneous results and therefore impact reliability. Also, without the accurate data, it is very difficult for the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner to duplicate a UVLS event and determine the root cause of the problem.

To support a UVLS Program database, it is necessary for each UVLS entity to provide accurate data to its Planning Coordinator. Each UVLS entity will provide the data according to the specified format and schedule provided by the Planning Coordinator. This is required in order for the Planning Coordinator to maintain and support a comprehensive UVLS Program database. By having a comprehensive database, the Planning Coordinator can embark on a reliability assessment or event analysis/benchmarking studies, identify the issues with the UVLS Program, and develop Corrective Action Plans.

The UVLS Program database may include, but is not limited to the following:

- Owner and operator of the UVLS Program
- Size and location of customer load, or percent of connected load, to be interrupted
- Corresponding voltage set points and clearing times
- Time delay from initiation to trip signal
- Breaker operating times
- Any other schemes that are part of or impact the UVLS Programs, such as related generation protection, islanding schemes, automatic load restoration schemes, underfrequency load shedding (UFLS), and RAS

Additionally, the UVLS Program database is required to be updated annually (once every calendar year) by the Planning Coordinator. The intent here is for UVLS entities to review the data annually and provide changes to the Planning Coordinators so that Planning Coordinators can keep the databases current and accurate for performing event analysis and other assessments.

Finally, a Planning Coordinator is required to provide information to other Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners within its Interconnection, and other functional entities with a reliability need, within 30 calendar days of receipt of a written request. Thirty calendar days was selected as the time frame as it is considered to be reasonable and well- accepted by the industry. Also, this requirement of sharing the database with applicable functional entities supports the directive provided by FERC that requires an integrated and coordinated approach to UVLS programs (Paragraph 1509 of FERC Order No. 693).

Frequently Asked Questions

To succinctly address common comment themes that require drafting team response on Project 2008-02 UVLS (proposed PRC-010-1), the drafting team provides the following discussion in the construct of an FAQ format.

Introduction

This Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) document was created during the development of PRC-010-1 (*Undervoltage Load Shedding*)^{4,5} to succinctly address common comment themes with respect to the approach and intent of the Project 2008-02 Undervoltage Load Shedding (UVLS)⁶ standard drafting team ("drafting team"). This FAQ document is the outcome of comments received during comment periods and multiple outreach sessions with industry. All comments submitted by industry during comment periods may be reviewed on the project page.

Subsequent to the adoption of PRC-010-1, the UVLS drafting team made minor revisions to the standard address the UVLS Misoperation identification and correction.⁷ This FAQ document was amended to reflect up the approach and intent of the drafting team during the development of PRC-010-2 concerning Misoperation of UVLS equipment.

Purpose of Standard Revision

1) What is the basis for a revision of the existing UVLS standards?

The initial input into a revision of the existing UVLS standards is FERC <u>Order No. 693</u>,⁸ Paragraph 1509, which directed the ERO to develop a modification of PRC-010-0 that "requires that an integrated and coordinated approach be included in all protection systems on the Bulk-Power System, including generators and transmission lines, generators' low voltage ride through capabilities, and UFLS and UVLS programs." In addition, <u>The Final Report on the August 14, 2003</u> <u>Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations</u>⁹ ("August 14 Blackout Report") showed that proper coordination would have mitigated effects if UVLS was used as a tool.

⁴ (<u>http://www.nerc.com/_layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=PRC-010-1&title=Undervoltage%20Load%20Shedding</u>).

⁵ Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees on November 14, 2014.

⁶ (<u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2008-02-Undervoltage-Load-Shedding.aspx</u>).

⁷ Refer to Project 2010-05.1, which developed PRC-004-3 (Protection System Misoperation Identification and Correction) concurrently with the development of PRC-010-1. (<u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project2010-05_Protection_System_Misoperations.aspx</u>).

⁸ (http://www.nerc.com/docs/docs/ferc/order_693.pdf).

⁹ (http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf).

Additional inputs included 1) recommendations from the NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee (SPCS) in its December 2010 <u>Technical Review of UVLS-Related Standards</u>¹⁰ to combine the four existing UVLS standards, revise the applicability to entities responsible for UVLS program design, implementation, and coordination, specifically include a requirement for assessment of coordination between UVLS programs and all other protection systems, and differentiate post-event validation of UVLS program design from verifying correct operation of UVLS equipment; 2) the existing UVLS standards were not in the current results-based format; 3) the preceding revision of the underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) standards had similar types of requirements and had been completed under the construct of a consolidation; and 4) the Independent Expert Review Panel recommendations, which included an evaluation of the existing standards' applicability and level of specificity.

The drafting team agrees that a lack of coordination among protection systems is a key risk to reliability. As part of the revision to address this, the drafting team also agreed that an evaluation and consolidation of the existing UVLS standards was necessary to meet current Reliability Standard development initiatives and to provide clear, comprehensive requirements to address the application and coordination of UVLS.

2) UVLS programs are not mandatory—is compliance for an optional tool necessary?

The drafting team asserts that a key takeaway from the August 14 Blackout Report is that coordination of UVLS with other protection systems could have mitigated the effects if UVLS was used as a tool. Although the use of UVLS is not mandatory, if it is determined that this system preservation measure is necessary to support reliability and a UVLS program is installed, the program needs to be properly coordinated, implemented, and assessed due to the inherent associated reliability risks. As such, there needs to be a level of performance required to properly protect system reliability. Of note, PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2 apply to the defined term "UVLS Program," which limits the standard's applicability to only those undervoltage-based load shedding programs whose performance has an impact on system reliability.¹¹

Coordination with Project 2009-03 Emergency Operations

3) EOP-003-2 has potential redundant requirements with proposed PRC-010-1—how is this being addressed?

As part of its five-year review, Project 2009-03 – Emergency Operations (EOP) identified EOP-003-2 (*Load Shedding Plans*),¹² Requirements R2, R4, and R7 as being more properly covered by Project 2008-02 – UVLS. Both projects were strategically coordinated to move in lockstep from a timing perspective to address these requirements. Project 2009-03 – EOP proposed to revise and

¹⁰ (<u>http://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/spctf/PRC-010_022%20Report_Approved_20101208.pdf</u>).

¹¹ The term "UVLS Program" used herein was adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees on November 14, 2014.

¹² (<u>http://www.nerc.com/ layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=EOP-003-2&title=Load%20Shedding%20Plans</u>).

consolidate EOP-001-2.1b (*Emergency Operations Planning*),¹³ EOP-002-3 (Capacity and Energy Emergencies),¹⁴ and EOP-003-2 to create EOP-011-1, will retire the noted EOP-003-2 requirements (among other revisions), and the Project 2008-02 – UVLS *Mapping Document* will show how PRC-010-1 encompasses the retired content accordingly. Slated to have aligning effective dates, both EOP-011-1 (*Emergency Operations*)¹⁵ and PRC-010-1 will be posted and balloted separately but concurrently, so that industry stakeholders will be able to clearly evaluate the transition. Please see the posted Project 2008-02 UVLS Project Coordination Plan for more information.

"UVLS Program" Definition

4) Why is the introduction of the new defined term "UVLS Program" necessary?

The drafting team found it necessary to introduce the term "UVLS Program" for inclusion in the <u>Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards</u>¹⁶ ("NERC Glossary") because different types of UVLS systems need to be treated appropriately with respect to reliability requirements. Therefore, the term establishes which UVLS systems PRC-010-1 will apply to an: "automatic load shedding program consisting of distributed relays and controls used to mitigate undervoltage conditions impacting the Bulk Electric System (BES), leading to voltage instability, voltage collapse, or Cascading. Centrally controlled undervoltage-based load shedding is not included."

The definition excludes locally-applied relays that are designed to protect a contained area or, in other words, are not designed to mitigate wide-area voltage collapse. This exclusion is not explicit in these terms in the enforceable language of the definition since the meaning and measurement of "local" or "wide-area" varies greatly on a continent-wide basis and could potentially be interpreted differently by auditors and the applicable functional entities. Therefore, the definition as written is meant to provide flexibility for the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner to determine if a UVLS system falls under the defined term with respect to its impact on the reliability of the BES (voltage instability, voltage collapse, or Cascading). To further support the intended exclusion, further discussion and an example are provided on in the PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2 Guidelines and Technical Basis section under the heading "Guidelines for UVLS Program Definition."

The definition does explicitly note that the term excludes centrally controlled undervoltagebased load shedding. This type of load shedding is excluded because the drafting team asserts that the design and characteristics of centrally controlled undervoltage-based load shedding are commensurate with those of a Special Protection System (SPS) or Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) and should therefore be subject to SPS or RAS-related Reliability Standards. See PRC-010-1 and

¹³ (http://www.nerc.com/_layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=EOP-001-2.1b&title=Emergency%20Operations %20Planning).

¹⁴ (<u>http://www.nerc.com/_layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=EOP-002-3&title=Capacity%20and%20Energy%20</u> Emergencies).

¹⁵ (http://www.nerc.com/ layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=EOP-011-1&title=Emergency%20Operations).

¹⁶ (http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Glossary%20of%20Terms/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf).

PRC-010-2 Guidelines and Technical Basis section under the heading "Guidelines for UVLS Program Definition" for further discussion.

5) If the definition excludes certain types of UVLS, does this preclude an "integrated" approach (FERC Order No. 693, Paragraph 1509)?

The defined term "UVLS Program" clarifies which UVLS systems are subject to the requirements in PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2. The resulting exclusions from these versions of the standard do not preclude an "integrated" approach because the standard requires that an entity coordinate with all other protection and control systems as necessary, which may include other types of UVLS (i.e., locally-applied UVLS relays and centrally controlled undervoltage-based load shedding).

6) Where will centrally controlled undervoltage-based load shedding be covered?

As explained immediately above, the Requirements of PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2 are applicable to the proposed NERC Glossary term "UVLS Program," which excludes centrally controlled undervoltage-based load shedding because its design and characteristics are commensurate with those of an SPS or RAS. However, the NERC Glossary during the development of PRC-010-1 definition of "Special Protection System" excluded UVLS. Therefore, the work under Project 2010-05.2 – Special Protection Systems (Phase 2 of Protection Systems) combined the NERC Glossary definition of "Special Protection System" into the single term "Remedial Action Scheme."¹⁷ The definition revisions specifically excluded UVLS Programs, therefore including centrally controlled undervoltage-based shedding.

Consequently, the introduction of the term "UVLS Program" and the conforming revision to the term "Remedial Action Scheme" explicitly clarifies that RAS-related standards are applicable to centrally controlled undervoltage-based load shedding. The implementation plan for the revised definition of "Remedial Action Scheme" will address entities that will have newly identified RAS resulting from the application of the defined term.

Similar to the coordination effort with Project 2009-03 – EOP explained above, Project 2008-02 – UVLS and Project 2010-05.2 – SPS were coordinated to ensure that the effective dates of the adopted definitions of "Remedial Action Scheme" and "UVLS Program," the PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-1 Reliability Standards, and all associated retirements align.

7) Is the term "UVLS Program" inclusive of a collection of independent UVLS relays?

No; multiple independent relays do not constitute a program. While the definition stipulates that a UVLS Program consists of distributed relays and controls, the definition specifies that it must be "[a]n automatic load shedding program, consisting of distributed relays and controls, used to mitigate undervoltage conditions impacting the Bulk Electric System(BES), leading to voltage

¹⁷ Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees on November 14, 2014.

instability, voltage collapse, or Cascading. Centrally controlled undervoltage-based load shedding is not included."

Applicability

8) What is meant by the phrase "Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner"?

The PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2 Reliability Standards are applicable to both the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner because either may be responsible for designing and coordinating the program based on agreements, memorandums of understanding, or tariffs. The phrase "Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner" provides the flexibility for applicability to the entity that will perform the action. The expectation is not that both parties will perform the action, but rather that the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner will engage in discussion to determine the appropriate responsible entity. In addition, the requirements containing this phrase have specific language to qualify the responsible entity. For example, Requirement R1 states: "Each Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner *that is developing* a UVLS Program shall . . ." This language provides clarity that the applicable entity would be the one that is developing the program.

9) Why is the Transmission Operator not included?

While the Transmission Operator may be involved with UVLS Program activities, the drafting team did not identify any required performance for the Transmission Operator that was necessary to capture within PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2, since the Transmission Operator does not have the resources necessary to implement program specifications. If responsibilities are delegated to the Transmission Operator by the Transmission Owner, the Transmission Owner is still the accountable party.

To the extent that the Transmission Operator is required to have knowledge of system relays and protection systems, the drafting team notes that this requirement is covered under PRC-001-1.1 (*System Protection Coordination*), ¹⁸ Requirement R1. It is also noted that manual load shedding, for which the Transmission Operator is responsible, is not in the purview of PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2, as it is covered under current EOP-003-2 and will subsequently be covered by proposed EOP-011-1 (see Project 2009-03 – Emergency Operations).

10) What about UVLS schemes owned by Transmission Owners, Distribution Providers, or Transmission Operators that are not required by the planner?

The PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2 Reliability Standards are applicable to the term "UVLS Program." The drafting team notes that, by its defining attributes, a UVLS Program would be required and developed by a Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner. The nature of a UVLS scheme developed or required by a Distribution Provider, Transmission Operator, or Transmission Owner

¹⁸ <u>http://www.nerc.com/_layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=PRC-001-1.1&title=System%20Protection%20</u> <u>Coordination</u>.

would not meet the attributes of the defined term and would therefore not have the design and characteristics necessary to be subject to the requirements of PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2.

Requirements R1, R3, R4, and R5

11) What is required to evaluate the coordination referenced in Requirement R1, part 1.2?

Requirement R1 requires each Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner that develops a UVLS Program to evaluate the program's viability and effectiveness prior to implementation. This evaluation should include studies and analyses used when developing the program that show implementation of the program resolves the identified undervoltage issues that led to its design. These studies and analyses should also show that the UVLS Program is integrated through coordination with generator voltage ride-through capabilities and other protection and control systems. As such, the requirement is meant to provide flexibility for an entity to make the proper determinations, including the considerations for coordination, with respect to program effectiveness based on system characteristics. For further guidance on and examples of coordination considerations, please see the portion of the Guidelines and Technical Basis section under the Requirement R1 heading.

12) Requirements R1, R3, and R4 seem to all require evaluations of program effectiveness—how are they different?

Requirements R1, R3, and R4 do require evaluations of program effectiveness, but they are each at distinct points in time.

Requirement R1 requires evaluation of program effectiveness (by way of the qualifying parts) at the onset of program development, or during the initial planning stage, prior to implementation. Requirement R3 requires the same objectives of an evaluation of effectiveness, but at the point of a mandatory periodic review (at least once every 60 calendar months). Requirement R4 addresses the performance of a UVLS Program after an event (for applicable voltage excursion) to evaluate whether the UVLS Program resolved the undervoltage issues associated with the event.

It is noted that, because of the separate activities of each requirement, UVLS Program deficiencies found as a result of the assessments performed in Requirement R3 or R4 would not be violations of Requirement R1.

13) Requirement R4 would require the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner to review all voltage excursions—isn't this unduly burdensome?

While Requirement R4 essentially requires the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner to review all voltage excursions to see if they fall below the initializing set points of the UVLS Program, the drafting team contends that it will be clearly evident if voltage falls below the UVLS

threshold because either a) UVLS devices will operate; or b) the system will experience the adverse conditions the UVLS Program was installed to mitigate.

In addition, the drafting team acknowledges that the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner may not have the ability to know when voltage excursions are occurring since they are not operating entities. However, a process for the Transmission Operator, Transmission Owner, or Distribution Provider to notify the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator of such voltage excursion events is consistent with standard utility practice.

14) PRC-022-1 required the analysis of UVLS Misoperations. How is this addressed in PRC-010-1?

One of the recommendations in the SPCS report was to clearly differentiate between the postevent process of validating the effectiveness of the UVLS program design, its coordination with other protection and control systems, and the potential need to modify the program design (activities addressed in PRC-010-1) and the process of verifying correct operation of UVLS equipment. Because PRC-010-1 was not specific concerning the Misoperation of UVLS equipment, the drafting team made a subsequent revision creating PRC-010-2. Version two (PRC-010-2) now requires that the assessment according to Requirement R4 include the performance (i.e., operation or non-operation) of the UVLS Program equipment.

Relative to the assessment, Requirement R5 requires that a Corrective Action Plan be developed to address any identified deficiencies. This structure ensures that UVLS Program equipment is assessed to identify any Misoperation which could affect BES reliability. Although, the UVLS drafting team maintained during development of PRC-010-1 that verifying correct operation of UVLS equipment should be addressed in PRC-004, the drafting team included UVLS that is intended to trip one or more BES Elements in the proposed PRC-004-5.

Requirements R6, R7, and R8

15) Do Requirements R6, R7, and R8 overlap with the requirements of MOD-032-1?

While both MOD-032-1 (*Data for Power System Modeling and Analysis*)¹⁹ and Requirements R6, R7, and R8 of PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2 address data requirements, MOD-032-1 establishes overarching modeling data requirements with respect to consistency in format and reporting procedures, whereas the PRC-010-1 and PRC-010-2 requirements address the need to maintain and share data and databases for the purposes of studies for use in event analyses for UVLS Programs specifically. While Reliability Standards in general may have overlap in this manner, the activities in these requirements remain distinctly different.

¹⁹ (http://www.nerc.com/ layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=MOD-032-1&title=Data%20for%20Power%20System %20Modeling%20and%20Analysis).

16) Requirements R6, R7, and R8 appear to be administrative — doesn't this conflict with Paragraph 81 criteria?²⁰

Proper maintenance and timely sharing of UVLS Program data as required by Requirements R6, R7, and R8 is necessary to inform the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner's studies and analyses. While administrative tasks are required, the tasks have a core reliability-based need.

In addition, Requirements R6, R7, and R8 were written to emulate FERC-approved PRC-006-2 (*Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding*)^{21,22} data requirements. While some of these analogous requirements in PRC-006-2 are listed as candidates for Phase 2 of the Paragraph 81 project, they are not yet approved as meeting the criteria; furthermore, the Independent Expert Review Panel has recommended that these Paragraph 81 candidates not be included for deletion, citing that "there should be a clear expectation for Planning Coordinators to share data necessary to determine their UFLS program parameters."

Rationale

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

Rationale for Applicability

This standard is applicable to Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners that have or are developing a UVLS Program, and to Distribution Providers and Transmission Owners responsible for the ownership, operation, or control of UVLS equipment as required by the UVLS Program established by the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator. These Distribution Providers and Transmission Owners are referred to as UVLS entities for the purpose of this standard.

The applicability includes both the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner because either may be responsible for designing and coordinating the program based on agreements, memorandums of understanding, or tariffs.

The phrase "Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner" provides the latitude for applicability to the entity that will perform the action. The expectation is not that both parties will perform the action, but rather that the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner will engage in discussion to determine the appropriate responsible entity.

Rationale for R1

In Paragraph 1509 from Order No. 693, FERC directed NERC to require an integrated and coordinated approach to all protection systems. The drafting team agrees that a lack of coordination among protection systems is a key risk to reliability, and that each Planning

 ²⁰ Refer to Standards Independent Expert Review Project (IERP). (<u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Standard%20</u>
 <u>Development%20Plan/Standards_Independent_Experts_Review_Project_Report-SOTC_and_Board.pdf</u>).
 ²¹ (<u>http://www.nerc.com/_layouts/PrintStandard.aspx?standardnumber=PRC-006-2&title=Automatic%20Underfrequency</u>
 <u>%20Load%20Shedding</u>).

²² Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees on November 14, 2014.

Coordinator or Transmission Planner that develops a UVLS Program should evaluate the program's viability and effectiveness prior to implementation. This evaluation should include studies and analyses used when developing the program that show implementation of the program resolves the identified undervoltage conditions that led to its design. These studies and analyses should also show that the UVLS Program is integrated through coordination with generator voltage ride-through capabilities and other protection and control systems. Though presented as separate items, the drafting team recognizes that the studies that show coordination considerations and that the program addresses undervoltage issues may be interrelated and presented as one comprehensive analysis.

In addition, Requirement R1 also requires the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner to provide the UVLS Program's specifications and implementation schedule to applicable UVLS entities to implement the program. It is noted that studies to evaluate the effectiveness of the program should be completed prior to providing the specifications and schedule.

Rationale for R2

UVLS entities must implement a UVLS Program or address any necessary corrective actions for a UVLS Program according to the specifications and schedule provided by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner. If UVLS entities do not implement the UVLS Program according to the specifications and schedule provided, the UVLS Program may not be effective and may not achieve its intended goal.

Rationale for R3

A periodic comprehensive assessment (detailed analysis) should be conducted to identify and catalogue the accumulated effects of minor changes to the system that have occurred since the last assessment was completed, and should include an evaluation of each UVLS Program to ensure the continued integration through coordination. This comprehensive assessment supplements the NERC Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 annual assessment requirement to evaluate the impact of protection systems.

Based on the drafting team's knowledge and experience, and in keeping with time frames contained in similar requirements from other PRC Reliability Standards, 60 calendar months was determined to be the maximum amount of time allowable between assessments. Assessments will be performed sooner than the end of the 60-calendar month period if the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner determines that there are material changes to system topology or operating conditions that affect the performance of a UVLS Program. Note that the 60-calendar-month time frame would reset after each assessment.

Rationale for R4

A UVLS Program not functioning as expected during a voltage excursion event for which the UVLS Program was designed to operate presents a critical risk to system reliability. Therefore, a timely assessment to evaluate (1) whether the UVLS Program resolved the undervoltage issues and (2) the performance of the UVLS Program equipment associated with the applicable event is essential. The 12 calendar months (from the date of the event) provides adequate time to coordinate with other Planning Coordinators, Transmission Planners, Transmission Operators,

and UVLS entities, simulate pre- and post-event conditions, and complete the performance assessment.

Rationale for R5

If program deficiencies are identified during an assessment performed in either Requirement R3 or R4, the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner must develop a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to address the deficiencies. Based on the drafting team's knowledge and experience with UVLS studies, three calendar months was determined to provide a judicious balance between the reliability need to address deficiencies expeditiously and the time needed to consider potential solutions, coordinate resources, develop a CAP and implementation schedule, and provide the CAP and schedule to UVLS entities.

It is noted that the three-month time frame is only to develop the CAP and provide it to UVLS entities and does not encompass the time UVLS entities have to implement the CAP. Requirement R2 requires UVLS entities to execute the CAP according to the schedule provided by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner.

Rationale for R6

Having accurate and current data is required for the Planning Coordinator to perform undervoltage studies and for use in event analyses. Requirement R6 supports this reliability need by requiring the Planning Coordinator to update its UVLS Program database at least once each calendar year.

Rationale for R7

Having accurate and current data is required for the Planning Coordinator to perform undervoltage studies and for use in event analyses. Requirement R7 supports this reliability need by requiring the UVLS entity to provide UVLS Program data in accordance with specified parameters.

Rationale for R8

Requirement R8 supports the integrated and coordinated approach to UVLS programs directed by Paragraph 1509 of Order No. 693 by requiring that UVLS Program data be shared with neighboring Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners within a reasonable time period. Requests for the database should also be fulfilled for those functional entities that have a reliability need for the data (such as the Transmission Operators that develop System Operating Limits and Reliability Coordinators that develop Interconnection Reliability Operating Limits).

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Remedial Action Schemes
- **2. Number:** PRC-012-2
- **3. Purpose:** To ensure that Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) do not introduce unintentional or unacceptable reliability risks to the Bulk Electric System (BES).
- 4. Applicability:
 - 4.1. Functional Entities:
 - 4.1.1. Reliability Coordinator
 - 4.1.2. Planning Coordinator
 - **4.1.3.** RAS-entity the Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that owns all or part of a RAS
 - 4.2. Facilities:
 - 4.2.1. Remedial Action Schemes (RAS)
- 5. Effective Date*: See the BC Implementation Plan for PRC-012-2.

B. Requirements and Measures

- **R1.** Prior to placing a new or functionally modified RAS in service or retiring an existing RAS, each RAS-entity shall provide the information identified in Attachment 1 for review to the Reliability Coordinator(s) where the RAS is located. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- M1. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, a copy of the Attachment 1 documentation and the dated communications with the reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) in accordance with Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each Reliability Coordinator that receives Attachment 1 information pursuant to Requirement R1 shall, within four full calendar months of receipt or on a mutually agreed upon schedule, perform a review of the RAS in accordance with Attachment 2, and provide written feedback to each RAS-entity. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- M2. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated reports, checklists, or other documentation detailing the RAS review, and the dated communications with the RAS-entity in accordance with Requirement R2.
- **R3.** Prior to placing a new or functionally modified RAS in service or retiring an existing RAS, each RAS-entity that receives feedback from the reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) identifying reliability issue(s) shall resolve each issue to obtain approval of the RAS from each reviewing Reliability Coordinator. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]

- M3. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation and communications with the reviewing Reliability Coordinator that no reliability issues were identified during the review or that all identified reliability issues were resolved in accordance with Requirement R3.
- **R4.** Each Planning Coordinator, at least once every five full calendar years, shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - **4.1.** Perform an evaluation of each RAS within its planning area to determine whether:
 - **4.1.1.** The RAS mitigates the System condition(s) or Contingency(ies) for which it was designed.
 - **4.1.2.** The RAS avoids adverse interactions with other RAS, and protection and control systems.
 - **4.1.3.** For limited impact¹ RAS, the inadvertent operation of the RAS or the failure of the RAS to operate does not cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations.
 - **4.1.4.** Except for limited impact RAS, the possible inadvertent operation of the RAS, resulting from any single RAS component malfunction satisfies all of the following:
 - **4.1.4.1.** The BES shall remain stable.
 - **4.1.4.2.** Cascading shall not occur.
 - **4.1.4.3.** Applicable Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.
 - **4.1.4.4.** BES voltages shall be within post-Contingency voltage limits and post-Contingency voltage deviation limits as established by the Transmission Planner and the Planning Coordinator.
 - **4.1.4.5.** Transient voltage responses shall be within acceptable limits as established by the Transmission Planner and the Planning Coordinator.
 - **4.1.5.** Except for limited impact RAS, a single component failure in the RAS, when the RAS is intended to operate does not prevent the BES from meeting the same performance requirements (defined in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 or its successor) as those required for the events and conditions for which the RAS is designed.

¹ A RAS designated as limited impact cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations.

- **4.2.** Provide the results of the RAS evaluation including any identified deficiencies to each reviewing Reliability Coordinator and RAS-entity, and each impacted Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator.
- M4. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated reports or other documentation of the analyses comprising the evaluation(s) of each RAS and dated communications with the RAS-entity(ies), Transmission Planner(s), Planning Coordinator(s), and the reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each RAS-entity, within 120 full calendar days of a RAS operation or a failure of its RAS to operate when expected, or on a mutually agreed upon schedule with its reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s), shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
 - 5.1. Participate in analyzing the RAS operational performance to determine whether:
 - **5.1.1.** The System events and/or conditions appropriately triggered the RAS.
 - **5.1.2.** The RAS responded as designed.
 - **5.1.3.** The RAS was effective in mitigating BES performance issues it was designed to address.
 - **5.1.4.** The RAS operation resulted in any unintended or adverse BES response.
 - **5.2.** Provide the results of RAS operational performance analysis that identified any deficiencies to its reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s).
- M5. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation detailing the results of the RAS operational performance analysis and dated communications with participating RAS-entities and the reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) in accordance with Requirement R5.
- **R6.** Each RAS-entity shall participate in developing a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) and submit the CAP to its reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) within six full calendar months of: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]
 - Being notified of a deficiency in its RAS pursuant to Requirement R4, or
 - Notifying the Reliability Coordinator of a deficiency pursuant to Requirement R5, Part 5.2, or
 - Identifying a deficiency in its RAS pursuant to Requirement R8.
- **M6.** Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, a dated CAP and dated communications among each reviewing Reliability Coordinator and each RAS-entity in accordance with Requirement R6.

- **R7.** Each RAS-entity shall, for each of its CAPs developed pursuant to Requirement R6: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning, Long-term Planning]
 - 7.1. Implement the CAP.
 - **7.2.** Update the CAP if actions or timetables change.
 - **7.3.** Notify each reviewing Reliability Coordinator if CAP actions or timetables change and when the CAP is completed.
- M7. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation such as CAPs, project or work management program records, settings sheets, work orders, maintenance records, and communication with the reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) that documents the implementation, updating, or completion of a CAP in accordance with Requirement R7.
- **R8.** Each RAS-entity shall participate in performing a functional test of each of its RAS to verify the overall RAS performance and the proper operation of non-Protection System components: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
 - At least once every six full calendar years for all RAS not designated as limited impact, or
 - At least once every twelve full calendar years for all RAS designated as limited impact
- **M8.** Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated documentation detailing the RAS operational performance analysis for a correct RAS segment or an end-to-end operation (Measure M5 documentation), or dated documentation demonstrating that a functional test of each RAS segment or an end-to-end test was performed in accordance with Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each Reliability Coordinator shall update a RAS database containing, at a minimum, the information in Attachment 3 at least once every twelve full calendar months. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
- **M9.** Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to, dated spreadsheets, database reports, or other documentation demonstrating a RAS database was updated in accordance with Requirement R9.

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** The British Columbia Utilities Commission.
 - **1.2.** Evidence Retention:

The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The RAS-entity (Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider) shall each keep data or evidence to show compliance with Requirements R1, R3, R5, R6, R7, and R8, and Measures M1, M3, M5, M6, M7, and M8 since the last audit, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The Reliability Coordinator shall each keep data or evidence to show compliance with Requirements R2 and R9, and Measures M2 and M9 since the last audit, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The Planning Coordinator shall each keep data or evidence to show compliance with Requirement R4 and Measure M4 since the last audit, unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

If a RAS-entity (Transmission Owner, Generator Owner or Distribution Provider), Reliability Coordinator, or Planning Coordinator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is completed and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

Violation Severity Levels

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The RAS-entity failed to provide the information identified in Attachment 1 to each Reliability Coordinator prior to placing a new or functionally modified RAS in service or retiring an existing RAS in accordance with Requirement R1.
R2.	The reviewing Reliability Coordinator performed the review and provided the written feedback in accordance with Requirement R2, but was late by less than or equal to 30 full calendar days.	The reviewing Reliability Coordinator performed the review and provided the written feedback in accordance with Requirement R2, but was late by more than 30 full calendar days but less than or equal to 60 full calendar days.	The reviewing Reliability Coordinator performed the review and provided the written feedback in accordance with Requirement R2, but was late by more than 60 full calendar days but less than or equal to 90 full calendar days.	The reviewing Reliability Coordinator performed the review and provided the written feedback in accordance with Requirement R2, but was late by more than 90 full calendar days. OR The reviewing Reliability Coordinator failed to perform the review or provide feedback in accordance with Requirement R2.

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R3.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The RAS-entity failed to resolve identified reliability issue(s) to obtain approval from each reviewing Reliability Coordinator prior to placing a new or functionally modified RAS in service or retiring an existing RAS in accordance with Requirement R3.
R4.	The Planning Coordinator performed the evaluation in accordance with Requirement R4, but was late by less than or equal to 30 full calendar days.	The Planning Coordinator performed the evaluation in accordance with Requirement R4, but was late by more than 30 full calendar days but less than or equal to 60 full calendar days.	The Planning Coordinator performed the evaluation in accordance with Requirement R4, but was late by more than 60 full calendar days but less than or equal to 90 full calendar days. OR The Planning Coordinator performed the evaluation in accordance with Requirement R4, but failed to evaluate one of the Parts 4.1.1 through 4.1.5.	The Planning Coordinator performed the evaluation in accordance with Requirement R4, but was late by more than 90 full calendar days. OR The Planning Coordinator performed the evaluation in accordance with Requirement R4, but failed to evaluate two or more of the Parts 4.1.1 through 4.1.5. OR

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				The Planning Coordinator performed the evaluation in accordance with Requirement R4, but failed to provide the results to one or more of the receiving entities listed in Part 4.2. OR The Planning Coordinator failed to perform the evaluation in accordance with Requirement R4.
R5.	The RAS-entity performed the analysis in accordance with Requirement R5, but was late by less than or equal to 10 full calendar days.	The RAS-entity performed the analysis in accordance with Requirement R5, but was late by more than 10 full calendar days but less than or equal to 20 full calendar days.	The RAS-entity performed the analysis in accordance with Requirement R5, but was late by more than 20 full calendar days but less than or equal to 30 full calendar days. OR The RAS-entity performed the analysis in accordance with Requirement R5, but failed to address one of the Parts 5.1.1 through 5.1.4.	The RAS-entity performed the analysis in accordance with Requirement R5, but was late by more than 30 full calendar days. OR The RAS-entity performed the analysis in accordance with Requirement R5, but failed to address two or more of the Parts 5.1.1 through 5.1.4.

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				OR
				The RAS-entity performed the analysis in accordance with Requirement R5, but failed to provide the results (Part 5.2) to one or more of the reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s). OR
				The RAS-entity failed to perform the analysis in accordance with Requirement R5.
R6.	The RAS-entity developed a Corrective Action Plan and submitted it to its reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) in accordance with Requirement R6, but was late by less than or equal to 10 full calendar days.	The RAS-entity developed a Corrective Action Plan and submitted it to its reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) in accordance with Requirement R6, but was late by more than 10 full calendar days but less than or equal to 20 full calendar days.	The RAS-entity developed a Corrective Action Plan and submitted it to its reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) in accordance with Requirement R6, but was late by more than 20 full calendar days but less than or equal to 30 full calendar days.	The RAS-entity developed a Corrective Action Plan and submitted it to its reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) in accordance with Requirement R6, but was late by more than 30 full calendar days. OR The RAS-entity developed a Corrective Action Plan but failed to submit it to one or

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
				more of its reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) in accordance with Requirement R6. OR The RAS-entity failed to develop a Corrective Action
				Plan in accordance with Requirement R6.
R7.	The RAS-entity implemented a CAP in accordance with Requirement R7, Part 7.1, but failed to update the CAP (Part 7.2) if actions or timetables changed, or failed to notify (Part 7.3) each of the reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) of the updated CAP or completion of the CAP.	N/A	N/A	The RAS-entity failed to implement a CAP in accordance with Requirement R7, Part 7.1.
R8.	The RAS-entity performed the functional test for a RAS as specified in Requirement R8, but was late by less than	The RAS-entity performed the functional test for a RAS as specified in Requirement R8, but was late by more than 30 full calendar days	The RAS-entity performed the functional test for a RAS as specified in Requirement R8, but was late by more than 60 full calendar days	The RAS-entity performed the functional test for a RAS as specified in Requirement R8, but was late by more than 90 full calendar days.

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
	or equal to 30 full calendar days.	but less than or equal to 60 full calendar days.	but less than or equal to 90 full calendar days.	OR The RAS-entity failed to perform the functional test for a RAS as specified in Requirement R8.
R9.	The Reliability Coordinator updated the RAS database in accordance with Requirement R9, but was late by less than or equal to 30 full calendar days.	The Reliability Coordinator updated the RAS database in accordance with Requirement R9, but was late by more than 30 full calendar days but less than or equal to 60 full calendar days.	The Reliability Coordinator updated the RAS database in accordance with Requirement R9, but was late by more than 60 full calendar days but less than or equal to 90 full calendar days.	The Reliability Coordinator updated the RAS database in accordance with Requirement R9 but was late by more than 90 full calendar days. OR The Reliability Coordinator failed to update the RAS database in accordance with Requirement R9.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	February 8, 2005	Adopted by the Board of Trustees	
0	March 16, 2007	Identified by Commission as "fill-in-the-blank" with no action taken on the standard	
1	November 13, 2014	Adopted by the Board of Trustees	
1	November 19, 2015	Accepted by Commission for informational purposes only	
2	May 5, 2016	Adopted by Board of Trustees	
2	September 20, 2017	FERC Order No. 837 issued approving PRC-012-2	

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Attachment 1 Supporting Documentation for RAS Review

The following checklist identifies important Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) information for each new or functionally modified² RAS that the RAS-entity must document and provide to the reviewing Reliability Coordinator(s) (RC). If an item on this list does not apply to a specific RAS, a response of "Not Applicable" for that item is appropriate. When RAS are submitted for functional modification review and approval, only the proposed modifications to that RAS require review; however, the RAS-entity must provide a summary of the existing functionality. The RC may request additional information on any aspect of the RAS as well as any reliability issue related to the RAS. Additional entities (without decision authority) may be part of the RAS review process at the request of the RC.

I. General

- 1. Information such as maps, one-line drawings, substation and schematic drawings that identify the physical and electrical location of the RAS and related facilities.
- 2. Functionality of new RAS or proposed functional modifications to existing RAS and documentation of the pre- and post-modified functionality of the RAS.
- 3. The Corrective Action Plan (CAP) if RAS modifications are proposed in a CAP.
- 4. Data to populate the RAS database:
 - a. RAS name.
 - b. Each RAS-entity and contact information.
 - c. Expected or actual in-service date; most recent RC-approval date (Requirement R3); most recent evaluation date (Requirement R4); and date of retirement, if applicable.
 - d. System performance issue or reason for installing the RAS (e.g., thermal overload, angular instability, poor oscillation damping, voltage instability, under- or over-voltage, or slow voltage recovery).
 - e. Description of the Contingencies or System conditions for which the RAS was designed (i.e., initiating conditions).
 - f. Action(s) to be taken by the RAS.
 - g. Identification of limited impact³ RAS.
 - h. Any additional explanation relevant to high-level understanding of the RAS.

Changes to System conditions or contingencies monitored by the RAS

- Changes to RAS hardware beyond in-kind replacement; i.e., match the original functionality of existing components
- Changes to RAS logic beyond correcting existing errors
- Changes to redundancy levels; i.e., addition or removal

² Functionally modified: Any modification to a RAS consisting of any of the following:

[•] Changes to the actions the RAS is designed to initiate

³ A RAS designated as limited impact cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations.

II. Functional Description and Transmission Planning Information

- 1. Contingencies and System conditions that the RAS is intended to remedy.
- 2. The action(s) to be taken by the RAS in response to disturbance conditions.
- 3. A summary of technical studies, if applicable, demonstrating that the proposed RAS actions satisfy System performance objectives for the scope of System events and conditions that the RAS is intended to remedy. The technical studies summary shall also include information such as the study year(s), System conditions, and Contingencies analyzed on which the RAS design is based, and the date those technical studies were performed.
- 4. Information regarding any future System plans that will impact the RAS.
- 5. RAS-entity proposal and justification for limited impact designation, if applicable.
- 6. Documentation describing the System performance resulting from the possible inadvertent operation of the RAS, except for limited impact RAS, caused by any single RAS component malfunction. Single component malfunctions in a RAS not determined to be limited impact must satisfy all of the following:
 - a. The BES shall remain stable.
 - b. Cascading shall not occur.
 - c. Applicable Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.
 - d. BES voltages shall be within post-Contingency voltage limits and post-Contingency voltage deviation limits as established by the Transmission Planner and the Planning Coordinator.
 - e. Transient voltage responses shall be within acceptable limits as established by the Transmission Planner and the Planning Coordinator.
- 7. An evaluation indicating that the RAS settings and operation avoid adverse interactions with other RAS, and protection and control systems.
- 8. Identification of other affected RCs.

III. Implementation

- 1. Documentation describing the applicable equipment used for detection, dc supply, communications, transfer trip, logic processing, control actions, and monitoring.
- 2. Information on detection logic and settings/parameters that control the operation of the RAS.
- 3. Documentation showing that any multifunction device used to perform RAS function(s), in addition to other functions such as protective relaying or SCADA, does not compromise the reliability of the RAS when the device is not in service or is being maintained.
- 4. Documentation describing the System performance resulting from a single component failure in the RAS, except for limited impact RAS, when the RAS is intended to operate. A single component failure in a RAS not determined to be limited impact must not prevent the BES from meeting the same performance requirements (defined in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 or its successor) as those required for the events and conditions for which the RAS is designed. The documentation should describe or illustrate how the design achieves this objective.
- 5. Documentation describing the functional testing process.

IV. RAS Retirement

The following checklist identifies RAS information that the RAS-entity shall document and provide to each reviewing RC.

- 1. Information necessary to ensure that the RC is able to understand the physical and electrical location of the RAS and related facilities.
- 2. A summary of applicable technical studies and technical justifications upon which the decision to retire the RAS is based.
- 3. Anticipated date of RAS retirement.

Attachment 2 Reliability Coordinator RAS Review Checklist

The following checklist identifies reliability-related considerations for the Reliability Coordinator (RC) to review and verify for each new or functionally modified⁴ Remedial Action Scheme (RAS). The RC review is not limited to the checklist items and the RC may request additional information on any aspect of the RAS as well as any reliability issue related to the RAS. If a checklist item is not relevant to a particular RAS, it should be noted as "Not Applicable." If reliability considerations are identified during the review, the considerations and the proposed resolutions should be documented with the remaining applicable Attachment 2 items.

I. Design

- 1. The RAS actions satisfy performance objectives for the scope of events and conditions that the RAS is intended to mitigate.
- 2. The designed timing of RAS operation(s) is appropriate to its BES performance objectives.
- 3. The RAS arming conditions, if applicable, are appropriate to its System performance objectives.
- 4. The RAS avoids adverse interactions with other RAS, and protection and control systems.
- 5. The effects of RAS incorrect operation, including inadvertent operation and failure to operate, have been identified.
- 6. Determination whether or not the RAS is limited impact.⁵ A RAS designated as limited impact cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations.
- 7. Except for limited impact RAS as determined by the RC, the possible inadvertent operation of the RAS resulting from any single RAS component malfunction satisfies all of the following:
 - a. The BES shall remain stable.
 - b. Cascading shall not occur.
 - c. Applicable Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.

Changes to System conditions or contingencies monitored by the RAS

- Changes to RAS hardware beyond in-kind replacement; i.e., match the original functionality of existing components
- Changes to RAS logic beyond correcting existing errors
- Changes to redundancy levels; i.e., addition or removal

⁴ Functionally modified: Any modification to a RAS consisting of any of the following:

[•] Changes to the actions the RAS is designed to initiate

⁵ A RAS designated as limited impact cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations.

- d. BES voltages shall be within post-Contingency voltage limits and post-Contingency voltage deviation limits as established by the Transmission Planner and the Planning Coordinator.
- e. Transient voltage responses shall be within acceptable limits as established by the Transmission Planner and the Planning Coordinator.
- 8. The effects of future BES modifications on the design and operation of the RAS have been identified, where applicable.

II. Implementation

- 1. The implementation of RAS logic appropriately correlates desired actions (outputs) with events and conditions (inputs).
- 2. Except for limited impact RAS as determined by the RC, a single component failure in a RAS does not prevent the BES from meeting the same performance requirements as those required for the events and conditions for which the RAS is designed.
- 3. The RAS design facilitates periodic testing and maintenance.
- 4. The mechanism or procedure by which the RAS is armed is clearly described, and is appropriate for reliable arming and operation of the RAS for the conditions and events for which it is designed to operate.

III. RAS Retirement

RAS retirement reviews should assure that there is adequate justification for why a RAS is no longer needed.

Attachment 3 Database Information

- 1. RAS name.
- 2. Each RAS-entity and contact information.
- 3. Expected or actual in-service date; most recent RC-approval date (Requirement R3); most recent evaluation date (Requirement R4); and date of retirement, if applicable.
- 4. System performance issue or reason for installing the RAS (e.g., thermal overload, angular instability, poor oscillation damping, voltage instability, under- or over-voltage, or slow voltage recovery).
- 5. Description of the Contingencies or System conditions for which the RAS was designed (i.e., initiating conditions).
- 6. Action(s) to be taken by the RAS.
- 7. Identification of limited impact⁶ RAS.
- 8. Any additional explanation relevant to high-level understanding of the RAS.

⁶ A RAS designated as limited impact cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations.

Technical Justification

4.1.1 Reliability Coordinator

The Reliability Coordinator (RC) is the best-suited functional entity to perform the Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) review because the RC has the widest area reliability perspective of all functional entities and an awareness of reliability issues in neighboring RC Areas. The Wide Area purview better facilitates the evaluation of interactions among separate RAS, as well as interactions among RAS and other protection and control systems. The selection of the RC also minimizes the possibility of a conflict of interest that could exist because of business relationships among the RAS-entity, Planning Coordinator, Transmission Planner, or other entities involved in the planning or implementation of a RAS. The RC is also less likely to be a stakeholder in any given RAS and can therefore maintain objective independence.

4.1.2 Planning Coordinator

The Planning Coordinator (PC) is the best-suited functional entity to perform the RAS evaluation to verify the continued effectiveness and coordination of the RAS, its inadvertent operation performance, and the performance for a single component failure. The items that must be addressed in the evaluations include: 1) RAS mitigation of the System condition(s) or event(s) for which it was designed; 2) RAS avoidance of adverse interactions with other RAS and with protection and control systems; 3) the impact of inadvertent operation; and 4) the impact of a single component failure. The evaluation of these items involves modeling and studying the interconnected transmission system, similar to the planning analyses performed by PCs.

4.1.3 RAS-entity

The RAS-entity is any Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that owns all or part of a RAS. If all of the RAS (RAS components) have a single owner, then that RASentity has sole responsibility for all the activities assigned within the standard to the RAS-entity. If the RAS (RAS components) have more than one owner, then each separate RAS component owner is a RAS-entity and is obligated to participate in various activities identified by the Requirements.

The standard does not stipulate particular compliance methods. RAS-entities have the option of collaborating to fulfill their responsibilities for each applicable requirement. Such collaboration and coordination may promote efficiency in achieving the reliability objectives of the requirements; however, the individual RAS-entity must be able to demonstrate its participation for compliance. As an example, the individual RAS-entities could collaborate to produce and submit a single, coordinated Attachment 1 to the reviewing RC pursuant to Requirement R1 to initiate the RAS review process.

Limited impact

RAS are unique and customized assemblages of protection and control equipment that vary in complexity and impact on the reliability of the BES. These differences in RAS design, action, and risk to the BES are identified and verified within the construct of Requirements R1-R4 of PRC-012-2.

The reviewing RC has the authority to designate a RAS as limited impact if the RAS cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled

separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations. The reviewing RC makes the final determination as to whether a RAS qualifies for the limited impact designation based upon the studies and other information provided with the Attachment 1 submittal by the RAS-entity.

The standard recognizes the Local Area Protection Scheme (LAPS) classification in WECC (Western Electricity Coordinating Council) and the Type III classification in NPCC (Northeast Power Coordinating Council) as initially appropriate for limited impact designation. The following information describing the aforementioned WECC and NPCC RAS is excerpted from the respective regional documentation⁷. The drafting team notes that the information below represents the state of the WECC and NPCC regional processes at the time of this standard development and is subject to change before the effective date of PRC-012-2.

WECC: Local Area Protection Scheme (LAPS)

A Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) whose failure to operate would NOT result in any of the following:

- Violations of TPL-001-WECC-RBP System Performance RBP,
- Maximum load loss ≥ 300 MW,
- Maximum generation loss ≥ 1000 MW.

NPCC: Type III

An SPS whose misoperation or failure to operate results in no **significant adverse impact** outside the **local area**.

The following terms are also defined by NPCC to assess the impact of the SPS for classification:

Significant adverse impact – With due regard for the maximum operating capability of the affected systems, one or more of the following conditions arising from faults or disturbances, shall be deemed as having significant adverse impact:

- a. system instability;
- b. unacceptable system dynamic response or equipment tripping;
- c. voltage levels in violation of applicable emergency limits;
- d. loadings on transmission facilities in violation of applicable emergency limits;
- e. unacceptable loss of load.

Local area – An electrically confined or radial portion of the system. The geographic size and number of system elements contained will vary based on system characteristics. A local area may be relatively large geographically with relatively few buses in a sparse system, or be

⁷ WECC Procedure to Submit a RAS for Assessment Information Required to Assess the Reliability of a RAS Guideline, Revised 10/28/2013 | NPCC Regional Reliability Reference Directory # 7, Special Protection Systems, Version 2, 3/31/2015

relatively small geographically with a relatively large number of buses in a densely networked system.

A RAS implemented prior to the effective date of PRC-012-2 that has been through the regional review processes of WECC or NPCC and classified as either a Local Area Protection Scheme (LAPS) in WECC or a Type III in NPCC, is recognized as a limited impact RAS upon the effective date of PRC-012-2 for the purposes of this standard and is subject to all applicable requirements.

To propose an existing RAS (a RAS implemented prior to the effective date of PRC-012-2) be designated as limited impact by the reviewing RC, the RAS-entity must prepare and submit the appropriate Attachment 1 information that includes the technical justification (evaluations) documenting that the System can meet the performance requirements (specified in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1.4 and 4.1.5) resulting from a single RAS component malfunction or failure, respectively.

There is nothing that precludes a RAS-entity from working with the reviewing RC during the implementation period of PRC-012-2, in anticipation of the standard becoming enforceable. However, even if the reviewing RC determines the RAS qualifies as limited impact, the designation is not relevant until the standard becomes effective. Until then, the existing regional processes remain in effect as well as the existing RAS classifications or lack thereof.

An example of a scheme that could be recognized as a limited impact RAS is a load shedding or generation rejection scheme used to mitigate the overload of a BES transmission line. The inadvertent operation of such a scheme would cause the loss of either a certain amount of generation or load. The evaluation by the RAS-entity should demonstrate that the loss of this amount of generation or load, without the associated contingency for RAS operation actually occurring, is acceptable and not detrimental to the reliability of BES; e.g., in terms of frequency and voltage stability. The failure of that scheme to operate when intended could potentially lead to the overloading of a transmission line beyond its acceptable rating. The RAS-entity would need to demonstrate that this overload, while in excess of the applicable Facility Rating, is not detrimental to the BES outside the contained area (predetermined by studies) affected by the contingency.

Other examples of limited impact RAS include:

- A scheme used to protect BES equipment from damage caused by overvoltage through generation rejection or equipment tripping.
- A centrally-controlled undervoltage load shedding scheme used to protect a contained area (predetermined by studies) of the BES against voltage collapse.
- A scheme used to trip a generating unit following certain BES Contingencies to prevent the unit from going out of synch with the System; where, if the RAS fails to operate and the unit pulls out of synchronism, the resulting apparent impedance swings do not

result in the tripping of any Transmission System Elements other than the generating unit and its directly connected Facilities.

Requirement R1

Each RAS is unique and its action(s) can have a significant impact on the reliability and integrity of the Bulk Electric System (BES); therefore, a review of a proposed new RAS or an existing RAS proposed for functional modification, or retirement (removal from service) must be completed prior to implementation.

Functional modifications consists of any of the following:

- Changes to System conditions or Contingencies monitored by the RAS
- Changes to the actions the RAS is designed to initiate
- Changes to RAS hardware beyond in-kind replacement; i.e., match the original functionality of existing components
- Changes to RAS logic beyond correcting existing errors
- Changes to redundancy levels; i.e., addition or removal

An example indicating the limits of an in-kind replacement of a RAS component is the replacement of one relay (or other device) with a relay (or other device) that uses similar functions. For instance, if a RAS included a CO-11 relay which was replaced by an IAC-53 relay, that would be an in-kind replacement. If the CO-11 relay were replaced by a microprocessor SEL-451 relay that used only the same functions as the original CO-11 relay, that would also be an in-kind replacement; however, if the SEL-451 relay was used to add new logic to what the CO-11 relay had provided, then the replacement relay would be a functional modification.

Changes to RAS pickup levels that require no other scheme changes are not considered a functional modification. For example, System conditions require a RAS to be armed when the combined flow on two lines exceeds 500 MW. If a periodic evaluation pursuant to Requirement R4, or other assessment, indicates that the arming level should be reduced to 450 MW without requiring any other RAS changes that would not be a functional modification. Similarly, if a RAS is designed to shed load to reduce loading on a particular line below 1000 amps, then a change in the load shedding trigger from 1000 amps to 1100 amps would not be a functional modification.

Another example illustrates a case where a System change may result in a RAS functional change. Assume that a generation center is connected to a load center through two transmission lines. The lines are not rated to accommodate full plant output if one line is out of service, so a RAS monitors the status of both lines and trips or ramps down the generation to a safe level following loss of either line. Later, one of the lines is tapped to serve additional load. The System that the RAS impacts now includes three lines, loss of any of which is likely to still require generation reduction. The modified RAS will need to monitor all three lines (add two line terminal status inputs to the RAS) and the logic to recognize the specific line outages would

change, while the generation reduction (RAS output) requirement may or may not change, depending on which line is out of service. These required RAS changes would be a functional modification.

Any functional modification to a RAS will need to be reviewed and approved through the process described in Requirements R1, R2, and R3. The need for such functional modifications may be identified in several ways including but not limited to the Planning evaluations pursuant to R4, incorrect operations pursuant to R5, a test failure pursuant to R8, or Planning assessments related to future additions or modifications of other facilities.

See Item 4a in the Implementation Section of Attachment 1 in the Supplemental Material section for typical RAS components for which a failure may be considered. The RC has the discretion to make the final determination regarding which components should be regarded as RAS components during its review.

To facilitate a review that promotes reliability, the RAS-entity(ies) must provide the reviewer with sufficient details of the RAS design, function, and operation. This data and supporting documentation are identified in Attachment 1 of this standard, and Requirement R1 mandates that the RAS-entity(ies) provide them to the reviewing Reliability Coordinator (RC). The RC that coordinates the area where the RAS is located is responsible for the review. In cases where a RAS crosses multiple RC Area boundaries, each affected RC is responsible for conducting either individual reviews or a coordinated review.

Requirement R1 does not specify how far in advance of implementation the RAS-entity(ies) must provide Attachment 1 data to the reviewing RC. The information will need to be submitted early enough to allow RC review in the allotted time pursuant to Requirement R2, including resolution of any reliability issues that might be identified, in order to obtain approval of the reviewing RC. Expeditious submittal of this information is in the interest of each RAS-entity to effect a timely implementation.

Requirement R2

Requirement R2 mandates that the RC perform reviews of all proposed new RAS and existing RAS proposed for functional modification, or retirement (removal from service) in its RC Area.

RAS are unique and customized assemblages of protection and control equipment. As such, they have a potential to introduce reliability risks to the BES, if not carefully planned, designed, and installed. A RAS may be installed to address a reliability issue, or achieve an economic or operational advantage, and could introduce reliability risks that might not be apparent to a RAS-entity(ies). An independent review by a multi-disciplinary panel of subject matter experts with planning, operations, protection, telecommunications, and equipment expertise is an effective means of identifying risks and recommending RAS modifications when necessary.

The RC is the functional entity best suited to perform the RAS reviews because it has the widest area reliability perspective of all functional entities and an awareness of reliability issues in

neighboring RC Areas. This Wide Area purview facilitates the evaluation of interactions among separate RAS as well as interactions among the RAS and other protection and control systems.

The selection of the RC also minimizes the possibility of a "conflict of interest" that could exist because of business relationships among the RAS-entity, Planning Coordinator (PC), Transmission Planner (TP), or other entities that are likely to be involved in the planning or implementation of a RAS. The RC may request assistance in RAS reviews from other parties such as the PC(s) or regional technical groups (e.g., Regional Entities); however, the RC retains responsibility for compliance with the requirement. It is recognized that the RC does not possesses more information or ability than anticipated by their functional registration as designated by NERC. The NERC Functional Model is a guideline for the development of standards and their applicability and does not contain compliance requirements. If Reliability Standards address functions that are not described in the model, the Reliability Standard requirements take precedence over the Functional Model. For further reference, please see the Introduction section of NERC's Reliability Functional Model, Version 5, November 2009. Attachment 2 of this standard is a checklist for assisting the RC in identifying design and implementation aspects of a RAS, and for facilitating consistent reviews of each RAS submitted for review. The time frame of four full calendar months is consistent with current utility practice; however, flexibility is provided by allowing the parties to negotiate a different schedule for the review. Note, an RC may need to include this task in its reliability plan(s) for the NERC Region(s) in which it is located.

Requirement R3

Requirement R3 mandates that each RAS-entity resolve all reliability issues (pertaining to its RAS) identified during the RAS review by the reviewing Reliability Coordinators. Examples of reliability issues include a lack of dependability, security, or coordination. RC approval of a RAS is considered to be obtained when the reviewing RC's feedback to each RAS-entity indicates that either no reliability issues were identified during the review or all identified reliability issues were resolved to the RC's satisfaction.

Dependability is a component of reliability that is the measure of certainty of a device to operate when required. If a RAS is installed to meet performance requirements of NERC Reliability Standards, a failure of the RAS to operate when intended would put the System at risk of violating NERC Reliability Standards if specified Contingency(ies) or System conditions occur. This risk is mitigated by designing the RAS so that it will accomplish the intended purpose while experiencing a single RAS component failure. This is often accomplished through redundancy. Other strategies for providing dependability include "over-tripping" load or generation, or alternative automatic backup schemes.

Security is a component of reliability that is the measure of certainty of a device to not operate inadvertently. False or inadvertent operation of a RAS results in taking a programmed action without the appropriate arming conditions, occurrence of specified Contingency(ies), or System conditions expected to trigger the RAS action. Typical RAS actions include shedding load or generation or re-configuring the System. Such actions, if inadvertently taken, are undesirable

and may put the System in a less secure state. Worst case impacts from inadvertent operation often occur if all programmed RAS actions occur. If the System performance still satisfies PRC-012-2 Requirement R4, Part 4.3, no additional mitigation is required. Security enhancements to the RAS design, such as voting schemes, are acceptable mitigations against inadvertent operations.

Any reliability issue identified during the review must be resolved before implementing the RAS to avoid placing the System at unacceptable risk. The RAS-entity or the reviewing RC(s) may have alternative ideas or methods available to resolve the issue(s). In either case, the concern needs to be resolved in deference to reliability, and the RC has the final decision.

A specific time period for the RAS-entity to respond to the RC(s) review is not necessary because an expeditious response is in the interest of each RAS-entity to effect a timely implementation.

A specific time period for the RC to respond to the RAS-entity following the RAS review is also not necessary because the RC will be aware of (1) any reliability issues associated with the RAS not being in service and (2) the RAS-entity's schedule to implement the RAS to address those reliability issues. Since the RC is the ultimate arbiter of BES operating reliability, resolving reliability issues is a priority for the RC and serves as an incentive to expeditiously respond to the RAS-entity.

Requirement R4

Requirement R4 mandates that an evaluation of each RAS be performed at least once every five full calendar years. The purpose of a periodic RAS evaluation is to verify the continued effectiveness and coordination of the RAS, as well as to verify that requirements for BES performance following inadvertent RAS operation and single component failure continue to be satisfied. A periodic evaluation is required because changes in System topology or operating conditions may change the effectiveness of a RAS or the way it interacts with and impacts the BES.

A RAS designated as limited impact cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations. Limited impact RAS are not subject to the RAS single component malfunction and failure tests of Parts 4.1.4 and 4.1.5, respectively. Requiring a limited impact RAS to meet these tests would add complexity to the design with minimal benefit to BES reliability.

A RAS implemented after the effective date of this standard can only be designated as limited impact by the reviewing RC(s). A RAS implemented prior to the effective date of PRC-012-2 that has been through the regional review processes of WECC or NPCC and is classified as either a Local Area Protection Scheme (LAPS) in WECC or a Type III in NPCC is recognized as a limited impact RAS upon the effective date of PRC-012-2 for the purposes of this standard and is subject to all applicable requirements.

Requirement R4 also clarifies that the RAS single component failure and inadvertent operation tests do not apply to RAS which are determined to be limited impact. Requiring a limited impact RAS to meet the single component failure and inadvertent operation tests would just add complexity to the design with little or no improvement in the reliability of the BES.

For existing RAS, the initial performance of Requirement R4 must be completed within five full calendar years of the effective date of PRC-012-2. For new or functionally modified RAS, the initial performance of the requirement must be completed within five full calendar years of the RAS approval date by the reviewing RC(s). Five full calendar years was selected as the maximum time frame between evaluations based on the time frames for similar requirements in Reliability Standards PRC-006, PRC-010, and PRC-014. The RAS evaluation can be performed sooner if it is determined that material changes to System topology or System operating conditions could potentially impact the effectiveness or coordination of the RAS. System changes also have the potential to alter the reliability impact of limited impact RAS on the BES. Requirement 4, Part 4.1.3 explicitly requires the periodic evaluation of limited impact RAS to verify the limited impact designation remains applicable. The periodic RAS evaluation will typically lead to one of the following outcomes: 1) affirmation that the existing RAS is effective; 2) identification of changes needed to the existing RAS; or, 3) justification for RAS retirement.

The items required to be addressed in the evaluations (Requirement R4, Parts 4.1.1 through 4.1.5) are planning analyses that may involve modeling of the interconnected transmission system to assess BES performance. The PC is the functional entity best suited to perform the analyses because they have a wide-area planning perspective. To promote reliability, the PC is required to provide the results of the evaluation to each impacted Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator, in addition to each reviewing RC and RAS-entity. In cases where a RAS crosses PC boundaries, each affected PC is responsible for conducting either individual evaluations or participating in a coordinated evaluation.

The intent of Requirement R4, Part 4.1.4 is to verify that the possible inadvertent operation of the RAS (other than limited impact RAS), caused by the malfunction of a single component of the RAS, meet the same System performance requirements as those required for the Contingency(ies) or System conditions for which it is designed. If the RAS is designed to meet one of the planning events (P0-P7) in TPL-001-4, the possible inadvertent operation of the RAS must meet the same performance requirements listed in the standard for that planning event. The requirement clarifies that the inadvertent operation to be considered is only that caused by the malfunction of a single RAS component. This allows features to be designed into the RAS to improve security, such that inadvertent operation due to malfunction of a single component is prevented; otherwise, the RAS inadvertent operation must satisfy Requirement R4, Part 4.1.4.

The intent of Requirement R4, Part 4.1.4 is also to verify that the possible inadvertent operation of the RAS (other than limited impact RAS) installed for an extreme event in TPL-001-4 or for some other Contingency or System conditions not defined in TPL-001-4 (therefore without performance requirements), meet the minimum System performance requirements of Category P7 in Table 1 of NERC Reliability Standard TPL-001-4. However, instead of referring to the TPL

standard, the requirement lists the System performance requirements that a potential inadvertent operation must satisfy. The performance requirements listed (Requirement R4, Parts 4.1.4.1 – 4.1.4.5) are the ones that are common to all planning events (P0-P7) listed in TPL-001-4.

With reference to Requirement 4, Part 4.1.4, note that the only differences in performance requirements among the TPL (P0-P7) events (not common to all of them) concern Non-Consequential Load Loss and interruption of Firm Transmission Service. It is not necessary for Requirement R4, Part 4.1.4 to specify performance requirements related to these areas because a RAS is only allowed to drop non-consequential load or interrupt Firm Transmission Service if that action is allowed for the Contingency for which it is designed. Therefore, the inadvertent operation should automatically meet Non-Consequential Load Loss or interrupting Firm Transmission Service performance requirements for the Contingency(ies) for which it was designed.

The intent of Requirement R4, Part 4.1.5 is to verify that a single component failure in a RAS, other than limited impact RAS, when the RAS is intended to operate, does not prevent the BES from meeting the same performance requirements (defined in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 or its successor) as those required for the events and conditions for which the RAS is designed. This analysis is needed to ensure that changing System conditions do not result in the single component failure requirement not being met.

The following is an example of a single component failure causing the System to fail to meet the performance requirements for the P1 event for which the RAS was installed. Consider the instance where a three-phase Fault (P1 event) results in a generating plant becoming unstable (a violation of the System performance requirements of TPL-001-4). To resolve this, a RAS is installed to trip a single generating unit which allows the remaining units at the plant to remain stable. If failure of a single component (e.g., relay) in the RAS results in the RAS failing to operate for the P1 event, the generating plant would become unstable (failing to meet the System performance requirements of TPL-001-4 for a P1 event).

Requirement R4, Part 4.1.5 does not mandate that all RAS have redundant components. For example:

- Consider the instance where a RAS is installed to mitigate an extreme event in TPL-001-4. There are no System performance requirements for extreme events; therefore, the RAS does not need redundancy to meet the same performance requirements as those required for the events and conditions for which the RAS was designed.
- Consider a RAS that arms more load or generation than necessary such that failure of the RAS to drop a portion of load or generation due to that single component failure will still result in satisfactory System performance, as long as tripping the total armed amount of load or generation does not cause other adverse impacts to reliability.

The scope of the periodic evaluation does not include a new review of the physical implementation of the RAS, as this was confirmed by the RC during the initial review and verified by subsequent functional testing. However, it is possible that a RAS design which previously satisfied requirements for inadvertent RAS operation and single component failure by means other than component redundancy may fail to satisfy these requirements at a later time, and must be evaluated with respect to the current System. For example, if the actions of a particular RAS include tripping load, load growth could occur over time that impacts the amount of load to be tripped. These changes could result in tripping too much load upon inadvertent operation and result in violations of Facility Ratings. Alternatively, the RAS might be designed to trip more load than necessary (i.e., "over trip") in order to satisfy single component failure requirements. System changes could result in too little load being tripped and unacceptable BES performance if one of the loads failed to trip.

Requirement R5

The correct operation of a RAS is important to maintain the reliability and integrity of the BES. Any incorrect operation of a RAS indicates the RAS effectiveness and/or coordination may have been compromised. Therefore, all operations of a RAS and failures of a RAS to operate when expected must be analyzed to verify that the RAS operation was consistent with its intended functionality and design.

A RAS operational performance analysis is intended to: (1) verify RAS operation is consistent with implemented design; or (2) identify RAS performance deficiencies that manifested in the incorrect RAS operation or failure of RAS to operate when expected.

The 120 full calendar day time frame for the completion of RAS operational performance analysis aligns with the time frame established in Requirement R1 from PRC-004-4 regarding the investigation of a Protection System Misoperation; however, flexibility is provided by allowing the parties to negotiate a different schedule for the analysis. To promote reliability, the RAS-entity(s) is required to provide the results of RAS operational performance analyses to its reviewing RC(s) if the analyses revealed a deficiency.

The RAS-entity(ies) may need to collaborate with its associated Transmission Planner to comprehensively analyze RAS operational performance. This is because a RAS operational performance analysis involves verifying that the RAS operation was triggered correctly (Part 5.1.1), responded as designed (Part 5.1.2), and that the resulting BES response (Parts 5.1.3 and 5.1.4) was consistent with the intended functionality and design of the RAS. Ideally, when there is more than one RAS-entity for a RAS, the RAS-entities would collaborate to conduct and submit a single, coordinated operational performance analysis.

Requirement R6

RAS deficiencies potentially pose a reliability risk to the BES. RAS deficiencies may be identified in the periodic RAS evaluation conducted by the PC in Requirement R4, in the operational analysis conducted by the RAS-entity in Requirement R5, or in the functional test performed by the RAS-entity(ies) in Requirement R8. To mitigate potential reliability risks, Requirement R6 mandates that each RAS-entity participate in developing a CAP that establishes the mitigation actions and timetable necessary to address the deficiency.

The RAS-entity(ies) that owns the RAS components, is responsible for the RAS equipment, and is in the best position to develop the timelines and perform the necessary work to correct RAS deficiencies. If necessary, the RAS-entity(ies) may request assistance with development of the CAP from other parties such as its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator; however, the RAS-entity has the responsibility for compliance with this requirement.

A CAP may require functional changes be made to a RAS. In this case, Attachment 1 information must be submitted to the reviewing RC(s), an RC review must be performed to obtain RC approval before the RAS-entity can place RAS modifications in service, per Requirements R1, R2, and R3.

Depending on the complexity of the issues, development of a CAP may require study, engineering or consulting work. A timeframe of six full calendar months is allotted to allow enough time for RAS-entity collaboration on the CAP development, while ensuring that deficiencies are addressed in a reasonable time. Ideally, when there is more than one RASentity for a RAS, the RAS-entities would collaborate to develop and submit a single, coordinated CAP. A RAS deficiency may require the RC or Transmission Operator to impose operating restrictions so the System can operate in a reliable way until the RAS deficiency is resolved. The possibility of such operating restrictions will incent the RAS-entity to resolve the issue as quickly as possible.

The following are example situations of when a CAP is required:

- A determination after a RAS operation/non-operation investigation that the RAS did not meet performance expectations or did not operate as designed.
- Periodic planning assessment reveals RAS changes are necessary to correct performance or coordination issues.
- Equipment failures.
- Functional testing identifies that a RAS is not operating as designed.

Requirement R7

Requirement R7 mandates that each RAS-entity implement its CAP developed in Requirement R6 which mitigates the deficiencies identified in Requirements R4, R5, or R8. By definition, a CAP is: "A list of actions and an associated timetable for implementation to remedy a specific problem."

A CAP can be modified if necessary to account for adjustments to the actions or scheduled timetable of activities. If the CAP is changed, the RAS-entity must notify the reviewing Reliability

Coordinator(s). The RAS-entity must also notify the Reliability Coordinator(s) when the CAP has been completed.

The implementation of a properly developed CAP ensures that RAS deficiencies are mitigated in a timely manner. A RAS deficiency may require the RC or Transmission Operator to impose operating restrictions so the System can operate in a reliable way until the CAP is completed. The possibility of such operating restrictions will incent the RAS-entity to complete the CAP as quickly as possible.

Requirement R8

The reliability objective of Requirement R8 is to test the non-Protection System components of a RAS (controllers such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs)) and to verify the overall performance of the RAS through functional testing. Functional tests validate RAS operation by ensuring System states are detected and processed, and that actions taken by the controls are correct and occur within the expected time using the in-service settings and logic. Functional testing is aimed at assuring overall RAS performance and not the component focused testing contained in the PRC-005 maintenance standard.

Since the functional test operates the RAS under controlled conditions with known System states and expected results, testing and analysis can be performed with minimum impact to the BES and should align with expected results. The RAS-entity is in the best position to determine the testing procedure and schedule due to their overall knowledge of the RAS design, installation, and functionality. Periodic testing provides the RAS-entity assurance that latent failures may be identified and also promotes identification of changes in the System that may have introduced latent failures.

The six and twelve full calendar year functional testing intervals are greater than the annual or bi-annual periodic testing performed in some NERC Regions. However, these intervals are a balance between the resources required to perform the testing and the potential reliability impacts to the BES created by undiscovered latent failures that could cause an incorrect operation of the RAS. Longer test intervals for limited impact RAS are acceptable because incorrect operations or failures to operate present a low reliability risk to the Bulk Power System.

Functional testing is not synonymous with end-to-end testing. End-to-end testing is an acceptable method but may not be feasible for many RAS. When end-to-end testing is not possible, a RAS-entity may use a segmented functional testing approach. The segments can be tested individually negating the need for complex maintenance schedules. In addition, actual RAS operation(s) can be used to fulfill the functional testing requirement. If a RAS does not operate in its entirety during a System event or System conditions do not allow an end-to-end scheme test, then the segmented approach should be used to fulfill this Requirement. Functional testing includes the testing of all RAS inputs used for detection, arming, operating, and data collection. Functional testing, by default operates the processing logic and infrastructure of a RAS, but focuses on the RAS inputs as well as the actions initiated by RAS

outputs to address the System condition(s) for which the RAS is designed. All segments and components of a RAS must be tested or have proven operations within the applicable maximum test interval to demonstrate compliance with the Requirement.

As an example of segment testing, consider a RAS controller implemented using a PLC that receives System data, such as loading or line status, from distributed devices. These distributed devices could include meters, protective relays, or other PLCs. In this example RAS, a line protective relay is used to provide an analog metering quantity to the RAS control PLC. A functional test would verify that the System data is received from the protective relay by the PLC, processed by the PLC, and that PLC outputs are appropriate. There is no need to verify the protective relay's ability to measure the power system quantities, as this is a requirement for Protection Systems used as RAS in PRC-005, Table 1-1, Component Type – Protective Relay. Rather the functional test is focused on the use of the protective relay data at the PLC, including the communications data path from relay to PLC if this data is essential for proper RAS operation. Additionally, if the control signal back to the protective relay is also critical to the proper functioning of this example RAS, then that path is also verified up to the protective relay. This example describes a test for one segment of a RAS which verifies RAS action, verifies PLC control logic, and verifies RAS communications.

IEEE C37.233, "IEEE Guide for Power System Protection Testing," 2009 section 8 (particularly 8.3-8.5), provides an overview of functional testing. The following opens section 8.3:

Proper implementation requires a well-defined and coordinated test plan for performance evaluation of the overall system during agreed maintenance intervals. The maintenance test plan, also referred to as functional system testing, should include inputs, outputs, communication, logic, and throughput timing tests. The functional tests are generally not component-level testing, rather overall system testing. Some of the input tests may need to be done ahead of overall system testing to the extent that the tests affect the overall performance. The test coordinator or coordinators need to have full knowledge of the intent of the scheme, isolation points, simulation scenarios, and restoration to normal procedures.

The concept is to validate the overall performance of the scheme, including the logic where applicable, to validate the overall throughput times against system modeling for different types of Contingencies, and to verify scheme performance as well as the inputs and outputs.

If a RAS passes a functional test, it is not necessary to provide that specific information to the RC because that is the expected result and requires no further action. If a segment of a RAS fails a functional test, the status of that degraded RAS is required to be reported (in Real-time) to the Transmission Operator via PRC-001, Requirement R6, then to the RC via TOP-001-3, Requirement R8. See Phase 2 of Project 2007-06 for the mapping document from PRC-001 to other standards regarding notification of RC by TOP if a deficiency is found during testing. Consequently, it is not necessary to include a similar requirement in this standard.

The initial test interval begins on the effective date of the standard pursuant to the implementation plan. Subsequently, the maximum allowable interval between functional tests

is six full calendar years for RAS that are not designated as limited impact RAS and twelve full calendar years for RAS that are designated as limited impact RAS. The interval between tests begins on the date of the most recent successful test for each individual segment or end-to-end test. A successful test of one segment only resets the test interval clock for that segment. A RAS-entity may choose to count a correct RAS operation as a qualifying functional test for those RAS segments which operate. If a System event causes a correct, but partial RAS operation, separate functional tests of the segments that did not operate are still required within the maximum test interval that started on the date of the previous successful test of those (non-operating) segments in order to be compliant with Requirement R8.

Requirement R9


The RAS database required to be maintained by the RC in Requirement R9 ensures information regarding existing RAS is available. Attachment 3 contains the minimum information that is required to be included about each RAS listed in the database. Additional information can be requested by the RC.

The database enables the RC to provide other entities high-level information on existing RAS that could potentially impact the operational and/or planning activities of that entity. The information provided is sufficient for an entity with a reliability need to evaluate whether the RAS can impact its System. For example, a RAS performing generation rejection to mitigate an overload on a transmission line may cause a power flow change within an adjacent entity area. This entity should be able to evaluate the risk that a RAS poses to its System from the high-level information provided in the RAS database.

The RAS database does not need to list detailed settings or modeling information, but the description of the System performance issues, System conditions, and the intended corrective actions must be included. If additional details about the RAS operation are required, the entity may obtain the contact information of the RAS-entity from the RC.

Process Flow Diagram

The diagram below depicts the process flow of the PRC-012-2 requirements.



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Technical Justifications for Attachment 1 Content Supporting Documentation for RAS Review

To perform an adequate review of the expected reliability implications of a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), it is necessary for the RAS-entity(ies) to provide a detailed list of information describing the RAS to the reviewing RC. If there are multiple RAS-entities for a single RAS, information will be needed from all RAS-entities. Ideally, in such cases, a single RAS-entity will take the lead to compile all the data identified into a single Attachment 1.

The necessary data ranges from a general overview of the RAS to summarized results of transmission planning studies, to information about hardware used to implement the RAS. Coordination between the RAS and other RAS and protection and control systems will be examined for possible adverse interactions. This review can include wide-ranging electrical design issues involving the specific hardware, logic, telecommunications, and other relevant equipment and controls that make up the RAS.

Attachment 1

The following checklist identifies important RAS information for each new or functionally modified⁸ RAS that the RAS-entity shall document and provide to the RC for review pursuant to Requirement R1. When a RAS has been previously reviewed, only the proposed modifications to that RAS require review; however, it will be helpful to each reviewing RC if the RAS-entity provides a summary of the existing RAS functionality.

I. General

1. Information such as maps, one-line drawings, substation and schematic drawings that identify the physical and electrical location of the RAS and related facilities.

Provide a description of the RAS to give an overall understanding of the functionality and a map showing the location of the RAS. Identify other protection and control systems requiring coordination with the RAS. See RAS Design below for additional information.

Provide a single-line drawing(s) showing all sites involved. The drawing(s) should provide sufficient information to allow the RC review team to assess design reliability, and should include information such as the bus arrangement, circuit breakers, the associated switches, etc. For each site, indicate whether detection, logic, action, or a combination of these is present.

2. Functionality of new RAS or proposed functional modifications to existing RAS and documentation of the pre- and post-modified functionality of the RAS.

⁸ Functionally modified: Any modification to a RAS consisting of any of the following:

Changes to System conditions or contingencies monitored by the RAS

[•] Changes to the actions the RAS is designed to initiate

[•] Changes to RAS hardware beyond in-kind replacement; i.e., match the original functionality of existing components

Changes to RAS logic beyond correcting existing errors

Changes to redundancy levels; i.e., addition or removal

3. The Corrective Action Plan (CAP) if RAS modifications are proposed in a CAP. [Reference NERC Reliability Standard PRC-012-2, Requirements R5 and R7]

Provide a description of any functional modifications to a RAS that are part of a CAP that are proposed to address performance deficiency(ies) identified in the periodic evaluation pursuant to Requirement R4, the analysis of an actual RAS operation pursuant to Requirement R5, or functional test failure pursuant to Requirement R8. A copy of the most recent CAP must be submitted in addition to the other data specified in Attachment 1.

- 4. Initial data to populate the RAS database.
 - a. RAS name.
 - b. Each RAS-entity and contact information.
 - c. Expected or actual in-service date; most recent (Requirement R3) RC-approval date; most recent five full calendar year (Requirement R4) evaluation date; and, date of retirement, if applicable.
 - d. System performance issue or reason for installing the RAS (*e.g.*, thermal overload, angular instability, poor oscillation damping, voltage instability, under-/over-voltage, slow voltage recovery).
 - e. Description of the Contingencies or System conditions for which the RAS was designed (initiating conditions).
 - f. Corrective action taken by the RAS.
 - g. Identification of limited impact⁹ RAS.
 - h. Any additional explanation relevant to high level understanding of the RAS.

Note: This is the same information as is identified in Attachment 3. Supplying the data at this point in the review process ensures a more complete review and minimizes any administrative burden on the reviewing RC(s).

II. Functional Description and Transmission Planning Information

- 1. Contingencies and System conditions that the RAS is intended to remedy. [Reference NERC Reliability Standards PRC-012, R1.2 and PRC-013, R1.1]
 - a. The System conditions that would result if no RAS action occurred should be identified.
 - b. Include a description of the System conditions that should arm the RAS so as to be ready to take action upon subsequent occurrence of the critical System Contingencies or other operating conditions when RAS action is intended to occur. If no arming conditions are required, this should also be stated.

⁹ A RAS designated as limited impact cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations.

- c. Event-based RAS are triggered by specific Contingencies that initiate mitigating action. Condition-based RAS may also be initiated by specific Contingencies, but specific Contingencies are not always required. These triggering Contingencies and/or conditions should be identified.
- 2. The actions to be taken by the RAS in response to disturbance conditions. [Reference NERC Reliability Standards PRC-012, R1.2 and PRC-013, R1.2]

Mitigating actions are designed to result in acceptable System performance. These actions should be identified, including any time constraints and/or "backup" mitigating measures that may be required in case of a single RAS component failure.

3. A summary of technical studies, if applicable, demonstrating that the proposed RAS actions satisfy System performance objectives for the scope of System events and conditions that the RAS is intended to remedy. The technical studies summary shall also include information such as the study year(s), System conditions, and Contingencies analyzed on which the RAS design is based, and the date those technical studies were performed. [Reference NEC Reliability Standard PRC-014, R3.2]

Review the scheme purpose and impact to ensure it is (still) necessary, serves the intended purposes, and meets current performance requirements. While copies of the full, detailed studies may not be necessary, any abbreviated descriptions of the studies must be detailed enough to allow the reviewing RC(s) to be convinced of the need for the scheme and the results of RAS-related operations.

4. Information regarding any future System plans that will impact the RAS. [Reference NERC Reliability Standard PRC-014, R3.2]

The RC's other responsibilities under the NERC Reliability Standards focus on the Operating Horizon, rather than the Planning Horizon. As such, the RC is less likely to be aware of any longer range plans that may have an impact on the proposed RAS. Such knowledge of future Plans is helpful to provide perspective on the capabilities of the RAS.

5. RAS-entity proposal and justification for limited impact designation, if applicable.

A RAS designated as limited impact cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations. A RAS implemented prior to the effective date of PRC-012-2 that has been through the regional review processes of WECC or NPCC and is classified as either a Local Area Protection Scheme (LAPS) in WECC or a Type 3 in NPCC is recognized as a limited impact RAS upon the effective date of PRC-012-2 for the purposes of this standard and is subject to all applicable requirements.

 Documentation describing the System performance resulting from the possible inadvertent operation of the RAS, except for limited impact RAS, caused by any single RAS component malfunction. Single component malfunctions in a RAS not determined to be limited impact must satisfy all of the following: [Reference NERC Reliability Standard PRC-012, R1.4]

- a. The BES shall remain stable.
- b. Cascading shall not occur.
- c. Applicable Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.
- d. BES voltages shall be within post-Contingency voltage limits and post-Contingency voltage deviation limits as established by the Transmission Planner and the Planning Coordinator.
- e. Transient voltage responses shall be within acceptable limits as established by the Transmission Planner and the Planning Coordinator.
- An evaluation indicating that the RAS settings and operation avoids adverse interactions with other RAS, and protection and control systems. [Reference NERC Reliability Standards PRC-012, R1.5 and PRC-014, R3.4]

RAS are complex schemes that may take action such as tripping load or generation or reconfiguring the System. Many RAS depend on sensing specific System configurations to determine whether they need to arm or take actions. An examples of an adverse interaction: A RAS that reconfigures the System also changes the available Fault duty, which can affect distance relay overcurrent ("fault detector") supervision and ground overcurrent protection coordination.

8. Identification of other affected RCs.

This information is needed to aid in information exchange among all affected entities and coordination of the RAS with other RAS and protection and control systems.

III. Implementation

1. Documentation describing the applicable equipment used for detection, dc supply, communications, transfer trip, logic processing, control actions, and monitoring.

Detection

Detection and initiating devices, whether for arming or triggering action, should be designed to be secure. Several types of devices have been commonly used as disturbance, condition, or status detectors:

- Line open status (event detectors),
- Protective relay inputs and outputs (event and parameter detectors),
- Transducer and IED (analog) inputs (parameter and response detectors),
- Rate of change (parameter and response detectors).

DC Supply

Batteries and charges, or other forms of dc supply for RAS, are commonly also used for Protection Systems. This is acceptable, and maintenance of such supplies is covered by PRC-005. However, redundant RAS, when used, should be supplied from separately protected (fused or breakered) circuits.

Communications: Telecommunications Channels

Telecommunications channels used for sending and receiving RAS information between sites and/or transfer trip devices should meet at least the same criteria as other relaying protection communication channels. Discuss performance of any non-deterministic communication systems used (such as Ethernet).

The scheme logic should be designed so that loss of the channel, noise, or other channel or equipment failure will not result in a false operation of the scheme.

It is highly desirable that the channel equipment and communications media (power line carrier, microwave, optical fiber, etc.) be owned and maintained by the RAS-entity, or perhaps leased from another entity familiar with the necessary reliability requirements. All channel equipment should be monitored and alarmed to the dispatch center so that timely diagnostic and repair action shall take place upon failure. Publicly switched telephone networks are generally an undesirable option.

Communication channels should be well labeled or identified so that the personnel working on the channel can readily identify the proper circuit. Channels between entities should be identified with a common name at all terminals.

Transfer Trip

Transfer trip equipment, when separate from other RAS equipment, should be monitored and labeled similarly to the channel equipment.

Logic Processing

All RAS require some form of logic processing to determine the action to take when the scheme is triggered. Required actions are always scheme dependent. Different actions may be required at different arming levels or for different Contingencies. Scheme logic may be achievable by something as simple as wiring a few auxiliary relay contacts or by much more complex logic processing.

Platforms that have been used reliably and successfully include PLCs in various forms, personal computers (PCs), microprocessor protective relays, remote terminal units (RTUs), and logic processors. Single-function relays have been used historically to implement RAS, but this approach is now less common except for very simple new RAS or minor additions to existing RAS.

Control Actions

RAS action devices may include a variety of equipment such as transfer trip, protective relays, and other control devices. These devices receive commands from the logic processing function (perhaps through telecommunication facilities) and initiate RAS actions at the sites where action is required.

Monitoring by SCADA/EMS should include at least

- Whether the scheme is in service or out of service.
 - For RAS that are armed manually, the arming status may be the same as whether the RAS is in service or out of service.

- For RAS that are armed automatically, these two states are independent because a RAS that has been placed in service may be armed or unarmed based on whether the automatic arming criteria have been met.
- The current operational state of the scheme (available or not).
- In cases where the RAS requires single component failure performance; e.g., redundancy, the minimal status indications should be provided separately for each RAS.
 - The minimum status is generally sufficient for operational purposes; however, where possible it is often useful to provide additional information regarding partial failures or the status of critical components to allow the RAS-entity to more efficiently troubleshoot a reported failure. Whether this capability exists will depend in part on the design and vintage of equipment used in the RAS. While all schemes should provide the minimum level of monitoring, new schemes should be designed with the objective of providing monitoring at least similar to what is provided for microprocessor-based Protection Systems.
- 2. Information on detection logic and settings/parameters that control the operation of the RAS. [Reference NERC Reliability Standards PRC-012, R1.2 and PRC-013, R1.3]

Several methods to determine line or other equipment status are in common use, often in combination:

- Auxiliary switch contacts from circuit breakers and disconnect switches (52a/b, 89a/b)—the most common status monitor; "a" contacts exactly emulate actual breaker status, while "b" contacts are opposite to the status of the breaker;
- b. Undercurrent detection—a low level indicates an open condition, including at the far end of a line; pickup is typically slightly above the total line-charging current;
- c. Breaker trip coil current monitoring—typically used when high-speed RAS response is required, but usually in combination with auxiliary switch contacts and/or other detection because the trip coil current ceases when the breaker opens; and
- d. Other detectors such as angle, voltage, power, frequency, rate of change of the aforementioned, out of step, etc. are dependent on specific scheme requirements, but some forms may substitute for or enhance other monitoring described in items 'a', 'b', and 'c' above.

Both RAS arming and action triggers often require monitoring of analog quantities such as power, current, and voltage at one or more locations and are set to detect a specific level of the pertinent quantity. These monitors may be relays, meters, transducers, or other devices

 Documentation showing that any multifunction device used to perform RAS function(s), in addition to other functions such as protective relaying or SCADA, does not compromise the reliability of the RAS when the device is not in service or is being maintained. In this context, a multifunction device (e.g., microprocessor-based relay) is a single component that is used to perform the function of a RAS in addition to protective relaying and/or SCADA simultaneously. It is important that other applications in the multifunction device do not compromise the functionality of the RAS when the device is in service or when it is being maintained. The following list outlines considerations when the RAS function is applied in the same microprocessor-based relay as equipment protection functions:

- a. Describe how the multifunction device is applied in the RAS.
- b. Show the general arrangement and describe how the multi-function device is labeled in the design and application, so as to identify the RAS and other device functions.
- c. Describe the procedures used to isolate the RAS function from other functions in the device.
- d. Describe the procedures used when each multifunction device is removed from service and whether coordination with other protection schemes is required.
- e. Describe how each multifunction device is tested, both for commissioning and during periodic maintenance testing, with regard to each function of the device.
- f. Describe how overall periodic RAS functional and throughput tests are performed if multifunction devices are used for both local protection and RAS.
- g. Describe how upgrades to the multifunction device, such as firmware upgrades, are accomplished. How is the RAS function taken into consideration?

Other devices that are usually not considered multifunction devices such as auxiliary relays, control switches, and instrument transformers may serve multiple purposes such as protection and RAS. Similar concerns apply for these applications as noted above.

4. Documentation describing the System performance resulting from a single component failure in the RAS, except for limited impact RAS, when the RAS is intended to operate. A single component failure in a RAS not determined to be limited impact must not prevent the BES from meeting the same performance requirements (defined in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 or its successor) as those required for the events and conditions for which the RAS is designed. The documentation should describe or illustrate how the design achieves this objective. [Reference NERC Reliability Standard PRC-012, R1.3]

RAS automatic arming, if applicable, is vital to RAS and System performance and is therefore included in this requirement.

Acceptable methods to achieve this objective include, but are not limited to the following:

- a. Providing redundancy of RAS components. Typical examples are listed below:
 - i. Protective or auxiliary relays used by the RAS.

- ii. Communications systems necessary for correct operation of the RAS.
- iii. Sensing devices used to measure electrical or other quantities used by the RAS.
- iv. Station dc supply associated with RAS functions.
- v. Control circuitry associated with RAS functions through the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices.
- vi. Logic processing devices that accept System inputs from RAS components or other sources, make decisions based on those inputs, or initiate output signals to take remedial actions.
- b. Arming more load or generation than necessary such that failure of the RAS to drop a portion of load or generation due to that single component failure will still result in satisfactory System performance, as long as tripping the total armed amount of load or generation does not cause other adverse impacts to reliability.
- c. Using alternative automatic actions to back up failures of single RAS components.
- d. Manual backup operations, using planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation, if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.
- 5. Documentation describing the functional testing process.

IV. RAS Retirement

The following checklist identifies important RAS information for each existing RAS to be retired that the RAS-entity shall document and provide to the Reliability Coordinator for review pursuant to Requirement R1.

- 1. Information necessary to ensure that the Reliability Coordinator is able to understand the physical and electrical location of the RAS and related facilities.
- 2. A summary of technical studies and technical justifications, if applicable, upon which the decision to retire the RAS is based.
- 3. Anticipated date of RAS retirement.

While the documentation necessary to evaluate RAS removals is not as extensive as for new or functionally modified RAS, it is still vital that, when the RAS is no longer available, System performance will still meet the appropriate (usually TPL) requirements for the Contingencies or System conditions that the RAS had been installed to remediate.

Technical Justification for Attachment 2 Content

Reliability Coordinator RAS Review Checklist

Attachment 2 is a checklist provided to facilitate consistent reviews continent-wide for new or functionally modified RAS prior to the RAS installation. The checklist is meant to assist the RC in identifying reliability-related considerations relevant to various aspects of RAS design and implementation.

Technical Justifications for Attachment 3 Content

Database Information

Attachment 3 contains the minimum information that the RC must consolidate into its database for each RAS in its area.

- 1. RAS name.
 - The name used to identify the RAS.
- 2. Each RAS-entity and contact information.
 - A reliable phone number or email address should be included to contact each RAS-entity if more information is needed.
- 3. Expected or actual in-service date; most recent (Requirement R3) RC-approval date; most recent five full calendar year (Requirement R4) evaluation date; and, date of retirement, if applicable.
 - Specify each applicable date.
- 4. System performance issue or reason for installing the RAS (e.g., thermal overload, angular instability, poor oscillation damping, voltage instability, under-/over-voltage, slow voltage recovery).
 - A short description of the reason for installing the RAS is sufficient, as long as the main System issues addressed by the RAS can be identified by someone with a reliability need.
- 5. Description of the Contingencies or System conditions for which the RAS was designed (initiating conditions).
 - A high level summary of the conditions/Contingencies is expected. Not all combinations of conditions are required to be listed.
- 6. Corrective action taken by the RAS.
 - A short description of the actions should be given. For schemes shedding load or generation, the maximum amount of megawatts should be included.

- 7. Identification of limited impact¹⁰ RAS.
 - Specify whether or not the RAS is designated as limited impact.
- 8. Any additional explanation relevant to high-level understanding of the RAS.
 - If deemed necessary, any additional information can be included in this section, but is not mandatory.

¹⁰ A RAS designated as limited impact cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations.

Rationale

Rationale for Requirement R1: Each Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) is unique and its action(s) can have a significant impact on the reliability and integrity of the Bulk Electric System (BES). Therefore, a review of a proposed new RAS or an existing RAS proposed for functional modification or retirement; i.e., removal from service must be completed prior to implementation or retirement.

Functional modifications consist of any of the following:

- Changes to System conditions or Contingencies monitored by the RAS
- Changes to the actions the RAS is designed to initiate
- Changes to RAS hardware beyond in-kind replacement; i.e., match the original functionality of existing components
- Changes to RAS logic beyond correcting existing errors
- Changes to redundancy levels; i.e., addition or removal

To facilitate a review that promotes reliability, the RAS-entity must provide the reviewer with sufficient details of the RAS design, function, and operation. This data and supporting documentation are identified in Attachment 1 of this standard, and Requirement R1 mandates that the RAS-entity provide them to the reviewing Reliability Coordinator (RC). The RC (reviewing RC) that coordinates the area where the RAS is located is responsible for the review. Ideally, when there is more than one RAS-entity for a RAS, the RAS-entities would collaborate and submit a single, coordinated Attachment 1 to the reviewing RC. In cases where a RAS crosses RC Area boundaries, each affected RC is responsible for conducting either individual reviews or participating in a coordinated review.

Rationale for Requirement R2: The RC is the functional entity best suited to perform the RAS review because it has the widest area operational and reliability perspective of all functional entities and an awareness of reliability issues in any neighboring RC Area. This Wide Area purview facilitates the evaluation of interactions among separate RAS as well as interactions among RAS and other protection and control systems. Review by the RC also minimizes the possibility of a conflict of interest that could exist because of business relationships among the RAS-entity, Planning Coordinator (PC), Transmission Planner (TP), or other entities that are likely to be involved in the planning or implementation of a RAS. The RC is not expected to possess more information or ability than anticipated by their functional registration as designated by NERC. The RC may request assistance to perform RAS reviews from other parties such as the PC or regional technical groups; however, the RC will retain the responsibility for compliance with this requirement.

Attachment 2 of this standard is a checklist the RC can use to identify design and implementation aspects of RAS and facilitate consistent reviews for each submitted RAS. The time frame of four full calendar months is consistent with current utility and regional practice;

however, flexibility is provided by allowing the RC(s) and RAS-entity(ies) to negotiate a mutually agreed upon schedule for the review.

Note: An RC may need to include this task in its reliability plan(s) for the NERC Regions(s) in which it is located.

Rationale for Requirement R3: The RC review is intended to identify reliability issues that must be resolved before the RAS can be put in service. Examples of reliability issues include a lack of dependability, security, or coordination.

A specific time period for the RAS-entity to respond to the reviewing RC following identification of any reliability issue(s) is not necessary because the RAS-entity wants to expedite the timely approval and subsequent implementation of the RAS.

A specific time period for the RC to respond to the RAS-entity following the RAS review is also not necessary because the RC will be aware of (1) any reliability issues associated with the RAS not being in service and (2) the RAS-entity's schedule to implement the RAS to address those reliability issues. Since the RC is the ultimate arbiter of BES operating reliability, resolving reliability issues is a priority for the RC and serves as an incentive to expeditiously respond to the RAS-entity.

Rationale for Requirement R4: Requirement R4 mandates that an evaluation of each RAS be performed at least once every five full calendar years. The purpose of the periodic RAS evaluation is to verify the continued effectiveness and coordination of the RAS, as well as to verify that, if a RAS single component malfunction or single component failure were to occur, the requirements for BES performance would continue to be satisfied. A periodic evaluation is required because changes in System topology or operating conditions may change the effectiveness of a RAS or the way it impacts the BES.

RAS are unique and customized assemblages of protection and control equipment that vary in complexity and impact on the reliability of the BES. In recognition of these differences, RAS can be designated by the reviewing RC(s) as limited impact. A limited impact RAS cannot, by inadvertent operation or failure to operate, cause or contribute to BES Cascading, uncontrolled separation, angular instability, voltage instability, voltage collapse, or unacceptably damped oscillations. The "BES" qualifier in the preceding statement modifies all of the conditions that follow it. Limited impact RAS are not subject to the RAS single component malfunction and failure tests of Parts 4.1.4 and 4.1.5, respectively. Requiring a limited impact RAS to meet these tests would add complexity to the design with minimal benefit to BES reliability. See the Supplemental Material for more on the limited impact designation.

The standard recognizes the Local Area Protection Scheme (LAPS) classification in WECC (Western Electricity Coordinating Council) and the Type III classification in NPCC (Northeast Power Coordinating Council) as initially appropriate for limited impact designation. A RAS implemented prior to the effective date of PRC-012-2 that has been through the regional

review processes of WECC or NPCC and is classified as either a Local Area Protection Scheme (LAPS) in WECC or a Type III in NPCC is recognized as a limited impact RAS upon the effective date of PRC-012-2 for the purposes of this standard and is subject to all applicable requirements.

For existing RAS, the initial performance of Requirement R4 must be completed within five full calendar years of the effective date of PRC-012-2. For new or functionally modified RAS, the initial performance of the requirement must be completed within five full calendar years of the RAS approval date by the reviewing RC(s). Five full calendar years was selected as the maximum time frame between evaluations based on the time frames for similar requirements in Reliability Standards PRC-006, PRC-010, and PRC-014. The RAS evaluation can be performed sooner if it is determined that material changes to System topology or System operating conditions could potentially impact the effectiveness or coordination of the RAS. System changes also have the potential to alter the reliability impact of limited impact RAS on the BES. Requirement 4, Part 4.1.3 explicitly requires the periodic evaluation of limited impact RAS to verify the limited impact designation remains applicable; the PC can use its discretion as to how this evaluation is performed. The periodic RAS evaluation will typically lead to one of the following outcomes: 1) affirmation that the existing RAS is effective; 2) identification of changes needed to the existing RAS; or, 3) justification for RAS retirement.

The items required to be addressed in the evaluations (Requirement R4, Parts 4.1.1 through 4.1.5) are planning analyses that may involve modeling of the interconnected transmission system to assess BES performance. The Planning Coordinator (PC) is the functional entity best suited to perform this evaluation because they have a wide area planning perspective. To promote reliability, the PC is required to provide the results of the evaluation to each impacted Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator, in addition to each reviewing RC and RAS-entity. In cases where a RAS crosses PC boundaries, each affected PC is responsible for conducting either individual evaluations or participating in a coordinated evaluation.

The previous version of this standard (PRC-012-1 Requirement 1, R1.4) states "... the inadvertent operation of a RAS shall meet the same performance requirement (TPL-001-0, TPL-002-0, and TPL-003-0) as that required of the Contingency for which it was designed, and not exceed TPL-003-0." Requirement R4 clarifies that the inadvertent operation to be considered would only be that caused by the malfunction of a single RAS component. This allows security features to be designed into the RAS such that inadvertent operation due to a single component malfunction is prevented. Otherwise, consistent with PRC-012-1 Requirement 1, R1.4, the RAS should be designed so that its whole or partial inadvertent operation due to a single component malfunction satisfies the System performance requirements for the same Contingency for which the RAS was designed.

If the RAS was installed for an extreme event in TPL-001-4 or for some other Contingency or System condition not defined in TPL-001-4 (therefore without performance requirements), its inadvertent operation still must meet some minimum System performance requirements. However, instead of referring to the TPL-001-4, Requirement R4 lists the System performance requirements that the inadvertent operation must satisfy. The performance requirements listed (Parts 4.1.4.1 - 4.1.4.5) are the ones that are common to all planning events PO-P7 listed in TPL-001-4.

Rationale for Requirement R5: The correct operation of a RAS is important for maintaining the reliability and integrity of the BES. Any incorrect operation of a RAS indicates that the RAS effectiveness and/or coordination has been compromised. Therefore, all operations of a RAS and failures of a RAS to operate when expected must be analyzed to verify that the RAS operation was consistent with its intended functionality and design.

A RAS operational performance analysis is intended to: 1) verify RAS operation was consistent with the implemented design; or 2) identify RAS performance deficiencies that manifested in the incorrect RAS operation or failure of RAS to operate when expected.

The 120 full calendar day time frame for the completion of RAS operational performance analysis aligns with the time frame established in Requirement R1 from PRC-004-4 regarding the investigation of a Protection System Misoperation. To promote reliability, each RAS-entity is required to provide the results of RAS operational performance analyses that identified any deficiencies to its reviewing RC(s).

RAS-entities may need to collaborate with their associated Transmission Planner to comprehensively analyze RAS operational performance. This is because a RAS operational performance analysis involves verifying that the RAS operation was triggered correctly (Part 5.1.1), responded as designed (Part 5.1.2), and that the resulting BES response (Parts 5.1.3 and 5.1.4) was consistent with the intended functionality and design of the RAS. Ideally, when there is more than one RAS-entity for a RAS, the RAS-entities would collaborate to conduct and submit a single, coordinated operational performance analysis.

Rationale for Requirement R6: Deficiencies identified in the periodic RAS evaluation conducted by the PC pursuant to Requirement R4, in the operational performance analysis conducted by the RAS-entity pursuant to Requirement R5, or in the functional test performed by the RASentity pursuant to Requirement R8, potentially pose a reliability risk to the BES. To mitigate these potential reliability risks, Requirement R6 mandates that each RAS-entity develop a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to address the identified deficiency. The CAP contains the mitigation actions and associated timetable necessary to remedy the specific deficiency. The RAS-entity may request assistance with CAP development from other parties such as its Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator; however, the RAS-entity has the responsibility for compliance with this requirement.

If the CAP requires that a functional change be made to a RAS, the RAS-entity will need to submit information identified in Attachment 1 to the reviewing RC(s) prior to placing RAS modifications in service per Requirement R1.

Depending on the complexity of the identified deficiency(ies), development of a CAP may require studies, and other engineering or consulting work. A maximum time frame of six full calendar months is specified for RAS-entity collaboration on the CAP development. Ideally, when there is more than one RAS-entity for a RAS, the RAS-entities would collaborate to develop and submit a single, coordinated CAP.

Rationale for Requirement R7: Requirement R7 mandates each RAS-entity implement a CAP (developed in Requirement R6) that mitigates the deficiencies identified in Requirements R4, R5, or R8. By definition, a CAP is: "A list of actions and an associated timetable for implementation to remedy a specific problem." The implementation of a properly developed CAP ensures that RAS deficiencies are mitigated in a timely manner. Each reviewing Reliability Coordinator must be notified if CAP actions or timetables change, and when the CAP is completed.

Rationale for Requirement R8: Due to the wide variety of RAS designs and implementations, and the potential for impacting BES reliability, it is important that periodic functional testing of a RAS be performed. A functional test provides an overall confirmation of the RAS to operate as designed and verifies the proper operation of the non-Protection System (control) components of a RAS that are not addressed in PRC-005. Protection System components that are part of a RAS are maintained in accordance with PRC-005.

The six or twelve full calendar year test interval, which begins on the effective date of the standard pursuant to the PRC-012-2 implementation plan, is a balance between the resources required to perform the testing and the potential reliability impacts to the BES created by undiscovered latent failures that could cause an incorrect operation of the RAS. Extending to longer intervals increases the reliability risk to the BES posed by an undiscovered latent failure that could cause an incorrect operation or failure of the RAS. The RAS-entity is in the best position to determine the testing procedure and schedule due to its overall knowledge of the RAS design, installation, and functionality. Functional testing may be accomplished with end-to-end testing or a segmented approach. For segmented testing, each segment of a RAS must be tested. Overlapping segments can be tested individually negating the need for complex maintenance schedules and outages.

The maximum allowable interval between functional tests is six full calendar years for RAS that are not designated as limited impact RAS and twelve full calendar years for RAS that are designated as limited impact RAS. The interval between tests begins on the date of the most recent successful test for each individual segment or end-to-end test. A successful test of one segment only resets the test interval clock for that segment. A correct operation of a RAS qualifies as a functional test for those RAS segments which operate (documentation for compliance with Requirement R5 Part 5.1). If an event causes a partial operation of a RAS, the segments without an operation will require a separate functional test of the segments that did not operate.

Rationale for Requirement R9: The RAS database is a comprehensive record of all RAS existing in a Reliability Coordinator Area. The database enables the RC to provide other entities highlevel information on existing RAS that could potentially impact the operational and/or planning activities of that entity. Attachment 3 lists the minimum information required for the RAS database, which includes a summary of the RAS initiating conditions, corrective actions, and System issues being mitigated. This information allows an entity to evaluate the reliability need for requesting more detailed information from the RAS-entities identified in the database contact information. The RC is the appropriate entity to maintain the database because the RC receives the required database information when a new or modified RAS is submitted for review. The twelve full calendar month time frame is aligned with industry practice and allows sufficient time for the RC to collect the appropriate information from RAS-entities and update the RAS database.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Transmission Relay Loadability
- **2. Number:** PRC-023-2
- **3. Purpose:** Protective relay settings shall not limit transmission loadability; not interfere with system operators' ability to take remedial action to protect system reliability and; be set to reliably detect all fault conditions and protect the electrical network from these faults.

4. Applicability

4.1. Functional Entity

- **4.1.1** Transmission Owners with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-2 Attachment A, applied to circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 R5*).
- **4.1.2** Generator Owners with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-2 Attachment A, applied to circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 R5*).
- **4.1.3** Distribution Providers with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-2 Attachment A, applied to circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 R5*), provided those circuits have bi-directional flow capabilities.
- 4.1.4 Planning Coordinators

4.2. Circuits

4.2.1 Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5

- **4.2.1.1** Transmission lines operated at 200 kV and above.
- **4.2.1.2** Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.
- **4.2.1.3** Transmission lines operated below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.
- **4.2.1.4** Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 200 kV and above.
- **4.2.1.5** Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.
- **4.2.1.6** Transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with R6.

4.2.2 Circuits Subject to Requirement R6

- **4.2.2.1** Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV
- **4.2.2.2** Transmission lines operated below100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES
- 5. Effective Date*: See the BC Implementation Plan for PRC-023-2

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B. Requirements

R1. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1, criteria 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the BES for all fault conditions. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning].*

Criteria:

- 1. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 150% of the highest seasonal Facility Rating of a circuit, for the available defined loading duration nearest 4 hours (expressed in amperes).
- 2. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the highest seasonal 15-minute Facility Rating² of a circuit (expressed in amperes).
- **3.** Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum theoretical power transfer capability (using a 90-degree angle between the sending-end and receiving-end voltages and either reactance or complex impedance) of the circuit (expressed in amperes) using one of the following to perform the power transfer calculation:
 - An infinite source (zero source impedance) with a 1.00 per unit bus voltage at each end of the line.
 - An impedance at each end of the line, which reflects the actual system source impedance with a 1.05 per unit voltage behind each source impedance.
- 4. Set transmission line relays on series compensated transmission lines so they do not operate at or below the maximum power transfer capability of the line, determined as the greater of:
 - 115% of the highest emergency rating of the series capacitor.
 - 115% of the maximum power transfer capability of the circuit (expressed in amperes), calculated in accordance with Requirement R1, criterion 3, using the full line inductive reactance.
- 5. Set transmission line relays on weak source systems so they do not operate at or below 170% of the maximum end-of-line three-phase fault magnitude (expressed in amperes).
- **6.** Set transmission line relays applied on transmission lines connected to generation stations remote to load so they do not operate at or below 230% of the aggregated generation nameplate capability.
- 7. Set transmission line relays applied at the load center terminal, remote from generation stations, so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the generation source under any system configuration.

 $^{^{2}}$ When a 15-minute rating has been calculated and published for use in real-time operations, the 15-minute rating can be used to establish the loadability requirement for the protective relays.

- **8.** Set transmission line relays applied on the bulk system-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the system to the load under any system configuration.
- **9.** Set transmission line relays applied on the load-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the bulk system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the system under any system configuration.
- **10.** Set transformer fault protection relays and transmission line relays on transmission lines terminated only with a transformer so that the relays do not operate at or below the greater of:
 - 150% of the applicable maximum transformer nameplate rating (expressed in amperes), including the forced cooled ratings corresponding to all installed supplemental cooling equipment.
 - 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating
 - **10.1** Set load responsive transformer fault protection relays, if used, such that the protection settings do not expose the transformer to a fault level and duration that exceeds the transformer's mechanical withstand capability³.
- **11.** For transformer overload protection relays that do not comply with the loadability component of Requirement R1, criterion 10 set the relays according to one of the following:
 - Set the relays to allow the transformer to be operated at an overload level of at least 150% of the maximum applicable nameplate rating, or 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating, whichever is greater, for at least 15 minutes to provide time for the operator to take controlled action to relieve the overload.
 - Install supervision for the relays using either a top oil or simulated winding hot spot temperature element set no less than 100° C for the top oil temperature or no less than 140° C for the winding hot spot temperature⁴.
- **12.** When the desired transmission line capability is limited by the requirement to adequately protect the transmission line, set the transmission line distance relays to a maximum of 125% of the apparent impedance (at the impedance angle of the transmission line) subject to the following constraints:
 - a. Set the maximum torque angle (MTA) to 90 degrees or the highest supported by the manufacturer.
 - b. Evaluate the relay loadability in amperes at the relay trip point at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.

³ As illustrated by the "dotted line" in IEEE C57.109-1993 - *IEEE Guide for Liquid-Immersed Transformer Through-Fault-Current Duration*, Clause 4.4, Figure 4

⁴ IEEE standard C57.91, Tables 7 and 8, specify that transformers are to be designed to withstand a winding hot spot temperature of 180 degrees C, and Annex A cautions that bubble formation may occur above 140 degrees C.

- c. Include a relay setting component of 87% of the current calculated in Requirement R1, criterion 12 in the Facility Rating determination for the circuit.
- **13.** Where other situations present practical limitations on circuit capability, set the phase protection relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of such limitations.
- **R2.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall set its out-of-step blocking elements to allow tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]
- **R3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1, criterion 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and shall obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- **R4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that chooses to use Requirement R1 criterion 2 as the basis for verifying transmission line relay loadability shall provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- **R5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1 criterion 12 shall provide an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports, to allow the ERO to compile a list of all circuits that have protective relay settings that limit circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- **R6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct an assessment at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments, by applying the criteria in Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers must comply with Requirements R1 through R5. The Planning Coordinator shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]
 - **6.1** Maintain a list of circuits subject to PRC-023-2 per application of Attachment B, including identification of the first calendar year in which any criterion in Attachment B applies.
 - **6.2** Provide the list of circuits to all Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within 30 calendar days of the establishment of the initial list and within 30 calendar days of any changes to that list.

C. Measures

M1. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its transmission relays is set according to one of the criteria in Requirement R1, criterion 1 through 13 and shall have evidence such as coordination curves or summaries of calculations that show that relays set per criterion 10 do not expose the transformer to fault levels and durations beyond those indicated in the standard. (R1)

- M2. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its out-of-step blocking elements is set to allow tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1. (R2)
- M3. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider with transmission relays set according to Requirement R1, criterion 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall have evidence such as Facility Rating spreadsheets or Facility Rating database to show that it used the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and evidence such as dated correspondence that the resulting Facility Rating was agreed to by its associated Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator. (R3)
- M4. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 2 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence to show that it provided its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R4)
- M5. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 12 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R5)
- M6. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as power flow results, calculation summaries, or study reports that it used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard as described in Requirement R6. The Planning Coordinator shall have a dated list of such circuits and shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided the list to the Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within the required timeframe.

D. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
 - 1.1. Compliance Monitoring Responsibility
 - British Columbia Utilitlies Commission

1.2. Data Retention

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider and Planning Coordinator shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation:

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each retain documentation to demonstrate compliance with Requirements R1 through R5 for three calendar years.

The Planning Coordinator shall retain documentation of the most recent review process required in R6. The Planning Coordinator shall retain the most recent list of circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard, as determined per R6.

If a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider or Planning Coordinator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until found compliant or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Monitor shall keep the last audit record and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

2. Violation Severity Levels:

Requirement	Lower	Moderate	High	Severe
R1	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1 criterion 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the Bulk Electric System for all fault conditions.
				OR
				The responsible entity did not evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.
R2	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity failed to ensure that its out-of-step blocking elements allowed tripping of phase protective relays for faults that occur during the loading conditions used to verify transmission line relay loadability per Requirement R1.
R3	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1 criterion 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 did not use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit. OR

Requirement	Lower	Moderate	High	Severe
				The responsible entity did not obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability.
R4	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 2 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports.
R5	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not provide its Regional Entity, with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 12 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports.
R6	N/A	The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but more than 15 months and less than 24 months lapsed between assessments.	The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but 24 months or more lapsed between assessments.	The Planning Coordinator failed to use the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard. OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within

Requirement	Lower	Moderate	High	Severe
		OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but failed to include the calendar year in which any criterion in Attachment B first applies. OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 31 days and 45 days after the list was established or updated. (part 6.2)	OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 46 days and 60 days after list was established or updated. (part 6.2)	Attachment B, at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to meet parts 6.1 and 6.2. OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to maintain the list of circuits determined according to the process described in Requirement R6. (part 6.1) OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 but failed to provide the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission

Standard PRC-023-2 — Transmission Relay Loadability

Requirement	Lower	Moderate	High	Severe
				Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area or provided the list more than 60 days after the list was established or updated. (part 6.2)
				OR
				The Planning Coordinator failed to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard.

E. Regional Differences

None

F. Supplemental Technical Reference Document

1. The following document is an explanatory supplement to the standard. It provides the technical rationale underlying the requirements in this standard. The reference document contains methodology examples for illustration purposes it does not preclude other technically comparable methodologies

"Determination and Application of Practical Relaying Loadability Ratings," Version 1.0, June 2008, prepared by the System Protection and Control Task Force of the NERC Planning Committee, available at:

http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Standards/Relay_Loadability_Reference_Doc_Clean_Final_2008July3.pdf

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	February 12, 2008	Approved by Board of Trustees	New
1	March 19, 2008	Corrected typo in last sentence of Severe VSL for Requirement 3 — "then" should be "than."	Errata
1	March 18, 2010	Approved by FERC	
1	Filed for approval April 19, 2010	Changed VRF for R3 from Medium to High; changed VSLs for R1, R2, R3 to binary Severe to comply with Order 733	Revision
2	March 10, 2011 approved by Board of Trustees	Revised to address initial set of directives from Order 733	Revision (Project 2010-13)
2	March 15, 2012	FERC order issued approving PRC-023-2 (approval becomes effective May 7, 2012)	

PRC-023 — Attachment A

- 1. This standard includes any protective functions which could trip with or without time delay, on load current, including but not limited to:
 - **1.1.** Phase distance.
 - **1.2.** Out-of-step tripping.
 - **1.3.** Switch-on-to-fault.
 - **1.4.** Overcurrent relays.
 - **1.5.** Communications aided protection schemes including but not limited to:
 - **1.5.1** Permissive overreach transfer trip (POTT).
 - **1.5.2** Permissive under-reach transfer trip (PUTT).
 - **1.5.3** Directional comparison blocking (DCB).
 - **1.5.4** Directional comparison unblocking (DCUB).
 - **1.6.** Phase overcurrent supervisory elements (i.e., phase fault detectors) associated with currentbased, communication-assisted schemes (i.e., pilot wire, phase comparison, and line current differential) where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications.
- 2. The following protection systems are excluded from requirements of this standard:
 - **2.1.** Relay elements that are only enabled when other relays or associated systems fail. For example:
 - Overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions.
 - Elements that are only enabled during a loss of communications except as noted in section 1.6
 - **2.2.** Protection systems intended for the detection of ground fault conditions.
 - **2.3.** Protection systems intended for protection during stable power swings.
 - **2.4.** Generator protection relays that are susceptible to load.
 - **2.5.** Relay elements used only for Special Protection Systems applied and approved in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards PRC-012 through PRC-017 or their successors.
 - **2.6.** Protection systems that are designed only to respond in time periods which allow 15 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions.
 - 2.7. Thermal emulation relays which are used in conjunction with dynamic Facility Ratings.
 - **2.8.** Relay elements associated with dc lines.
 - **2.9.** Relay elements associated with dc converter transformers.

PRC-023 — Attachment B

Circuits to Evaluate

- Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV.
- Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES.

Criteria

If any of the following criteria apply to a circuit, the applicable entity must comply with the standard for that circuit.

- B1. The circuit is a monitored Facility of a permanent flowgate in the Eastern Interconnection, a major transfer path within the Western Interconnection as defined by the Regional Entity, or a comparable monitored Facility in the Québec Interconnection, that has been included to address reliability concerns for loading of that circuit, as confirmed by the applicable Planning Coordinator.
- **B2.** The circuit is a monitored Facility of an IROL, where the IROL was determined in the planning horizon pursuant to FAC-010.
- **B3.** The circuit forms a path (as agreed to by the Generator Operator and the transmission entity) to supply off-site power to a nuclear plant as established in the Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs) pursuant to NUC-001.
- **B4.** The circuit is identified through the following sequence of power flow analyses⁵ performed by the Planning Coordinator for the one-to-five-year planning horizon:
 - a. Simulate double contingency combinations selected by engineering judgment, without manual system adjustments in between the two contingencies (reflects a situation where a System Operator may not have time between the two contingencies to make appropriate system adjustments).
 - b. For circuits operated between 100 kV and 200 kV evaluate the post-contingency loading, in consultation with the Facility owner, against a threshold based on the Facility Rating assigned for that circuit and used in the power flow case by the Planning Coordinator.
 - c. When more than one Facility Rating for that circuit is available in the power flow case, the threshold for selection will be based on the Facility Rating for the loading duration nearest four hours.
 - d. The threshold for selection of the circuit will vary based on the loading duration assumed in the development of the Facility Rating.

⁵ Past analyses may be used to support the assessment if no material changes to the system have occurred since the last assessment

- i. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of up to and including four hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 115% of the Facility Rating.
- ii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration greater than four and up to and including eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 120% of the Facility Rating.
- iii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of greater than eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 130% of the Facility Rating.
- e. Radially operated circuits serving only load are excluded.
- **B5.** The circuit is selected by the Planning Coordinator based on technical studies or assessments, other than those specified in criteria B1 through B4, in consultation with the Facility owner.
- **B6.** The circuit is mutually agreed upon for inclusion by the Planning Coordinator and the Facility owner.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Transmission Relay Loadability
- **2. Number:** PRC-023-6
- **3. Purpose:** Protective relay settings shall not limit transmission loadability; not interfere with system operators' ability to take remedial action to protect system reliability and; be set to reliably detect all fault conditions and protect the electrical network from these faults.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entity:

- **4.1.1** Transmission Owner with load-responsive phase protection systems as describedin PRC-023-6 Attachment A, applied at the terminals of the circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 R5*).
- **4.1.2** Generator Owner with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-6 Attachment A, applied at the terminals of the circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 R5*).
- **4.1.3** Distribution Provider with load-responsive phase protection systems as described in PRC-023-6 Attachment A, applied at the terminals of the circuits defined in 4.2.1 (*Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 R5*), provided those circuits have bi- directional flow capabilities.
- 4.1.4 Planning Coordinator

4.2. Circuits:

4.2.1 Circuits Subject to Requirements R1 – R5:

- **4.2.1.1** Transmission lines operated at 200 kV and above, except Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.
- **4.2.1.2** Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
- **4.2.1.3** Transmission lines operated below 100 kV that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
- **4.2.1.4** Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 200 kV and above.
- **4.2.1.5** Transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordance with Requirement R6.
- 4.2.1.6 Transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV

that are part of the BES and selected by the Planning Coordinator in accordancewith Requirement R6.

4.2.2 Circuits Subject to Requirement R6:

- **4.2.2.1** Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200 kV and transformers withlow voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV, except Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that areused exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.
- **4.2.2.2** Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the BES, except Elements that connect the GSU transformer(s) to the Transmission system that are used exclusively to export energy directly from a BES generating unit or generating plant. Elements may also supply generating plant loads.
- 5. Effective Date*: See the BC Implementation Plan for PRC-023-6

B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1, criteria 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the BES for all fault conditions. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees. *[Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*

Criteria:

- Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 150% of the highest seasonal Facility Rating of a circuit, for the available defined loading duration nearest 4 hours (expressed in amperes).
- 2. Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the highest seasonal 15-minute Facility Rating¹ of a circuit (expressed in amperes).
- **3.** Set transmission line relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum theoretical power transfer capability (using a 90-degree angle between the sending-end and receiving-end voltages and either reactance or complex impedance) of the circuit(expressed in amperes) using one of the following to perform the power transfer calculation:
 - An infinite source (zero source impedance) with a 1.00 per unit bus voltage at each end of the line.
 - An impedance at each end of the line, which reflects the actual system source impedance with a 1.05 per unit voltage behind each source impedance.
- **4.** Set transmission line relays on series compensated transmission lines so they do not operate at or below the maximum power transfer capability of the line, determined as the greaterof:
 - 115% of the highest emergency rating of the series capacitor.
 - 115% of the maximum power transfer capability of the circuit (expressed in amperes), calculated in accordance with Requirement R1, criterion 3, using the full lineinductive reactance.
- 5. Set transmission line relays on weak source systems so they do not operate at or below 170% of the maximum end-of-line three-phase fault magnitude (expressed in amperes).
- 6. Reserved.
- 7. Set transmission line relays applied at the load center terminal, remote from generation stations, so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the generation source under any system configuration.

¹ When a 15-minute rating has been calculated and published for use in real-time operations, the 15-minute rating can be used to establish the loadability requirement for the protective relays.

- 8. Set transmission line relays applied on the bulk system-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the system to the load under any system configuration.
- **9.** Set transmission line relays applied on the load-end of transmission lines that serve load remote to the bulk system so they do not operate at or below 115% of the maximum current flow from the load to the system under any system configuration.
- **10.** Set transformer fault protection relays and transmission line relays on transmission lines terminated only with a transformer so that the relays do not operate at or below the greater of:
 - 150% of the applicable maximum transformer nameplate rating (expressed in amperes), including the forced cooled ratings corresponding to all installed supplemental cooling equipment.
 - 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating.
 - **10.1** Set load-responsive transformer fault protection relays, if used, such that the protection settings do not expose the transformer to a fault level and duration that exceeds the transformer's mechanical withstand capability².
- **11.** For transformer overload protection relays that do not comply with the loadability component of Requirement R1, criterion 10 set the relays according to one of the following:
 - Set the relays to allow the transformer to be operated at an overload level of at least 150% of the maximum applicable nameplate rating, or 115% of the highest operator established emergency transformer rating, whichever is greater, for at least 15 minutesto provide time for the operator to take controlled action to relieve the overload.
 - Install supervision for the relays using either a top oil or simulated winding hot spot temperature element set no less than 100° C for the top oil temperature or no less than 140° C for the winding hot spot temperature³.
- 12. When the desired transmission line capability is limited by the requirement to adequately protect the transmission line, set the transmission line distance relays to a maximum of 125% of the apparent impedance (at the impedance angle of the transmission line) subject to the following constraints:
 - a. Set the maximum torque angle (MTA) to 90 degrees or the highest supported by the manufacturer.
 - b. Evaluate the relay loadability in amperes at the relay trip point at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.
 - c. Include a relay setting component of 87% of the current calculated in

² As illustrated by the "dotted line" in IEEE C57.109-1993 - *IEEE Guide for Liquid-Immersed Transformer Through-Fault-Current Duration,* Clause 4.4, Figure 4.

³ IEEE standard C57.91, Tables 7 and 8, specify that transformers are to be designed to withstand a winding hot spot temperature of 180 degrees C, and Annex A cautions that bubble formation may occur above 140 degrees C.

Requirement R1, criterion 12 in the Facility Rating determination for the circuit.

- **13.** Where other situations present practical limitations on circuit capability, set the phase protection relays so they do not operate at or below 115% of such limitations.
- M1. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its transmission relays is set according to one of the criteria in Requirement R1, criterion 1 through 13 and shall have evidence such as coordination curves or summaries of calculations that show that relays set per criterion 10 do not expose the transformer to fault levels and durations beyond those indicated in the standard. (R1)
- R2. Reserved.
- M2. Reserved.
- **R3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1, criterion 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and shall obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability. *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]*
- **M3.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider with transmission relays set according to Requirement R1, criterion 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 shall have evidence such as Facility Rating spreadsheets or Facility Rating database to show that it used the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit and evidence such as dated correspondence that the resulting Facility Rating was agreed to by its associated Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator. (R3)
- **R4.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that chooses to use Requirement R1 criterion 2 as the basis for verifying transmission line relay loadability shall provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]
- M4. Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 2 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence to show that it provided its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits associated with those transmission line relays within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R4)
- **R5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1 criterion 12 shall provide an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports, to allow the

ERO to compile a list of all circuits that have protective relay settings that limit circuit capability. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]

- **M5.** Each Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, or Distribution Provider that sets transmission line relays according to Requirement R1, criterion 12 shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided an updated list of the circuits associated with those relays to its Regional Entity within the required timeframe. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list. (R5)
- **R6.** Each Planning Coordinator shall conduct an assessment at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments, by applying the criteria in PRC-023-6, Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers must comply with Requirements R1 through R5. The Planning Coordinator shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long Term Planning]
 - **6.1** Maintain a list of circuits subject to PRC-023-6 per application of Attachment B, including identification of the first calendar year in which any criterion in PRC-023-6, Attachment B applies.
 - **6.2** Provide the list of circuits to all Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within 30 calendar days of the establishment of the initial list and within 30 calendar days of any changes to that list.
- M6. Each Planning Coordinator shall have evidence such as power flow results, calculation summaries, or study reports that it used the criteria established within PRC-023-6, Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard as described in Requirement R6. The Planning Coordinator shall have a dated list of such circuits and shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided the list to the Regional Entities, Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area within the required timeframe. (R6)

C. Compliance

- 1. Compliance Monitoring Process
- **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** British Columbia Utilities Commission
- **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

The Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, and Distribution Provider shall each retain documentation to demonstrate compliance with Requirements R1 through R5 for three calendar years.

The Planning Coordinator shall retain documentation of the most recent review process required in Requirement R6. The Planning Coordinator shall retain the most recent list of circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard, as determined per Requirement R6.

If a Transmission Owner, Generator Owner, Distribution Provider, or Planning Coordinator is found non-compliant, it shall keep information related to the noncompliance until found compliant or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The Compliance Enforcement Authority shall keep the last audit record and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

Violation Severity Levels

	Violation Severity Levels						
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL			
R1	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not use any one of the following criteria (Requirement R1 criterion 1 through 13) for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the BES for all fault conditions. OR The responsible entity did not evaluate relay loadability at 0.85 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.			
R2	N/A	N/A	N/A	Reserved.			
R3	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity that uses a circuit capability with the practical limitations described in Requirement R1 criterion 7, 8, 9, 12, or 13 did not use the calculated circuit capability as the Facility Rating of the circuit.			

		Violation Severity Levels						
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL				
				OR The responsible entity did not obtain the agreement of the Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with the calculated circuit capability.				
R4	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not provide its Planning Coordinator, Transmission Operator, and Reliability Coordinator with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 2 at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports.				
R5	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not provide its Regional Entity, with an updated list of circuits that have transmission line relays set according to the criteria established in Requirement R1 criterion 12 at least once				

	Violation Severity Levels							
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL				
				each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between reports.				
R6	N/A	 The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but more than 15 months and less than 24 months lapsed between assessments. OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but failed to include the calendar year in which any criterion in Attachment B first 	The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met parts 6.1 and 6.2, but 24 months or more lapsed between assessments. OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners,	The Planning Coordinator failed to use the criteria established within Attachment B to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard. OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B, at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to meet parts 6.1 and 6.2. OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established				

	Violation Severity Levels							
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL				
		applies. OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 and 6.2 but provided the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 31 days and 45 days after the list was established or updated. (part 6.2)	Generator Owners, and Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area between 46 days and 60 days after list was established or updated. (part 6.2)	 within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard but failed to maintain the list of circuits determined according to the process described in Requirement R6. (part 6.1) OR The Planning Coordinator used the criteria established within Attachment B at least once each calendar year, with no more than 15 months between assessments to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard and met 6.1 but failed to provide the list of circuits to the Reliability Coordinators, Transmission Owners, Generator Owners, and 				

- "	Violation Severity Levels						
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL			
				 Distribution Providers within its Planning Coordinator area or provided the list more than 60 days after the list was established or updated. (part 6.2) OR The Planning Coordinator failed to determine the circuits in its Planning Coordinator area for which applicable entities must comply with the standard. 			

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Associated Documents

The following document is an explanatory supplement to the standard. It provides the technical rationale underlying the requirements in this standard. The reference document contains methodology examples for illustration purposes it does not preclude other technically comparable methodologies.

"Determination and Application of Practical Relaying Loadability Ratings," Version 1.0, June 2008, prepared by the System Protection and Control Task Force of the NERC Planning Committee, available at: <u>http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Standards/Relay_Loadability_Reference_Doc_Clean_Final_2008July3.pdf</u>

NERC Reliability Standard PRC-023-6 Implementation Plan.

NERC Reliability Standard PRC-023-6 Technical Rationale.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	February 12, 2008	Approved by Board of Trustees	New
1	March 19, 2008	Corrected typo in last sentence of Severe VSL for Requirement 3 — "then" should be "than."	Errata
1	March 18, 2010	Approved by FERC	
1	Filed for approval April 19, 2010	Changed VRF for R3 from Medium to High; changed VSLs for R1, R2, R3 to binary Severe to comply with Order 733	Revision
2	March 10, 2011 approved by Board of Trustees	Revised to address initial set of directives from Order 733	Revision (Project 2010-13)
2	March 15, 2012	FERC order issued approving PRC-023-2 (approval becomes effective May 7, 2012)	
3	November 7, 2013	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	Supplemental SAR to Clarify applicability for consistency with PRC-025-1 and other minor corrections.
4	November 13, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Replaced references to Special Protection System and SPS with Remedial Action Scheme and RAS
4	November 19, 2015	FERC Order issued approving PRC-023-4. Docket No. RM15-13-000.	
5	May 13, 2021	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	
6	March 4, 2022	FERC Order issued approving PRC-023-5	
7	February 16,2022	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees PRC-023-6.	

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Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
7	January 24, 2024	FERC issued a delegated letter order approving PRC-023-6. Docket No. RD23-5- 000	

Attachment A

- 1. This standard includes any protective functions which could trip with or without time delay, on load current, including but not limited to:
 - 1.1. Phase distance.
 - **1.2.** Out-of-step tripping.
 - **1.3.** Switch-on-to-fault.
 - **1.4.** Overcurrent relays.
 - **1.5.** Communications aided protection schemes including but not limited to:
 - **1.5.1** Permissive overreach transfer trip (POTT).
 - 1.5.2 Permissive under-reach transfer trip (PUTT).
 - **1.5.3** Directional comparison blocking (DCB).
 - **1.5.4** Directional comparison unblocking (DCUB).
 - **1.6.** Phase overcurrent supervisory elements (i.e., phase fault detectors) associated with current- based, communication-assisted schemes (i.e., pilot wire, phase comparison, and line current differential) where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications.
- 2. The following protection systems are excluded from requirements of this standard:
 - **2.1.** Relay elements that are only enabled when other relays or associated systems fail. For example:
 - Overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions.
 - Elements that are only enabled during a loss of communications except as noted in section 1.6.
 - **2.2.** Protection systems intended for the detection of ground fault conditions.
 - 2.3. Reserved.
 - 2.4. Reserved.
 - **2.5.** Relay elements used only for Remedial Action Schemes applied and approved in accordance with NERC Reliability Standards PRC-012 through PRC-017 or their successors.
 - **2.6.** Protection systems that are designed only to respond in time periods which allow 15 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions.
 - 2.7. Thermal emulation relays which are used in conjunction with dynamic Facility Ratings.
 - **2.8.** Relay elements associated with dc lines.
 - **2.9.** Relay elements associated with dc converter transformers.

Attachment B

Circuits to Evaluate

- Transmission lines operated at 100 kV to 200kV and transformers with low voltage terminals connected at 100 kV to 200 kV.
- Transmission lines operated below 100 kV and transformers with low voltageterminals connected below 100 kV that are part of the Bulk Electric System.

Criteria

If any of the following criteria apply to a circuit, the applicable entity must comply with the standard for that circuit.

- **B1.** The circuit is a monitored Facility of a permanent flowgate in the Eastern Interconnection, a major transfer path within the Western Interconnection as defined by the Regional Entity, or a comparable monitored Facility in the Québec Interconnection, that has been included to address reliability concerns for loading of that circuit, as confirmed by the applicable Planning Coordinator.
- **B2.** The circuit is selected by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner based on Planning Assessments of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon that identify instances of instability, Cascading, or uncontrolled separation, that adversely impact the reliability of the Bulk Electric System for planning events.
- **B3.** The circuit forms a path (as agreed to by the Generator Operator and the transmission entity) to supply off-site power to a nuclear plant as established in the Nuclear Plant Interface Requirements (NPIRs) pursuant to NUC-001.
- **B4.** The circuit is identified through the following sequence of power flow analyses⁴ performed by the Planning Coordinator for the one-to-five-year planning horizon:
 - a. Simulate double contingency combinations selected by engineering judgment, without manual system adjustments in between the two contingencies (reflects a situation where a System Operator may not have time between the two contingencies to make appropriate system adjustments).
 - For circuits operated between 100 kV and 200 kV evaluate the post-contingency loading, in consultation with the Facility owner, against a threshold based on the Facility Rating assigned for that circuit and used in the power flow case by the Planning Coordinator.
 - **c.** When more than one Facility Rating for that circuit is available in the power flow case, the threshold for selection will be based on the Facility Rating for the loading duration nearest four hours.
 - **d.** The threshold for selection of the circuit will vary based on the loading duration assumed in the development of the Facility Rating.
 - i. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of up to and including four

⁴ Past analyses may be used to support the assessment if no material changes to the system have occurred since the last assessment

hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 115% of the Facility Rating.

- **ii.** If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration greater than four and up to and including eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 120% of the Facility Rating.
- iii. If the Facility Rating is based on a loading duration of greater than eight hours, the circuit must comply with the standard if the loading exceeds 130% of the Facility Rating.
- e. Radially operated circuits serving only load are excluded.
- **B5.** The circuit is selected by the Planning Coordinator based on technical studies or assessments, other than those specified in criteria B1 through B4, in consultation with the Facility owner.
- **B6.** The circuit is mutually agreed upon for inclusion by the Planning Coordinator and the Facility owner.

A. Introduction

- 1. Title: Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings
- 2. Number: PRC-026-2
- **3. Purpose:** To ensure that load-responsive protective relays are expected to not trip in response to stable power swings during non-Fault conditions.

4. Applicability:

4.1. Functional Entities:

- **4.1.1** Generator Owner that applies load-responsive protective relays as described in PRC-026-2 Attachment A at the terminals of the Elements listed in Section 4.2, Facilities.
- **4.1.2** Planning Coordinator.
- **4.1.3** Transmission Owner that applies load-responsive protective relays as described in PRC-026-2 Attachment A at the terminals of the Elements listed in Section 4.2, Facilities.
- **4.2.** Facilities: The following Elements that are part of the Bulk Electric System (BES):
 - 4.2.1 Generators.
 - 4.2.2 Transformers.
 - **4.2.3** Transmission lines.

5. Background:

This is the third phase of a three-phased standard development project that focused on developing this new Reliability Standard to address protective relay operations due to stable power swings. The March 18, 2010, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order No. 733 approved Reliability Standard PRC-023-1 – Transmission Relay Loadability. In that Order, FERC directed NERC to address three areas of relay loadability that include modifications to the approved PRC-023-1, development of a new Reliability Standard to address the operation of protective relay loadability, and a new Reliability Standard to address the operation of protective relays due to stable power swings. This project's SAR addresses these directives with a three-phased approach to standard development.

Phase 1 focused on making the specific modifications from FERC Order No. 733 to PRC-023-1. Reliability Standard PRC-023-2, which incorporated these modifications, became mandatory on July 1, 2012.

Phase 2 focused on developing a new Reliability Standard, PRC-025-1 – Generator Relay Loadability, to address generator protective relay loadability. PRC-025-1 became mandatory on October 1, 2014, along with PRC-023-3, which was modified to harmonize PRC-023-2 with PRC-025-1.

Phase 3 focuses on preventing protective relays from tripping unnecessarily due to stable power swings by requiring identification of Elements on which a stable or unstable power swing may affect Protection System operation, assessment of the security of loadresponsive protective relays to tripping in response to only a stable power swing, and implementation of Corrective Action Plans (CAP), where necessary. Phase 3 improves security of load-responsive protective relays for stable power swings so they are expected to not trip in response to stable power swings during non-Fault conditions while maintaining dependable fault detection and dependable out-of-step tripping.

6. Effective Date*:

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B. Requirements and Measures

R1. Each Planning Coordinator shall, at least once each calendar year, provide notification of each generator, transformer, and transmission line BES Element in its area that meets one or more of the following criteria, if any, to the respective Generator Owner and Transmission Owner: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

Criteria:

- 1. Generator(s) where an angular stability constraint, identified in Planning Assessments of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon for a planning event, that is addressed by limiting the output of a generator or a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), and those Elements terminating at the Transmission station associated with the generator(s).
- 2. Elements associated with angular instability identified in Planning Assessments of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon for a planning event..
- 3. An Element that forms the boundary of an island in the most recent underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) design assessment based on application of the Planning Coordinator's criteria for identifying islands, only if the island is formed by tripping the Element due to angular instability.
- 4. An Element identified in the most recent annual Planning Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon where relay tripping occurs due to a stable or unstable¹ power swing during a simulated disturbance for a planning event.
- M1. Each Planning Coordinator shall have dated evidence that demonstrates notification of the generator, transformer, and transmission line BES Element(s) that meet one or more of the criteria in Requirement R1, if any, to the respective Generator Owner and Transmission Owner. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, the following documentation: emails, facsimiles, records, reports, transmittals, lists, or spreadsheets.

¹ An example of an unstable power swing is provided in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section, "Justification for Including Unstable Power Swings in the Requirements section of the Guidelines and Technical Basis."

- **R2.** Each Generator Owner and Transmission Owner shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]
 - 2.1 Within 12 full calendar months of notification of a BES Element pursuant to Requirement R1, determine whether its load-responsive protective relay(s) applied to that BES Element meets the criteria in PRC-026-2 Attachment B where an evaluation of that Element's load-responsive protective relay(s) based on PRC-026-2 Attachment B criteria has not been performed in the last five calendar years.
 - **2.2** Within 12 full calendar months of becoming aware² of a generator, transformer, or transmission line BES Element that tripped in response to a stable or unstable³ power swing due to the operation of its protective relay(s), determine whether its load-responsive protective relay(s) applied to that BES Element meets the criteria in PRC-026-2 Attachment B.
- M2. Each Generator Owner and Transmission Owner shall have dated evidence that demonstrates the evaluation was performed according to Requirement R2. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, the following documentation: apparent impedance characteristic plots, email, design drawings, facsimiles, R-X plots, software output, records, reports, transmittals, lists, settings sheets, or spreadsheets.
- **R3.** Each Generator Owner and Transmission Owner shall, within six full calendar months of determining a load-responsive protective relay does not meet the PRC-026-2 Attachment B criteria pursuant to Requirement R2, develop a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to meet one of the following: *[Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Operations Planning]*
 - The Protection System meets the PRC-026-2 Attachment B criteria, while maintaining dependable fault detection and dependable out-of-step tripping (if out-of-step tripping is applied at the terminal of the BES Element); or
 - The Protection System is excluded under the PRC-026-2 Attachment A criteria (e.g., modifying the Protection System so that relay functions are supervised by power swing blocking or using relay systems that are immune to power swings), while maintaining dependable fault detection and dependable out-of-step tripping (if out-of-step tripping is applied at the terminal of the BES Element).
- **M3.** The Generator Owner and Transmission Owner shall have dated evidence that demonstrates the development of a CAP in accordance with Requirement R3. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, the following documentation: corrective action plans, maintenance records, settings sheets, project or work management program records, or work orders.
- **R4.** Each Generator Owner and Transmission Owner shall implement each CAP developed pursuant to Requirement R3 and update each CAP if actions or timetables change until all actions are complete. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium][Time Horizon: Long-Term Planning]

M4. The Generator Owner and Transmission Owner shall have dated evidence that demonstrates implementation of each CAP according to Requirement R4, including updates to the CAP when actions or timetables change. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, the following documentation: corrective action plans, maintenance records, settings sheets, project or work management program records, or work orders.

C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority

The British Columbia Utilities Commission.

1.2. Evidence Retention

The following evidence retention periods identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the CEA may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full time period since the last audit.

The Generator Owner, Planning Coordinator, and Transmission Owner shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its CEA to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- The Planning Coordinator shall retain evidence of Requirement R1 for a minimum of one calendar year following the completion of the Requirement.
- The Generator Owner and Transmission Owner shall retain evidence of Requirement R2 evaluation for a minimum of 12 calendar months following completion of each evaluation where a CAP is not developed.
- The Generator Owner and Transmission Owner shall retain evidence of Requirements R2, R3, and R4 for a minimum of 12 calendar months following completion of each CAP.

If a Generator Owner, Planning Coordinator, or Transmission Owner is found noncompliant, it shall keep information related to the non-compliance until mitigation is complete and approved, or for the time specified above, whichever is longer.

The CEA shall keep the last audit records and all requested and submitted subsequent audit records.

² Some examples of the ways an entity may become aware of a power swing are provided in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section, "Becoming Aware of an Element That Tripped in Response to a Power Swing."

³ An example of an unstable power swing is provided in the Guidelines and Technical Basis section, "Justification for Including Unstable Power Swings in the Requirements section of the Guidelines and Technical Basis."

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Table of Compliance Elements

R#	Time	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
κ#	Horizon		Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Planning Coordinator provided notification of the BES Element(s) in accordance with Requirement R1, but was less than or equal to 30 calendar days late.	The Planning Coordinator provided notification of the BES Element(s) in accordance with Requirement R1, but was more than 30 calendar days and less than or equal to 60 calendar days late.	The Planning Coordinator provided notification of the BES Element(s) in accordance with Requirement R1, but was more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 90 calendar days late.	The Planning Coordinator provided notification of the BES Element(s) in accordance with Requirement R1, but was more than 90 calendar days late. OR The Planning Coordinator failed to provide notification of the BES Element(s) in accordance with Requirement R1.

R#	Time	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
K#	Horizon	VKF	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R2	Operations Planning	High	The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner evaluated its load-responsive protective relay(s) in accordance with Requirement R2, but was less than or equal to 30 calendar days late.	The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner evaluated its load-responsive protective relay(s) in accordance with Requirement R2, but was more than 30 calendar days and less than or equal to 60 calendar days late.	The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner evaluated its load-responsive protective relay(s) in accordance with Requirement R2, but was more than 60 calendar days and less than or equal to 90 calendar days late.	The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner evaluated its load-responsive protective relay(s) in accordance with Requirement R2, but was more than 90 calendar days late. OR The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner failed to evaluate its load- responsive protective relay(s) in accordance with Requirement R2.

R#	Time	VRF	Violation Severity Levels			
R#	Horizon	VKF	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R3	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner developed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) in accordance with Requirement R3, but in more than six calendar months and less than or equal to seven calendar months.	The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner developed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) in accordance with Requirement R3, but in more than seven calendar months and less than or equal to eight calendar months.	The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner developed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) in accordance with Requirement R3, but in more than eight calendar months and less than or equal to nine calendar months.	The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner developed a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) in accordance with Requirement R3, but in more than nine calendar months. OR The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner failed to develop a CAP in accordance with Requirement R3.
R4	Long-term Planning	Medium	The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner implemented a Corrective Action Plan (CAP), but failed to update a CAP when actions or timetables changed, in accordance with Requirement R4.	N/A	N/A	The Generator Owner or Transmission Owner failed to implement a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) in accordance with Requirement R4.

D. Regional Variances

None.

E. Interpretations

None.

F. Associated Documents

Applied Protective Relaying, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1979.

- Burdy, John, Loss-of-excitation Protection for Synchronous Generators GER-3183, General Electric Company.
- IEEE Power System Relaying Committee WG D6, Power Swing and Out-of-Step Considerations on Transmission Lines, July 2005: <u>http://www.pes-psrc.org/Reports</u> /Power%20Swing%20and%20OOS%20Considerations%20on%20Transmission%20 Lines%20F..pdf.
- Kimbark Edward Wilson, Power System Stability, Volume II: Power Circuit Breakers and Protective Relays, Published by John Wiley and Sons, 1950.
- Kundur, Prabha, *Power System Stability and Control*, 1994, Palo Alto: EPRI, McGraw Hill, Inc.
- NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee, *Protection System Response to Power Swings*, August 2013: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/System%20Protection%20</u> <u>and%20Control%20Subcommittee%20SPCS%2020/SPCS%20Power%20Swing%20</u> <u>Report Final 20131015.pdf</u>.
- Reimert, Donald, *Protective Relaying for Power Generation Systems*, 2006, Boca Raton: CRC Press.

Version History

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	November 13, 2014	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	New
1	March 17, 2016	FERC Order issued approving PRC-026-1. Docket No. RM15- 8-000.	

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PRC-026-2 — Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
2	May 13, 2021	Adopted by NERC Board of Trustees	Revised under Project 2015-09
2	March 4,2022	FERC Letter Order issued approving Docket No.RD22-2- 000.	
2	March 4, 2022	Effective Date of Standard	April 1, 2024

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PRC-026-2 – Attachment A

This standard applies to any protective functions which could trip instantaneously or with a time delay of less than 15 cycles on load current (i.e., "load-responsive") including, but not limited to:

- Phase distance
- Phase overcurrent
- Out-of-step tripping
- Loss-of-field

The following protection functions are excluded from Requirements of this standard:

- Relay elements supervised by power swing blocking
- Relay elements that are only enabled when other relays or associated systems fail. For example:
 - Overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions.
 - Relay elements that are only enabled during a loss of communications
- Thermal emulation relays which are used in conjunction with dynamic Facility Ratings
- Relay elements associated with direct current (dc) lines
- Relay elements associated with dc converter transformers
- Phase fault detector relay elements employed to supervise other load-responsive phase distance elements (i.e., in order to prevent false operation in the event of a loss of potential)
- Relay elements associated with switch-onto-fault schemes
- Reverse power relay on the generator
- Generator relay elements that are armed only when the generator is disconnected from the system, (e.g., non-directional overcurrent elements used in conjunction with inadvertent energization schemes, and open breaker flashover schemes)
- Current differential relay, pilot wire relay, and phase comparison relay
- Voltage-restrained or voltage-controlled overcurrent relays

PRC-026-2 – Attachment B

Criterion A:

An impedance-based relay used for tripping is expected to not trip for a stable power swing, when the relay characteristic is completely contained within the unstable power swing region.⁴ The unstable power swing region is formed by the union of three shapes in the impedance (R-X) plane; (1) a lower loss-of-synchronism circle based on a ratio of the sending-end to receiving-end voltages of 0.7; (2) an upper loss-of-synchronism circle based on a ratio of the sending-end to receiving-end voltages of 1.43; (3) a lens that connects the endpoints of the total system impedance (with the parallel transfer impedance removed) bounded by varying the sending-end and receiving-end voltages from 0.0 to 1.0 per unit, while maintaining a constant system separation angle across the total system impedance where:

- 1. The system separation angle is:
 - At least 120 degrees, or
 - An angle less than 120 degrees where a documented transient stability analysis demonstrates that the expected maximum stable separation angle is less than 120 degrees.
- 2. All generation is in service and all transmission BES Elements are in their normal operating state when calculating the system impedance.
- 3. Saturated (transient or sub-transient) reactance is used for all machines.

⁴ Guidelines and Technical Basis, Figures 1 and 2.

PRC-026-2 – Attachment B

Criterion B:

The pickup of an overcurrent relay element used for tripping, that is above the calculated current value (with the parallel transfer impedance removed) for the conditions below:

- 1. The system separation angle is:
 - At least 120 degrees, or
 - An angle less than 120 degrees where a documented transient stability analysis demonstrates that the expected maximum stable separation angle is less than 120 degrees.
- 2. All generation is in service and all transmission BES Elements are in their normal operating state when calculating the system impedance.
- 3. Saturated (transient or sub-transient) reactance is used for all machines.
- 4. Both the sending-end and receiving-end voltages at 1.05 per unit.

Guidelines and Technical Basis

Introduction

The NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee technical document, Protection System Response to Power Swings, August 2013,⁵ ("PSRPS Report" or "report") was specifically prepared to support the development of this NERC Reliability Standard. The report provided a historical perspective on power swings as early as 1965 up through the approval of the report by the NERC Planning Committee. The report also addresses reliability issues regarding trade-offs between security and dependability of Protection Systems, considerations for this NERC Reliability Standard, and a collection of technical information about power swing characteristics and varying issues with practical applications and approaches to power swings. Of these topics, the report suggests an approach for this NERC Reliability Standard ("standard" or "PRC-026-2") which is consistent with addressing three regulatory directives in the FERC Order No. 733. The first directive concerns the need for "...protective relay systems that differentiate between faults and stable power swings and, when necessary, phases out protective relay systems that cannot meet this requirement."6 Second, is "...to develop a Reliability Standard addressing undesirable relay operation due to stable power swings."⁷ The third directive "...to consider "islanding" strategies that achieve the fundamental performance for all islands in developing the new Reliability Standard addressing stable power swings"⁸ was considered during development of the standard.

The development of this standard implements the majority of the approaches suggested by the report. However, it is noted that the Reliability Coordinator and Transmission Planner have not been included in the standard's Applicability section (as suggested by the PSRPS Report). This is so that a single entity, the Planning Coordinator, may be the single source for identifying Elements according to Requirement R1. A single source will insure that multiple entities will not identify Elements in duplicate, nor will one entity fail to provide an Element because it believes the Element is being provided by another entity. The Planning Coordinator has, or has access to, the wide-area model and can correctly identify the Elements that may be susceptible to a stable or unstable power swing. Additionally, not including the Reliability Coordinator and Transmission Planner is consistent with the applicability of other relay loadability NERC Reliability Standards (e.g., PRC-023 and PRC-025). It is also consistent with the NERC Functional Model.

The phrase, "while maintaining dependable fault detection and dependable out-of-step tripping" in Requirement R3, describes that the Generator Owner and Transmission Owner are to comply with this standard while achieving its desired protection goals. Load-responsive protective relays, as addressed within this standard, may be intended to provide a variety of backup protection functions, both within the generating unit or generating plant and on the transmission system, and

⁵ NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee, *Protection System Response to Power Swings*, August 2013: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/System%20Protection%20and%20Control%20Subcommittee%20SPCS%2020/SPC</u> <u>S%20Power%20Swing%20Report_Final_20131015.pdf</u>)</u>

⁶ Transmission Relay Loadability Reliability Standard, Order No. 733, P.150 FERC ¶ 61,221 (2010).

⁷ Ibid. P.153.

⁸ Ibid. P.162.

this standard is not intended to result in the loss of these protection functions. Instead, the Generator Owner and Transmission Owner must consider both the Requirements within this standard and its desired protection goals and perform modifications to its protective relays or protection philosophies as necessary to achieve both.

Power Swings

The IEEE Power System Relaying Committee WG D6 developed a technical document called *Power Swing and Out-of-Step Considerations on Transmission Lines* (July 2005) that provides background on power swings. The following are general definitions from that document:⁹

Power Swing: a variation in three phase power flow which occurs when the generator rotor angles are advancing or retarding relative to each other in response to changes in load magnitude and direction, line switching, loss of generation, faults, and other system disturbances.

Pole Slip: a condition whereby a generator, or group of generators, terminal voltage angles (or phases) go past 180 degrees with respect to the rest of the connected power system.

Stable Power Swing: a power swing is considered stable if the generators do not slip poles and the system reaches a new state of equilibrium, i.e. an acceptable operating condition.

Unstable Power Swing: a power swing that will result in a generator or group of generators experiencing pole slipping for which some corrective action must be taken.

Out-of-Step Condition: Same as an unstable power swing.

Electrical System Center or Voltage Zero: it is the point or points in the system where the voltage becomes zero during an unstable power swing.

Burden to Entities

The PSRPS Report provides a technical basis and approach for focusing on Protection Systems, which are susceptible to power swings, while achieving the purpose of the standard. The approach reduces the number of relays to which the PRC-026-2 Requirements would apply by first identifying the BES Element(s) on which load-responsive protective relays must be evaluated. The first step uses criteria to identify the Elements on which a Protection System is expected to be challenged by power swings. Of those Elements, the second step is to evaluate each load-responsive protective relay that is applied on each identified Element. Rather than requiring the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner to perform simulations to obtain information for each identified Element, the Generator Owner and Transmission Owner will reduce the need for simulation by comparing the load-responsive protective relay characteristic to specific criteria in PRC-026-2 – Attachment B.

⁹ <u>http://www.pes-psrc.org/Reports/Power%20Swing%20and%20OOS%20Considerations%20on%20Transmission</u> <u>%20Lines%20F..pdf</u>.

Applicability

The standard is applicable to the Generator Owner, Planning Coordinator, and Transmission Owner entities. More specifically, the Generator Owner and Transmission Owner entities are applicable when applying load-responsive protective relays at the terminals of the applicable BES Elements. The standard is applicable to the following BES Elements: generators, transformers, and transmission lines. The Distribution Provider was considered for inclusion in the standard; however, it is not subject to the standard because this entity, by functional registration, would not own generators, transmission lines, or transformers other than load serving.

Load-responsive protective relays include any protective functions which could trip with or without time delay, on load current.

Requirement R1

The Planning Coordinator has a wide-area view and is in the position to identify what, if any, Elements meet the criteria. The criterion-based approach is consistent with the NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee (SPCS) technical document, *Protection System Response to Power Swings* (August 2013),¹⁰ which recommends a focused approach to determine an at-risk Element. Identification of Elements comes from the annual Planning Assessments pursuant to the transmission planning (i.e., "TPL") and other NERC Reliability Standards (e.g., PRC-006), and the standard is not requiring any other assessments to be performed by the Planning Coordinator. The required notification on a calendar year basis to the respective Generator Owner and Transmission Owner is sufficient because it is expected that the Planning Coordinator will make its notifications following the completion of Elements on a calendar year basis even if a study is performed less frequently (e.g., PRC-006 – Automatic Underfrequency Load Shedding, which is five years) and has not changed. It is possible that a Planning Coordinator could utilize studies from a prior year in determining the necessary notifications pursuant to Requirement R1.

Criterion 1

The first criterion involves generator(s) where an angular stability constraint exists that is addressed by limiting the output of a generator or a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) and those Elements terminating at the Transmission station associated with the generator(s). For example, a scheme to remove generation for specific conditions is implemented for a four-unit generating plant (1,100 MW). Two of the units are 500 MW each; one is connected to the 345 kV system and one is connected to the 230 kV system. The Transmission Owner has two 230 kV transmission lines and one 345 kV transmission line all terminating at the generating facility as well as a 345/230 kV autotransformer. The remaining 100 MW consists of two 50 MW combustion turbine (CT) units connected to four 66 kV transmission lines. The 66 kV transmission lines are not electrically joined to the 345 kV and 230 kV transmission lines at the plant site and are not subject to any generating output limitation or RAS. A stability constraint limits the output of the portion of the

¹⁰ http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/System%20Protection%20and%20Control%20Subcommittee%20SPCS%20 20/SPCS%20Power%20Swing%20Report Final 20131015.pdf)

plant affected by the RAS to 700 MW for an outage of the 345 kV transmission line. The RAS trips one of the 500 MW units to maintain stability for a loss of the 345 kV transmission line when the total output from both 500 MW units is above 700 MW. For this example, both 500 MW generating units and the associated generator step-up (GSU) transformers would be identified as Elements meeting this criterion. The 345/230 kV autotransformer, the 345 kV transmission line, and the two 230 kV transmission lines would also be identified as Elements meeting this criterion. The 50 MW combustion turbines and 66 kV transmission lines would not be identified pursuant to Criterion 1 because these Elements are not subject to any generating output limitation or RAS and do not terminate at the Transmission station associated with the generators that are subject to any generating output limitation or RAS.

Criterion 2

The second criterion involves Elements associated with angular instability identified in the Planning Assessments. For example, if Planning Assessments have identified that an angular instability could limit transfer capability on two long parallel 500 kV transmission lines to a maximum of 1,200 MW, and this limitation is based on angular instability resulting from a fault and subsequent loss of one of the two lines, then both lines would be identified as Elements meeting the criterion.

Criterion 3

The third criterion involves Elements that form the boundary of an island within an underfrequency load shedding (UFLS) design assessment. The criterion applies to islands identified based on application of the Planning Coordinator's criteria for identifying islands, where the island is formed by tripping the Elements based on angular instability. The criterion applies if the angular instability is modeled in the UFLS design assessment, or if the boundary is identified "off-line" (i.e., the Elements are selected based on angular instability considerations, but the Elements are tripped in the UFLS design assessment without modeling the initiating angular instability). In cases where an out-of-step condition is detected and tripping is initiated at an alternate location, the criterion applies to the Element on which the power swing is detected. The criterion does not apply to islands identified based on other considerations that do not involve angular instability, such as excessive loading, Planning Coordinator area boundary tie lines, or Balancing Authority boundary tie lines.

Criterion 4

The fourth criterion involves Elements identified in the most recent annual Planning Assessment where relay tripping occurs due to a stable or unstable¹¹ power swing during a simulated disturbance. The intent is for the Planning Coordinator to include any Element(s) where relay tripping was observed during simulations performed for the most recent annual Planning Assessment associated with the transmission planning TPL-001-4 Reliability Standard. Note that

¹¹ Refer to the "Justification for Including Unstable Power Swings in the Requirements" section.

relay tripping must be assessed within those annual Planning Assessments per TPL-001-4, R4, Part 4.3.1.3, which indicates that analysis shall include the "Tripping of Transmission lines and transformers where transient swings cause Protection System operation based on generic or actual relay models." Identifying such Elements according to Criterion 4 and notifying the respective Generator Owner and Transmission Owner will require that the owners of any load-responsive protective relay applied at the terminals of the identified Element evaluate the relay's susceptibility to tripping in response to a stable power swing.

Planning Coordinators have the discretion to determine whether the observed tripping for a power swing in its Planning Assessments occurs for valid contingencies and system conditions. The Planning Coordinator will address tripping that is observed in transient analyses on an individual basis; therefore, the Planning Coordinator is responsible for identifying the Elements based only on simulation results that are determined to be valid.

Due to the nature of how a Planning Assessment is performed, there may be cases where a previously-identified Element is not identified in the most recent annual Planning Assessment. If so, this is acceptable because the Generator Owner and Transmission Owner would have taken action upon the initial notification of the previously identified Element. When an Element is not identified in later Planning Assessments, the risk of load-responsive protective relays tripping in response to a stable power swing during non-Fault conditions would have already been assessed under Requirement R2 and mitigated according to Requirements R3 and R4 where the relays did not meet the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria. According to Requirement R2, the Generator Owner and Transmission Owner are only required to re-evaluate each load-responsive protective relay for an identified Element where the evaluation has not been performed in the last five calendar years.

Although Requirement R1 requires the Planning Coordinator to notify the respective Generator Owner and Transmission Owner of any Elements meeting one or more of the four criteria, it does not preclude the Planning Coordinator from providing additional information, such as apparent impedance characteristics, in advance or upon request, that may be useful in evaluating protective relays. Generator Owners and Transmission Owners are able to complete protective relay evaluations and perform the required actions without additional information. The standard does not include any requirement for the entities to provide information that is already being shared or exchanged between entities for operating needs. While a Requirement has not been included for the exchange of information, entities should recognize that relay performance needs to be measured against the most current information.

Requirement R2

Requirement R2 requires the Generator Owner and Transmission Owner to evaluate its loadresponsive protective relays to ensure that they are expected to not trip in response to stable power swings. The PRC-026-2 – Attachment A lists the applicable load-responsive relays that must be evaluated which include phase distance, phase overcurrent, out-of-step tripping, and loss-of-field relay functions. Phase distance relays could include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Zone elements with instantaneous tripping or intentional time delays of less than 15 cycles
- Phase distance elements used in high-speed communication-aided tripping schemes including:
 - Directional Comparison Blocking (DCB) schemes
 - Directional Comparison Un-Blocking (DCUB) schemes
 - Permissive Overreach Transfer Trip (POTT) schemes
 - Permissive Underreach Transfer Trip (PUTT) schemes

A method is provided within the standard to support consistent evaluation by Generator Owners and Transmission Owners based on specified conditions. Once a Generator Owner or Transmission Owner is notified of Elements pursuant to Requirement R1, it has 12 full calendar months to determine if each Element's load-responsive protective relays meet the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria, if the determination has not been performed in the last five calendar years. Additionally, each Generator Owner and Transmission Owner, that becomes aware of a generator, transformer, or transmission line BES Element that tripped in response to a stable or unstable power swing due to the operation of its protective relays pursuant to Requirement R2, Part 2.2, must perform the same PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria determination within 12 full calendar months.

Becoming Aware of an Element That Tripped in Response to a Power Swing

Part 2.2 in Requirement R2 is intended to initiate action by the Generator Owner and Transmission Owner when there is a known stable or unstable power swing and it resulted in the entity's Element tripping. The criterion starts with becoming aware of the event (i.e., power swing) and then any connection with the entity's Element tripping. By doing so, the focus is removed from the entity having to demonstrate that it made a determination whether a power swing was present for every Element trip. The basis for structuring the criterion in this manner is driven by the available ways that a Generator Owner and Transmission Owner could become aware of an Element that tripped in response to a stable or unstable power swing due to the operation of its protective relay(s).

Element trips caused by stable or unstable power swings, though infrequent, would be more common in a larger event. The identification of power swings will be revealed during an analysis of the event. Event analysis where an entity may become aware of a stable or unstable power swing could include internal analysis conducted by the entity, the entity's Protection System review following a trip, or a larger scale analysis by other entities. Event analysis could include include include include include include scale analysis by other entities. Event analysis could include involvement by the entity's Regional Entity, and in some cases NERC.

Information Common to Both Generation and Transmission Elements

The PRC-026-2 – Attachment A lists the load-responsive protective relays that are subject to this standard. Generator Owners and Transmission Owners may own load-responsive protective relays (e.g., distance relays) that directly affect generation or transmission BES Elements and will require analysis as a result of Elements being identified by the Planning Coordinator in Requirement R1

or the Generator Owner or Transmission Owner in Requirement R2. For example, distance relays owned by the Transmission Owner may be installed at the high-voltage side of the generator stepup (GSU) transformer (directional toward the generator) providing backup to generation protection. Generator Owners may have distance relays applied to backup transmission protection or backup protection to the GSU transformer. The Generator Owner may have relays installed at the generator terminals or the high-voltage side of the GSU transformer.

Exclusion of Time Based Load-Responsive Protective Relays

The purpose of the standard is "[t]o ensure that load-responsive protective relays are expected to not trip in response to stable power swings during non-Fault conditions." Load-responsive, high-speed tripping protective relays pose the highest risk of operating during a power swing. Because of this, high-speed tripping protective relays and relays with a time delay of less than 15 cycles are included in the standard; whereas other relays (i.e., Zones 2 and 3) with a time delay of 15 cycles or greater are excluded. The time delay used for exclusion on some load-responsive protective relays is based on the maximum expected time that load-responsive protective relays would be exposed to a stable power swing with a slow slip rate frequency.

In order to establish a time delay that distinguishes a high-risk load-responsive protective relay from one that has a time delay for tripping (lower-risk), a sample of swing rates were calculated based on a stable power swing entering and leaving the impedance characteristic as shown in Table 1. For a relay impedance characteristic that has a power swing entering and leaving, beginning at 90 degrees with a termination at 120 degrees before exiting the zone, the zone timer must be greater than the calculated time the stable power swing is inside the relay's operating zone to not trip in response to the stable power swing.

Eq. (1) Zone timer >
$$2 \times \left(\frac{(120^{\circ} - Angle of entry into the relay characteristic) \times 60}{(360 \times Slip Rate)}\right)$$

Table 1: Swing Rates		
Zone Timer Slip Rate (Cycles) (Hz)		
10	1.00	
15	0.67	
20	0.50	
30	0.33	

With a minimum zone timer of 15 cycles, the corresponding slip rate of the system is 0.67 Hz. This represents an approximation of a slow slip rate during a system Disturbance. Longer time delays allow for slower slip rates.

Application to Transmission Elements

Criterion A in PRC-026-2 – Attachment B describes an unstable power swing region that is formed by the union of three shapes in the impedance (R-X) plane. The first shape is a lower loss-ofsynchronism circle based on a ratio of the sending-end to receiving-end voltages of 0.7 (i.e., E_s/ $E_R = 0.7 / 1.0 = 0.7$). The second shape is an upper loss-of-synchronism circle based on a ratio of the sending-end to receiving-end voltages of 1.43 (i.e., $E_S / E_R = 1.0 / 0.7 = 1.43$). The third shape is a lens that connects the endpoints of the total system impedance together by varying the sendingend and receiving-end system voltages from 0.0 to 1.0 per unit, while maintaining a constant system separation angle across the total system impedance (with the parallel transfer impedance removed—see Figures 1 through 5). The total system impedance is derived from a two-bus equivalent network and is determined by summing the sending-end source impedance, the line impedance (excluding the Thévenin equivalent transfer impedance), and the receiving-end source impedance as shown in Figures 6 and 7. Establishing the total system impedance provides a conservative condition that will maximize the security of the relay against various system conditions. The smallest total system impedance represents a condition where the size of the lens characteristic in the R-X plane is smallest and is a conservative operating point from the standpoint of ensuring a load-responsive protective relay is expected to not trip given a predetermined angular displacement between the sending-end and receiving-end voltages. The smallest total system impedance results when all generation is in service and all transmission BES Elements are modeled in their "normal" system configuration (PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A). The parallel transfer impedance is removed to represent a likely condition where parallel Elements may be lost during the disturbance, and the loss of these Elements magnifies the sensitivity of the loadresponsive relays on the parallel line by removing the "infeed effect" (i.e., the apparent impedance sensed by the relay is decreased as a result of the loss of the transfer impedance, thus making the relay more likely to trip for a stable power swing—See Figures 13 and 14).

The sending-end and receiving-end source voltages are varied from 0.7 to 1.0 per unit to form the lower and upper loss-of-synchronism circles. The ratio of these two voltages is used in the calculation of the loss-of-synchronism circles, and result in a ratio range from 0.7 to 1.43.

Eq. (2)
$$\frac{E_S}{E_R} = \frac{0.7}{1.0} = 0.7$$
 Eq. (3): $\frac{E_S}{E_R} = \frac{1.0}{0.7} = 1.43$

The internal generator voltage during severe power swings or transmission system fault conditions will be greater than zero due to voltage regulator support. The voltage ratio of 0.7 to 1.43 is chosen to be more conservative than the PRC-023¹² and PRC-025¹³ NERC Reliability Standards where a lower bound voltage of 0.85 per unit voltage is used. A $\pm 15\%$ internal generator voltage range was chosen as a conservative voltage range for calculation of the voltage ratio used to calculate the loss-of-synchronism circles. For example, the voltage ratio using these voltages would result in a ratio range from 0.739 to 1.353.

¹² Transmission Relay Loadability

¹³ Generator Relay Loadability

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Eq. (4)
$$\frac{E_S}{E_R} = \frac{0.85}{1.15} = 0.739$$
 Eq. (5): $\frac{E_S}{E_R} = \frac{1.15}{0.85} = 1.353$

The lower ratio is rounded down to 0.7 to be more conservative, allowing a voltage range of 0.7 to 1.0 per unit to be used for the calculation of the loss-of-synchronism circles.¹⁴

When the parallel transfer impedance is included in the model, the division of current through the parallel transfer impedance path results in actual measured relay impedances that are larger than those measured when the parallel transfer impedance is removed (i.e., infeed effect), which would make it more likely for an impedance relay element to be completely contained within the unstable power swing region as shown in Figure 11. If the transfer impedance is included in the evaluation, a distance relay element could be deemed as meeting PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria and, in fact would be secure, assuming all Elements were in their normal state. In this case, the distance relay element could trip in response to a stable power swing during an actual event if the system was weakened (i.e., a higher transfer impedance) by the loss of a subset of lines that make up the parallel transfer impedance tripped on unstable swings, contained the initiating fault, and/or were lost due to operation of breaker failure or remote back-up protection schemes.

Table 10 shows the percent size increase of the lens shape as seen by the relay under evaluation when the parallel transfer impedance is included. The parallel transfer impedance has minimal effect on the apparent size of the lens shape as long as the parallel transfer impedance is at least 10 multiples of the parallel line impedance (less than 5% lens shape expansion), therefore, its removal has minimal impact, but results in a slightly more conservative, smaller lens shape. Parallel transfer impedances of 5 multiples of the parallel line impedance or less result in an apparent lens shape size of 10% or greater as seen by the relay. If two parallel lines and a parallel transfer impedance will be one or less multiples of the parallel line impedance, resulting in an apparent lens shape size of 45% or greater. It is a realistic contingency that the parallel line could be out-of-service, leaving the parallel transfer impedance making up the rest of the system in parallel with the line impedance. Since it is not known exactly which lines making up the parallel transfer impedance will be out of service during a major system disturbance, it is most conservative to assume that all of them are out, leaving just the line under evaluation in service.

Either the saturated transient or sub-transient direct axis reactance may be used for machines in the evaluation because they are smaller than the un-saturated reactances. Since saturated sub-transient generator reactances are smaller than the transient or synchronous reactances, the use of sub-transient reactances will result in a smaller source impedance and a smaller unstable power swing region in the graphical analysis as shown in Figures 8 and 9. Because power swings occur in a time frame where generator transient reactances will be prevalent, it is acceptable to use saturated transient reactances instead of saturated sub-transient reactances. Because some short-

¹⁴ Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, April 2004, Section 6 (The Cascade Stage of the Blackout), p. 94 under "Why the Generators Tripped Off," states, "Some generator undervoltage relays were set to trip at or above 90% voltage. However, a motor stalls out at about 70% voltage and a motor starter contactor drops out around 75%, so if there is a compelling need to protect the turbine from the system the under-voltage trigger point should be no higher than 80%."

circuit models may not include transient reactances, the use of sub-transient reactances is also acceptable because it produces more conservative results. For this reason, either value is acceptable when determining the system source impedances (PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A and B, No. 3).

Saturated reactances are used in short-circuit programs that produce the system impedance mentioned above. Planning and stability software generally use un-saturated reactances. Generator models used in transient stability analyses recognize that the extent of the saturation effect depends upon both rotor (field) and stator currents. Accordingly, they derive the effective saturated parameters of the machine at each instant by internal calculation from the specified (constant) unsaturated values of machine reactances and the instantaneous internal flux level. The specific assumptions regarding which inductances are affected by saturation, and the relative effect of that saturation, are different for the various generator models used. Thus, unsaturated values of all machine reactances are used in setting up planning and stability software data, and the appropriate set of open-circuit magnetization curve data is provided for each machine.

Saturated reactance values are smaller than unsaturated reactance values and are used in shortcircuit programs owned by the Generator and Transmission Owners. Because of this, saturated reactance values are to be used in the development of the system source impedances.

The source or system equivalent impedances can be obtained by a number of different methods using commercially available short-circuit calculation tools.¹⁵ Most short-circuit tools have a network reduction feature that allows the user to select the local and remote terminal buses to retain. The first method reduces the system to one that contains two buses, an equivalent generator at each bus (representing the source impedances at the sending-end and receiving-end), and two parallel lines; one being the line impedance of the protected line with relays being analyzed, the other being the parallel transfer impedance representing all other combinations of lines that connect the two buses together as shown in Figure 6. Another conservative method is to open both ends of the line being evaluated, and apply a three-phase bolted fault at each bus to determine the Thévenin equivalent impedance at each bus. The source impedances are set equal to the Thévenin equivalent impedances and will be less than or equal to the actual source impedances calculated by the network reduction method. Either method can be used to develop the system source impedances at both ends.

The two bullets of PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A, No. 1, identify the system separation angles used to identify the size of the power swing stability boundary for evaluating load-responsive protective relay impedance elements. The first bullet of PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A, No. 1 evaluates a system separation angle of at least 120 degrees that is held constant while varying the sending-end and receiving-end source voltages from 0.7 to 1.0 per unit, thus creating an unstable power swing region about the total system impedance in Figure 1. This unstable power swing region is compared to the tripping portion of the distance relay characteristic; that is, the portion that is not supervised by load encroachment, blinders, or some other form of supervision as shown in Figure 12 that restricts the distance element from tripping

¹⁵ Demetrios A. Tziouvaras and Daqing Hou, Appendix in *Out-Of-Step Protection Fundamentals and Advancements*, April 17, 2014: <u>https://www.selinc.com</u>.


for heavy, balanced load conditions. If the tripping portion of the impedance characteristics are completely contained within the unstable power swing region, the relay impedance element meets Criterion A in PRC-026-2 – Attachment B. A system separation angle of 120 degrees was chosen for the evaluation because it is generally accepted in the industry that recovery for a swing beyond this angle is unlikely to occur.¹⁶

The second bullet of PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A, No. 1 evaluates impedance relay elements at a system separation angle of less than 120 degrees, similar to the first bullet described above. An angle less than 120 degrees may be used if a documented stability analysis demonstrates that the power swing becomes unstable at a system separation angle of less than 120 degrees.


The exclusion of relay elements supervised by Power Swing Blocking (PSB) in PRC-026-2 – Attachment A allows the Generator Owner or Transmission Owner to exclude protective relay elements if they are blocked from tripping by PSB relays. A PSB relay applied and set according to industry accepted practices prevent supervised load-responsive protective relays from tripping in response to power swings. Further, PSB relays are set to allow dependable tripping of supervised elements. The criteria in PRC-026-2 – Attachment B specifically applies to unsupervised elements that could trip for stable power swings. Therefore, load-responsive protective relay elements supervised by PSB can be excluded from the Requirements of this standard.

¹⁶ "The critical angle for maintaining stability will vary depending on the contingency and the system condition at the time the contingency occurs; however, the likelihood of recovering from a swing that exceeds 120 degrees is marginal and 120 degrees is generally accepted as an appropriate basis for setting out-of-step protection. Given the importance of separating unstable systems, defining 120 degrees as the critical angle is appropriate to achieve a proper balance between dependable tripping for unstable power swings and secure operation for stable power swings." NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee, *Protection System Response to Power Swings*, August 2013: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/System%20Protection%20and%20Control%20Subcommittee%20</u> SPCS%2020/SPCS%20Power%20Swing%20Report_Final_20131015.pdf), p. 28.





Shape 2) Upper loss-of-synchronism circle, and Shape 3) Lens. The mho element characteristic is completely contained within the unstable power swing region (i.e., it does not intersect any portion of the unstable power swing region), therefore it meets PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A, No. 1.







Figure 2: Full graphic of the unstable power swing region formed by the union of the three shapes in the impedance (R-X) plane: Shape 1) Lower loss-of-synchronism circle, Shape 2) Upper loss-of-synchronism circle, and Shape 3) Lens. The mho element characteristic is completely contained within the unstable power swing region, therefore it meets PRC-26-1 – Attachment B, Criterion A, No.1.








Figure 4: The defining unstable power swing region points where the lens shape intersects the lower and upper loss-of-synchronism circle shapes and where the lens intersects the equal EMF (electromotive force) power swing.

Γ	Left	Side	Right	Side
	Coordinates		Coord	inates
Es / ER				
Voltage Ratio	R	+ jX	R	+ jX
0.7	-12.005	11.946	15.676	6.41
0.72	-12.004	12.407	15.852	6.836
0.74	-11.996	12.857	16.018	7.255
0.76	-11.982	13.298	16.175	7.667
0.78	-11.961	13.729	16.321	8.073
0.8	-11.935	14.151	16.459	8.472
0.82	-11.903	14.563	16.589	8.865
0.84	-11.867	14.966	16.71	9.251
0.86	-11.826	15.361	16.824	9.631
0.88	-11.78	15.746	16.93	10.004
0.9	-11.731	16.123	17.03	10.371
0.92	-11.678	16.492	17.123	10.732
0.94	-11.621	16.852	17.209	11.086
0.96	-11.562	17.205	17.29	11.435
0.98	-11.499	17.55	17.364	11.777
1	-11.434	17.887	17.434	12.113
1.0286	-11.336	18.356	17.524	12.584
1.0572	-11.234	18.81	17.604	13.043
1.0858	-11.127	19.251	17.675	13.49
1.1144	-11.017	19.677	17.738	13.926
1.143	-10.904	20.091	17.792	14.351
1.1716	-10.788	20.491	17.84	14.766
1.2002	-10.67	20.88	17.88	15.17
1.2288	-10.55	21.256	17.914	15.564
1.2574	-10.428	21.621	17.942	15.948
1.286	-10.304	21.975	17.964	16.322
1.3146	-10.18	22.319	17.981	16.687
1.3432	-10.054	22.652	17.993	17.043
1.3718	-9.928	22.976	18.001	17.39
1.4004	-9.801	23.29	18.005	17.728
1.429	-9.676	23.59	18.005	18.054

Figure 5: Full table of 31 detailed lens shape point calculations. The bold highlighted rows correspond to the detailed calculations in Tables 2-7.

Table 2: Example Calculation (Lens Point 1)		
This example is for calculating the impedance the first point of the lens characteristic. Equal source voltages are used for the 230 kV (base) line with the sending-end voltage (E_s) leading the receiving-end voltage (E_R) by 120 degrees. See Figures 3 and 4.		
Eq. (6)	$E_S = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 120^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}}$	

	Table 2: Example Calculation (Lens Point 1)
	$E_{S} = \frac{230,000 \ge 120^{\circ} V}{\sqrt{3}}$
	$E_S = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}$
	$E_S = 132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V$
Eq. (7)	$E_R = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 0^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}}$
	$E_R = \frac{230,000 \angle 0^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}}$
	$E_R = 132,791 \ge 0^{\circ} V$
Positive sequ	ence impedance data (with transfer impedance Z_{TR} set to a large value).
Given:	$Z_S = 2 + j10 \Omega \qquad \qquad Z_L = 4 + j20 \Omega \qquad \qquad Z_R = 4 + j20 \Omega$
Given:	$Z_{TR} = Z_L \times 10^{10} \ \Omega$
Total impeda	nce between the generators.
Eq. (8)	$Z_{total} = \frac{(Z_L \times Z_{TR})}{(Z_L + Z_{TR})}$
	$Z_{total} = \frac{\left((4+j20)\ \Omega \times (4+j20) \times 10^{10}\ \Omega\right)}{\left((4+j20)\ \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10}\ \Omega\right)}$
	$Z_{total} = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$
Total system	impedance.
Eq. (9)	$Z_{sys} = Z_S + Z_{total} + Z_R$
	$Z_{sys} = (2 + j10) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega$
	$Z_{sys} = 10 + j50 \ \Omega$
Total system	current from sending-end source.
Eq. (10)	$I_{sys} = \frac{E_s - E_R}{Z_{sys}}$
	$I_{sys} = \frac{132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V - 132,791 \angle 0^{\circ} V}{(10 + j50)\Omega}$
	$I_{sys} = 4,511 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A$
	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is only the current flowing through that nined by using the current divider equation.
Eq. (11)	$I_L = I_{SYS} \times \frac{Z_{TR}}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$

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	Table 2: Example Calculation (Lens Point 1)
	$I_L = 4,511 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A \times \frac{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}{(4+j20) \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}$
	$I_L = 4,511 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A$
-	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is the voltage drop from the sending- rough the sending-end source impedance.
Eq. (12)	$V_S = E_S - \left(Z_S \times I_{sys}\right)$
	$V_{S} = 132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V - [(2 + j10) \Omega \times 4,511 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A]$
	$V_S = 95,757 \angle 106.1^{\circ} V$
The impedan	ce seen by the relay on Z _L .
Eq. (13)	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{V_S}{I_L}$
	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{95,757 \angle 106.1^{\circ} V}{4,511 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A}$
	$Z_{L-Relay} = 17.434 + j12.113 \Omega$

Table 3: Example Calculation (Lens Point 2)

This example is for calculating the impedance second point of the lens characteristic. Unequal source voltages are used for the 230 kV (base) line with the sending-end voltage (E_s) at 70% of the receiving-end voltage (E_R) and leading the receiving-end voltage by 120 degrees. See Figures 3 and 4.

8 -			
Eq. (14)	$E_S = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 120^\circ}{\sqrt{3}} \times 70\%$		
	$E_S = \frac{230,000 \angle 120^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}} \times$	0.70	
	$E_S = 92,953.7 \angle 120^\circ V$		
Eq. (15)	$E_R = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 0^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_R = \frac{230,000 \angle 0^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_R = 132,791 \angle 0^{\circ} V$		
Positive seque	ence impedance data (with	transfer impedance Z _{TR} set	to a large value).
Given:	$Z_S = 2 + j10 \Omega$	$Z_L = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$	$Z_R = 4 + j20 \Omega$
Given:	$Z_{TR} = Z_L \times 10^{10} \Omega$		

	Table 3: Example Calculation (Lens Point 2)
Total impeda	ance between the generators.
Eq. (16)	$Z_{total} = \frac{(Z_L \times Z_{TR})}{(Z_L + Z_{TR})}$
	$Z_{total} = \frac{\left((4+j20)\ \Omega \times (4+j20) \times 10^{10}\ \Omega\right)}{\left((4+j20)\ \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10}\ \Omega\right)}$
	$Z_{total} = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$
Total system	impedance.
Eq. (17)	$Z_{sys} = Z_S + Z_{total} + Z_R$
	$Z_{sys} = (2 + j10) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega$
	$Z_{sys} = 10 + j50 \ \Omega$
Total system	current from sending-end source.
Eq. (18)	$I_{sys} = \frac{E_s - E_R}{Z_{sys}}$
	$I_{sys} = \frac{92,953.7 \angle 120^{\circ} V - 132,791 \angle 0^{\circ} V}{(10 + j50) \Omega}$
	$I_{sys} = 3,854 \angle 77^{\circ} A$
	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is only the current flowing through that nined by using the current divider equation.
Eq. (19)	$I_L = I_{sys} \times \frac{Z_{TR}}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$
	$I_L = 3,854 \angle 77^{\circ} A \times \frac{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}{(4+j20) \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}$
	$I_L = 3,854 \angle 77^\circ A$
-	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is the voltage drop from the sending- prough the sending-end source impedance.
Eq. (20)	$V_S = E_S - \left(Z_S \times I_{sys}\right)$
	$V_{S} = 92,953 \angle 120^{\circ} V - [(2 + j10)\Omega \times 3,854 \angle 77^{\circ} A]$
	$V_S = 65,271 \angle 99^\circ V$
The impedan	ace seen by the relay on Z_L .
Eq. (21)	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{V_S}{I_L}$

Table 3: Example Calculation (Lens Point 2)	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{65,271\angle 99^{\circ} V}{3,854\angle 77^{\circ} A}$
	$Z_{L-Relay} = 15.676 + j6.41 \Omega$

Table 4: Example Calculation (Lens Point 3)

This example is for calculating the impedance third point of the lens characteristic. Unequal source voltages are used for the 230 kV (base) line with the receiving-end voltage (E_R) at 70% of the sending-end voltage (E_S) and the sending-end voltage leading the receiving-end voltage by 120 degrees. See Figures 3 and 4.

, 0	8		
Eq. (22)	$E_S = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 120^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_{S} = \frac{230,000 \angle 120^{\circ} V}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_S = 132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V$		
Eq. (23)	$E_R = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 0^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}} \times 70\%$		
	$E_R = \frac{230,000 \angle 0^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}} \times 0.$	70	
	$E_R = 92,953.7 \angle 0^\circ V$		
Positive seque	ence impedance data (with	transfer impedance Z _{TR} set	to a large value).
Given:	$Z_S = 2 + j10 \ \Omega$	$Z_L = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$	$Z_R = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$
Given:	$Z_{TR} = Z_L \times 10^{10} \ \Omega$		
Total impedat	nce between the generators.		
Eq. (24)	$Z_{total} = \frac{(Z_L \times Z_{TR})}{(Z_L + Z_{TR})}$		
	$Z_{total} = \frac{\left((4+j20)\Omega \times\right.}{\left((4+j20)\Omega +\right.}$	$\frac{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}$	
	$Z_{total} = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$		
Total system impedance.			
Eq. (25)	$Z_{sys} = Z_S + Z_{total} + Z_R$		
	$Z_{sys} = (2 + j10) \Omega + (4)$	$+ j20) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega$	
	$Z_{sys} = 10 + j50 \ \Omega$		
·	•		

1	Table 4: Example Calculation (Lens Point 3)	
Total system	current from sending-end source.	
Eq. (26)	$I_{sys} = \frac{E_S - E_R}{Z_{sys}}$	
	$I_{sys} = \frac{132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V - 92,953.7 \angle 0^{\circ} V}{(10+j50) \Omega}$	
	$I_{sys} = 3,854 \angle 65.5^{\circ} A$	
	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is only the current flowing through that nined by using the current divider equation.	
Eq. (27)	$I_L = I_{SYS} \times \frac{Z_{TR}}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$	
	$I_L = 3,854 \angle 65.5^{\circ} A \times \frac{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}{(4+j20) \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}$	
	$I_L = 3,854 \angle 65.5^{\circ} A$	
U .	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is the voltage drop from the sending- rough the sending-end source impedance.	
Eq. (28)	$V_S = E_S - (Z_S \times I_L)$	
	$V_S = 132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V - [(2+j10) \Omega \times 3,854 \angle 65.5^{\circ} A]$	
	$V_S = 98,265 \angle 110.6^{\circ} V$	
The impedan	ce seen by the relay on Z_L .	
Eq. (29)	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{V_S}{I_L}$	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{98,265 \angle 110.6^{\circ} V}{3,854 \angle 65.5^{\circ} A}$	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = 18.005 + j18.054 \Omega$	

Table 5: Example Calculation (Lens Point 4)

This example is for calculating the impedance fourth point of the lens characteristic. Equal source voltages are used for the 230 kV (base) line with the sending-end voltage (E_s) leading the receiving-end voltage (E_R) by 240 degrees. See Figures 3 and 4.

Eq. (30)	$E_S = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 240^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}}$
	$E_{S} = \frac{230,000 \angle 240^{\circ} V}{\sqrt{3}}$

Table 5: Example Calculation (Lens Point 4)			
	$E_{S} = 132,791 \angle 240^{\circ} V$		
Eq. (31)	$E_R = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 0^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_R = \frac{230,000 \angle 0^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_R = 132,791 \angle 0^\circ V$		
Positive sequ	ence impedance data (with t	transfer impedance Z_{TR} set t	o a large value).
Given:	$Z_S = 2 + j10 \Omega$	$Z_L = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$	$Z_R = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$
Given:	$Z_{TR} = Z_L \times 10^{10} \Omega$		
Total impeda	nce between the generators.		
Eq. (32)	$Z_{total} = \frac{(Z_L \times Z_{TR})}{(Z_L + Z_{TR})}$		
	$Z_{total} = \frac{((4+j20) \Omega \times (4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega)}{((4+j20) \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega)}$		
	$Z_{total} = 4 + j20 \Omega$		
Total system	impedance.		
Eq. (33)	$Z_{sys} = Z_S + Z_{total} + Z_R$		
	$Z_{sys} = (2 + j10) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega$		
	$Z_{sys} = 10 + j50 \ \Omega$		
Total system	current from sending-end so	ource.	
Eq. (34)	$I_{sys} = \frac{E_s - E_R}{Z_{sys}}$		
	$I_{sys} = \frac{132,791 \angle 240^{\circ} V - 132,791 \angle 0^{\circ} V}{(10 + j50)\Omega}$		
	$I_{sys} = 4,511 \angle 131.3^{\circ} A$		
The current, as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is only the current flowing through that line as determined by using the current divider equation.			
Eq. (35)	$I_L = I_{sys} \times \frac{Z_{TR}}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$		
	$I_L = 4,511 \angle 131.1^\circ A \times \frac{1}{(A)}$	$\frac{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}{4+j20) \Omega + (4+j20) \times}$	$10^{10} \Omega$
	$I_L = 4,511 \angle 131.1^\circ A$		

Table 5: Example Calculation (Lens Point 4)

The voltage, as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is the voltage drop from the sendingend source through the sending-end source impedance.

end source into agn the source impedance.		
Eq. (36)	$V_S = E_S - (Z_S \times I_L)$	
	$V_S = 132,791 \angle 240^{\circ} V - [(2 + j10) \Omega \times 4,511 \angle 131.1^{\circ} A]$	
	$V_S = 95,756 \angle -106.1^{\circ} V$	
The impedance	ce seen by the relay on Z_L .	
Eq. (37)	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{V_S}{I_L}$	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{95,756\angle -106.1^{\circ}V}{4,511\angle 131.1^{\circ}A}$	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = -11.434 + j17.887 \Omega$	

Table 6: Example Calculation (Lens Point 5)

This example is for calculating the impedance fifth point of the lens characteristic. Unequal source voltages are used for the 230 kV (base) line with the sending-end voltage (E_S) at 70% of the receiving-end voltage (E_R) and leading the receiving-end voltage by 240 degrees. See Figures 3 and 4.

Eq. (38)	$E_S = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 240^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}} \times 70\%$		
	$E_S = \frac{230,000 \angle 240^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}} \times$	0.70	
	$E_S = 92,953.7 \angle 240^\circ V$		
Eq. (39)	$E_R = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 0^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_R = \frac{230,000 \angle 0^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_R = 132,791 \angle 0^{\circ} V$		
Positive seque	ence impedance data (with	transfer impedance Z_{TR} set	to a large value).
Given:	$Z_S = 2 + j10 \ \Omega$	$Z_L = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$	$Z_R = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$
Given:	$Z_{TR} = Z_L \times 10^{10} \Omega$		
Total impedance between the generators.			
Eq. (40)	$Z_{total} = \frac{(Z_L \times Z_{TR})}{(Z_L + Z_{TR})}$		

Table 6: Example Calculation (Lens Point 5)		
	$Z_{total} = \frac{\left((4+j20)\ \Omega \times (4+j20) \times 10^{10}\ \Omega\right)}{\left((4+j20)\ \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10}\ \Omega\right)}$	
	$Z_{total} = 4 + j20 \Omega$	
Total system	impedance.	
Eq. (41)	$Z_{sys} = Z_S + Z_{total} + Z_R$	
	$Z_{sys} = (2 + j10 \Omega) + (4 + j20 \Omega) + (4 + j20 \Omega)$	
	$Z_{sys} = 10 + j50 \ \Omega$	
Total system	current from sending-end source.	
Eq. (42)	$I_{sys} = \frac{E_s - E_R}{Z_{sys}}$	
	$I_{sys} = \frac{92,953.7 \angle 240^{\circ} V - 132,791 \angle 0^{\circ} V}{10 + j50 \ \Omega}$	
	$I_{sys} = 3,854 \angle 125.5^{\circ} A$	
	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is only the current flowing through that nined by using the current divider equation.	
Eq. (43)	$I_L = I_{sys} \times \frac{Z_{TR}}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$	
	$I_L = 3,854 \angle 125.5^{\circ} A \times \frac{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}{(4+j20) \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}$	
	$I_L = 3,854 \angle 125.5^{\circ} A$	
	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is the voltage drop from the sending- rough the sending-end source impedance.	
Eq. (44)	$V_S = E_S - (Z_S \times I_L)$	
	$V_S = 92,953.7 \angle 240^{\circ} V - [(2+j10) \Omega \times 3,854 \angle 125.5^{\circ} A]$	
	$V_S = 65,270.5 \angle -99.4^{\circ} V$	
The impedance seen by the relay on Z_L .		
Eq. (45)	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{V_S}{I_L}$	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{65,270.5\angle -99.4^{\circ}V}{3,854\angle 125.5^{\circ}A}$	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = -12.005 + j11.946 \Omega$	

Table 7: Example Calculation (Lens Point 6)

This example is for calculating the impedance sixth point of the lens characteristic. Unequal source voltages are used for the 230 kV (base) line with the receiving-end voltage (E_R) at 70% of the sending-end voltage (E_S) and the sending-end voltage leading the receiving-end voltage by 240 degrees. See Figures 3 and 4.

Eq. (46)	$E_S = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 240^\circ}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_{S} = \frac{230,000 \angle 240^{\circ} V}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_S = 132,791 \angle 240^\circ V$		
Eq. (47)	$E_R = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 0^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}} \times 70\%$		
	$E_R = \frac{230,000 \angle 0^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}} \times 0.$	70	
	$E_R = 92,953.7 \angle 0^\circ V$		
Positive sequ	ence impedance data (with	transfer impedance Z _{TR} set	to a large value).
Given:	$Z_S = 2 + j10 \ \Omega$	$Z_L = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$	$Z_R = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$
Given:	$Z_{TR} = Z_L \times 10^{10} \ \Omega$		
Total impeda	nce between the generators.		
Eq. (48)	$Z_{total} = \frac{(Z_L \times Z_{TR})}{(Z_L + Z_{TR})}$		
	$Z_{total} = \frac{\left((4+j20)\ \Omega \times (4+j20) \times 10^{10}\ \Omega\right)}{\left((4+j20)\ \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10}\ \Omega\right)}$		
	$Z_{total} = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$		
Total system	impedance.		
Eq. (49)	$Z_{sys} = Z_S + Z_{total} + Z_R$		
	$Z_{sys} = (2 + j10) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega$		
	$Z_{sys} = 10 + j50 \ \Omega$		
Total system current from sending-end source.			
Eq. (50)	$I_{sys} = \frac{E_s - E_R}{Z_{sys}}$		
	_ 132,791∠240° <i>V</i>	– 92,953.7∠0° V	
	$I_{sys} =$	50 Ω	
	$I_{sys} = 3,854 \angle 137.1^{\circ} A$		

l	Table 7: Example Calculation (Lens Point 6)		
	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is only the current flowing through that nined by using the current divider equation.		
Eq. (51)	$I_L = I_{sys} \times \frac{Z_{TR}}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$		
	$I_L = 3,854 \angle 137.1^{\circ} A \times \frac{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}{(4+j20) \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}$		
	$I_L = 3,854 \angle 137.1^\circ A$		
•	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is the voltage drop from the sending- rough the sending-end source impedance.		
Eq. (52)	$V_S = E_S - (Z_S \times I_L)$		
	$V_S = 132,791 \angle 240^{\circ} V - [(2 + j10) \Omega \times 3,854 \angle 137.1^{\circ} A]$		
	$V_S = 98,265 \angle -110.6^{\circ} V$		
The impedant	ce seen by the relay on Z_L .		
Eq. (53)	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{V_S}{I_L}$		
	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{98,265 \angle -110.6^{\circ} V}{3,854 \angle 137.1^{\circ} A}$		
	$Z_{L-Relay} = -9.676 + j23.59 \Omega$		





Figure 6: Reduced two bus system with sending-end source impedance Z_s , receiving-end source impedance Z_R , line impedance Z_L , and parallel transfer impedance Z_{TR} .








Figure 8: A strong-source system with a line impedance of $Z_L = 20.4$ ohms (i.e., the thicker red line). This mho element characteristic (i.e., the blue circle) does not meet the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A because it is not completely contained within the unstable power swing region (i.e., the orange characteristic).

Figure 8 above represents a heavily-loaded system with all generation in service and all transmission BES Elements in their normal operating state. The mho element characteristic (set at 137% of Z_L) extends into the unstable power swing region (i.e., the orange characteristic). Using the strongest source system is more conservative because it shrinks the unstable power swing region, bringing it closer to the mho element characteristic. This figure also graphically represents the effect of a system strengthening over time and this is the reason for re-evaluation if the relay has not been evaluated in the last five calendar years. Figure 9 below depicts a relay that meets the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A. Figure 8 depicts the same relay with the same setting five years later, where each source has strengthened by about 10% and now the same mho element characteristic does not meet Criterion A.




Figure 9: A weak-source system with a line impedance of $Z_L = 20.4$ ohms (i.e., the thicker red line). This mho element characteristic (i.e., the blue circle) meets the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A because it is completely contained within the unstable power swing region (i.e., the orange characteristic).

Figure 9 above represents a lightly-loaded system, using a minimum generation profile. The mho element characteristic (set at 137% of Z_L) does not extend into the unstable power swing region (i.e., the orange characteristic). Using a weaker source system expands the unstable power swing region away from the mho element characteristic.




Figure 10: This is an example of an unstable power swing region (i.e., the orange characteristic) with the parallel transfer impedance removed. This relay mho element characteristic (i.e., the blue circle) does not meet PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A because it is not completely contained within the unstable power swing region.


Table 8: Example Calcu	ulation (Parallel Transf	fer Impedance Removed)
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Calculations for the point at 120 degrees with equal source impedances. The total system current equals the line current. See Figure 10.

Eq. (54)	$E_S = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 120^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}}$
	$E_{S} = \frac{230,000 \angle 120^{\circ} V}{\sqrt{3}}$
	$E_S = 132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V$

Table	8: Example Calculation	(Parallel Transfer Impe	edance Removed)
Eq. (55)	$E_R = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 0^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	¹ √3		
	$E_R = \frac{230,000 \angle 0^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_R = 132,791 \angle 0^\circ V$		
Given impeda	ance data.		
Given:	$Z_S = 2 + j10 \ \Omega$	$Z_L = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$	$Z_R = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$
Given:	$Z_{TR} = Z_L \times 10^{10} \ \Omega$		
Total impeda	nce between the generators.		
Eq. (56)	$Z_{total} = \frac{(Z_L \times Z_{TR})}{(Z_L + Z_{TR})}$		
	$Z_{total} = \frac{((4+j20) \ \Omega \times (0))}{((4+j20) \ \Omega + (0))}$	$\frac{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}$	
	$Z_{total} = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$		
Total system	impedance.		
Eq. (57)	$Z_{sys} = Z_S + Z_{total} + Z_R$		
	$Z_{sys} = (2 + j10) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega$		
	$Z_{sys} = 10 + j50 \ \Omega$		
Total system	current from sending-end sc	ource.	
Eq. (58)	$I_{sys} = \frac{E_s - E_R}{Z_{sys}}$		
	132,791∠120° <i>V</i> -		
	$I_{sys} = \frac{1}{10 + j50 \Omega}$		
	$I_{sys} = 4,511 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A$		
The current, as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is only the current flowing through that line as determined by using the current divider equation.			
Eq. (59)	$I_L = I_{sys} \times \frac{Z_{TR}}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$		
	$I_L = 4,511 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A \times \frac{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}{(4+j20) \Omega + (4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega}$		
	$I_L = 4,511 \angle 71.3^\circ A$		

Table	Table 8: Example Calculation (Parallel Transfer Impedance Removed)	
-	as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is the voltage drop from the sending- rough the sending-end source impedance.	
Eq. (60)	$V_S = E_S - \left(Z_S \times I_{sys}\right)$	
	$V_S = 132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V - [(2 + j10 \ \Omega) \times 4,511 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A]$	
	$V_S = 95,757 \angle 106.1^{\circ} V$	
The impedance	ce seen by the relay on Z_L .	
Eq. (61)	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{V_S}{I_L}$	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{95,757 \angle 106.1^{\circ} V}{4,511 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A}$	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = 17.434 + j12.113 \Omega$	



completely contained within the unstable power swing region. Including the parallel transfer impedance in the calculation is not allowed by the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A.

In Figure 11 above, the parallel transfer impedance is 5 times the line impedance. The unstable power swing region has expanded out beyond the mho element characteristic due to the infeed effect from the parallel current through the parallel transfer impedance, thus allowing the mho element characteristic to appear to meet the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A. Including the parallel transfer impedance in the calculation is not allowed by the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A.

Table 9: Example	Calculation (Parallel Transfer I	mpedance Included)
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Calculations for the point at 120 degrees with equal source impedances. The total system current does not equal the line current. See Figure 11.

1	a the fine current. See Figure 11.		
Eq. (62)	$E_S = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 120^\circ}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_{S} = \frac{230,000 \angle 120^{\circ} V}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_S = 132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V$		
Eq. (63)	$E_R = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 0^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_R = \frac{230,000 \angle 0^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}}$		
	$E_R = 132,791 \angle 0^{\circ} V$		
Given impeda	ance data.		
Given:	$Z_S = 2 + j10 \Omega \qquad \qquad Z_L = 4 + j20 \Omega \qquad \qquad Z_R = 4 + j20 \Omega$		
Given:	$Z_{TR} = Z_L \times 5$		
	$Z_{TR} = (4 + j20) \Omega \times 5$		
	$Z_{TR} = 20 + j100 \ \Omega$		
Total impeda	nce between the generators.		
Eq. (64)	$Z_{total} = \frac{(Z_L \times Z_{TR})}{(Z_L + Z_{TR})}$		
	$Z_{total} = \frac{(4+j20) \Omega \times (20+j100) \Omega}{(4+j20) \Omega + (20+j100) \Omega}$		
	$Z_{total} = 3.333 + j16.667 \Omega$		
Total system	impedance.		
Eq. (65)	$Z_{sys} = Z_S + Z_{total} + Z_R$		
	$Z_{sys} = (2 + j10) \Omega + (3.333 + j16.667) \Omega + (4 + j20) \Omega$		
	$Z_{sys} = 9.333 + j46.667 \Omega$		
Total system current from sending-end source.			
Eq. (66)	$I_{Sys} = \frac{E_S - E_R}{Z_{Sys}}$		
	$I_{sys} = \frac{132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V - 132,791 \angle 0^{\circ} V}{9.333 + j46.667 \Omega}$		


Table 9: Example Calculation (Parallel Transfer Impedance Included)		
	$I_{sys} = 4,833 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A$	
The current, as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is only the current flowing through that line as determined by using the current divider equation.		
Eq. (67)	$I_L = I_{sys} \times \frac{Z_{TR}}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$	
	$I_L = 4,833 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A \times \frac{(20 + j100) \Omega}{(4 + j20) \Omega + (20 + j100) \Omega}$	
	$I_L = 4,027.4 \angle 71.3^\circ A$	
The voltage, as measured by the relay on Z_L (Figure 3), is the voltage drop from the sending- end source through the sending-end source impedance.		
Eq. (68)	$V_S = E_S - \left(Z_S \times I_{sys}\right)$	
	$V_{S} = 132,791 \angle 120^{\circ} V - [(2 + j10 \Omega) \times 4,833 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A]$	
	$V_S = 93,417 \angle 104.7^{\circ} V$	
The impedance seen by the relay on Z _L .		
Eq. (69)	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{V_S}{I_L}$	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = \frac{93,417 \angle 104.7^{\circ} V}{4,027 \angle 71.3^{\circ} A}$	
	$Z_{L-Relay} = 19.366 + j12.767 \Omega$	

Table 10: Percent Increase of a Lens Due To Parallel Transfer Impedance.

The following demonstrates the percent size increase of the lens characteristic for Z_{TR} in multiples of Z_L with the parallel transfer impedance included.

Z_{TR} in multiples of Z_L	Percent increase of lens with equal EMF sources (Infinite source as reference)
Infinite	N/A
1000	0.05%
100	0.46%
10	4.63%
5	9.27%
2	23.26%
1	46.76%
0.5	94.14%
0.25	189.56%

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


Figure 12: The tripping portion of the mho element characteristic (i.e., the blue circle) not blocked by load encroachment (i.e., the parallel green lines) is completely contained within the unstable power swing region (i.e., the orange characteristic). Therefore, the mho element characteristic meets the PRC-026-2– Attachment B, Criterion A.






Figure 13: The infeed diagram shows the impedance in front of the relay R with the parallel transfer impedance included. As the parallel transfer impedance approaches infinity, the impedances seen by the relay R in the forward direction becomes $Z_L + Z_R$.

Table 11: Calculations (System Apparent Impedance in the forward direction)

The following equations are provided for calculating the apparent impedance back to the E_R source voltage as seen by relay R. Infeed equations from V_S to source E_R where $E_R = 0$. See Figure 13.

•				
Eq. (70)	$I_L = \frac{V_S - V_R}{Z_L}$			
Eq. (71)	$I_{sys} = \frac{V_R - E_R}{Z_R}$			
Eq. (72)	$I_{sys} = I_L + I_{TR}$			
Eq. (73)	$I_{sys} = \frac{V_R}{Z_R}$ Since $E_R = 0$ Rearranged: $V_R = I_{sys} \times Z_R$			
Eq. (74)	$I_L = \frac{V_S - I_{SYS} \times Z_R}{Z_L}$			
Eq. (75)	$I_L = \frac{V_S - \left[(I_L + I_{TR}) \times Z_R \right]}{Z_L}$			
Eq. (76)	$V_S = (I_L \times Z_L) + (I_L \times Z_R) + (I_{TR} \times Z_R)$			
Eq. (77)	$Z_{Relay} = \frac{V_S}{I_L} = Z_L + Z_R + \frac{I_{TR} \times Z_R}{I_L} = Z_L + Z_R \times \left(1 + \frac{I_{TR}}{I_L}\right)$			
Eq. (78)	$I_{TR} = I_{sys} \times \frac{Z_L}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$			
Eq. (79)	$I_L = I_{SYS} \times \frac{Z_{TR}}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$			

PRC-026-2 — Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings

Table 11: Calculations (System Apparent Impedance in the forward direction)				
Eq. (80)	$\frac{I_{TR}}{I_L} = \frac{Z_L}{Z_{TR}}$			
The infeed equations shows the impedance in front of the relay R (Figure 13) with the parallel transfer impedance included. As the parallel transfer impedance approaches infinity, the impedances seen by the relay R in the forward direction becomes $Z_L + Z_R$.				
Eq. (81)	$Z_{Relay} = Z_L + Z_R \times \left(1 + \frac{Z_L}{Z_{TR}}\right)$			




Figure 14: The infeed diagram shows the impedance behind relay R with the parallel transfer impedance included. As the parallel transfer impedance approaches infinity, the impedances seen by the relay R in the reverse direction becomes Z_S .

Table 12: Calculations (System Apparent Impedance in the Reverse Direction)


The following equations are provided for calculating the apparent impedance back to the E_S source voltage as seen by relay R. Infeed equations from V_R back to source E_S where $E_S = 0$. See Figure 14.

~~~~	
Eq. (82)	$I_L = \frac{V_R - V_S}{Z_L}$
Eq. (83)	$I_{sys} = \frac{V_S - E_S}{Z_S}$
Eq. (84)	$I_{sys} = I_L + I_{TR}$
Eq. (85)	$I_{sys} = \frac{V_S}{Z_S}$ Since $E_s = 0$ Rearranged: $V_S = I_{sys} \times Z_S$
Eq. (86)	$I_L = \frac{V_R - I_{SYS} \times Z_S}{Z_L}$

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PRC-026-2 — R	Relay Performance	<b>During Stable</b>	<b>Power Swings</b>

Table 12: Calculations (System Apparent Impedance in the Reverse Direction)				
Eq. (87)	$I_L = \frac{V_R - \left[ (I_L + I_{TR}) \times Z_S \right]}{Z_L}$			
Eq. (88)	$V_R = (I_L \times Z_L) + (I_L \times Z_S) + (I_{TH})$	$_R \times Z_{RS}$ )		
Eq. (89)	$Z_{Relay} = \frac{V_R}{I_L} = Z_L + Z_S + \frac{I_{TR} \times Z}{I_L}$	$Z_{Relay} = \frac{V_R}{I_L} = Z_L + Z_S + \frac{I_{TR} \times Z_S}{I_L} = Z_L + Z_S \times \left(1 + \frac{I_{TR}}{I_L}\right)$		
Eq. (90)	$I_{TR} = I_{SYS} \times \frac{Z_L}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$			
Eq. (91)	$I_L = I_{SYS} \times \frac{Z_{TR}}{Z_L + Z_{TR}}$			
Eq. (92)	$\frac{I_{TR}}{I_L} = \frac{Z_L}{Z_{TR}}$			
The infeed equations shows the impedance behind relay R (Figure 14) with the parallel transfer impedance included. As the parallel transfer impedance approaches infinity, the impedances seen by the relay R in the reverse direction becomes $Z_s$ .				
Eq. (93)	$Z_{Relay} = Z_L + Z_S \times \left(1 + \frac{Z_L}{Z_{TR}}\right)$	As seen by relay R at the receiving-end of the line.		
Eq. (94)	$Z_{Relay} = Z_S \times \left(1 + \frac{Z_L}{Z_{TR}}\right)$	Subtract $Z_L$ for relay R impedance as seen at sending-end of the line.		



**Figure 15:** Out-of-step trip (OST) inner blinder (i.e., the parallel green lines) meets the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A because the inner OST blinder initiates tripping either On-The-Way-In or On-The-Way-Out. Since the inner blinder is completely contained within the unstable power swing region (i.e., the orange characteristic), it meets the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A.

### Table 13: Example Calculation (Voltage Ratios)


These calculations are based on the loss-of-synchronism characteristics for the cases of N < 1 and N > 1 as found in the *Application of Out-of-Step Blocking and Tripping Relays*, GER-3180, p. 12, Figure 3.¹⁷ The GE illustration shows the formulae used to calculate the radius and center of the circles that make up the ends of the portion of the lens.

Voltage ratio equations, source impedance equation with infeed formulae applied, and circle equations.

-				
Given:	$E_S = 0.7$ $E$	$T_{R} = 1.0$		
Eq. (95)	$N = \frac{ E_S }{ E_R } = \frac{0.7}{1.0} = 0.7$			
The total syst	tem impedance as seen by the relay wit	h infeed form	nulae applied.	
Given:	$Z_S = 2 + j10 \ \Omega \qquad \qquad Z_L = 4 + j2$	0 Ω	$Z_R = 4 + j20 \ \Omega$	
Given:	$Z_{TR} = Z_L \times 10^{10} \ \Omega$			
	$Z_{TR} = (4 + j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega$			
Eq. (96)	$Z_{SYS} = Z_S \times \left(1 + \frac{Z_L}{Z_{TR}}\right) + \left[Z_L + Z_R \times \left(1 + \frac{Z_L}{Z_{TR}}\right)\right]$			
	$Z_{sys} = 10 + j50 \ \Omega$			
The calculate	ed coordinates of the lower loss-of-sync	hronism circ	ele center.	
Eq. (97)	$Z_{C1} = -\left[Z_S \times \left(1 + \frac{Z_L}{Z_{TR}}\right)\right] - \left[\frac{N^2 \times Z_{SYS}}{1 - N^2}\right]$			
	$Z_{C1} = -\left[ (2+j10) \Omega \times \left( 1 + \frac{(4+j20) \Omega}{(4+j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega} \right) \right] - \left[ \frac{0.7^2 \times (10+j50) \Omega}{1-0.7^2} \right]$			
	$Z_{C1} = -11.608 - j58.039 \Omega$			
The calculate	The calculated radius of the lower loss-of-synchronism circle.			
Eq. (98)	$r_a = \left  \frac{N \times Z_{sys}}{1 - N^2} \right $			
	$r_a = \left  \frac{0.7 \times (10 + j50) \Omega}{1 - 0.7^2} \right $			
	$r_a = 69.987 \Omega$			
The calculate	The calculated coordinates of the upper loss-of-synchronism circle center.			
Given:	$E_{S} = 1.0$	$E_R=0.$	7	


¹⁷ http://store.gedigitalenergy.com/faq/Documents/Alps/GER-3180.pdf

	Table 13: Example Calculation (Voltage Ratios)			
Eq. (99)	$N = \frac{ E_S }{ E_R } = \frac{1.0}{0.7} = 1.43$			
Eq. (100)	$Z_{C2} = Z_L + \left[ Z_R \times \left( 1 + \frac{Z_L}{Z_{TR}} \right) \right] + \left[ \frac{Z_{Sys}}{N^2 - 1} \right]$			
	$Z_{C2} = 4 + j20 \Omega + \left[ (4 + j20) \Omega \times \left( 1 + \frac{(4 + j20) \Omega}{(4 + j20) \times 10^{10} \Omega} \right) \right] + \left[ \frac{(10 + j50) \Omega}{1.43^2 - 1} \right]$			
	$Z_{C2} = 17.608 + j88.039 \Omega$			
The calculate	The calculated radius of the upper loss-of-synchronism circle.			
Eq. (101)	$r_b = \left  \frac{N \times Z_{sys}}{N^2 - 1} \right $			
	$r_b = \left  \frac{1.43 \times (10 + j50) \Omega}{1.43^2 - 1} \right $			
	$r_b = 69.987 \Omega$			




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









Calculate the angle step size for the desired number of points.




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




calculations in Tables 2-7). 2) Calculate the distance between the two upper circle points identified in Step 1. 3) Calculate the angle of arc that connects the two upper circle points identified in Step 1.


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**Figure 15g:** Upper circle loss-of-synchronism region showing the steps to calculate the start angle, end angle, and the angle step size for the desired number of calculated points. 1) Calculate the system angle. 2) Calculate the start angle. 3) Calculate the end angle. 4) Calculate the angle step size for the desired number of points.





coordinates of the points on the circle. 1) Start at the intersection with the lens shape and proceed in a clockwise direction. 2) Advance the step angle for each point. 3) Calculate the new angle after step advancement. 4) Calculate the R-X coordinates.

Lower Loss	Lower Loss of Synchronism			Upper Loss of Synchronism		
Circle C	Circle Coordinates			Circle Coordinates		
Angle				Angle		
(degrees)	R	+ jX		(degrees)	R	+ jX
67.055	15.676	6.41		67.055	-9.676	23.59
55.831	27.699	-0.134		55.831	-21.699	30.134
44.606	38.219	-8.892		44.606	-32.219	38.892
33.382	46.832	-19.531		33.382	40.832	49.531
22.158	53.21	-31.643		22.158	-47.21	61.643
10.933	57.108	-44.765		10.933	-51.108	74.765
359.709	58.378	-58.395		359.709	-52.378	88.395
348.485	56.97	-72.011		348.485	-50.97	102.011
337.26	52.939	-85.092		337.26	-46.939	115.092
326.036	46.438	-97.139		326.036	-40.438	127.139
314.812	37.717	-107.69		314.812	-31.717	137.69
303.587	27.109	-116.341		303.587	-21.109	146.341
292.363	15.02	-122.762		292.363	-9.02	152.762
281.139	1.913	-126.707		281.139	4.087	156.707
269.914	-11.712	-128.026		269.914	17.712	158.026
258.69	-25.333	-126.667		258.69	31.333	156.667
247.466	-38.429	-122.682		247.466	44.429	152.682
236.241	-50.499	-116.225		236.241	56.499	146.225
225.017	-61.081	-107.542		225.017	67.081	137.542
213.793	-69.771	-96.965		213.793	75.771	126.965
202.568	-76.235	-84.899	[	202.568	82.235	114.899
191.344	-80.227	-71.806	[	191.344	86.227	101.806
180.12	-81.594	-58.185	[	180.12	87.594	88.185
168.895	-80.284	-44.56		168.895	86.284	74.56
157.671	-76.347	-31.45		157.671	82.347	61.45
146.447	-69.933	-19.357		146.447	75.933	49.357
135.222	-61.288	-8.744		135.222	67.288	38.744
123.998	-50.742	-0.016		123.998	56.742	30.016
112.774	-38.699	6.491		112.774	44.699	23.509
101.549	-25.62	10.53		101.549	31.62	19.47
90.325	-12.005	11.946		90.325	18.005	18.054

**Figure 15i:** Full tables of calculated lower and upper loss-of-synchronism circle coordinates. The highlighted row is the detailed calculated points in Figures 15d and 15h.

## **Application Specific to Criterion B**

The PRC-026-2– Attachment B, Criterion B evaluates overcurrent elements used for tripping. The same criteria as PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A is used except for an additional criterion (No. 4) that calculates a current magnitude based upon generator internal voltage of 1.05 per unit. A value of 1.05 per unit generator voltage is used to establish a minimum pickup current value for overcurrent relays that have a time delay less than 15 cycles. The sending-end and receiving-end voltages are established at 1.05 per unit at 120 degree system separation angle. The 1.05 per unit is the typical upper end of the operating voltage, which is also consistent with the maximum power

transfer calculation using actual system source impedances in the PRC-023 NERC Reliability Standard. The formulas used to calculate the current are in Table 14 below.

#### Table 14: Example Calculation (Overcurrent)

This example is for a 230 kV line terminal with a directional instantaneous phase overcurrent element set to 50 amps secondary times a CT ratio of 160:1 that equals 8,000 amps, primary. The following calculation is where  $V_S$  equals the base line-to-ground sending-end generator source voltage times 1.05 at an angle of 120 degrees,  $V_R$  equals the base line-to-ground receiving-end generator internal voltage times 1.05 at an angle of 0 degrees, and  $Z_{sys}$  equals the sum of the sending-end source, line, and receiving-end source impedances in ohms.


Here, the instantaneous phase setting of 8,000 amps is greater than the calculated system current of 5,716 amps; therefore, it meets PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion B.

Eq. (102)	$V_S = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 120^\circ}{\sqrt{3}} \times 1.05$			
	$V_S = \frac{230,000 \angle 120^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}} \times$	1.05		
	$V_S = 139,430 \angle 120^{\circ} V$			
Receiving-en	d generator terminal voltage	2.		
Eq. (103)	$V_R = \frac{V_{LL} \angle 0^{\circ}}{\sqrt{3}} \times 1.05$			
	$V_R = \frac{230,000 \angle 0^\circ V}{\sqrt{3}} \times 1.05$			
	$V_R = 139,430 \angle 0^\circ V$			
-	edance of the system $(Z_{sys})$ edance of the line $(Z_L)$ , and	-	ding-end source impedance $Z_R$ ) in ohms.	
Given:	$Z_S = 3 + j26 \Omega$	$Z_L = 1.3 + j8.7 \ \Omega$	$Z_R = 0.3 + j7.3 \Omega$	
Eq. (104)	$Z_{sys} = Z_S + Z_L + Z_R$			
	$Z_{sys} = (3 + j26) \Omega + (1.3 + j8.7) \Omega + (0.3 + j7.3) \Omega$			
	$Z_{sys} = 4.6 + j42 \Omega$			
Total system current.				
Eq. (105)	$I_{sys} = \frac{(V_S - V_R)}{Z_{sys}}$			
	$I_{sys} = \frac{(139,430 \angle 120^{\circ} V - 139,430 \angle 0^{\circ} V)}{(4.6 + j42) \Omega}$			
	$I_{sys} = 5,715.82 \angle 66.25^{\circ}$	A		

### **Application Specific to Three-Terminal Lines**


If a three-terminal line is identified as an Element that is susceptible to a power swing based on Requirement R1, the load-responsive protective relays at each end of the three-terminal line must be evaluated.

As shown in Figure 15j, the source impedances at each end of the line can be obtained from the similar short circuit calculation as for the two-terminal line (assuming the parallel transfer impedances are ignored).



**Figure 15j:** Three-terminal line. To evaluate the load-responsive protective relays on the threeterminal line at Terminal A, the circuit in Figure 15j is first reduced to the equivalent circuit shown in Figure 15k. The evaluation process for the load-responsive protective relays on the line at Terminal A will now be the same as that of the two-terminal line.





### **Application to Generation Elements**

As with transmission BES Elements, the determination of the apparent impedance seen at an Element located at, or near, a generation Facility is complex for power swings due to various interdependent quantities. These variances in quantities are caused by changes in machine internal voltage, speed governor action, voltage regulator action, the reaction of other local generators, and the reaction of other interconnected transmission BES Elements as the event progresses through the time domain. Though transient stability simulations may be used to determine the apparent impedance for verifying load-responsive relay settings, ^{18,19} Requirement R2, PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criteria A and B provides a simplified method for evaluating the load-responsive protective relay's susceptibility to tripping in response to a stable power swing without requiring stability simulations.

In general, the electrical center will be in the transmission system for cases where the generator is connected through a weak transmission system (high external impedance). In other cases where the generator is connected through a strong transmission system, the electrical center could be inside the unit connected zone.²⁰ In either case, load-responsive protective relays connected at the generator terminals or at the high-voltage side of the generator step-up (GSU) transformer may be challenged by power swings. Relays that may be challenged by power swings will be determined by the Planning Coordinator in Requirement R1 or by the Generator Owner after becoming aware of a generator, transformer, or transmission line BES Element that tripped²¹ in response to a stable or unstable power swing due to the operation of its protective relay(s) in Requirement R2.

¹⁸ Donald Reimert, Protective Relaying for Power Generation Systems, Boca Raton, FL, CRC Press, 2006.

¹⁹ Prabha Kundur, *Power System Stability and Control*, EPRI, McGraw Hill, Inc., 1994.


²⁰ Ibid, Kundur.

²¹ See Guidelines and Technical Basis section, "Becoming Aware of an Element That Tripped in Response to a Power Swing,"

Voltage controlled time-overcurrent and voltage-restrained time-overcurrent relays are excluded from this standard. When these relays are set based on equipment permissible overload capability, their operating times are much greater than 15 cycles for the current levels observed during a power swing.

Instantaneous overcurrent, time-overcurrent, and definite-time overcurrent relays with a time delay of less than 15 cycles for the current levels observed during a power swing are applicable and are required to be evaluated for identified Elements.

The generator loss-of-field protective function is provided by impedance relay(s) connected at the generator terminals. The settings are applied to protect the generator from a partial or complete loss of excitation under all generator loading conditions and, at the same time, be immune to tripping on stable power swings. It is more likely that the loss-of-field relay would operate during a power swing when the automatic voltage regulator (AVR) is in manual mode rather than when in automatic mode.²² Figure 16 illustrates the loss-of-field relay in the R-X plot, which typically includes up to three zones of protection.



²² John Burdy, Loss-of-excitation Protection for Synchronous Generators GER-3183, General Electric Company.

Loss-of-field characteristic 40-1 has a wider impedance characteristic (positive offset) than characteristic 40-2 or characteristic 40-3 and provides additional generator protection for a partial loss of field or a loss of field under low load (less than 10% of rated). The tripping logic of this protection scheme is established by a directional contact, a voltage setpoint, and a time delay. The voltage and time delay add security to the relay operation for stable power swings. Characteristic 40-3 is less sensitive to power swings than characteristic 40-2 and is set outside the generator capability curve in the leading direction. Regardless of the relay impedance setting, PRC-019²³ requires that the "in-service limiters operate before Protection Systems to avoid unnecessary trip" and "in-service Protection System devices are set to isolate or de-energize equipment in order to limit the extent of damage when operating conditions exceed equipment capabilities or stability limits." Time delays for tripping associated with loss-of-field relays^{24,25} have a range from 15 cycles for characteristic 40-2 to 60 cycles for characteristic 40-1 to minimize tripping during stable power swings. In PRC-026-2, 15 cycles establishes a threshold for applicability; however, it is the responsibility of the Generator Owner to establish settings that provide security against stable power swings and, at the same time, dependable protection for the generator.

The simple two-machine system circuit (method also used in the Application to Transmission Elements section) is used to analyze the effect of a power swing at a generator facility for load-responsive relays. In this section, the calculation method is used for calculating the impedance seen by the relay connected at a point in the circuit.²⁶ The electrical quantities used to determine the apparent impedance plot using this method are generator saturated transient reactance ( $X'_d$ ), GSU transformer impedance ( $X_{GSU}$ ), transmission line impedance ( $Z_L$ ), and the system equivalent ( $Z_e$ ) at the point of interconnection. All impedance values are known to the Generator Owner except for the system equivalent. The system equivalent is obtainable from the Transmission Owner. The sending-end and receiving-end source voltages are varied from 0.0 to 1.0 per unit to form the lens shape portion of the unstable power swing region. The voltage range of 0.7 to 1.0 results in a ratio range from 0.7 to 1.43. This ratio range is used to form the lower and upper loss-of-synchronism circle shapes of the unstable power swing region. A system separation angle of 120 degrees is used in accordance with PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria for each load-responsive protective relay evaluation.

Table 15 below is an example calculation of the apparent impedance locus method based on Figures 17 and 18.²⁷ In this example, the generator is connected to the 345 kV transmission system through the GSU transformer and has the listed ratings. Note that the load-responsive protective relays in this example may have ownership with the Generator Owner or the Transmission Owner.

²³ Coordination of Generating Unit or Plant Capabilities, Voltage Regulating Controls, and Protection

²⁴ Ibid, Burdy.

²⁵ Applied Protective Relaying, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1979.

²⁶ Edward Wilson Kimbark, *Power System Stability, Volume II: Power Circuit Breakers and Protective Relays*, Published by John Wiley and Sons, 1950.

²⁷ Ibid, Kimbark.




Table15: Example Data (Generator)				
Input Descriptions	Input Values			
Synchronous Generator nameplate (MVA)	940 MVA			
Saturated transient reactance (940 MVA base)	$X'_{d} = 0.3845$ per unit			
Generator rated voltage (Line-to-Line)	20 kV			
Generator step-up (GSU) transformer rating	880 MVA			
GSU transformer reactance (880 MVA base)	$X_{GSU} = 16.05\%$			
System Equivalent (100 MVA base)	$Z_e = 0.00723 \angle 90^\circ$ per unit			
Generator Owner Load-Responsive Protective	Relays			
	Positive Offset Impedance			
40-1	Offset = 0.294 per unit			
	Diameter $= 0.294$ per unit			
	Negative Offset Impedance			
40-2	Offset = 0.22 per unit			
	Diameter $= 2.24$ per unit			
	Negative Offset Impedance			
40-3	Offset = 0.22 per unit			
	Diameter = 1.00 per unit			
21-1	Diameter $= 0.643$ per unit			
21-1	$MTA = 85^{\circ}$			

²⁸ Ibid, Kimbark.

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Table15: Example Data (Generator)				
50 I (pickup) = 5.0 per unit				
Transmission Owned Load-Responsive Protective Relays				
21-2	Diameter $= 0.55$ per unit			
	$MTA = 85^{\circ}$			

Calculations shown for a 120 degree angle and  $E_S/E_R = 1$ . The equation for calculating  $Z_R$  is:²⁹

Eq. (106) 
$$Z_R = \left(\frac{(1-m)(E_S \angle \delta) + (m)(E_R)}{E_S \angle \delta - E_R}\right) \times Z_{sys}$$

Where m is the relay location as a function of the total impedance (real number less than 1)

 $E_S$  and  $E_R$  is the sending-end and receiving-end voltages

Z_{sys} is the total system impedance

Z_R is the complex impedance at the relay location and plotted on an R-X diagram

All of the above are constants (940 MVA base) while the angle  $\delta$  is varied. Table 16 below contains calculations for a generator using the data listed in Table 15.

Table16: Example Calculations (Generator)									
The following calculations are on a 940 MVA base.									
Given:	$X'_d = j0.3845 \ pu$	$X_{GSU} = j0.17144  pu$	$Z_e = j0.06796  pu$						
Eq. (107)	$Z_{sys} = X'_d + X_{GSU} + Z_e$								
	$Z_{sys} = j0.3845  pu + j0.17144  pu + j0.06796  pu$								
	$Z_{sys} = 0.6239 \angle 90^{\circ} pu$								
Eq. (108)	$m = \frac{X'_d}{Z_{sys}} = \frac{0.3845}{0.6239} = 0.6163$								
Eq. (109)	$Z_R = \left(\frac{(1-m)(E_S \angle \delta) + (m)(E_R)}{E_S \angle \delta - E_R}\right) \times Z_{sys}$								
	$Z_R = \left(\frac{(1 - 0.6163) \times (1 \angle 120^\circ) + (0.6163)(1 \angle 0^\circ)}{1 \angle 120^\circ - 1 \angle 0^\circ}\right) \times (0.6239 \angle 90^\circ)  pu$								

²⁹ Ibid, Kimbark.

Table16: Example Calculations (Generator)					
	$Z_R = \left(\frac{0.4244 + j0.3323}{-1.5 + j\ 0.866}\right) \times (0.6239 \angle 90^\circ) \ pu$				
	$Z_R = (0.3116 \angle -111.95^\circ) \times (0.6239 \angle 90^\circ) pu$				
	$\mathbf{Z}_R = 0.194  \angle -21.95^\circ  pu$				
	$Z_R = -0.18 - j0.073  pu$				

Table 17 lists the swing impedance values at other angles and at  $E_S/E_R = 1$ , 1.43, and 0.7. The impedance values are plotted on an R-X graph with the center being at the generator terminals for use in evaluating impedance relay settings.

Table 17: Sample Calculations for a Swing Impedance Chart for Varying Voltagesat the Sending-End and Receiving-End.										
	Es/E _R =1		E _S /E _R =1.43		Es/E _R =0.7					
	Z _R		Z _R		Z _R					
Angle (δ) (Degrees)	Magnitude (pu)	Angle (Degrees)	Magnitude (pu)	Angle (Degrees)	Magnitude (pu)	Angle (Degrees)				
90	0.320	-13.1	0.296	6.3	0.344	-31.5				
120	0.194	-21.9	0.173	-0.4	0.227	-40.1				
150	0.111	-41.0	0.082	-10.3	0.154	-58.4				
210	0.111	-25.9	0.082	190.3	0.154	238.4				
240	0.194	201.9	0.173	180.4	0.225	220.1				
270	0.320	193.1	0.296	173.7	0.344	211.5				


## **Requirement R2 Generator Examples**

## **Distance Relay Application**

Based on PRC-026-2– Attachment B, Criterion A, the distance relay (21-1) (i.e., owned by the Generation Owner) characteristic is in the region where a stable power swing would not occur as shown in Figure 19. There is no further obligation to the owner in this standard for this load-responsive protective relay.

The distance relay (21-2) (i.e., owned by the Transmission Owner) is connected at the high-voltage side of the GSU transformer and its impedance characteristic is in the region where a stable power swing could occur causing the relay to operate. In this example, if the intentional time delay of this relay is less than 15 cycles, the PRC-026 – Attachment B, Criterion A cannot be met, thus the Transmission Owner is required to create a CAP (Requirement R3). Some of the options include,


but are not limited to, changing the relay setting (i.e., impedance reach, angle, time delay), modify the scheme (i.e., add PSB), or replace the Protection System. Note that the relay may be excluded from this standard if it has an intentional time delay equal to or greater than 15 cycles.



## Loss-of-Field Relay Application

In Figure 20, the R-X diagram shows the loss-of-field relay (40-1 and 40-2) characteristics are in the region where a stable power swing can cause a relay operation. Protective relay 40-1 would be excluded if it has an intentional time delay equal to or greater than 15 cycles. Similarly, 40-2 would be excluded if its intentional time delay is equal to or greater than 15 cycles. For example, if 40-1 has a time delay of 1 second and 40-2 has a time delay of 0.25 seconds, they are excluded and there is no further obligation on the Generator Owner in this standard for these relays. The

loss-of-field relay characteristic 40-3 is entirely inside the unstable power swing region. In this case, the owner may select high speed tripping on operation of the 40-3 impedance element.



#### Instantaneous Overcurrent Relay

In similar fashion to the transmission line overcurrent example calculation in Table 14, the instantaneous overcurrent relay minimum setting is established by PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion B. The solution is found by:

Eq. (110) 
$$I_{sys} = \frac{E_S - E_R}{Z_{sys}}$$

As stated in the relay settings in Table 15, the relay is installed on the high-voltage side of the GSU transformer with a pickup of 5.0 per unit. The maximum allowable current is calculated below.

$$I_{sys} = \frac{(1.05 \angle 120^{\circ} - 1.05 \angle 0^{\circ})}{0.6239 \angle 90^{\circ}} \ pu$$

$$I_{sys} = \frac{1.819 \angle 150^{\circ}}{0.6239 \angle 90^{\circ}} pu$$
$$I_{sys} = 2.91 \angle 60^{\circ} pu$$

The instantaneous phase setting of 5.0 per unit is greater than the calculated system current of 2.91 per unit; therefore, it meets the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion B.

## **Out-of-Step Tripping for Generation Facilities**

Out-of-step protection for the generator generally falls into three different schemes. The first scheme is a distance relay connected at the high-voltage side of the GSU transformer with the directional element looking toward the generator. Because this relay setting may be the same setting used for generator backup protection (see Requirement R2 Generator Examples, Distance Relay Application), it is susceptible to tripping in response to stable power swings and would require modification. Because this scheme is susceptible to tripping in response to stable power swings and any modification to the mho circle will jeopardize the overall protection of the outof-step protection of the generator, available technical literature does not recommend using this scheme specifically for generator out-of-step protection. The second and third out-of-step Protection System schemes are commonly referred to as single and double blinder schemes. These schemes are installed or enabled for out-of-step protection using a combination of blinders, a mho element, and timers. The combination of these protective relay functions provides out-of-step protection and discrimination logic for stable and unstable power swings. Single blinder schemes use logic that discriminate between stable and unstable power swings by issuing a trip command after the first slip cycle. Double blinder schemes are more complex than the single blinder scheme and, depending on the settings of the inner blinder, a trip for a stable power swing may occur. While the logic discriminates between stable and unstable power swings in either scheme, it is important that the trip initiating blinders be set at an angle greater than the stability limit of 120 degrees to remove the possibility of a trip for a stable power swing. Below is a discussion of the double blinder scheme.

## **Double Blinder Scheme**


The double blinder scheme is a method for measuring the rate of change of positive sequence impedance for out-of-step swing detection. The scheme compares a timer setting to the actual elapsed time required by the impedance locus to pass between two impedance characteristics. In this case, the two impedance characteristics are simple blinders, each set to a specific resistive reach on the R-X plane. Typically, the two blinders on the left half plane are the mirror images of those on the right half plane. The scheme typically includes a mho characteristic which acts as a starting element, but is not a tripping element.

The scheme detects the blinder crossings and time delays as represented on the R-X plane as shown in Figure 21. The system impedance is composed of the generator transient ( $X_d$ '), GSU transformer ( $X_T$ ), and transmission system ( $X_{system}$ ), impedances.

The scheme logic is initiated when the swing locus crosses the outer Blinder R1 (Figure 21), on the right at separation angle  $\alpha$ . The scheme only commits to take action when a swing crosses the


inner blinder. At this point the scheme logic seals in the out-of-step trip logic at separation angle  $\beta$ . Tripping actually asserts as the impedance locus leaves the scheme characteristic at separation angle  $\delta$ .

The power swing may leave both inner and outer blinders in either direction, and tripping will assert. Therefore, the inner blinder must be set such that the separation angle  $\beta$  is large enough that the system cannot recover. This angle should be set at 120 degrees or more. Setting the angle greater than 120 degrees satisfies the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A (No. 1, 1st bullet) since the tripping function is asserted by the blinder element. Transient stability studies may indicate that a smaller stability limit angle is acceptable under PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A (No. 1, 2nd bullet). In this respect, the double blinder scheme is similar to the double lens and triple lens schemes and many transmission application out-of-step schemes.



#### PRC-026-2 — Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings

Figure 22 illustrates a sample setting of the double blinder scheme for the example 940 MVA generator. The only setting requirement for this relay scheme is the right inner blinder, which must be set greater than the separation angle of 120 degrees (or a lesser angle based on a transient stability study) to ensure that the out-of-step protective function is expected to not trip in response to a stable power swing during non-Fault conditions. Other settings such as the mho characteristic, outer blinders, and timers are set according to transient stability studies and are not a part of this standard.



**Figure 22:** Double Blinder Out-of-Step Scheme with unit impedance data and load-responsive protective relay impedance characteristics for the example 940 MVA generator, scaled in relay secondary ohms.

## **Requirement R3**

To achieve the stated purpose of this standard, which is to ensure that relays are expected to not trip in response to stable power swings during non-Fault conditions, this Requirement ensures that the applicable entity develops a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) that reduces the risk of relays tripping in response to a stable power swing during non-Fault conditions that may occur on any applicable BES Element.

## **Requirement R4**

To achieve the stated purpose of this standard, which is to ensure that load-responsive protective relays are expected to not trip in response to stable power swings during non-Fault conditions, the applicable entity is required to implement any CAP developed pursuant to Requirement R3 such that the Protection System will meet PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria or can be excluded under the PRC-026-2 – Attachment A criteria (e.g., modifying the Protection System so that relay functions are supervised by power swing blocking or using relay systems that are immune to power swings), while maintaining dependable fault detection and dependable out-of-step tripping (if out-of-step tripping is applied at the terminal of the BES Element). Protection System owners are required in the implementation of a CAP to update it when actions or timetable change, until all actions are complete. Accomplishing this objective is intended to reduce the occurrence of Protection System tripping during a stable power swing, thereby improving reliability and minimizing risk to the BES.

The following are examples of actions taken to complete CAPs for a relay that did not meet PRC-026-2 – Attachment B and could be at-risk of tripping in response to a stable power swing during non-Fault conditions. A Protection System change was determined to be acceptable (without diminishing the ability of the relay to protect for faults within its zone of protection).

**Example R4a:** Actions: Settings were issued on 6/02/2015 to reduce the Zone 2 reach of the impedance relay used in the directional comparison unblocking (DCUB) scheme from 30 ohms to 25 ohms so that the relay characteristic is completely contained within the lens characteristic identified by the criterion. The settings were applied to the relay on 6/25/2015. CAP was completed on 06/25/2015.

**Example R4b:** Actions: Settings were issued on 6/02/2015 to enable out-of-step blocking on the existing microprocessor-based relay to prevent tripping in response to stable power swings. The setting changes were applied to the relay on 6/25/2015. CAP was completed on 06/25/2015.

The following is an example of actions taken to complete a CAP for a relay responding to a stable power swing that required the addition of an electromechanical power swing blocking relay.

**Example R4c:** Actions: A project for the addition of an electromechanical power swing blocking relay to supervise the Zone 2 impedance relay was initiated on 6/5/2015 to prevent tripping in response to stable power swings. The relay installation was completed on 9/25/2015. CAP was completed on 9/25/2015.


The following is an example of actions taken to complete a CAP with a timetable that required updating for the replacement of the relay.

**Example R4d:** Actions: A project for the replacement of the impedance relays at both terminals of line X with line current differential relays was initiated on 6/5/2015 to prevent tripping in response to stable power swings. The completion of the project was postponed due to line outage rescheduling from 11/15/2015 to 3/15/2016. Following the timetable change, the impedance relay replacement was completed on 3/18/2016. CAP was completed on 3/18/2016.

The CAP is complete when all the documented actions to remedy the specific problem (i.e., unnecessary tripping during stable power swings) are completed.


## Justification for Including Unstable Power Swings in the Requirements

Protection Systems that are applicable to the Standard and must be secure for a stable power swing condition (i.e., meets PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria) are identified based on Elements that are susceptible to both stable and unstable power swings. This section provides an example of why Elements that trip in response to unstable power swings (in addition to stable power swings) are identified and that their load-responsive protective relays need to be evaluated under PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria.




In Figure 23 the relays at circuit breakers 1, 2, 3, and 4 are equipped with a typical overreaching Zone 2 pilot system, using a Directional Comparison Blocking (DCB) scheme. Internal faults (or power swings) will result in instantaneous tripping of the Zone 2 relays if the measured fault or power swing impedance falls within the zone 2 operating characteristic. These lines will trip on

pilot Zone 2 for out-of-step conditions if the power swing impedance characteristic enters into Zone 2. All breakers are rated for out-of-phase switching.




**Figure 24:** In this case, the Zone 2 element on circuit breakers 1, 2, 3, and 4 did not meet the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria (this figure depicts the power swing as seen by relays on breakers 3 and 4).

In Figure 24, a large disturbance occurs within the small utility and its system goes out-of-step with the large interconnect. The small utility is importing power at the time of the disturbance. The actual power swing, as shown by the solid green line, enters the Zone 2 relay characteristic on the terminals of Lines 1, 2, 3, and 4 causing both lines to trip as shown in Figure 25.




In Figure 25, the relays at circuit breakers 1, 2, 3, and 4 have correctly tripped due to the unstable power swing (shown by the dashed green line in Figure 24), de-energizing Lines 1 and 2, and creating an island between the small utility and the big interconnect. The small utility shed 500 MW of load on underfrequency and maintained a load to generation balance.




Subsequent to the correct tripping of Lines 1 and 2 for the unstable power swing in Figure 25, another system disturbance occurs while the system is operating with Line 1 out-of-service for maintenance. The disturbance causes a stable power swing on Line 2, which challenges the relays at circuit breakers 2 and 4 as shown in Figure 27.





If the relays on circuit breakers 2 and 4 were not addressed under the Requirements for the previous unstable power swing condition, the relays would trip in response to the stable power swing, which would result in unnecessary system separation, load shedding, and possibly cascading or blackout.



If the relays that tripped in response to the previous unstable power swing condition in Figure 24 were addressed under the Requirements to meet PRC-026-2 - Attachment B criteria, the unnecessary tripping of the relays for the stable power swing shown in Figure 28 would have been averted, and the possible blackout of the small utility would have been avoided.

#### Rationale

During development of this standard, text boxes were embedded within the standard to explain the rationale for various parts of the standard. Upon BOT approval, the text from the rationale text boxes was moved to this section.

#### **Rationale for R1**

The Planning Coordinator has a wide-area view and is in the position to identify generator, transformer, and transmission line BES Elements which meet the criteria, if any. The criteria-based approach is consistent with the NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee (SPCS) technical document *Protection System Response to Power Swings*, August 2013 ("PSRPS Report"),³⁰ which recommends a focused approach to determine an at-risk BES Element. See the Guidelines and Technical Basis for a detailed discussion of the criteria.

#### **Rationale for R2**

The Generator Owner and Transmission Owner are in a position to determine whether their loadresponsive protective relays meet the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria. Generator, transformer, and transmission line BES Elements are identified by the Planning Coordinator in Requirement R1 and by the Generator Owner and Transmission Owner following an actual event where the Generator Owner and Transmission Owner became aware (i.e., through an event analysis or Protection System review) tripping was due to a stable or unstable power swing. A period of 12 calendar months allows sufficient time for the entity to conduct the evaluation.

³⁰ NERC System Protection and Control Subcommittee, *Protection System Response to Power Swings*, August 2013:

http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/System%20Protection%20and%20Control%20Subcommittee%20SPCS%2020/SPC S%20Power%20Swing%20Report_Final_20131015.pdf)

#### **Rationale for R3**

To meet the reliability purpose of the standard, a CAP is necessary to ensure the entity's Protection System meets the PRC-026-2 – Attachment B criteria (1st bullet) so that protective relays are expected to not trip in response to stable power swings. A CAP may also be developed to modify the Protection System for exclusion under PRC-026-2 – Attachment A (2nd bullet). Such an exclusion will allow the Protection System to be exempt from the Requirement for future events. The phrase, "…while maintaining dependable fault detection and dependable out-of-step tripping…" in Requirement R3 describes that the entity is to comply with this standard, while achieving their desired protection goals. Refer to the Guidelines and Technical Basis, Introduction, for more information.

#### **Rationale for R4**

Implementation of the CAP must accomplish all identified actions to be complete to achieve the desired reliability goal. During the course of implementing a CAP, updates may be necessary for a variety of reasons such as new information, scheduling conflicts, or resource issues. Documenting CAP changes and completion of activities provides measurable progress and confirmation of completion.

#### **Rationale for Attachment B (Criterion A)**

The PRC-026-2 – Attachment B, Criterion A provides a basis for determining if the relays are expected to not trip for a stable power swing having a system separation angle of up to 120 degrees with the sending-end and receiving-end voltages varying from 0.7 to 1.0 per unit (See Guidelines and Technical Basis).

# **A. Introduction**

- 1. Title: Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements
- 2. Number: TPL-001-5.1
- **3. Purpose:** Establish Transmission system planning performance requirements within the planning horizon to develop a Bulk Electric System (BES) that will operate reliably over a broad spectrum of System conditions and following a wide range of probable Contingencies.
- 4. Applicability:
  - 4.1. Functional Entity
    - Planning Coordinator.
    - Transmission Planner.
- 5. Effective Date*: See BC Implementation Plan for TPL-001-5.1.

## **B. Requirements and Measures**

- **R1.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall maintain System models within its respective area for performing the studies needed to complete its Planning Assessment. The models shall use data consistent with that provided in accordance with the MOD-032 standard, supplemented by other sources as needed, including items represented in the Corrective Action Plan, and shall represent projected System conditions. This establishes Category PO as the normal System condition in Table 1. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
  - **1.1.** System models shall represent:
    - **1.1.1.** Existing Facilities.
    - 1.1.2. New planned Facilities and changes to existing Facilities.
    - **1.1.3.** Real and reactive Load forecasts.
    - **1.1.4.** Known commitments for Firm Transmission Service and Interchange.
    - **1.1.5.** Resources (supply or demand side) required for Load.
- M1. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide evidence, in electronic or hard copy format, that it is maintaining System models within its respective area, using data consistent with MOD-032, including items represented in the Corrective Action Plan, representing projected System conditions, and that the models represent the required information in accordance with Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall prepare an annual Planning Assessment of its portion of the BES. This Planning Assessment shall use current or qualified past studies (as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6), document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analyses, short

circuit analyses, and Stability analyses. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- 2.1. For the Planning Assessment, the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the steady state analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by current annual studies or qualified past studies as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. Qualifying studies need to include the following conditions:
  - **2.1.1.** System peak Load for either Year One or year two, and for year five.
  - **2.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for one of the five years.
  - 2.1.3. For each of the studies described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, sensitivity case(s) shall be utilized to demonstrate the impact of changes to the basic assumptions used in the model. To accomplish this, the sensitivity analysis in the Planning Assessment must vary one or more of the following conditions by a sufficient amount to stress the System within a range of credible conditions that demonstrate a measurable change in System response :
    - Real and reactive forecasted Load.
    - Expected transfers.
    - Expected in service dates of new or modified Transmission Facilities.
    - Reactive resource capability.
    - Generation additions, retirements, or other dispatch scenarios.
    - Controllable Loads and Demand Side Management.
    - Duration or timing of known Transmission outages.
  - When known outage(s) of generation or Transmission Facility(ies) are 2.1.4. planned in the Near-Term Planning Horizon, the impact of selected known outages on System performance shall be assessed. These known outage(s) shall be selected for assessment consistent with a documented outage coordination procedure or technical rationale by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner. Known outage(s) shall not be excluded solely based upon outage duration. The assessment shall be performed for the PO and P1 categories identified in Table 1 with the System peak or Off-Peak conditions that the System is expected to experience when the known outage(s) are planned. This assessment shall include, at a minimum known outages expected to produce more severe System impacts on the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner's portion of the BES. Past or current studies may support the selection of known outage(s), if the study(s) has comparable post-Contingency System conditions and

configuration such as those following P3 or P6 category events in Table 1.

- 2.1.5. When an entity's spare equipment strategy could result in the unavailability of major Transmission equipment that has a lead time of one year or more (such as a transformer), the impact of this possible unavailability on System performance shall be assessed. Based upon this assessment, an analysis shall be performed for the P0, P1, and P2 categories identified in Table 1 with the conditions that the System is expected to experience during the possible unavailability of the long lead time equipment.
- **2.2.** For the Planning Assessment, the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the steady state analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by the following annual current study, supplemented with qualified past studies as indicated in Requirement R2, Part 2.6:
  - **2.2.1.** A current study assessing expected System peak Load conditions for one of the years in the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon and the rationale for why that year was selected.
- 2.3. The short circuit analysis portion of the Planning Assessment shall be conducted annually addressing the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon and can be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part 2.6. The analysis shall be used to determine whether circuit breakers have interrupting capability for Faults that they will be expected to interrupt using the System short circuit model with any planned generation and Transmission Facilities in service which could impact the study area.
- **2.4.** For the Planning Assessment, the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the Stability analysis shall be assessed annually and be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part2.6. The following studies are required:
  - **2.4.1.** System peak Load for one of the five years. System peak Load levels shall include a Load model which represents the expected dynamic behavior of Loads that could impact the study area, considering the behavior of induction motor Loads. An aggregate System Load model which represents the overall dynamic behavior of the Load is acceptable.
  - **2.4.2.** System Off-Peak Load for one of the five years.
  - **2.4.3.** For each of the studies described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, sensitivity case(s) shall be utilized to demonstrate the impact of changes to the basic assumptions used in the model. To accomplish this, the sensitivity analysis in the Planning Assessment must vary one or more of the following conditions by a sufficient amount to stress

the System within a range of credible conditions that demonstrate a measurable change in performance:

- Load level, Load forecast, or dynamic Load model assumptions.
- Expected transfers.
- Expected in service dates of new or modified Transmission Facilities.
- Reactive resource capability.
- Generation additions, retirements, or other dispatch scenarios.
- 2.4.4. When known outage(s) of generation or Transmission Facility(ies) are planned in the Near-Term Planning Horizon, the impact of selected known outages on System performance shall be assessed. These known outage(s) shall be selected for assessment consistent with a documented outage coordination procedure or technical rationale by the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner. Known outage(s) shall not be excluded solely based upon outage duration. The assessment shall be performed for the P1 categories identified in Table 1 with the System peak or Off-Peak conditions that the System is expected to experience when the known outage(s) are planned. This assessment shall include, at a minimum, those known outages expected to produce more severe System impacts on the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner's portion of the BES. Past or current studies may support the selection of known outage(s), if the study(s) has comparable post-Contingency System conditions and configuration such as those following P3 or P6 category events in Table 1.
- 2.4.5. When an entity's spare equipment strategy could result in the unavailability of major Transmission equipment that has a lead time of one year or more (such as a transformer), the impact of this possible unavailability on System performance shall be assessed. Based upon this assessment, an analysis shall be performed for the selected P1 and P2 category events identified in Table 1 for which the unavailability is expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES. The analysis shall simulate the conditions that the System is expected to experience during the possible unavailability of the long lead time equipment.
- 2.5. For the Planning Assessment, the Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizon portion of the Stability analysis shall be assessed to address the impact of proposed material generation additions or changes in that timeframe and be supported by current or past studies as qualified in Requirement R2, Part2.6 and shall include documentation to support the technical rationale for determining material changes.

- **2.6.** Past studies may be used to support the Planning Assessment if they meet the following requirements:
  - **2.6.1.** For steady state, short circuit, or Stability analysis: the study shall be five calendar years old or less, unless a technical rationale can be provided to demonstrate that the results of an older study are still valid.
  - 2.6.2. For steady state, short circuit, or Stability analysis: no material changes have occurred to the System represented in the study. Documentation to support the technical rationale for determining material changes shall be included.
- 2.7. For planning events shown in Table 1, when the analysis indicates an inability of the System to meet the performance requirements in Table 1, the Planning Assessment shall include Corrective Action Plan(s) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. Revisions to the Corrective Action Plan(s) are allowed in subsequent Planning Assessments, but the planned System shall continue to meet the performance requirements in Table 1. Corrective Action Plan(s) do not need to be developed solely to meet the performance requirements for a single sensitivity case analyzed in accordance with Requirements R2, Parts 2.1.3 and 2.4.3. The Corrective Action Plan(s) shall:
  - **2.7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
    - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
    - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
    - Installation or modification of automatic generation tripping as a response to a single or multiple Contingency to mitigate Stability performance violations.
    - Installation or modification of manual and automatic generation runback/tripping as a response to a single or multiple Contingency to mitigate steady state performance violations.
    - Use of Operating Procedures specifying how long they will be needed as part of the Corrective Action Plan.
    - Use of rate applications, DSM, new technologies, or other initiatives.
  - **2.7.2.** Include actions to resolve performance deficiencies identified in multiple sensitivity studies or provide a rationale for why actions were not necessary.

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- 2.7.3. If situations arise that are beyond the control of the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator that prevent the implementation of a Corrective Action Plan in the required timeframe, then the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator is permitted to utilize Non-Consequential Load Loss and curtailment of Firm Transmission Service to correct the situation that would normally not be permitted in Table 1, provided that the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator documents that they are taking actions to resolve the situation. The Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator shall document the situation causing the problem, alternatives evaluated, and the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service.
- **2.7.4.** Be reviewed in subsequent annual Planning Assessments for continued validity and implementation status of identified System Facilities and Operating Procedures.
- 2.8. For short circuit analysis, if the short circuit current interrupting duty on circuit breakers determined in Requirement R2, Part 2.3 exceeds their Equipment Rating, the Planning Assessment shall include a Corrective Action Plan to address the Equipment Rating violations. The Corrective Action Plan shall:
  - **2.8.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance.
  - **2.8.2.** Be reviewed in subsequent annual Planning Assessments for continued validity and implementation status of identified System Facilities and Operating Procedures.
- M2. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of its annual Planning Assessment, that it has prepared an annual Planning Assessment of its portion of the BES in accordance with Requirement R2.
- **R3.** For the steady state portion of the Planning Assessment, each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall perform studies for the Near-Term and Long-Term Transmission Planning Horizons in Requirement R2, Parts 2.1, and 2.2. The studies shall be based on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
  - **3.1.** Studies shall be performed for planning events to determine whether the BES meets the performance requirements in Table 1 based on the Contingency list created in Requirement R3, Part 3.4.
  - **3.2.** Studies shall be performed to assess the impact of the extreme events which are identified by the list created in Requirement R3, Part 3.5. If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the occurrence of extreme events, an

evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.

- **3.3.** Contingency analyses for Requirement R3, Parts 3.1 and 3.2 shall:
  - **3.3.1.** Simulate the removal of all elements that the Protection System and other automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency without operator intervention. The analyses shall include the impact of subsequent:
    - **3.3.1.1.** Tripping of generators where simulations show generator bus voltages or high side of the generation step up (GSU) voltages are less than known or assumed minimum generator steady state or ride through voltage limitations. Include in the assessment any assumptions made.
    - **3.3.1.2.** Tripping of Transmission elements where relay loadability limits are exceeded.
  - **3.3.2.** Simulate the expected automatic operation of existing and planned devices designed to provide steady state control of electrical system quantities when such devices impact the study area. These devices may include equipment such as phase-shifting transformers, load tap changing transformers, and switched capacitors and inductors.
- **3.4.** Those planning events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES shall be identified, and a list of those Contingencies to be evaluated for System performance in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 created. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
  - **3.4.1.** The Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall coordinate with adjacent Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners to ensure that Contingencies on adjacent Systems which may impact their Systems are included in the Contingency list.
- **3.5.** Those extreme events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts shall be identified and a list created of those events to be evaluated in Requirement R3, Part 3.2. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
- M3. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the studies utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment, in accordance with Requirement R3.
- **R4.** For the Stability portion of the Planning Assessment, as described in Requirement R2, Parts 2.4 and 2.5, each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall perform the Contingency analyses listed in Table 1. The studies shall be based on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

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- **4.1.** Studies shall be performed for planning events to determine whether the BES meets the performance requirements in Table 1 based on the Contingency list created in Requirement R4, Part 4.4.
  - **4.1.1.** For planning event P1: No generating unit shall pull out of synchronism. A generator being disconnected from the System by fault clearing action or by a Remedial Action Scheme is not considered pulling out of synchronism.
  - **4.1.2.** For planning events P2 through P7: When a generator pulls out of synchronism in the simulations, the resulting apparent impedance swings shall not result in the tripping of any Transmission system elements other than the generating unit and its directly connected Facilities.
  - **4.1.3.** For planning events P1 through P7: Power oscillations shall exhibit acceptable damping as established by the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner.
- **4.2.** Studies shall be performed to assess the impact of the extreme events which are identified by the list created in Requirement R4, Part 4.5. If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the occurrence of extreme events, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of the event (s) shall be conducted.
- **4.3.** Contingency analyses for Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 and 4.2 shall :
  - **4.3.1.** Simulate the removal of all elements that the Protection System and other automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency without operator intervention. The analyses shall include the impact of subsequent:
    - **4.3.1.1.** Successful high speed (less than one second) reclosing and unsuccessful high speed reclosing into a Fault where high speed reclosing is utilized.
    - **4.3.1.2.** Tripping of generators where simulations show generator bus voltages or high side of the GSU voltages are less than known or assumed generator low voltage ride through capability. Include in the assessment any assumptions made.
    - **4.3.1.3.** Tripping of Transmission lines and transformers where transient swings cause Protection System operation based on generic or actual relay models.
  - **4.3.2.** Simulate the expected automatic operation of existing and planned devices designed to provide dynamic control of electrical system quantities when such devices impact the study area. These devices may include equipment such as generation exciter control and power

system stabilizers, static var compensators, power flow controllers, and DC Transmission controllers.

- **4.4.** Those planning events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts on its portion of the BES, shall be identified, and a list created of those Contingencies to be evaluated in Requirement R4, Part 4.1. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
  - **4.4.1.** Each Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall coordinate with adjacent Planning Coordinators and Transmission Planners to ensure that Contingencies on adjacent Systems which may impact their Systems are included in the Contingency list.
- **4.5.** Those extreme events in Table 1 that are expected to produce more severe System impacts shall be identified and a list created of those events to be evaluated in Requirement R4, Part 4.2. The rationale for those Contingencies selected for evaluation shall be available as supporting information.
- M4. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the studies utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage deviations, and the transient voltage response for its System. For transient voltage response, the criteria shall at a minimum, specify a low voltage level and a maximum length of time that transient voltages may remain below that level. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M5. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of the documentation specifying the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post-Contingency voltage deviations, and the transient voltage response for its System in accordance with Requirement R5.
- **R6.** Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall define and document, within their Planning Assessment, the criteria or methodology used in the analysis to identify System instability for conditions such as Cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M6. Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator shall provide dated evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of documentation specifying the criteria or methodology used in the analysis to identify System instability for conditions such as Cascading, voltage instability, or uncontrolled islanding that was utilized in preparing the Planning Assessment in accordance with Requirement R6.
- **R7.** Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with each of its Transmission Planners, shall determine and identify each entity's individual and joint responsibilities for

performing the required studies for the Planning Assessment. [Violation Risk Factor: Low] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **M7.** Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with each of its Transmission Planners, shall provide dated documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, and e-mail correspondence that identifies that agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for performing the required studies and Assessments in accordance with Requirement R7.
- **R8.** Each Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall distribute its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completing its Planning Assessment, and to any functional entity that has a reliability related need and submits a written request for the information within 30 days of such a request. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
  - 8.1. If a recipient of the Planning Assessment results provides documented comments on the results, the respective Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M8. Each Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner shall provide evidence, such as email notices, documentation of updated web pages, postal receipts showing recipient and date; or a demonstration of a public posting, that it has distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 days of having completed its Planning Assessment, and to any functional entity who has indicated a reliability need within 30 days of a written request and that the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner has provided a documented response to comments received on Planning Assessment results within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.

## **C.** Compliance

#### 1. Compliance Monitoring Process

- **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:** The British Columbia Utilities Commission.
- **1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data identified in Measures M1 through M8 or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

• Each Responsible Entity shall retain evidence of each requirement in this standard for three calendar years.

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# **Violation Severity Levels**

D.#	Violation Severity Levels						
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL			
R1.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent one of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent two of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent three of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5.	The responsible entity's System model failed to represent four or more of the Requirement R1, Parts 1.1.1 through 1.1.5. OR The responsible entity's System model did not represent projected System conditions as described in Requirement R1. OR The responsible entity's System model did not use data consistent with that provided in accordance with the MOD-032 standard and other sources, including items represented in the Corrective Action Plan.			
R2.	The responsible entity failed to comply with Requirement R2, Part 2.6.	The responsible entity failed to comply with Requirement R2, Part 2.3 or Part 2.8.	The responsible entity failed to comply with one of the following Parts of Requirement R2: Part 2.1,	The responsible entity failed to comply with two or more of the following Parts of			

D #	Violation Severity Levels						
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL			
			Part 2.2, Part 2.4, Part 2.5, or Part 2.7.	Requirement R2: Part 2.1, Part 2.2, Part 2.4, or Part 2.7. OR The responsible entity does not have a completed annual Planning Assessment.			
R3.	The responsible entity did not identify planning events as described in Requirement R3, Part 3.4 or extreme events as described in Requirement R3, Part 3.5.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for one of the categories (P2 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.2 to assess the impact of extreme events.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for two of the categories (P2 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform Contingency analysis as described in Requirement R3, Part 3.3.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R3, Part 3.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for three or more of the categories (P2 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform studies to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for the P0 or P1 categories in Table 1. OR			

D #	Violation Severity Levels						
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL			
				The responsible entity did not base its studies on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1.			
R4.	The responsible entity did not identify planning events as described in Requirement R4, Part 4.4 or extreme events as described in Requirement R4, Part 4.5.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for one of the categories (P1 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.2 to assess the impact of extreme events.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for two of the categories (P1 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not perform Contingency analysis as described in Requirement R4, Part 4.3.	The responsible entity did not perform studies as specified in Requirement R4, Part 4.1 to determine that the BES meets the performance requirements for three or more of the categories (P1 through P7) in Table 1. OR The responsible entity did not base its studies on computer simulation models using data provided in Requirement R1.			
R5.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity does not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage limits, post- Contingency voltage			

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	Violation Severity Levels					
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
				deviations, or the transient voltage response for its System.		
R6.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity failed to define and document the criteria or methodology for System instability used within its analysis as described in Requirement R6.		
R7.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with each of its Transmission Planners, failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities for performing required studies.		
R8	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 90 days but less than or equal to 120	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 120 days but less than or equal to 130	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 130 days but less than or equal to 140	The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners but it was more than 140 days following its completion.		

D.#	Violation Severity Levels					
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
	days following its completion. OR, The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 30 days but less than or equal to 40 days following the request.	days following its completion. OR, The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 40 days but less than or equal to 50 days following the request.	days following its completion. OR, The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 50 days but less than or equal to 60 days following the request.	OR The responsible entity did not distribute its Planning Assessment results to adjacent Planning Coordinators and adjacent Transmission Planners. OR The responsible entity distributed its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing but it was more than 60 days following the request. OR The responsible entity did not distribute its Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment results to functional entities having a reliability related need who requested the Planning Assessment in writing.		

## **D. Regional Variances**

None.

## **E. Associated Documents**

None.

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## **Version History**

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
0	April 1, 2005	Effective Date	New
0	February 8, 2005	BOT Approval	Revised
0	June 3, 2005	Fixed reference in M1 to read TPL-001-0 R2.1	Errata
0	July 24, 2007	and TPL-001-0 R2.2 Corrected reference in M1. to read TPL- 001-0 R1 and TPL-001-0 R2.	Errata
0.1	October 29, 2008	BOT adopted errata changes; updated version number to "0.1"	Errata
0.1	May 13, 2009	FERC Approved – Updated Effective Date and Footer	Revised
1	Approved by Board of Trustees February 17, 2011	Revised footnote 'b' pursuant to FERC Order RM06-16-009	Revised (Project 2010-11)
2	August 4, 2011	Revision of TPL-001-1; includes merging and upgrading requirements of TPL-001- 0, TPL-002-0, TPL-003-0, and TPL-004-0 into one, single, comprehensive, coordinated standard: TPL-001-2; and retirement of TPL-005-0 and TPL-006-0.	Project 2006-02 – complete revision
2	August 4, 2011	Adopted by Board of Trustees	
1	April 19, 2012	FERC issued Order 762 remanding TPL- 001-1, TPL-002-1b, TPL-003-1a, and TPL- 004-1. FERC also issued a NOPR proposing to remand TPL-001-2. NERC has been directed to revise footnote 'b' in accordance with the directives of Order Nos. 762 and 693.	
3	February 7, 2013	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	

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Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
		TPL-001-3 was created after the Board of Trustees approved the revised footnote 'b' in TPL-002-2b, which was balloted and appended to: TPL-001-0.1, TPL-002-0b, TPL-003-0a, and TPL-004-0.	
4	February 7, 2013	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees. TPL-001-4 was adopted by the Board of Trustees as TPL-001-3, but a discrepancy in numbering was identified and corrected prior to filing with the regulatory agencies.	
4	October 17, 2013	FERC Order issued approving TPL-001-4 (Order effective December 23, 2013).	
4	May 7, 2014	NERC Board of Trustees adopted change to VRF in Requirement 1 from Medium to High.	Revision
4	November 26, 2014	FERC issued a letter order approving change to VRF in Requirement 1 from Medium to High.	
5	November 7, 2018	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees.	Revised to address reliability issues as identified in FERC Order No. 754 and Order No. 786 directives and update the references to the MOD Reliability Standards in TPL-001.
5.	January 23, 2020	FERC Order issued approving TPL-001-5. Docket No. RM19-10-000.	
5.1	June 10, 2020	FERC Order issued approving TPL-001-5.1. Docket No. RD20-8-000.	Errata

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
5.1	July 29,2020	Effective Date	7/1/2023

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#### Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Planning Events

#### **Steady State & Stability:**

- a. The System shall remain stable. Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Consequential Load Loss as well as generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of any event excluding PO.
- c. Simulate the removal of all elements that Protection Systems and other controls are expected to automatically disconnect for each event.
- d. Simulate Normal Clearing unless otherwise specified.
- e. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

#### Steady State Only:

- f. Applicable Facility Ratings shall not be exceeded.
- g. System steady state voltages and post-Contingency voltage deviations shall be within acceptable limits as established by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner.
- h. Planning event P0 is applicable to steady state only.
- i. The response of voltage sensitive Load that is disconnected from the System by end-user equipment associated with an event shall not be used to meet steady state performance requirements.

#### **Stability Only:**

j. Transient voltage response shall be within acceptable limits established by the Planning Coordinator and the Transmission Planner.

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non- Consequential Load Loss Allowed
PO No Contingency	Normal System	None	N/A	EHV, HV	No	No
<b>P1</b> Single Contingency	Normal System	<ul> <li>Loss of one of the following:</li> <li>1. Generator</li> <li>2. Transmission Circuit</li> <li>3. Transformer⁵</li> <li>4. Shunt Device⁶</li> <li>5. Single Pole of a DC line</li> </ul>	3Ø SLG	EHV, HV	No ⁹	No ¹²
		<ol> <li>Opening of a line section w/o a fault ⁷</li> </ol>	N/A	EHV, HV	No ⁹	No ¹²
		2. Bus Section Fault	SLG	EHV	No ⁹	No
P2	Normal System		510	HV	Yes	Yes
Single Contingency		3. Internal Breaker Fault ⁸	SLG	EHV	No ⁹	No
		(non-Bus-tie Breaker)	310	HV	Yes	Yes
		<ol> <li>Internal Breaker Fault (Bus-tie Breaker)⁸</li> </ol>	SLG	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non- Consequential Load Loss Allowed
<b>P3</b> Multiple Contingency	Loss of generator unit followed by System adjustments ⁹	<ul> <li>Loss of one of the following:</li> <li>1. Generator</li> <li>2. Transmission Circuit</li> <li>3. Transformer⁵</li> <li>4. Shunt Device⁶</li> </ul>	3Ø	EHV, HV	No ⁹	No ¹²
		5. Single pole of a DC line	SLG			
		Loss of multiple elements caused by a stuck breaker ¹⁰ (non-Bus-tie		EHV	No ⁹	No
P4 Multiple Contingency (Fault plus stuck breaker ¹⁰ )	Normal System	<ul> <li>Breaker) attempting to clear a Fault on one of the following:</li> <li>1. Generator</li> <li>2. Transmission Circuit</li> <li>3. Transformer⁵</li> <li>4. Shunt Device⁶</li> <li>5. Bus Section</li> </ul>	SLG	HV	Yes	Yes
breaker ¹⁰ )		<ol> <li>Loss of multiple elements caused by a stuck breaker¹⁰ (Bus-tie Breaker) attempting to clear a Fault on the associated bus</li> </ol>	SLG	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes

Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non- Consequential Load Loss Allowed
<b>P5</b> Multiple		Delayed Fault Clearing due to the failure of a non-redundant		EHV	No ⁹	No
Contingency (Fault plus non- redundant component of a Protection System failure to operate)	s Normal System	<ul> <li>component of a Protection System¹³</li> <li>protecting the Faulted element to operate as designed, for one of the following:</li> <li>1. Generator</li> <li>2. Transmission Circuit</li> <li>3. Transformer⁵</li> <li>4. Shunt Device⁶</li> <li>5. Bus Section</li> </ul>	SLG	HV	Yes	Yes
<b>P6</b> Multiple Contingency <i>(Two</i>	Loss of one of the following followed by System adjustments. ⁹ 1. Transmission Circuit 2. Transformer ⁵	Loss of one of the following: 1. Transmission Circuit 2. Transformer ⁵ 3. Shunt Device ⁶	3Ø	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes
overlapping singles)	<ul> <li>2. Transformer⁶</li> <li>3. Shunt Device⁶</li> <li>4. Single pole of a DC line</li> </ul>	4. Single pole of a DC line	SLG	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes

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Category	Initial Condition	Event ¹	Fault Type ²	BES Level ³	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed ⁴	Non- Consequential Load Loss Allowed
P7 Multiple Contingency (Common Structure)	Normal System	<ul> <li>The loss of:</li> <li>1. Any two adjacent (vertically or horizontally) circuits on common structure ¹¹</li> <li>2. Loss of a bipolar DC line</li> </ul>	SLG	EHV, HV	Yes	Yes

#### Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Extreme Events

#### **Steady State & Stability**

For all extreme events evaluated:

- a. Simulate the removal of all elements that Protection Systems and automatic controls are expected to disconnect for each Contingency.
- b. Simulate Normal Clearing unless otherwise specified.

#### **Steady State**

- 1. Loss of a single generator, Transmission Circuit, single pole of a DC Line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service followed by another single generator, Transmission Circuit, single pole of a different DC Line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service prior to System adjustments.
- 2. Local area events affecting the Transmission System such as:
  - a. Loss of a tower line with three or more circuits.¹¹
  - Loss of all Transmission lines on a common Right-of-Way¹¹.
  - c. Loss of a switching station or substation (loss of one voltage level plus transformers).
  - d. Loss of all generating units at a generating station.
  - e. Loss of a large Load or major Load center.
- 3. Wide area events affecting the Transmission System based on System topology such as:
  - a. Loss of two generating stations resulting from conditions such as:
    - i. Loss of a large gas pipeline into a region or multiple regions that have significant gas-fired generation.

#### Stability

- With an initial condition of a single generator, Transmission circuit, single pole of a DC line, shunt device, or transformer forced out of service, apply a 3Ø fault on another single generator, Transmission circuit, single pole of a different DC line, shunt device, or transformer prior to System adjustments.
- 2. Local or wide area events affecting the Transmission System such as:
  - a. 3Ø fault on generator with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing.
  - b. 3Ø fault on Transmission circuit with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing.
  - c. 3Ø fault on transformer with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing.
  - d. 3Ø fault on bus section with stuck breaker¹⁰ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing.
  - e. 3Ø fault on generator with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing.
  - f. 3Ø fault on Transmission circuit with failure of a nonredundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing.

ii.	Loss of the use of a large body of water as the
	cooling source for generation.

- iii. Wildfires.
- iv. Severe weather, e.g., hurricanes, tornadoes, etc.
- v. A successful cyber attack.
- vi. Shutdown of a nuclear power plant(s) and related facilities for a day or more for common causes such as problems with similarly designed plants.
- b. Other events based upon operating experience that may result in wide area disturbances.

- g. 3Ø fault on transformer with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing.
- h. 3Ø fault on bus section with failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System¹³ resulting in Delayed Fault Clearing.
- i. 3Ø internal breaker fault.
- j. Other events based upon operating experience, such as consideration of initiating events that experience suggests may result in wide area disturbances

# Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Footnotes(Planning Events and Extreme Events)

- 1. If the event analyzed involves BES elements at multiple System voltage levels, the lowest System voltage level of the element(s) removed for the analyzed event determines the stated performance criteria regarding allowances for interruptions of Firm Transmission Service and Non-Consequential Load Loss.
- 2. Unless specified otherwise, simulate Normal Clearing of faults. Single line to ground (SLG) or three-phase (3Ø) are the fault types that must be evaluated in Stability simulations for the event described. A 3Ø or a double line to ground fault study indicating the criteria are being met is sufficient evidence that a SLG condition would also meet the criteria.
- 3. Bulk Electric System (BES) level references include extra-high voltage (EHV) Facilities defined as greater than 300kV and high voltage (HV) Facilities defined as the 300kV and lower voltage Systems. The designation of EHV and HV is used to distinguish between stated performance criteria allowances for interruption of Firm Transmission Service and Non-Consequential Load Loss.
- 4. Curtailment of Conditional Firm Transmission Service is allowed when the conditions and/or events being studied formed the basis for the Conditional Firm Transmission Service.
- 5. For non-generator step up transformer outage events, the reference voltage, as used in footnote 1, applies to the low-side winding (excluding tertiary windings). For generator and Generator Step Up transformer outage events, the reference voltage applies to the BES connected voltage (high-side of the Generator Step Up transformer). Requirements which are applicable to transformers also apply to variable frequency transformers and phase shifting transformers.
- 6. Requirements which are applicable to shunt devices also apply to FACTS devices that are connected to ground.
- 7. Opening one end of a line section without a fault on a normally networked Transmission circuit such that the line is possibly serving Load radial from a single source point.
- 8. An internal breaker fault means a breaker failing internally, thus creating a System fault which must be cleared by protection on both sides of the breaker.
- 9. An objective of the planning process should be to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of interruption of Firm Transmission Service following Contingency events. Curtailment of Firm Transmission Service is allowed both as a System adjustment (as identified in the column entitled 'Initial Condition') and a corrective action when achieved through the appropriate re-dispatch of resources obligated to re-dispatch, where it can be demonstrated that Facilities, internal and external to the Transmission Planner's planning region, remain within applicable Facility Ratings and the re-dispatch does not result in any Non-Consequential Load Loss. Where limited options for re-dispatch exist, sensitivities associated with the availability of those resources should be considered.

# Table 1 – Steady State & Stability Performance Footnotes (Planning Events and Extreme Events)

- 10. A stuck breaker means that for a gang-operated breaker, all three phases of the breaker have remained closed. For an independent pole operated (IPO) or an independent pole tripping (IPT) breaker, only one pole is assumed to remain closed. A stuck breaker results in Delayed Fault Clearing.
- 11. Excludes circuits that share a common structure (Planning event P7, Extreme event steady state 2a) or common Right-of-Way (Extreme event, steady state 2b) for 1 mile or less.
- 12. An objective of the planning process is to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of Non-Consequential Load Loss following planning events. In limited circumstances, Non-Consequential Load Loss may be needed throughout the planning horizon to ensure that BES performance requirements are met. However, when Non-Consequential Load Loss is utilized under footnote 12 within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon to address BES performance requirements, such interruption is limited to circumstances where the Non-Consequential Load Loss meets the conditions shown in Attachment 1. In no case can the planned Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 exceed 75 MW for US registered entities. The amount of planned Non-Consequential Load Loss for a non-US Registered Entity should be implemented in a manner that is consistent with, or under the direction of, the applicable governmental authority or its agency in the non-US jurisdiction.
- 13. For purposes of this standard, non-redundant components of a Protection System to consider are as follows:
  - a. A single protective relay which responds to electrical quantities, without an alternative (which may or may not respond to electrical quantities) that provides comparable Normal Clearing times;
  - b. A single communications system associated with protective functions, necessary for correct operation of a communication-aided protection scheme required for Normal Clearing (an exception is a single communications system that is both monitored and reported at a Control Center);
  - c. A single station dc supply associated with protective functions required for Normal Clearing (an exception is a single station dc supply that is both monitored and reported at a Control Center for both low voltage and open circuit);
  - d. A single control circuitry (including auxiliary relays and lockout relays) associated with protective functions, from the dc supply through and including the trip coil(s) of the circuit breakers or other interrupting devices, required for Normal Clearing (the trip coil may be excluded if it is both monitored and reported at a Control Center).

#### Attachment 1

#### I. Stakeholder Process

During each Planning Assessment before the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 is allowed as an element of a Corrective Action Plan in the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon of the Planning Assessment, the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator shall ensure that the utilization of footnote 12 is reviewed through an open and transparent stakeholder process. The responsible entity can utilize an existing process or develop a new process. .The process must include the following:

- 1. Meetings must be open to affected stakeholders including applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues
- 2. Notice must be provided in advance of meetings to affected stakeholders including applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues and include an agenda with:
  - a. Date, time, and location for the meeting
  - b. Specific location(s) of the planned Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote
     12
  - c. Provisions for a stakeholder comment period
- 3. Information regarding the intended purpose and scope of the proposed Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 (as shown in Section II below) must be made available to meeting participants
- 4. A procedure for stakeholders to submit written questions or concerns and to receive written responses to the submitted questions and concerns
- 5. A dispute resolution process for any question or concern raised in #4 above that is not resolved to the stakeholder's satisfaction

An entity does not have to repeat the stakeholder process for a specific application of footnote 12 utilization with respect to subsequent Planning Assessments unless conditions spelled out in Section II below have materially changed for that specific application.

#### II. Information for Inclusion in Item #3 of the Stakeholder Process

The responsible entity shall document the planned use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 which must include the following:

- 1. Conditions under which Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 would be necessary:
  - a. System Load level and estimated annual hours of exposure at or above that Load level

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- b. Applicable Contingencies and the Facilities outside their applicable rating due to that Contingency
- 2. Amount of Non-Consequential Load Loss with:
  - a. The estimated number and type of customers affected
  - b. An explanation of the effect of the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 on the health, safety, and welfare of the community
- 3. Estimated frequency of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 based on historical performance
- 4. Expected duration of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 based on historical performance
- 5. Future plans to alleviate the need for Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12
- 6. Verification that TPL Reliability Standards performance requirements will be met following the application of footnote 12
- 7. Alternatives to Non-Consequential Load Loss considered and the rationale for not selecting those alternatives under footnote 12
- 8. Assessment of potential overlapping uses of footnote 12 including overlaps with adjacent Transmission Planners and Planning Coordinators

#### III. Instances for which Regulatory Review of Non-Consequential Load Loss under Footnote 12 is Required

Before a Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 is allowed as an element of a Corrective Action Plan in Year One of the Planning Assessment, the Transmission Planner or Planning Coordinator must ensure that the applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues do not object to the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 if either:

- 1. The voltage level of the Contingency is greater than 300 kV
  - a. If the Contingency analyzed involves BES Elements at multiple System voltage levels, the lowest System voltage level of the element(s) removed for the analyzed Contingency determines the stated performance criteria regarding allowances for Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12, or
  - b. For a non-generator step up transformer outage Contingency, the 300 kV limit applies to the low-side winding (excluding tertiary windings). For a generator or generator step up transformer outage Contingency, the 300 kV limit applies to the BES connected voltage (high-side of the Generator Step Up transformer)

 The planned Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12 is greater than or equal to 25 MW

Once assurance has been received that the applicable regulatory authorities or governing bodies responsible for retail electric service issues do not object to the use of Non-Consequential Load Loss under footnote 12, the Planning Coordinator or Transmission Planner must submit the information outlined in items II.1 through II.8 above to the ERO for a determination of whether there are any Adverse Reliability Impacts caused by the request to utilize footnote 12 for Non-Consequential Load Loss.

### **A. Introduction**

- 1. Title: Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
- **2. Number:** TPL-007-4
- **3. Purpose:** Establish requirements for Transmission system planned performance during geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) events.
- 4. Applicability:

#### 4.1. Functional Entities:

- **4.1.1.** Planning Coordinator with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- **4.1.2.** Transmission Planner with a planning area that includes a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2;
- 4.1.3. Transmission Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2; and
- **4.1.4.** Generator Owner who owns a Facility or Facilities specified in 4.2.
- 4.2. Facilities:
  - **4.2.1.** Facilities that include power transformer(s) with a high side, wye-grounded winding with terminal voltage greater than 200 kV.
- 5. Effective Date*: See BC Implementation Plan for TPL-007-4.
- 6. Background: During a GMD event, geomagnetically-induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.

### **B. Requirements and Measures**

**R1.** Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), shall identify the individual and joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- M1. Each Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planners, shall provide documentation on roles and responsibilities, such as meeting minutes, agreements, copies of procedures or protocols in effect between entities or between departments of a vertically integrated system, or email correspondence that identifies an agreement has been reached on individual and joint responsibilities for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data in accordance with Requirement R1.
- **R2.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall maintain System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M2. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence in either electronic or hard copy format that it is maintaining System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.
- **R3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1. [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- **M3.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence, such as electronic or hard copies of the criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System in accordance with Requirement R3.

#### Benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
  - **4.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
    - **4.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
    - **4.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **4.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **4.3.** The benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
  - **4.3.1.** If a recipient of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- M4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, and adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R4. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R4.
- **R5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the benchmark thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R6 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
  - **5.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.

- **5.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 5.1.
- **M5.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- **R6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater. The benchmark thermal impact assessment shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
  - 6.1. Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R5;
  - 6.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
  - **6.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
  - **6.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.
- **M6.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its benchmark thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R6.
- **R7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective

Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **7.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
  - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
  - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
  - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
  - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- **7.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- **7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to approval for any extension sought under Part 7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
  - **7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of development of the CAP; and
  - **7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of development of the CAP.
- **7.4.** Be submitted to the Compliance Enforcement Authority (CEA) with a request for extension of time if the responsible entity is unable to implement the CAP within the timetable provided in Part 7.3. The submitted CAP shall document the following:
  - **7.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1 and how those circumstances are beyond the control of the responsible entity;
  - **7.4.2.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures, if applicable; and
  - **7.4.3.** Updated timetable for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1.
- **7.5.** Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.

- **7.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the CAP, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- **M7.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it submitted a request for extension to the CEA if the responsible entity is unable to implement the CAP within the timetable provided in Part 7.3. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.

## Supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s)

- **R8.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall complete a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment of the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon at least once every 60 calendar months. This supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall use a study or studies based on models identified in Requirement R2, document assumptions, and document summarized results of the steady state analysis. [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
  - **8.1.** The study or studies shall include the following conditions:
    - **8.1.1.** System On-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon; and
    - **8.1.2.** System Off-Peak Load for at least one year within the Near-Term Transmission Planning Horizon.

- **8.2.** The study or studies shall be conducted based on the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 to determine whether the System meets the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1.
- **8.3.** The supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment shall be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later.
  - **8.3.1.** If a recipient of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment provides documented comments on the results, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.
- **M8.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have dated evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment meeting all of the requirements in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinators, adjacent Transmission Planners within 90 calendar days of completion, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, whichever is later, as specified in Requirement R8. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments in accordance with Requirement R8.
- **R9.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide GIC flow information to be used for the supplemental thermal impact assessment of transformers specified in Requirement R10 to each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns an applicable Bulk Electric System (BES) power transformer in the planning area. The GIC flow information shall include: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
  - **9.1.** The maximum effective GIC value for the worst case geoelectric field orientation for the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1. This value shall be provided to the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.

- **9.2.** The effective GIC time series, GIC(t), calculated using the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1 in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area. GIC(t) shall be provided within 90 calendar days of receipt of the written request and after determination of the maximum effective GIC value in Part 9.1.
- M9. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided the maximum effective GIC values to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area as specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided GIC(t) in response to a written request from the Transmission Owner or Generator Owner that owns an applicable BES power transformer in the planning area.
- R10. Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater. The supplemental thermal impact assessment shall: [Violation Risk Factor: Medium] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
  - 10.1. Be based on the effective GIC flow information provided in Requirement R9;
  - 10.2. Document assumptions used in the analysis;
  - **10.3.** Describe suggested actions and supporting analysis to mitigate the impact of GICs, if any; and
  - **10.4.** Be performed and provided to the responsible entities, as determined in Requirement R1, within 24 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.
- **M10.** Each Transmission Owner and Generator Owner shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its supplemental thermal impact assessment for all of its solely and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A per phase or greater, and shall have evidence such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided its supplemental thermal impact assessment to the responsible entities as specified in Requirement R10.
- **R11.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes through the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R8 that their System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1, shall develop a Corrective

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Action Plan (CAP) addressing how the performance requirements will be met. The CAP shall: [Violation Risk Factor: High] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]

- **11.1.** List System deficiencies and the associated actions needed to achieve required System performance. Examples of such actions include:
  - Installation, modification, retirement, or removal of Transmission and generation Facilities and any associated equipment.
  - Installation, modification, or removal of Protection Systems or Remedial Action Schemes.
  - Use of Operating Procedures, specifying how long they will be needed as part of the CAP.
  - Use of Demand-Side Management, new technologies, or other initiatives.
- **11.2.** Be developed within one year of completion of the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- **11.3.** Include a timetable, subject to approval for any extension sought under Part 11.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 11.1. The timetable shall:
  - **11.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of development of the CAP; and
  - **11.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of development of the CAP.
- 11.4. Be submitted to the CEA with a request for extension of time if the responsible entity is unable to implement the CAP within the timetable provided in Part 11.3. The submitted CAP shall document the following:
  - **11.4.1.** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 11.1 and how those circumstances are beyond the control of the responsible entity;
  - **11.4.2.** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 11.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures, if applicable; and
  - **11.4.3.** Updated timetable for implementing the selected actions in Part 11.1.
- 11.5. Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later.
  - **11.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the CAP, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.

M11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R8, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it submitted a request for extension to the CEA if the responsible entity is unable to implement the CAP within the timetable provided in Part 11.3. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, and (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R11.

## **GMD Measurement Data Processes**

- **R12.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System model. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M12. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its GIC monitor location(s) and documentation of its process to obtain GIC monitor data in accordance with Requirement R12.
- R13. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area. [Violation Risk Factor: Lower] [Time Horizon: Long-term Planning]
- M13. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have evidence such as electronic or hard copies of its process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area in accordance with Requirement R13.

## C. Compliance

1. Compliance Monitoring Process

#### **1.1. Compliance Enforcement Authority:**

The British Columbia Utilities Commission.

**1.2.** Evidence Retention: The following evidence retention period(s) identify the period of time an entity is required to retain specific evidence to demonstrate compliance. For instances where the evidence retention period specified below is shorter than the time since the last audit, the Compliance Enforcement Authority may ask an entity to provide other evidence to show that it was compliant for the full-time period since the last audit.

The applicable entity shall keep data or evidence to show compliance as identified below unless directed by its Compliance Enforcement Authority to retain specific evidence for a longer period of time as part of an investigation.

- For Requirements R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R9, and R10, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years.
- For Requirements R4 and R8, each responsible entity shall retain documentation of the current GMD Vulnerability Assessment and the preceding GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
- For Requirement R7 and R11, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for five years or until all actions in the Corrective Action Plan are completed, whichever is later.
- For Requirements R12 and R13, each responsible entity shall retain documentation as evidence for three years.

#### Table 1: Steady State Planning GMD Event

#### **Steady State:**

- a. Voltage collapse, Cascading and uncontrolled islanding shall not occur.
- b. Generation loss is acceptable as a consequence of the steady state planning GMD events.
- c. Planned System adjustments such as Transmission configuration changes and re-dispatch of generation are allowed if such adjustments are executable within the time duration applicable to the Facility Ratings.

Category	Initial Condition	Event	Interruption of Firm Transmission Service Allowed	Load Loss Allowed
<b>Benchmark GMD</b> <b>Event –</b> GMD Event with Outages	<ol> <li>System as may be postured in response to space weather information¹, and then</li> <li>GMD event²</li> </ol>	Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event	Yes ³	Yes ³
Supplemental GMD Event - GMD Event with Outages1. System as may be postured in response to space weather information ¹ , and then 2. GMD event ² Reactive Power compensation devices and other Transmission Facilities removed as a result of Protection System operation or Misoperation due to harmonics during the GMD event		Yes	Yes	
	Table	1: Steady State Performance Footnote	es	

- 1. The System condition for GMD planning may include adjustments to posture the System that are executable in response to space weather information.
- 2. The GMD conditions for the benchmark and supplemental planning events are described in Attachment 1.
- 3. Load loss as a result of manual or automatic Load shedding (e.g., UVLS) and/or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service may be used to meet BES performance requirements during studied GMD conditions. The likelihood and magnitude of Load loss or curtailment of Firm Transmission Service should be minimized.

## Violation Severity Levels

R #	Violation Severity Levels			
<b>K</b> #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R1.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The Planning Coordinator, in conjunction with its Transmission Planner(s), failed to determine and identify individual or joint responsibilities of the Planning Coordinator and Transmission Planner(s) in the Planning Coordinator's planning area for maintaining models, performing the study or studies needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, and implementing process(es) to obtain GMD measurement data as specified in this standard.
R2.	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not maintain either System models or GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies	The responsible entity did not maintain both System models and GIC System models of the responsible entity's planning area for performing the studies

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R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
			needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	needed to complete benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.	
R3.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the GMD events described in Attachment 1 as required.	
R4.	The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72	The responsible entity's completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R4, Parts 4.1 through 4.3; OR The responsible entity completed a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 72 calendar months since the last benchmark	

Violation Severity Levels			verity Levels	Levels		
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL		
		last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	last benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment.		
R5.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.		
R6.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to (and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a benchmark thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more than three of its solely owned and jointly owned		

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1.	owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include one of the	jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include two of the	applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a benchmark thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5, Part 5.1, is 75 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R5, Part 5.1; OR The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed	

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Violation			everity Levels		
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	required elements as listed in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	in Requirement R6, Parts 6.1 through 6.3.	
R7.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with one of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with two of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with three of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with four or more of the elements in Requirement R7, Parts 7.1 through 7.5; OR The responsible entity did not develop a Corrective Action Plan as required by Requirement R7.	
R8.	The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more than 60 calendar months and less than or equal to 64 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy one of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.3; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy two of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.3; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	The responsible entity's completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment failed to satisfy three of the elements listed in Requirement R8, Parts 8.1 through 8.3; OR The responsible entity completed a supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment, but it was more	

R #		Violation Se	verity Levels	
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
		than 64 calendar months and less than or equal to 68 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 68 calendar months and less than or equal to 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.	than 72 calendar months since the last supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment; OR The responsible entity does not have a completed supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment.
R9.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 90 calendar days and less than or equal to 100 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 100 calendar days and less than or equal to 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity provided the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), in response to written request, but did so more than 110 calendar days after receipt of a written request.	The responsible entity did not provide the maximum effective GIC value to the Transmission Owner and Generator Owner that owns each applicable BES power transformer in the planning area; OR The responsible entity did not provide the effective GIC time series, GIC(t), upon written request.
R10.	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for 5% or less or one of its	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 5% up to (and	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 10% up to	The responsible entity failed to conduct a supplemental thermal impact assessment for more than 15% or more

Violation Severit			erity Levels		
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
	solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 24 calendar months and less than or equal to 26 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1.	including) 10% or two of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 26 calendar months and less than or equal to 28 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1 OR	(and including) 15% or three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 28 calendar months and less than or equal to 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR	than three of its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers (whichever is greater) where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase; OR The responsible entity conducted a supplemental thermal impact assessment for its solely owned and jointly owned applicable BES power transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R9, Part 9.1, is 85 A or greater per phase but did so more than 30 calendar months of receiving GIC flow information specified in Requirement R9, Part 9.1; OR	

R #	Violation Severity Levels				
R #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL	
		The responsible entity failed to include one of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include two of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	The responsible entity failed to include three of the required elements as listed in Requirement R10, Parts 10.1 through 10.3.	
R11.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with one of the elements in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 through 11.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with two of the elements in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 through 11.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with three of the elements in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 through 11.5.	The responsible entity's Corrective Action Plan failed to comply with four or more of the elements in Requirement R11, Parts 11.1 through 11.5; OR The responsible entity did not develop a Corrective Action Plan as required by Requirement R11.	

D #	Violation Severity Levels			
<b>K</b> #	Lower VSL	Moderate VSL	High VSL	Severe VSL
R12.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain GIC monitor data from at least one GIC monitor located in the Planning Coordinator's planning area or other part of the system included in the Planning Coordinator's GIC System Model.
R13.	N/A	N/A	N/A	The responsible entity did not implement a process to obtain geomagnetic field data for its Planning Coordinator's planning area.

## **D. Regional Variances**

## **D.A. Regional Variance for Canadian Jurisdictions**

This Variance shall be applicable in those Canadian jurisdictions where the Variance has been approved for use by the applicable governmental authority or has otherwise become effective in the jurisdiction.

This variance replaces all references to "Attachment 1" in the standard with "Attachment 1 or Attachment 1-CAN."

In addition, this Variance replaces Requirement R7, Part 7.3 through Part 7.5 and Requirement R11, Part 11.3 through Part 11.5 with the following:

- **D.A.7.3.** Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part D.A.7.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 7.1. The timetable shall:
  - **D.A.7.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required; and
  - **D.A.7.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required.
- **D.A.7.4.** Be revised if the responsible entity is unable to implement the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part D.A.7.3. The revised CAP shall document the following:
  - **D.A.7.4.1** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1 and how those circumstances are beyond the control of the responsible entity;
  - **D.A.7.4.2** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 7.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable; and
  - **D.A.7.4.3** Updated timetable for implementing the selected actions in Part 7.1.
- D.A.7.5. Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later, and (iii) to the Compliance Enforcement Authority or Applicable Governmental Authority when revised under D.A.7.4 within 90 calendar days of revision.
  - **D.A.7.5.1** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the CAP, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.

- D.A.M.7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R4, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R7. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R7, and (iii) to the Compliance Enforcement Authority or Applicable Governmental Authority when revised under D.A.7.4 within 90 calendar days of revision. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R7.
- D.A.11.3. Include a timetable, subject to revision by the responsible entity in Part D.A.11.4, for implementing the selected actions from Part 11.1. The timetable shall:
  - **D.A.11.3.1.** Specify implementation of non-hardware mitigation, if any, within two years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required; and
  - **D.A.11.3.2.** Specify implementation of hardware mitigation, if any, within four years of the later of the development of the CAP or receipt of regulatory approvals, if required.
- **D.A.11.4.** Be revised if the responsible entity is unable to implement the CAP within the timetable for implementation provided in Part D.A.11.3. The revised CAP shall document the following:
  - **D.A.11.4.1** Circumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions in Part 11.1 and how those circumstances are beyond the control of the responsible entity;

- **D.A.11.4.2** Revisions to the selected actions in Part 11.1, if any, including utilization of Operating Procedures if applicable; and
- **D.A.11.4.3** Updated timetable for implementing the selected actions in Part 11.1.
- D.A.11.5. Be provided: (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later, and (iii) to the Compliance Enforcement Authority or Applicable Governmental Authority when revised under D.A.11.4 within 90 calendar days of revision.
  - **D.A.11.5.1.** If a recipient of the CAP provides documented comments on the CAP, the responsible entity shall provide a documented response to that recipient within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments.

**D.A.M.11.** Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, that concludes, through the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment conducted in Requirement R8, that the responsible entity's System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning supplemental GMD event contained in Table 1 shall have evidence such as dated electronic or hard copies of its CAP including timetable for implementing selected actions, as specified in Requirement R11. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has revised its CAP if situations beyond the responsible entity's control prevent implementation of the CAP within the timetable specified. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email records, web postings with an electronic notice of posting, or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has distributed its CAP or relevant information, if any, (i) to the responsible entity's Reliability Coordinator, adjacent Planning Coordinator(s), adjacent Transmission Planner(s), and functional entities referenced in the CAP within 90 calendar days of development or revision, (ii) to any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability-related need within 90 calendar days of receipt of such request or within 90 calendar days of development or revision, whichever is later as specified in Requirement R11, and (iii) to the Compliance Enforcement Authority or Applicable Governmental Authority when revised under D.A.11.4 within 90 calendar days of revision. Each responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall also provide evidence, such as email notices or postal receipts showing recipient and date, that it has provided a documented response to comments received on its CAP within 90 calendar days of receipt of those comments, in accordance with Requirement R11.

## **E. Associated Documents**

Attachment 1 Attachment 1-CAN

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## **Version History**

Version	Date	Action	Change Tracking
1	December 17, 2014	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	New
2	November 9, 2017	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revised to respond to directives in FERC Order No. 830.
2	November 25, 2018	FERC Order issued approving TPL-007-2. Docket No. RM18-8-000	
3	February 7, 2019	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Canadian Variance
4	February 6, 2020	Adopted by the NERC Board of Trustees	Revised to respond to directives in FERC Order. 851
4	March 19, 2020	FERC Order issued approving TPL-007-4. Docket No. RD20-3-000	

## Attachment 1

#### Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events

The benchmark GMD event¹ defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows that are needed to conduct a benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment. It is composed of the following elements: (1) a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment.

The supplemental GMD event is composed of similar elements as described above, except (1) the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude is 12 V/km over a localized area; and (2) the geomagnetic field time series or waveform includes a local enhancement in the waveform.²

The regional geoelectric field peak amplitude used in GMD Vulnerability Assessment,  $E_{peak}$ , can be obtained from the reference geoelectric field value of 8 V/km for the benchmark GMD event (1) or 12 V/km for the supplemental GMD event (2) using the following relationships:

$$E_{peak} = 8 \times \alpha \times \beta_b (V/km) \tag{1}$$

$$E_{peak} = 12 \times \alpha \times \beta_s (V/km)$$
⁽²⁾

where,  $\alpha$  is the scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude, and  $\beta$  is a scaling factor to account for the local earth conductivity structure. Subscripts *b* and *s* for the  $\beta$  scaling factor denote association with the benchmark or supplemental GMD events, respectively.

#### Scaling the Geomagnetic Field

The benchmark and supplemental GMD events are defined for geomagnetic latitude of 60° and must be scaled to account for regional differences based on geomagnetic latitude. Table 2 provides a scaling factor correlating peak geoelectric field to geomagnetic latitude. Alternatively, the scaling factor  $\alpha$  is computed with the empirical expression:

$$\alpha = 0.001 \times e^{(0.115 \times L)}$$
(3)

where, L is the geomagnetic latitude in degrees and  $0.1 \le \alpha \le 1$ .

¹ The Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, May 2016 is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/TPL0071RD/Benchmark clean May12 complete.pdf</u>.

² The extent of local enhancements is on the order of 100 km in North-South (latitude) direction but longer in East-West (longitude) direction. The local enhancement in the geomagnetic field occurs over the time period of 2-5 minutes. Additional information is available in the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, October 2017 white paper on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <a href="http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx">http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</a>.

For large planning areas that cover more than one scaling factor from Table 2, the GMD Vulnerability Assessment should be based on a peak geoelectric field that is:

- calculated by using the most conservative (largest) value for α; or
- calculated assuming a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geomagnetic field.

Table 2: Geomagnetic Field Scaling Factors for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events		
Geomagnetic Latitude (Degrees)	Scaling Factor1 (α)	
≤ 40	0.10	
45	0.2	
50	0.3	
54	0.5	
56	0.6	
57	0.7	
58	0.8	
59	0.9	
≥ 60	1.0	

## Scaling the Geoelectric Field

The benchmark GMD event is defined for the reference Quebec earth model described in Table 4. The peak geoelectric field, E_{peak}, used in a GMD Vulnerability Assessment may be obtained by either:

- Calculating the geoelectric field for the ground conductivity in the planning area and the reference geomagnetic field time series scaled according to geomagnetic latitude, using a procedure such as the plane wave method described in the NERC GMD Task Force GIC Application Guide;³ or
- Using the earth conductivity scaling factor  $\beta$  from Table 3 that correlates to the ground conductivity map in Figure 1 or Figure 2. Along with the scaling factor  $\alpha$  from equation (3) or Table 2,  $\beta$  is applied to the reference geoelectric field using equation (1 or 2, as applicable) to obtain the regional geoelectric field peak amplitude  $E_{peak}$  to be used in GMD Vulnerability Assessments. When a ground conductivity model is not available, the responsible entity should use the largest  $\beta$  factor of adjacent physiographic regions or a technically justified value.

³ Available at the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.

The earth models used to calculate Table 3 for the United States were obtained from publicly available information published on the U. S. Geological Survey website.⁴ The models used to calculate Table 3 for Canada were obtained from Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) and reflect the average structure for large regions. A planner can also use specific earth model(s) with documented justification and the reference geomagnetic field time series to calculate the  $\beta$  factor(s) as follows:

$$\beta_b = E/8$$
 for the benchmark GMD event (4)

$$\beta_s = E/12$$
 for the supplemental GMD (5)

where, *E* is the absolute value of peak geoelectric in V/km obtained from the technically justified earth model and the reference geomagnetic field time series.

For large planning areas that span more than one  $\beta$  scaling factor, the most conservative (largest) value for  $\beta$  may be used in determining the peak geoelectric field to obtain conservative results. Alternatively, a planner could perform analysis using a non-uniform or piecewise uniform geoelectric field.

## Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event

The peak geoelectric field of the supplemental GMD event occurs in a localized area.⁵ Planners have flexibility to determine how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning area in performing GIC calculations. Examples of approaches are:

- Apply the peak geoelectric field (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) over the entire planning area;
- Apply a spatially limited (12 V/km scaled to the planning area) peak geoelectric field (e.g., 100 km in North-South latitude direction and 500 km in East-West longitude direction) over a portion(s) of the system, and apply the benchmark GMD event over the rest of the system; or
- Other methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the supplemental GMD event.

⁴ Available at <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/conductivity/</u>.

⁵ See the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Description white paper located on the Project 2013-03 Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.




Figure 1: Physiographic Regions of the Continental United States⁶



Figure 2: Physiographic Regions of Canada

⁶ Additional map detail is available at the U.S. Geological Survey: <u>http://geomag.usgs.gov/</u>.

Table 3: Geoelectric Field Scaling Factors		
Earth model	Scaling Factor Benchmark Event (β _b )	Scaling Factor Supplemental Event (β _s )
AK1A	0.56	0.51
AK1B	0.56	0.51
AP1	0.33	0.30
AP2	0.82	0.78
BR1	0.22	0.22
CL1	0.76	0.73
CO1	0.27	0.25
CP1	0.81	0.77
CP2	0.95	0.86
FL1	0.76	0.73
CS1	0.41	0.37
IP1	0.94	0.90
IP2	0.28	0.25
IP3	0.93	0.90
IP4	0.41	0.35
NE1	0.81	0.77
PB1	0.62	0.55
PB2	0.46	0.39
PT1	1.17	1.19
SL1	0.53	0.49
SU1	0.93	0.90
BOU	0.28	0.24
FBK	0.56	0.56
PRU	0.21	0.22
BC	0.67	0.62
PRAIRIES	0.96	0.88
SHIELD	1.0	1.0
ATLANTIC	0.79	0.76

Scaling factors in Table 3 are dependent upon the frequency content of the reference storm. Consequently, the benchmark GMD event and the supplemental GMD event may produce different scaling factors for a given earth model.

Table 4: Reference Earth Model (Quebec)		
Layer Thickness (km)	<b>Resistivity (Ω</b> -m)	
15	20,000	
10	200	
125	1,000	
200	100	
∞	3	

# Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Benchmark GMD $\mathsf{Event}^{\scriptscriptstyle 7}$

The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 3) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 8 V/km (see Figures 4 and 5). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.⁸ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate benchmark conductivity scaling factor  $\beta_{b}$ .

⁷ Refer to the Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.

⁸ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the Related Information webpage for TPL-007-1: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/stand/Pages/TPL0071RI.aspx</u>.




Figure 3: Benchmark Geomagnetic Field Waveform Red B_n (Northward), Blue B_e (Eastward)





Figure 4: Benchmark Geoelectric Field Waveform E_E (Eastward)






# Reference Geomagnetic Field Time Series or Waveform for the Supplemental GMD $\mathsf{Event}^9$


The geomagnetic field measurement record of the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event, measured at the NRCan Ottawa geomagnetic observatory, is the basis for the reference geomagnetic field waveform to be used to calculate the GIC time series, GIC(t), required for transformer thermal impact assessment for the supplemental GMD event. The supplemental GMD event waveform differs from the benchmark GMD event waveform in that the supplemental GMD event waveform has a local enhancement.

The geomagnetic latitude of the Ottawa geomagnetic observatory is 55°; therefore, the amplitudes of the geomagnetic field measurement data were scaled up to the 60° reference geomagnetic latitude (see Figure 6) such that the resulting peak geoelectric field amplitude computed using the reference earth model was 12 V/km (see Figure 7). The sampling rate for the geomagnetic field waveform is 10 seconds.¹⁰ To use this geoelectric field time series when a different earth model is applicable, it should be scaled with the appropriate supplemental conductivity scaling factor  $\beta_s$ .

⁹ Refer to the Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description white paper for details on the determination of the reference geomagnetic field waveform: <u>http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/Project-2013-03-Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Mitigation.aspx</u>.

¹⁰ The data file of the benchmark geomagnetic field waveform is available on the NERC GMD Task Force project webpage: <u>http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Pages/Geomagnetic-Disturbance-Task-Force-(GMDTF)-2013.aspx</u>.








Figure 7: Supplemental Geoelectric Field Waveform Blue  $E_N$  (Northward), Red  $E_E$  (Eastward)

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## Attachment 1-CAN

Attachment 1-CAN provides an alternative that a Canadian entity may use in lieu of the benchmark or supplemental GMD event(s) defined in Attachment 1 for performing GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

A Canadian entity may use the provisions of Attachment 1-CAN if it has regionally specific information that provides a technically justified means to re-define a 1-in-100 year GMD planning event(s) within its planning area.

#### Information for the Alternative Methodology

GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s) require the use of geophysical and engineering models. Canadian-specific data is available and growing. Ongoing research allows for more accurate characterization of regional parameters used in these models. Such Canadian-specific data includes geomagnetic field, earth conductivity, and geomagnetically induced current measurements that can be used for modeling and simulation validation.

Information used to calculate geoelectric fields for the benchmark and supplemental GMD events shall be clearly documented and technically justified. For example, the factors involved in the calculation of geoelectric fields are geomagnetic field variations and an earth transfer function(s).¹ Technically justified information used in modelling geomagnetic field variations may include: technical documents produced by governmental entities such as Natural Resources Canada; technical papers published in peer-reviewed journals; and data sets gathered using sound scientific principles. An earth transfer function may rely on magnetotelluric measurements or earth conductivity models.

Modeling assumptions shall also be clearly documented and technically justified. An entity may use sensitivity analysis to identify how the assumptions affect the results.

A simplified model may be used to perform a GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), as long as the model is more conservative than a more detailed model.

When interpreting assessment results, the entity shall consider the maturity of the modeling, toolset, and techniques applied.

## Geomagnetic Disturbance Planning Events

The 1-in-100 year planning event shall be based on regionally specific data and technically justifiable statistical analyses (e.g., extreme value theory) and applied to the benchmark and supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s).

For the benchmark GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an entity shall consider the large-scale spatial structure of the GMD event. For the supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessment(s), an

¹ The "earth transfer function" is the relationship between the electric fields and magnetic field variations at the surface of the earth.

entity shall consider the small-scale spatial structure of the GMD event (e.g., using magnetometer measurements or realistic electrojet calculations).

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